In a Russian publication entitled “Russia and the USSR in the 20th Century Wars. The losses of the Armed Forces’ published in 2001 are detailed statistics. The analysis of these data, peculiarly concerning the post-war period of the USSR, i.e. the years 1946-1991, yields very interesting results. It turns out that but for the war in Afghanistan, which began in 1979, these losses can be considered to be very low and the sum of killed soldiers in all the operations conducted by the USSR, given the time since the civilian War in China from 1946 to 1950, through the War in Korea and the interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as the participation of russian specialists and advisers in another conflicts, closes with the number, as I counted, 2402 killed, besides called non-return losses.
The war in Afghanistan brought losses to the USSR of 15051 killed (total military and KGB losses), which gives a full of 17,453 killed for the full period since 1946, or for 45 years. This figure seems very small, especially erstwhile compared to the losses of another countries, including the western ones. Losses of the US for the same period are 95,944 killed, while losses of France, in wars in Indochina and Algeria, are 46,285 French. It is believed to be actual that the USSR pursued a very aggressive policy, but implemented it utilizing others: Koreans, Vietnamese, Cubans, Syrians, Egyptians, as its deputies in the wars against the West. erstwhile the USSR went to war alone, to Afghanistan in 1979, and this caused major problems that contributed to others that together resulted in the collapse of the USSR.
Since Russia began to regulation Putin, i.e. since 2000, the anticipation of utilizing others for her wars has decreased importantly and Russia has implemented almost all of them, including the current war in Ukraine, utilizing only its own soldiers. The consequence of this was that the losses of the Russian army increased massively. Already the Second War in Chechnya brought, according to various estimates, between 6,000 and 14,000 Russian soldiers killed. But yet this war proved victorious, so the number of losses does not play specified a large role. Definitely worse with the current war in Ukraine. The so-far non-returned Russian losses are much larger and range, according to various estimates, from 200 000 to even more than 300 000 Russian soldiers killed, and this excluding losses of separatist formations of DNR and LNR republics.
It can be assumed that in all Putin wars, taking into account the Second Chechen War, the Georgia War, the conflict in Ukraine in 2014-2022, and the current war in Ukraine, at least 300 000 Russian soldiers or volunteers and private companies specified as Wagner Group died in total. This means that during the 25 years of Putin's rule, 17 times more Russian soldiers were killed than in the last 45 years of the USSR. This is simply a large difference, which becomes even greater erstwhile we consider that the present Russia has almost twice as much population as the USSR at the time of the dissolution.
The awareness of suffering large losses exists in Russia and is suppressed by the current repressive law. If there was a truce, the question would arise as to whether specified a devastating war was worth pursuing. This could lead to the collapse of the government and the end of Putinism. Many say that Putin's support is very strong in Russia, but it does not take into account the fact that it was equally strong 2 years ago, but that no many citizens were present to defend power during the Primozhina rebellion that was pushing for Moscow. It was indifferent to them, and in many places, as in Rostov over Don, many expressed sympathy for the rebels.
That's why Putin needs a triumph that could justify large losses. Putin is in a situation of losing a player in a casino that continues to play hope to play back and does not take into account uncomfortable facts. And present they are specified that Ukraine cannot be defeated and the advancement of Russian troops has decreased greatly. In addition, Ukrainian long-range drones destroy, in turn, Russian oil refineries, leading to the situation that Russia lacks fuel.
This demolition of refineries in Russia and another attacks on infrastructure are sufficiently uncomfortable for the Russian authorities to be the reason for the current provocations associated with sending drones to Poland, or the emergence of Russian aircraft in Estonia's airspace. Putin may want to distract from the deficiency of petrol in the marketplace and the war in Ukraine goes wrong.
In addition, the current year is the first in Russia erstwhile a large budget deficit has emerged, which can, by the end of the year, scope up to 10 trillion rubles, i.e., according to the current course, around $120 billion. As it has been said so far that sanctions do not harm the Russian economy, it is now no longer a communicative that could be sustained further.In the Russian economy it is bad, and the Chinese partner is not willing to financially engage in support.
The situation is so that Putin does not win the war in Ukraine, but at the same time he cannot, without a serious hazard of losing power, admit this fact and agree to a truce and peace that he could not present as his victory.
Stanisław Lewicki
