On 25 September Poland opened the border with Belarus. In announcing this decision, Donald Tusk justified it by the fact that Belarus-Russian military exercises "Zapad-2025" had ended.
This relation seems questionable – the “Zapad” exercises ended in Belarus on 16 September. Besides, the government itself admitted that military exercises are not the issue here. On 17 September, he announced that the border would proceed to be closed, with the Ministry of the Interior's message indicating that the closure was unlimited and would not be expected to be shortly opened, until “when the border is full safe erstwhile the information provided by the services is confirmed”, as the spokesperson for the Ministry of the Interior stated.
In addition, it is crucial to note that, regardless of the large scope of information from authoritative parties involved, but besides from unofficial estimates, many less soldiers took part in fresh exercises in Belarus than in the erstwhile edition of the "Fall". They besides did not cover the areas close the Polish border, as was sometimes the case before, but were held in the central and east parts of the country. The maneuvers were varied in nature, included a marine component, but emphasis was placed on commanding drone operations, as well as simulating the attack with atomic weapons. The second is an implementation of a fresh atomic strategy, approved by Vladimir Putin last November, which assumed to include Belarus with a Russian atomic umbrella, that is to say, the usage of specified weapons of mass demolition in the case of a "critical" threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the Republic of Belarus, even resulting only from the usage of conventional forces by the enemy. The possible threat to the ‘Zapad’ exercises did not, therefore, primarily have the character of a conventional physical direct threat to the border line. Nor has the increased force of illegal migration to our territory been reported during these manoeuvres.
So what was the intent of closing the border?
I think three. In the first place, the Polish authorities intended to "punished" Russia for violating our airspace by respective drones, which occurred on September 10, as well as Belarus, from which territory these drones, according to authoritative information, flew. Second: manifesting hardness, the determination of state leadership to face neighbors.
Thirdly, the usage of the Chinese left to both, as the blockade of the Polish-Belarusian border harms the flow of Chinese goods to Europe.
So did we punish Russia and Belarus? I think that this was only proportionate for the latter, for which the benefits of a transit function involving, in addition to the flow of goods, Chinese investments and the transfer of technology to Belarus play an crucial function for its economy and public finances.
But in this way we besides punished ourselves. Of course, on a national scale, much less. It is impossible to say this about Polish transport companies whose vehicles and drivers were trapped in the territory of Belarus. With the merchandise. This clearly revealed either the amateur nature of the management of our state and its structures incapable to coordinate various state agendas in specified a way as to reduce the failure or even danger to citizens, or simply to ignore specified a threat to a large group of entrepreneurs, their employees, cooperators and customers. This is how the current authorities want to inspire assurance and willingness to support government policy in the field of safety and defence?
In the background we have an global context, Poland has unilaterally escalated tensions in a situation that has been going on for months, but just in September, a step further to the American-Belarusian warming.
It is besides worth remembering that Belarus informed us about the intrusion of drones. Was it a political maneuver by Alexander Lukashenko, trying to gain any space for political maneuvering? I do not have access to specified knowledge, but I know that Poland has chosen to unilaterally escalate confrontations in a way that no of its partners, including anti-Russian and anti-Belarusian, were prepared for, like Poland Lithuania and Latvia. Not much, as Lithuania's Deputy Minister of Defence, Karolis Alexa, said on September 17, "there is simply a hotline [between Vilnius and Minsk] and we usage this channel if necessary". Finally, the context is the interests of China and their policies, and thirdly. The blockade of the border, and thus the main railway thread ‘Pasa and Trail’, actually triggered their reaction.
On 15 September, Minister of abroad Affairs and Head of the Committee on abroad Affairs of the Central Committee of the Communist organization of China Wang Yi arrived in Poland. He met with abroad Minister Radosław Sikorski and then with president Karol Nawrocki. Following the gathering with Sikorski, no joint message was issued or a joint press conference was held. On the another hand, the parties issued their separate statements. This signals the deficiency of serious convergence of positions on key issues among which, as the government has communicated, were the actions of Russia and Belarus towards Poland and the question of the closure of the Belarusian-Polish border.
According to unofficial media information, Sikorski was to prepare a position to China that “supporting Russia has its priceIt’s okay. ” On 22 September, a typical of the PRC arrived in Minsk. Lukashenko met a associate of the Standing Committee of the Political Office of the KC Communist organization of China Li Xi. He is simply a associate of the strictest, top 7 ruling group in China. He is simply a politician of higher rank than the 1 who visited Warsaw. 3 days later Poland opened the border. Politicians, many commentators rejected the success of the manifestation of force. What is this success? Have we fundamentally changed the behaviour of Belarus or Russia? What did we get from them? There is no reliable public information. possibly something has been obtained that is not yet revealed to us. The problem is that since 1 of the main objectives – as the rulers themselves acknowledged – was strategical communication, success should besides be publically communicated.
The course of events leads me to conclude that there is no success. In fact, it was not Belarus or Russia that bowed under pressure, but Poland – under force from China, possibly besides under the influence of the West, which, if not pressed, surely did not support. We were alone, escalating a confrontation that no 1 else wanted but us. And although we have demonstrated strength for 13 days, the consequence of this demonstration is as symbolic as empty. Poland played a party, the final of which was decided not in Warsaw, but in Minsk and Beijing.
Krystian Kamiński
The author is simply a associate of the National Movement, a associate of the Sejm of the 9th term
photo of wikipedia
For: ‘X’
