Interference on the front. How the limitations of Starlink and Telegram will affect the Russian army

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Communication is 1 of the most crucial tools for effective military action.

Russian troops in Ukraine suffered 2 technological blows: blocking Starlink terminals and limiting access to Telegram. However, despite major tactical difficulties, the full Russian military communications strategy was not disrupted.

In early February, the Ukrainian and SpaceX authorities agreed to limit Russian Army unauthorized access to Starlink satellite communications. The company began to disable terminals operating in the country without registration via the Ukrainian military situational designation strategy DELTA or the civilian portal "Dija". Terminals were besides deactivated if they were moving at speeds above 90 km/h, preventing Starlink from being utilized in assault drones.

These actions rapidly led to mass reports by Russian military bloggers and propaganda about communications disruptions. They claimed that ‘all Starlinks on the front were deactivated’ and ‘communication was lost in all units of the Russian armed forces’.

At the same time, the Russian army faced another problem. On 10 February, Roskomover announced a "restricting" access to the Telegram in Russia as a punishment for "non-compliance with Russian law" by the communicator. Authorities ignored the fact that Telegram is besides an crucial channel of communication for the Russian army.

Officially, the Kremlin claims that neither Starlink nor Telegram are utilized by the Russian military. However, pro-war bloggers have already called it "a shot in the foot".

Starlink

Starlink plays an crucial function in the communication and command and control systems of both Russia and Ukraine, but the fundamental difference is the legality of its use. Following the start of the Russian invasion in February 2022, Kiev entered into an agreement with Elon Musk on satellite access and authoritative transportation of Starlink terminals.

This enabled the Ukrainian Armed Forces to build a comprehensive communications strategy based on hundreds of thousands of devices, a crucial number of which were purchased and handed over to the military by volunteers. On the front, Starlink terminals supply drone control, intelligence gathering and reliable communication in areas without safe networks.

Starlink was never officially sold or certified in Russia. The Kremlin declared that terminals are not delivered and cannot be utilized in this country. However, in the early 2024 reports were made that Russian military personnel in occupied territories purchased these devices: they were unofficially imported from 3rd countries and registered to fictional persons.

Consequently, the Russian army could get around 500,000 terminals. They are utilized to access the net along the contact line and to transmit images from drones.

After reports of Russian forces utilizing Starlink, Kiev and SpaceX, they discussed how to disable terminals in Moscow-controlled territories. The then Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, Mikhail Fiodorov, warned, however, that specified a decision would have been “catastrophic” for the Ukrainian Army itself, as the Ukrainian Armed Forces besides had many unofficially activated equipment provided by volunteers.

The situation intensified in late 2025 erstwhile Russia began equipping assault drones capable of attacking targets 20-80 km behind Ukraine's positions in Starlink antennas. Fyodorov, who then became Minister of Defence, announced the creation of a "white list" of terminals in use, and SpaceX blocked all devices not found on that list in Ukraine.

Russian soldiers have already begun searching for ways around this blockade. They effort to activate smuggled terminals through Ukrainian citizens. The telegram featured bots offering "remote activation of fresh and utilized terminals" linked to Ukrainian accounts. The founder of Conflict Intelligence Team, Ruslan Lewiew, besides admits that Russian military may effort to reprogram terminals by replacing their serial numbers.

Telegram

The telegram, like Starlink, is formally not the authoritative means of communication of the Russian military, but in fact performs many crucial functions for it. Many units have their own chats to transmit coordinates, meetings between command and frontline, upload photos and drone videos, and coordinate the work of mobile anti-aircraft defence groups.

According to the pro-war blogger “Belarusian Silivik”, The telegram serves to centralize public transport, as well as to conduct closed regional and interministerial chats for commanders and anti-aircraft defence crews, where soldiers immediately study drone flights and attacks.

The Russian Army besides communicates with the outside planet through a communicator. Videos from front lines, soldiers' comments, and movie materials from combat activities and the aftermath of shelling are frequently published in Telegram channels faster than they appear in authoritative reports. The military or their close sources shall transmit the material to the administrators of the main channels, who shall set a agenda and supply a ‘appropriate’ explanation of the events.

Volunteers' communities besides usage Telegram to coordinate activities and rise funds for equipment and supplies.

Overall, the Telegram serves as a media platform in this war, a logistical tool and a mechanics for mobilising resources, uniting the front, information space and civilian participants. The ability to make anonymous channels, rapidly disseminate content and scope a wide scope of audiences without complex moderation and censorship filters made Telegram irreplaceable in specified tasks.

At the same time, Telegram is besides widely utilized among civilians in Russia – it is the second most popular communicator in the country, with about 105 million users per month. The Kremlin has long encountered increasing complaints about the service administration. He was formally accused of disseminating prohibited information and insufficient fight against fraud, but in practice the authorities, as with WhatsApp, are simply dissatisfied with the existence of an unregulated communication channel.

That is why Russia launched the national MAX communicator last year, after which Roskomover began to consistently restrict the operation of its abroad competitors – first WhatsAppa and then Telegram – clearly ignoring its importance to the military.

Now the military lobby is trying to lift the limitations of the Telegram, which has sparked public debates different for Russian public life. For example, Sergei Mironov, the leader of the prosystemic Justice Russia party, powerfully criticized the blockade, claiming that it was the only way the military could communicate with their loved ones. The politician of the Bielgorod region of Wiaczesław Gładkow warned that the slowdown of the Telegram may impede the dissemination of operational information in the border region.

Finally, Sergei Bojarski, president of the State Duma IT Commission, stated that the Telegram is in contact with Roskomover and must "take a number of steps" to resolve the dispute. The abolition of restrictions under military force would be an crucial precedent – the first abolition of the blockade of the main website since the beginning of the war. Why foreign?

Active usage by the Russian army of abroad Starlinks and Telegrams is mostly a essential means. Both services filled a niche that should theoretically be filled by its own military communications infrastructure, but at the beginning of the war there was no full functional solution.

Russia has been working for decades to make the Unified Sozvezdie-M2 Tactical Steering strategy (UTCS) – a network-centric platform for the army. Its nonsubjective is to combine command, reconnaissance, artillery, aviation and commanders into a safe digital network with real-time intelligence transmission and mark setting. This task is frequently compared to the American Future Combat Systems program, which was cancelled in 2009 due to unsatisfactory results and advanced costs.

UTCS has not been formally shut down in Russia, but despite years of development, investigating and contracts worth hundreds of billion rubles, the strategy is inactive not full operational. The media repeatedly reported the problems of the strategy developer, Sozvezdie, with the implementation of state defence contracts, as well as method difficulties during the improvement and delays of electronic equipment supplies.

Due to the deficiency of full developed, specialized information exchange channels, the Russian military began actively utilizing civilian communicators specified as WhatsApp and Telegram, at the beginning of the war. WhatsApp was later abandoned due to the fact that it belonged to Meta, a company considered "ectremistic" in Russia, and its usage was considered dangerous. However, the telegram remained.

Similar reasons led to the usage of Starlink's Russian military. Russia lacks a comprehensive, widely available satellite communications network that could be widely utilized on front lines. Formally there is simply a Goniec satellite communication system, developed since the 1990s, but its data transmission velocity (2.4–9.6 kb/s) allows only short text messages. The Gazprom Space Systems network differs from the low-orbital Starlink network by utilizing geostationary satellites, resulting in a advanced signal hold (up to 700 ms).

In 2018, Roskosmos announced plans to make the Russian equivalent of Starlink, the global satellite strategy "Efir", with an first investment of around 299 billion rubles and implementation by 2025. However, a fewer years later, the task disappeared from the Digital Economy programme under which it was financed.

Later, the government presented an even more ambitious satellite task "The Sphere". However, in 2024 Roskosmos complained about the deficiency of budget for its implementation.

Indeed, there is presently no alternate to Starlink, not only in Russia, but worldwide. All global satellite communications systems, specified as the global Oneweb task or Chinese competitor Guowang, are not yet comparable to Starlink in terms of coverage, bandwidth, signal delays or data transmission rates.

Nevertheless, it is besides early to talk about the breakdown of the Russian communications system. According to military experts, neither Starlink nor Telegram form the foundation of the full command and control strategy of Russian troops, although they play an crucial role. The Russian Army is inactive based on conventional communications channels – UKF and KF radio networks, military radio stations and specialized data transmission systems. Fixed channels, including fibre optics, are besides utilized in the rear.

Consequently, the limitations on access to Starlink and the slowdown of Telegram make crucial tactical difficulties for Russian units – especially in terms of data exchange speed, mobile group coordination and drone image transmission. However, this does not mean a complete breakdown of the command and control system. The problem is to reduce the usefulness and efficiency of individual communication channels, alternatively than paralyze the full military infrastructure.

Written by Maria Kołomyczenko

Note: The Russian Federation added Carnegie Endowment for global Peace to its list of "unwanted organizations". If you are in Russia, delight do not make this article publically available.

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