In Russia on 4 November it is celebrated as the Day of National Unity, the anniversary of the banishment of the Polish crew from the Kremlin in 1612. In our country, this vacation is considered “anti-Polish”, which is simply a simplification.
However, in Russia as well as in Poland there is seldom talk about the most crucial issue – in these years a large Polish-Moscow union could be realized, which would make the most powerful state of Europe and possibly the world. In Poland, the conflict of Kłuszyn (1610) and the entry of the Polish crew to the Kremlin are treated as a large triumph over Moscow and a reason for malicious satisfaction – we conquered Moscow?
Only that at the time there were 2 concepts of Polish politics towards Moscow – hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski and King Zygmunt III. The first established a large deal about the Polish-Moscow union, which would be guaranteed by Russian militants with Prince Vasil Golicin (the 1 that led to the dethronement of Tsar Vasil Shujski). The Union was to be modelled on the Polish-Lithuanian union, and the liaison was to be the Prince Władysław (later Polish king Władysław IV), who was to sit on the Tsar's throne. The militants did not want to rent a car, he liked the Polish systemic solution, they only wanted guarantees for Orthodoxy, which hetman Żółkiewski, a large extra and visionary, gladly gave. The hetman biographer, Jerzy Besala, writes:
“On August 20th, 1610, 2 giant, beautifully decorated tents were placed between the Polish camp and Moscow in the mediate of the road. The first were to kneel to the militants—they were to arrive from Moscow as many as 10 thousand—and by the kiss “in the end” they took an oath “to the subjection of the prince Vlaslaw“. Then he did it by putting his hand on Ewan-gelii, Further his colonels, rotmistra and others crucial in the army of the Polish persona. Russia had a wave of assurances of faithfulness to the fresh Tsar.
The fresh arrangement was based on the Smolensk Agreement, dated February 1610, and contained most of Moscow's conditions. It declares the relationship and unity of both countries, directed against external enemies, a common defence against the harsh Crescent. The Polish army was to be paid from the Moscow box, but all the castles occupied by Poles were to return to Russia. Hetman committed to smash up Shallibra's army [Dymitr Self-Sustainer II] and capture him; he did not have the right to enter the Tsar capital without the approval of the Boy Scouts, as did John Peter Sapieha. The issue of the Prince's transition to Orthodoxy and another spiritual matters was postponed until the direct gathering of the Pride of the Fears with the King of Poland.’
The plan was great, but he besides had many enemies. He was opposed by King Sigismund III himself, who simply wanted to “get” Moscow, to impose on her a Tsar (as the same prince Władysław) and force him to turn to Catholicism. alternatively of a union, there was expected to be a dictatorship. While Żółkiewski opposed the entry of the Polish crew to the Kremlin due to the fact that he knew what it would end, Zygmunt III led to this. The behaviour of Poles in the Kremlin and in Moscow tipped the scales to the disadvantage of the boyars camp with the Duke of Golicin, but in favour of the unconvinced enemies of union with Poland. The spiritual factor, which hetman Żółkiewski wanted to completely neutralize, advanced to the set first. The stay of Poles in the Kremlin, marked by many excesses, ended in a terrible defeat, the plan not only for Żółkiewski but besides for King Sigismund III fell. She besides lost Poland as such, due to the fact that alternatively of making a large geopolitical and civilizational breakthrough – she bred a deadly enemy in the East.
As I mentioned, not only in Poland, but besides in Russia, there is small talk about this aspect of the reality of the time. Although there is 1 exception – B. Minister of Culture of Russia Vladimir Medyński speaks about it in his programs, claiming that if the plan of Żółkiewski and Golicin had been successful, there would have been a large political structure that would have permanently bound Russia with the West, and the boundaries of this creation would have reached the Pacific Ocean. Medynski does not find whether it would be good or bad for Russia, but it would surely be different. By the way, he considers Hetman Żółkiewski a prominent politician, although possibly from the point of knowing Russian reasoning about his past – as a dangerous policy. Why? due to the fact that he could direct Russia's past on a completely different track, depriving it of what she experienced in later centuries.
What about Poland? With us, this anniversary is almost exclusively an chance for simple triumphism, treatment of complexes and giving an outlet to utmost rusophobia. Practically nobody knows or accepts what I wrote before.
Jan Engelgard
Illustration: Ernst Lissner's 1938 painting "Polish Kremlin crew capitulates in front of the Prince of Fire in 1612".
