Between hope and fear. Poland to Trump's upcoming presidency

krytykapolityczna.pl 5 months ago

Second word of office approaching Donald Trump polarizes Polish public opinion. The sympathetic part with the right and the utmost right looks at his return to the White home with optimism. Among the sympathizers of the ruling coalition – extending from the centre-right PSL to the left – the possible of a Republican returning to power raises uncertainty at best, at worst fear. In turn, the Tusk government itself strives to approach this with pragmatism and cautious hope that despite all the differences it will be possible to build a correct relation with the fresh administration.

Will Trump cut off Ukraine's help?

The United States has been the main “safety provider” for Poland since the late 1990s – and this context will be crucial in Warsaw's relations with Trump.

Poland, as a country of the east flank of NATO, in addition to bordering Ukraine, is keen to guarantee that the ongoing war does not end in a way that could endanger our region. From the position of Warsaw, the implementation of the Ukrainian plan would be most advantageous: regaining control of all territories under global law, as part of it, as confirmed by the peace treaty, imposing on Russia a reparations for the creation of war. Ukraine's eventual triumph would be its accession to NATO and the European Union.

The implementation of this plan would be highly improbable even if the U.S. elections were won by Kamala Harris, and Trump's triumph makes it virtually unrealistic. It is so crucial that the war should end on conditions which are as favourable to Ukraine as possible, with minimum territorial concessions for Russia and, most importantly, with an open road to NATO.

The black script assumes a abrupt cut-off of Ukraine from US military aid or forcing the adoption of an adverse agreement with Russia. Trump seems to want to announce an instant success in this case, understood as ending the fight – he is willing to push Kiev to sit down and accept the aggressor's offer.

Zelenski, on the another hand, cannot agree to an agreement that the Ukrainians would read as surrender. Thus, it may be possible that Ukraine will decide to proceed the fight despite the possible simplification of American aid. The burden of supporting it would then fall on EU countries which, for logistical reasons, are incapable to replace the US as the main supplier of military equipment. Further engagement in this increasingly tiring European society can besides prove besides politically costly for the governments behind it.

At the same time, Russian experts are increasingly saying that present Putin can refuse any negotiations. He is convinced that he is winning militarily with Ukraine and that utilizing the skepticism of Republicans to proceed helping Kiev, it is worth continuing the war, due to the fact that Russia on the battlefield can supply itself with a stronger negotiating position than it presently has.

In this situation, Trump may consider Putin to have him as a weak, reckless leader, and to respond with Ukraine's even more military assistance than Biden. "If Russia does not want to negotiate, we will defend Ukraine so that the Russians will regret it" – this script was explicitly presented by retired general Keith Kellogg, who in the Trump administration will take the position of peculiar envoy for Ukraine. His nomination is simply a moderately optimistic signal about the policy direction of the future president towards Kiev. Kellogg is surely not pro-Ukrainian, but it is not pro-Russian, which in the case of future administration is an crucial advantage.

Focused in the Law, the main trend of the Polish right seems to presume that Trump, thanks to its unpredictability, hardness and strength of character, will prove to be a more hard opponent for Putin and a better option for Ukraine than Kamala Harris. In turn, the utmost right oriented towards the Confederate is either an anti-Ukrainian opening, or shows a far-reaching skepticism about the continuation of Ukraine's assistance and its continued war. So he's hoping Trump will force both sides to finish the fight as shortly as possible.

Find yourself in Trump NATO

Sooner or later there will be Russian-Ukrainian negotiations and ceasefires. Then there will be a fresh problem, especially crucial for Poland as a neighbour of Ukraine: how to warrant the integrity of the negotiated truce lines, so that the Russian troops do not exceed it in a year or two?

From the point of view of Ukraine, strong NATO guarantees or alliance states would be needed. Poland would like American guarantees – what about Trump in the White home seems unattainable. During a fresh visit to Warsaw, French president Emmanuel Macron was expected to talk to the Polish government about the anticipation of deploying Polish and French soldiers in Ukraine to defender borders.

The Polish government will avoid akin commitments. Polish public opinion could only accept the presence of our troops in Ukraine if they were included as part of NATO or UN forces. Among those with liberal views, Trump's second word besides raises concerns about NATO's future and how serious the U.S. president will take commitments to allied members. In a fresh NBC Trump tv interview, he reiterated that if NATO allies do not treat America well, he is even willing to leave the organization.

Polish political elites, including those on the government side, treat akin statements alternatively as Trump's tough negotiating game to force more commitment to transatlantic safety and its costs on Western European countries.

Donald Tusk's government would like to encourage European states to do the same. Maintaining a advanced level of defence spending, it sets itself up as Trump's "model ally". At the same time, the Republican presidency can reopen the subject of Europe's request to take greater work for its safety – not only in the form of defence spending, but besides in the form of enhanced military cooperation between the EU countries.

In turn, PiS sees Trump as a "personal safety guarantor of Poland". Any effort at European defence cooperation built in parallel with the Atlantic structures can be challenged by the written opposition as a "trying to push the US out of Europe" and the implementation of "German interests".

Trump gets us into a trade war?

Trump's second word of office will begin little than 3 weeks after Poland took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. In addition to the situation in Ukraine and its safety dilemmas, 1 of its key problems may be trade relations between the Union and the States.

Trump announces that imports into the US are subject to duties ranging from 10 to 20 percent. Today, customs duties on EU goods are on average 3.5%.

Direct exports from Poland to the US are comparatively tiny – as read "Rzeczpospolita", last year we sold goods worth little than $12 billion to Americans. This is only 3.14% of our abroad sales in 2023. Trump's duties would hit German exports, however, and many Polish companies work as subcontractors of German entities. Last year, the US was the Union's most crucial partner and the regulation of trade by customs could push the full European economy into recession – especially if the trade policy of the fresh administration had sparked a global trade-customs war with China.

Good relations between Poland and the States in the area of safety request not translate into a strong position of Warsaw in trade negotiations. Although relations with Trump will develop, the request to mitigate the various divisive crisis partners on 2 sides of the Atlantic may dominate the Polish Presidency in the EU.

Trump will give the Law and Justice power?

Trump's second word will besides be crucial for Poland due to the dynamics of our interior political life. The Republican's fresh triumph breathed fresh energy into the demoralized subsequent PiS defeats. Today, the organization revives the hope that the change of power in the US is the announcement of another populist-right wave that will lift the Law and Justice—to begin in the presidential election that will most likely take place in May 2025.

On the right, there are already fantasies about Trump's spring visit to Poland, during which he would meet not only president Duda, with whom he is said to have good relations, but besides with the candidate of the Law and Justice for the highest office in the country, Karol Nawrock. But if Trump leaves Ukraine alone or forces Kiev to accept unfavourable conditions of ceasefire, seen in Poland as a long-term threat to our security, then sticking with the American president could harm the Law and Justice.

The largest opposition organization besides hopes to support Trump and his administration in their media games. The Polish media late announced the possible acquisition of TVN – 1 of the 2 largest private televisions in the country, present owned by Warner Bros. Discovery – via a Hungarian investment fund affiliated with Orbán. The change of owner would translate into a change in the station's political orientation: from a centred, close-voted middle-class Tusk to a right-wing, sympathetic to the PiS.

In response, Tusk issued a regulation listing the 2 largest televisions, including TVN, on the list of strategical companies whose sales require government approval. As reported in “Newsweek” Jacek Gądek, PiS hopes that the fresh authorities in Washington will push Tusk to enable Warner Bros. Discovery selling TVN to whoever pays the most – regardless of his political sympathy and affiliation.

The question is whether Trump's surroundings will want to engage their time and contacts in marginal terms from the point of view of his administration, or whether he will effort to establish good relations with the current Polish government, despite the right-wing opposition of expressions of love for Trump and Trumpism.

Trump's first word was marked by chaos, continuous staff and program changes. Now he is expected to be better prepared to take power, due to the fact that task 2050 – an ideologically coherent squad and cognition of how the state operates and where he can defy it. Yet in the next 2025 forecasts, the word “unpredictability” comes back erstwhile again. The Polish political scene – this government and this opposition scene – will shortly see the effects of this unpredictability and will gotta learn to navigate in its waters.

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