W.P. Chichel: An effort to analyse the causes of the September Disaster

The Second Republic after the Versailles Treaty, uprisings, plebiscites, conferences and the Polish-Bolshevik War was adjacent to the Second German Reich in the West and the russian Union in the East. There were many politicians or publicists who considered specified a vicinity a large danger to the independency of the state. A prominent Polish diplomat, specialist in russian politics, Stanisław Patek, emphasized that despite various frictions these countries will cooperate with each other¹ And unfortunately, he was absolutely right. Furthermore, the alliance of both countries will search to erase Poland from the maps of Europe.

However, in 1920 there was an chance to halt the improvement of the communist revolution and defeat the Red Army. “Who saved russian power from destruction?”². This rhetorical question was asked by Gen. Anton Denikin to Józef Piłsudski in October 1919, erstwhile he was defeated by Bolsheviks. He felt that the deficiency of offensive at the turn of the summertime and autumn from Poland prevented the Red Russia from falling, which he unfortunately felt was little evil. The "white" general threatened that past would take revenge on our country and unfortunately he was right. We chose to be a neighbour of the communist state and we had to play diplomatic ground with it. On March 18, 1921, in Riga, we sign peace, and in 1932 the non-aggression pact and everything seems to be well-standardized relations. And what is the truth: as early as 1922 in Rapallo, they made a deal with Germany. So let's decision to our western neighbors. In 1925, we have a customs war with the Republic of Weirmar. The same year in Locarno, Germany gets along with the French on the inviolability of their common border. There is no specified warrant about the border with Poland, which showed hidden intentions of the Reich. Despite this, after Adolf Hitler took over, we signed a pact not to apply force to each other. Even the 3rd Reich will effort to encourage the Second Republic to join the anti-commiter pact and attack the USSR for any time. Poland, however, has since 1932 followed the alleged fresh course policy, i.e. balance between Germany and the Russians. This deficiency of determination will lead in 1939 to the fact that these 2 nations will agree behind our backs and do the alleged 4th partition of Poland. But I'll compose about it later. Leaving our neighbours for a moment, let us consider relations with our future “sociants” – France and the UK. In 1921 the Republic of Poland signed a covenant agreement with the French Republic. Better in 33’ Piłsudski offers the French a preventive war over the Nazi government in Germany. However, with Britain outside of the military agreement of 6 April 39’, we do not enter into any agreements in the memorable 25 August 1939 erstwhile we sign a deal with the British and together with France we form an anti-German coalition. Everything on the side looks great, but how was it really? The English had a large deal of interest in establishing an alliance with us due to the fact that in 1933 they had no land troops or aviation, and they wanted to do anything to distance German aggression to the east of Europe and give themselves more time to prepare for the predicted war.³. However, it was possible to get financial assistance from the UK, although subject to a change of government⁴which was impossible due to the fact that the recovery of erstwhile gained power was not intended to always return. The French and British press conducted propaganda that Poland with a strong army was ready for war. The most interesting thing is that the French and most likely British knew about the attack of the 3rd Reich and the russian Union on Poland, but they did not agree to inform our authorities about it, and all preparations for the war were hampered not to upset Adolf Hitler. Although the war with Germany has already been doomed since spring, since the seizure of Klaipeda⁵. And everything was sealed on August 23, 1939 in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, which divided II of Poland into 2 parts and merged Polish neighbours with an alliance. Chancellor III of the Reich predicted no aid from the Allies and already on 22 August at Berghof he presented his plans to the highest commanders⁶. On the another hand, the USSR chose a course for cooperation with Germany on 21 April 1939, as only in specified a case did it see the anticipation of incorporating western neighbours⁷. What could Poland have done erstwhile it was known about the Reich attack? Humiliate or gather all possible forces, as publicist Rafał Ziemkiewicz claims⁸ The Polish government, on the another hand, preferred to perceive to the Allies as I mentioned before and to do nothing while waiting for the last minute erstwhile it was besides late. And despite this, the Polish army was not in specified a tragic condition that it was able to present a long opposition to the invader in time, which showed a double change in the plan "Fall Weiss"⁹. The worst part was that, for example, Joseph Beck was until the end of the day reasoning that the war would not go off. All this leads to the outbreak of planet War II on September 1, 1939; On September 17, Soviets attack, and on Volyn, any localities are conquered by Ukrainian fascists. Moreover, Germany even had plans to make a Ukrainian state on Poland's lands if the Russians did not comply with the agreement¹⁰. On the 28th of this month, the capital “falls” and on 6 October the remnant of our army lose under Kock and 2 Polish people vanish from the map of Europe. The September run is simply a alleged river subject and how many people would not ask for comment so many answers. On the 1 hand, she showed the incompetence of the post-Mayan authorities, and on the another hand, Polish soldiers showed the full continent their courage and skills.

Foreign policy

Is it possible to compose about any glare of abroad policy if no of our alliances worked, we received no help, and the neighbors agreed behind our backs? Only to answer this question can you consider any positives. I believe that this is possible due to the fact that specified cases can never be judged zero-one. The II Polish Republic surely had a thoughtful concept of abroad policy, which on the side seems even reasonable. Correct relations with neighbours from both sides, without favouring any, are absolutely good, but unfortunately not in our region. Stanislaw Patek warned against attempts to scope an agreement between Russia and Germany. Józef Piłsudski had a akin opinion and in the early 1930s warned against besides good relations between these countries. Stanislaw Cat-Mackiewicz went a step further and presented thesis, which should be the basis of Polish abroad policy: “The political importance of Poland is simply a function of Russian-German relations. As these relations are bad, the importance of Poland grows, Poland regains political independence. erstwhile Russian-German relations are improving, the independency of Polish policy falls. At the minute of German-Russian political unity of action – the independency of Poland dies.”¹¹. The question is: Should Poles break the balance policy, join the anti-commiter pact and decision with the 3rd Reich to the russian Union? The fact is, knowing the past of the following years, we would most likely be absorbed by the Germans and we would have a co-operative government, specified as gunfighters in Hungary. In fact, we've been between a hammer and a stone since 1938, and I don't think there was any aid for us. And it was possible to prevent Hitler's governments, only unfortunately the pacifism promoted in interwar France stopped plans for a preventive war in 1933. The odds of winning were very large that the Germans had not yet armed themselves as in the years following¹². Apart from the subject of the attack on the 3rd Reich, let us decision on to Poland's pre-war relations with this country. It must be stressed that Hitler, after taking power, sought to normalize relations with Poland and Britain¹³. The 1934 non-aggression pact confirms this policy course. Polish diplomacy was besides successful in relations with the USSR, as Józef Beck was the first politician from another country to visit Moscow. It was a success unfortunately PR, due to the fact that as the pact on non-aggression will later turn out to be nothing, but we have moved on to history. Returning to Germany an interesting fact is simply a large sympathy of the furrier to Józef Piłsudski. 1 can wonder if the death of the Warden did not contribute to the slow way of Poles to the fall. After all, there was no serious political player left among the sanatorium elite. Let us remind you that Piłsudski noticed the anticipation of an alliance of neighbours. On the another hand, Joseph Beck pursued specified a policy that Europe considered us 1 of Germany's closest friends. erstwhile we got out of this, I'm going to decision on. We utilized the agreements with the 3rd Reich to the maximum: the number treaty or the joint demolition of Czechoslovakia and Zaolzia's occupation. However, in the spring of 1939 we found ourselves between the hammer and the hardwood – Hitler demanded from Poland Gdańsk, as well as the road to East Prussia. At a akin time, relations with Britain and France are being brought closer together. For example, the English warrant the independency of Poland on 31 March 1939. This was considered a success, and as if we did not know the actual intentions with any conviction, this can be confirmed. However, as Norman Davis writes, this warrant "was besides a bluff, due to the fact that in 1939 the United Kingdom had no chance nor to halt Germany nor to defend Poland"¹⁴. There was nothing more we could hope for from France. Poles besides did not announcement that the Allies did everything to guarantee that the 2nd Polish authorities did not agree to the conditions of Germany, due to the fact that having normalized relations in the east they would no longer have much more scruples to attack France and later England¹⁵. Even the best diplomatic decisions burned to pieces. It seemed that the military agreement between the 3 countries was a strong warrant of independence, but only on paper. Adolf Hitler knew that erstwhile the conflict with Western powers broke out, Germany would be attacked by Poland – and this decision should be warned¹⁶That's why he changed his earlier war plans. II Rzeczpospolita was already against the wall, as declared on 5 May 1939 by the speech of Józef Beck in the Polish parliament, as our people valued honor, the conflict with the western neighbour was already certain. Therefore, the only way for the state was to establish an alliance with the Allies, and so it was done on 25 August, which besides resulted in the shift of aggression to Poland from 26 August to 1 September. However, aside from the agreement with uncertain countries, it must be recognised that this minute has not been utilized to announce mobilisation. And the maxim from the Scriptures, "And by the fruits of them ye shall know" about our "sustainers," was explained after 3 September erstwhile they declared war on the 3rd Reich, and their only serious attack was to drop leaflets in German cities.

At this point, it is time to point out errors of Polish abroad policy, as well as to find real solutions for the future, due to the fact that past is the discipline of life and we should draw conclusions. surely our global conduct was a large mistake in our relations with Germany. We felt that we were balancing between both neighbours, and in fact, all the time since 1934 we have been approaching the state of national socialists. In Europe, we were described as 1 of the top allies. We supported their actions, which was confirmed by our participation in the dismantling of Czechoslovakia. In addition, we defended Italy's aggression to Abyssinia (sic!) in the League of Nations forum.¹⁷. With specified actions, we had to join the anti-commiter bloc in spite of the deficiency of accession to the pact. In fact, we seem like a bunch of hypocrites. We get along with Germany: we sign agreements, number treaties, our dignitaries go hunting with German people, we support Italians in their actions, and we refuse to make proposals to enter the alliance and we will shortly agree with the British. It's truly weird that Adolf Hitler hated us and cooked a hecatomb in the next years. What is more, the UK and France felt aversion to the Polish government, as I mentioned in the introduction and would like them to change it. In this we can besides look for failure to comply with the alliance during the September run by the Allies. In abroad policy, we made very unusual twists. Having a very good relation with the French after the war after they refused to attack Germany, we abruptly go to the camp of fascist states headed by the 3rd Reich and erstwhile we are already in serious relations we return to the Allies who are accepting us, nevertheless they were at least insincere. In addition, it is interesting that on 19 November 1937 Lord Halifax (the British abroad Minister) declared Hitler's support for the English on the policy of Germany in Central and east Europe, provided no war was waged. If even the British allowed the Nazis to do what they wanted, the only way was to get along with them, due to the fact that there were no allies. In the late 1930s, our geopolitical situation did not truly belong to the best. Apart from the paradoxes of our abroad policy, Joseph Beck's naive belief that Germany will spare Poland¹⁸. Our minister has been very strict about the threat warnings. However, he was not the only one, but the Warsaw press only posted short notes on the pages of newspapers¹⁹. Unfortunately, any alliances must be found in this game of interests, which give common benefits, but unfortunately Poland has lost its independency through its migration between countries. Of course, it is clear that it is not only the responsibility of Polish politicians. I think the war was inevitable.

Military

For sure, the activity of specified people as Tadeusz Kutrzyba was a blast in our army. In 1935, he and Władysław Bortnowski were appointed Brigadier Generals to conduct studies on the western section. Thus, Joseph Rómmel and Leon Berbecki dealt with the problem. In 1936 Kutrzeba published his “Study on the War Opportunities of Germany and Poland”. Most importantly, 1 can conclude from this work that the Republic of Poland is able to halt Germany only erstwhile the French army supports it in defence, and that Poland cannot defend itself if it takes more than 6-8 weeks. This will all prove actual in September 39’. Kutrzeba was afraid with uncovering ways to prepare Wielkopolska for defence. He predicted that Germany would attack armored units, so he advocated the restoration of Prussian fortresses and construction of concrete fortifications²⁰. The general together with Colonel Stefan Mossor are the creators of the “Studio of the strategical plan of Poland against Germany”. It has already known assumptions from the erstwhile work of Kutrzeba. The creators predicted that the war would be total. The number of prophecies of this commander that occurred during the fighting shows only how large a expert he was and it is simply a pity that he did not win during the fighting of September.

Until 1935, the Polish Army had no war plan with any state, for which Marshal Józef Piłsudski was responsible, as he did not announcement specified a need.²¹. In addition, it should be noted that this was 1 of the biggest negligencees of the Polish army in the interwar period, and it was only after the death of the Warden. Despite the large efforts of our commanders of the Second Republic, only the residual plans of the war could afford. Unfortunately, they could make up for so many years of work in 4 years (how could they have known in 1935 that only that much time they had). Rydz-Śmigły ordered, due to the deficiency of chance to conduct preparations for both fronts, that Poland is to prepare for the conflict with the russian Union and so the Main Staff was ordered to make the alleged "W" plan (East). This besides shows the large mistake of the Chief Inspector of the Armed Forces, who issued an order to prepare a war plan that will never enter into force, which is more ridiculous during the September run will forbid even fighting communists. What should have been said is that Poles did not have any plans to anticipate a fight on 2 fronts, due to the fact that it was considered impossible (and yet!).

However, the biggest mistake of the Polish command was the hold in mobilising the army. After all, Hitler announced his plans with his highest military rank to the commanders on August 22, and the russian Union began a secret concentration of troops under the border with Poland on August 24²². but for the last moments before the war broke out. Did not our authorities see that Germany did not comply with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and that everything on their part could be expected? In addition, the western states did not even intend to protest, they did everything not to anger the anti-Semitic Austrian, as evidenced by e.g. the Munich conference of 29-30 September 1938. Poles came out of the presumption that no defensive action is essential due to the fact that we have guarantees of France, as well as Germany do not have adequate strength through the restrictions recorded in Versailles in 1919. What the best interview of the 2nd Republic of Poland knew about the behaviour of national socialists. It should be noted, however, that Poles led to the arming of the army, but the probable conflict with the russian Union and specified a conflict was prepared. In addition, comparing economical potential, including the defence manufacture Poland compared to III The Reich was far behind²³.

The worst thing the authorities did to their soldiers was propaganda about the size of the Polish army, as well as assurances as alliances with the Allies are certain. For confirmation, I would like to mention the memories of 2 soldiers of September and then members of the conspiracy and journalist, Stanisław Cata-Mackiewicz. Antoni Szacki writes: “I have come to the conclusion that these mobilized troops do not have the constituency and combination needed for combat activities. I met reserve officers and soldiers who, asked by me what branch they belonged to and what their squad or company commander was called, could not answer me due to the fact that they did not know they were not instructed.”²⁴. This shows not the weakness of the military, but the disastrous decisions of the Polish authorities delaying the announcement of mobilization. This disorganization was only due to this fact. However, the commander of the Świętokrzyska Brigade points out another substance in his memoirs, this time due to the weakness of the Polish Army: “In the office of the Main Staff after a fewer days, more than half of the officers were incapable to work properly. They were mostly older people, and as a consequence of inconvenience, all the diseases in them spoke.”²⁵. Even the British and French press have written about the size of our army. On the assurances of Western allies and propaganda resulting from this, Jan Matejak wrote about the naivety of young soldiers who were certain that the war was already won: “Who knows – thought not only – possibly I will bring any Berlin beauty!... They say German women are considered good mothers and are industrious”²⁶. Reading this only in a man gathers any grief, compassion to these boys, a deficiency of awareness of their own position. What the Vilnius Conservative wrote, on the another hand, makes him terrified. The Polish army was at specified a mediocre level that “boys and girls with pillows on tapes jumped into tram and railway cars and begged for arms for the Polish army”²⁷. It does not even show weakness and the economy of the Polish state. After all, what can be said about the financial situation of the country is the fact that the army is based on voluntary donations from citizens who already paid the government for, for example, the army.

The course of combat

On the another hand, erstwhile it came to fighting with Germany during Polish September, Poles showed large heroism and heroism. It must be noted in advance that they were not only soldiers, but besides civilians. The Nazis launched an attack on Poland at 4.45 from the "Schleswig-Holstein" battleship, shelling Westerplatte (Polish transit depot). The crew commanded by Major Henryk Suchrski was ordered to surrender after resistance, but the subordinates led by Captain Francis Dąbrowski forced the commander to proceed the fight. They defended themselves until September 7, despite attacks from the air, sea and land. akin heroism was shown by defenders of the Polish Post Office in Gdańsk who fought for this building all day and announced the surrender only after its arson. besides in another region of the country on 1 September, the Volynska Cavalry Brigade showed the Germans excellent skills and steadfast valor by inflicting large losses on the 4th Armoured Division. Let us look at the types of these troops and consider what chances Poles had on horses against motorized Nazis. General Tadeusz Kutrzeba mentioned earlier showed excellent military skills in the alleged conflict of Bzura. Poles started the offensive on 9 September with an attack on Stryków, winning Łęczyca that day. They finished their activities on September 12 moving towards Łowicz, who was captured that day, however, the order ordered him to retreat from the city. Despite major German losses, it has unfortunately failed to accomplish a greater success, but it is 1 of the biggest successes of the WP. Captain Władysław Raginis, who had 8 100 soldiers, fought for 3 days with about 40,000 German armies close Wizna.

Approximately 6-7,000 soldiers died in the fighting against the Soviets. They were mostly people who disobeyed a cowardly order not to clash with the Red Army. Although the Border defender Corps was poorly equipped, a tiny number did not fear fighting the invader. 1 example of specified a fight is the defence of Augustów Forest. Poles had to fight against armored troops and despite tiny chances they could destruct 17 tanks. The symbol of this fight is the conflict of Kodziowice, which has not been decided, which, with the advantage of the communists, can be considered a success. Another success in the fight against the Soviets was the capture of Włodawa on September 26, the creation of the Polish administration, and even the appointment of the Podlaskie voivod²⁸.

Fr Mateusz Zabłocki showed an example of a firm stance in the defence struggle. By withdrawing from the Gniezno of the Army “Poznań” along with local government authorities, he ordered the mobilisation to self-defense, creating the Regional civilian Guard. Throughout the territory of Gniezno, the fighting continued from September 5 to 11²⁹. It failed to defeat the Germans, but in a hopeless situation the locals gave their patriotic duty. Similarly, the citizens of the town of Grodna, located in present-day Belarus, entered the borders of the Second Republic . Higher officers considered fighting the Soviets nonsense, ordered withdrawal, which any of the subordinates considered treason and disobeyed orders. And so they did with their guarding efforts to defend the city. The attack began on September 20. During the conflict of Grodno, the communists lost 50 dead, 160 wounded, and besides destroyed 19 tanks³⁰. This is simply a confirmation of the heroism of these people. Why? Their main weapon was a bottle of incendiary fluid. The Soviets attacked the city with full equipment. As a result, the fighting ended late on September 21st. It is besides essential to mention the heroic Silesians who came to Poland's side and faced the invader. The main function among the created self-defense was played by Silesian insurgents and scouts. They heroically defended cities specified as the Chorzów or Katowice³¹.

Soldiers and civilians behaved mostly heroically, but so unfortunately, it is impossible to compose about the main command. Although it has been said that the Polish army had no plan to fight at all, the fact is that by 6 September, it was fought according to a planned strategy, which can be considered as any kind of radiance. But then everything was just an improvisation. No 1 was prepared to neglect at Piotrków³². The formation of the office of the Chief Leader continued until 5 September, 2 days later it moved to Brest over Bug (sic!). Only in the capital for a fewer days was the gene left. Stachniewicz to contact the area. Polish command was completely unprepared to wage war. From the beginning of the battles the office had problems with communication, could not admit the actions of the opponent, the orders were late, and besides deficiency of information about their execution. Complete chaos. It is not amazing that Poles could only execute heroic acts, due to the fact that with specified an army organization we could not number on success. Therefore, the heroism of average soldiers with their commanders in the field should be emphasized. They defended the integrity of the Independent to the end.

However, the Prussian Army, which suffered defeat in Kielce due to the disrespectful attitude of General Stefan Dąb-Biernacki to the German troops, accelerated withdrawal on the defensive line at Narvia, Wisla and Sana.

The most shameful act of the Polish command was to abandon its subordinates on the battlefield and flee to Romania on 18 September. actual statesmen don't do that. According to the unverified account of Elżbieta Błocka, her uncle, Colonel Ludwik Bociański stopped the car column of the Chief Leader "Rejtanów gest". Marshal Blade-Rydz got out of the car and asked what he meant. "It's about the honour of the army!" exclaimed Bocianski. They exchanged a fewer sentences quietly, “The Chief” pushed distant the erstwhile Vilnius voivode and got in the car. The colonel shot himself in the chest and the Blade took him with him to Romania. Fortunately, he survived a suicide attempt.³³. This shows only what the sanctioning authority truly was – on May 5, Minister Beck gives a moving speech on honor, and 4 months later they showed what these beautiful phrases look like in practice. The top commanders besides decided that Polish soldiers should not fight the Soviets, but can only defend themselves. But sometimes they didn't even do it, as shown by Grodn's example, where civilians had to fight alone. The concept of fighting the Red Army was simply cowardly. Giving your country's land to invaders is simply a disgrace to a soldier.

The subject which cannot be included in the assessment of the actions of our countrymen is the situation in Bydgoszcz. On September 3, part of the Germans surviving in Poland before the war appeared armedly against the WP. 300 people captured with a weapon in hand, or accused of participating in the battles our soldiers shot. As a result, the entering Nazis murdered about 1,500 spontaneously captured men. A tragic example erstwhile pre-war neighbors from the same city are able to kill each another in the name of ideology.

Conclusion

The September run is simply a very delicate subject in Polish historiography, due to the fact that we are impressed by the heroism of our soldiers, but on the another hand, we know how many errors the sanatorium authorities made before the outbreak of the war, as well as on the front of the Main Command coming from most of this environment. Even Marshal Józef Piłsudski does not stay blameless, as he did not guarantee that the Polish Army created war plans. It should be noted that military matters were the eyes of the warden. In order to keep the chronological sequence, I will begin to consider abroad policy. I'm certain the affirmative thing was that we had a diplomacy strategy, but it didn't work out in practice. It is not possible to talk about balance if the anti-commiter block is supported internationally, with small effort in relation to the USSR, and there is no place about them but for Beck's visit to Moscow. There is simply a Polish NKVD operation initiated by order No. 00485 by Nikolai Jeżov, which consumed about 111 1000 people. Cooperation with Germany has only provided us with tiny Zaolzie with antipathy of the Czechoslovaks, as well as a reluctant attitude of Western powers. This is so strange, due to the fact that in 1933 Piłsudski wanted to go to Berlin with France. Unfortunately, this unusual abroad policy cost us an attack on the part of Germany, as well as the russian Union and the uncertainty of the Allies to the authorities of the II Republic. erstwhile I moved to the Polish Army, I had already raised the subject of Józef Piłsudski's negligence regarding plans for war, but after 1935, there were prominent individuals in the army to catch up with negligence. The large honors belong here, of course, to General Tadeusz Kutrzebie and his helpers, who contributed to the defence plan against the Nazis. And as the general stated in his work “Studio of the strategical plan of Poland against Germany” Poles had a 3 times weaker army. And the best thing the Polish government could do was make a National Defence Fund, for which citizens donated all valuables to aid the military. Not adequate taxation collection society paid more donations. It didn't work anyway. On the another hand, the course of combat is most likely the only area where you can boast so much radiance. Polish soldiers frequently showed large devotion to the origin and love for their homeland. They frequently besides displayed greater skills on the battlefield. Unfortunately, as Churchill said about Poles: "The bravest of the brave, ruled by the meanest of the vilest," so it was during the September Campaign, erstwhile the Chief Chief left the soldiers on 18 September going to Romania. I don't think there's anything worse than leaving the subordinates without a commander and likely sentenced to slavery or death. I believe that September has shown the quality of the regulation of sanitization and the results of this large task of renewal of Poland. It is besides 1 of the biggest tragedies in the past of the Polish state. I'm certain this subject will always be emotional, any will compose about it positively, others will condemn it, while I say that we should not now condemn or praise these people, but take as much discipline as possible so that this communicative does not happen again.