US peculiar operations against Venezuela have been going on for many years and are calculis of akin operations towards Cuba and another South American countries.
Like Panama, where president Norieg was captured on January 3, 1990 only, and accused of drug trafficking, and besides against Iran, where there are now many riots inspired by the U.S. and Israel, and Belarus or Ukraine, which is due to many factors, but the goal is always the same: to control. All others are lateral and in the case of Venezuela, the following are:
Venezuela has immense oil reserves. Before the Bolivian Revolution they were controlled by American mining companies, specified as ExxonMobil, Chevron Corporation, Conoco Phillips, Gulf Oil corp or Mobil Oil Corporations. In 1976 Venezuela formally nationalized the oil manufacture – most abroad companies, including US companies, lost their concessions and rights [1]. In later years after the alleged oil opening, Venezuela sometimes allowed global companies (including American companies) to cooperate with the state-owned PDVSA company as part of a joint venture; however, yet in the era of the government of Hugo Chávez many shares were re-taken by the state [2]. Companies that refused to comply with the fresh conditions (e.g. a simplification in shares or a transfer of control) were expropriated — e.g. ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips lost their assets in 2007 after refusing to accept the terms imposed by Caracas [3].
These are just a fewer examples that show how large the desire of erstwhile American "owners" of deposits in Venezuela must be to control them again.
The Trump government continues its policies towards Venezuela, which is to recognise Juana Guaidó as the legal and sole leader of Venezuela; this is served by sanctions, financial blockades and another actions against Venezuelan companies and companies [4]. As an authoritative origin of the current U.S. military activities at sea, the Caribbean administration of Washington states the desire to fight drug trafficking by cartels associated with the region. The administration claims that the Maduro government has links to drug trafficking targeting the United States [5].
Weaken the influence of geopolitical opponents and limit anti-US alliances
This is, in my view, the main reason for the current crisis situation around Venezuela. First Hugo Chávez, and now Nicolás Maduro, in order to survive, strengthened political, economical and military ties with Latin American countries and another US-independent countries, which, of course, the US has automatically declared a threat to their hegemony and which they do not intend to tolerate. ‘“In the reign of Chávez Venezuela has contributed to the creation of multilateral organisations excluding the United States, specified as the Commonwealth of Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC), the Bolivian Alliance of Nations of Our America (ALBA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and PetroCaribe, through which Caracas offers oil at preferential prices to various Latin American countries. These bodies are part of wider efforts to reduce Washington's influence in the region and support governments, for example in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras and El Salvador," Koerner said in an interview with Al Jazeera. It is no secret that Chávez and Maduro have angered the US by seeking closer economical relations with Iran, China and Russia" [6].
I believe that cooperation with China is simply a peculiar origin for concern for the US administration. In 2025, the number of shipments of oil from Venezuela to China increased importantly – after the U.S. decision to suspend part of export licences exports to Western markets fell and Caracas diverted crucial quantities of natural material to the East, usually to China. Venezuelan oil exports increased by 8% in June, reaching an average of 844,000 barrels per day, due to a crucial increase in supply to China [7]. In addition, Venezuela continued to export oil to strategical allies specified as Cuba, which received around 8,000 barrels a day, as well as sending smaller amounts of methanol and oil coke to Europe and India [8]. This strategical return on oil trade with Venezuela coincides with the strengthening of diplomatic relations between Caracas and Beijing.
In June, Venezuelan and Chinese officials held respective meetings to celebrate the anniversary of bilateral relations [9]. In literature and academic reports and marketplace analyses, it is stressed that China gave Venezuela tens of billions of dollars in the 2010-2025 credit oil contracts (often USD 50 billion is given as indicative) [10]. Other sources indicate even USD 62.6 billion from 2007 to 2018. [11]. This must have hurt, especially since not 1 dollar of these accounts fell to American corporations.
Moreover, contacts with China are not limited to economical relations. China provided Venezuela with military equipment, including light tanks, armored armored vehicles, transport vehicles, arms against ships, radars, anti-tank systems and another defence equipment elements [12]. China besides provides diplomatic support; at least they officially argue the presence of external military forces (e.g. the US) "near Venezuela" and declare their support for state sovereignty and the principles of global law [13].
To conclude with the Chinese theme, I would like to point out that Venezuela is an crucial component for China in the structure of satellite reflection and control bases, or distant sensing. "Comparing active joint satellite initiatives and the deployment of ground stations suggests that China puts more strategical emphasis on establishing ground stations in Latin America. Since 2025, China and regional partners have jointly served around 4 active satellites — mainly for distant sensing and communication — including 2 CBERS-4 satellites with Brazil, VRSS-2 with Venezuela and TKSAT-1 with Bolivia. China maintains at least 8 ground stations throughout the region, with facilities in Argentina (Neuquén and Río Gallegos ), Bolivia ( Amachuma and La Guardia ), Venezuela ( El Sombrero and Luepa ), as well as Chile ( Cerro Calán ) and Brazil ( Alcântara). Although China is not straight active in ground stations located in Iquitos, Lima, Piura, Pucallpie, Puerto Maldonado and Tacnie, Peru nevertheless maintains crucial space cooperation with Beijing through multilateral initiatives and satellite data sharing agreements" [14].
The next country that works extensively with Venezuela is Russia
The formal diplomatic relations between the then russian Union and Venezuela were established on 3 March 1945 [15], had an epidural and very limited nature for many years, only in 2000 had their intensification, which active taking the course for multi-vectority, and was economic, energetic, gradually more military [16]. The breakthrough is 2006 – then Venezuela signed a large contract with Russia to acquisition weapons: aircraft, helicopters, and another weapons systems [17]. In the following years – especially between 2005 and 2014 – Venezuela was 1 of the main importers of Russian military equipment in Latin America.
Deliveries included fighters, helicopters, anti-aircraft systems, tanks, artillery, etc [18]. Between 2001 and 2014, Russian arms exports to Venezuela increased significantly, reaching a full value of about $14.5 billion, including Su-30MK fighters, Mi-35 and Mi-17 helicopters, tanks, self-propelled artillery and advanced air defence systems specified as S-300VM [19]. In 2008, joint Russian-Venezuel maneuvers took place – among others, Russian strategical bombers were sent to Venezuela and exercises were organized in the Caribbean region [20]. Since then, Venezuela has been entering deeper and deeper into the alliance with Russia, which includes not only the acquisition of equipment but besides credits, technological support, military cooperation and opposition strategy against US influence [21].
In 2025, both countries signed a fresh comprehensive strategical partnership agreement, formalising cooperation in many spheres, including defence and security. "The agreement between the Russian Federation and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on strategical partnership and cooperation, signed in Moscow on 7 May 2025, is subject to ratification", the resolution states. The Agreement extends the interaction and cooperation between the 2 countries in the political and economical sphere, including energy, mining, transport, communication, safety and combating terrorism and extremism. In line with the explanatory note under the agreement, countries will besides keep regular and close political and diplomatic dialogue, make fresh "coordination mechanisms covering the full spectrum of bilateral agendas, address urgent global and regional issues of common interest" and grow existing ones.
As noted earlier by the president of State Duma Mr Volodin, the paper "ports Russian-Venezuel relations to a fundamental fresh level, covering all key areas of bilateral cooperation". Deputy Minister for abroad Affairs Sergei Riabkov explained that the paper consisted of a preamble and 25 articles and "reflects the qualitative change that has taken place in bilateral relations in fresh decades". According to him, the text reflects the desire not only to establish a multi-polar global strategy but besides a coordination strategy in relations between Russia and Venezuela, which full reflects the precedence approach of both countries [22]. 1 might be tempted to say that this agreement has become the reason for today's Trump administration's desire to gain and humiliate Venezuela. It's expected to be a signal that South America is simply a Washington field and no 1 else has a right to it. Constating: Venezuela has become Russia's most crucial ally and key partner in Latin America.
If we compare China and Russia's commitment to Venezuela, we will get a image showing that China has invested more money on respective occasions. Over the years, the full investment in the Chinese economy reached $62 billion at the end of 2018. In September 2018, the Chinese side declared further investments of USD 5 billion [23]. So for the year 2025, we can talk about about about $70 billion from China. Russia's commitment is about $20 billion in rounding [24]. In fact, it is impossible to establish the final actual amounts invested in Venezuela; I dare say they were somewhat larger.
The last country I would like to draw attention to is Iran. A country that has late experienced the benefits of U.S. and Israeli democracy in the form of mass bombings is besides politically and economically present in Venezuela, which most likely all the more motivates the Washington administration to take over Venezuela. Depriving the above 3 partners, which is Venezuela, would be the triumph Trump is very hungry for.
Iran is helping Venezuela to rebuild and modernise its refinery infrastructure, including their state-owned refinery company (or another related to it) has undertaken refinery renovations in Venezuela to enable the processing of its dense oil despite sanctions [25]. In 2020, Iran sent fuel tankers to Venezuela to support the country in the face of shortages caused by the crisis and sanctions [26]. In June 2023, officials from Iran and Venezuela declared that trade between countries could increase to USD 10–20 billion, if the current agreements are full implemented [27]. Cooperation covers not only natural materials: the parties besides plan to make industry, petrochemicals, technologies and another sectors, indicating that relationships are more comprehensive, not only bartered [28]. In 2024-2025, both countries deepened economical cooperation, with many agreements and agreements including energy, industry, technology, petrochemical manufacture and refinery modernisation gathering [29].
Iran's assessment of the value of investment and trade from Venezuela has many problems and the data is ambiguous and heavy shot – from $300 million to 8 billion. So I find the following declaration very optimistic: "Our nonsubjective in terms of trade and economical cooperation is to accomplish a level of cooperation of $10 billion," said Raisi. "The next step is to scope $20 billion" [30]. No time frame has been given for this purpose.
The current tense situation is just another wave. Let us add that individual factors are crucial in Trump's case. Donald Trump didn't forget how he writes Arthur Kalbarczyk: "Maduro became active with globalists who tricked Trump in the 2020 election and present paid the price and should be happy to be alive. The last thing a president should do is engage in elections in the United States. Dominion Voting Systems operated from Venezuela and counted votes in the 2020 election. A akin operation was in Toronto, for which Dominion Voting was besides responsible, which is why Justin Trudeau besides had to leave....” [33].
Mariusz K. Pomianowski
[1] past of U.S. invasion in Venezuela's petrochemical industry, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, ed. 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History of U.S. engagement in Venezuela%27s petroleum industry
[2] I. Trusewicz, K. Sawicka, K. Wardacki, Americans lost on nationalization, Rzeczpospolita, 2012, https://energy.rp.pl/energy/art6328331-American-lost-nationalization
[3] Oil sponsors undemocratic governments, Rzeczpospolita, 2008, https://www.rp.pl/business/art8288571-ropa-sponsor-non-democratic-governments
[4] J. Bartlett, M. Ophell, Sanctions by the Numbers: Spotlight on Venezuela, Center for a fresh American Security, 2021 https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/sanctions-by-the-numbers-3
[5] C. Thykjaer, Trump about the "fatal" US attack on the Caribbean on a Venezuelan drug ship, The Associated Press, 2025, https://pl.euronews.com/2025/09/03/trump-o-fatal-attack-usa-na-karaibach-na-venezuel-ship-with-drugs
[6] M. Roache, Sanctions, crowd. AI, Venezuela, and US intentions, Al Jazeera Media Network, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/28/sanctions-venezuela-and-us-intentions
[7] L.A. Ruiz, REUTERS: Venezuela Redirects Oil Exports to China Following U.S. Sanctions, Guacamaya, 2025, https://guacamayave.com/en/reuters-venezuela-redirects-oil-exports-to-china-following-u-s-sanctions/
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Q. Wang, R. Li, Sino-Venezuelan oil-for-loan deal – the Chinese strategical gamble?, ScinceDirect, 2016, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1364032116302763
[11] CHINA-VENEZUELA Financial, economical and production management, TransparenciaVenezuela, 2025, p.
[12] Ibid., p. 20
[13] I. Patrick, China wars US over military build-up as warships head merchandises Venezuela, myNews, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3322712/china-warns-us-over-military-build-warships-head-towards-venezuela
[14] D.I-K. Yang, The Overlooked Front in rocket Defense: China’s Ground Stations in Latin America, Sinopsis, 2025,
https://sinopsis.cz/en/the-overlooked-front-in-missile-defense-chinas-ground-stations-in-latin-america/
[15] Russia–Venezuela relations, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, ed. 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93Venezuela relations
[16] A. O’Brien, Venezuela and Russia: Geopolitical Allies in the 21st Century, The Yale Review of global Studies, 2019, https://yris.yira.org/essays/venezuela-and-russia-geopolistic-allies-in-the-21st-century/
[17] J. Wolland, Venezuela, Russia Sign Weapons Dea, Arms Control Association, 2006, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006-09/venezuela-russia-sign-weapons-deal
[18] H. Zhen, Chinese Scholars See Russia’s Venezuela strategy as a Model of Hybrid Power Projection in the U.S.’ Backyard, China Global South Project, 2025, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2025/11/03/russia-venezuela-strategic-partnership-military-energy-diplomacy/
[19] Ibid.
[20] abroad policy of Vladimir Putin, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, ed. 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign policy of Vladimir Putin
[21] I. Wiśniewska, Protection of Russian assets in Venezuela, Mark Karpi East Studies Centre, 2019, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publications/analysis/2019-02-06/Protection-Russian-active-in-venezuela
[22] https://tass.com/politics/203325
[23] I. Trusewicz, most in Venezuela, put China. We know how much, Rzeczpospolita, 2019, https://www.rp.pl/economy/art9467131-highest-in-Venezuele-lay-we know-how many
[24] C. Rangel, V. Amaya, R. Theis, Agreements-with-Russia-geopolistic-alliance, Transparencia Venezuela, 2022, p.13
[25] E. Ottolenghi, Iran and Venezuela Deepen Their strategical Alliance, Foundation for defence of Democracy, 2023, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/06/16/iran-and-venezuela-deepen-their-strategic-alliance/
[26] I. Trusewicz, Another tanker from Iran sailed to Venezuela, Rzeczpospolita, 2020, https://energy.rp.pl/ropa/art17028041-rail-tank-from-iranu-doplynal-do-venezuela
[27] Iran-Venezuela trade can scope $20b, Tehran Times, 2023, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/485718/Iran-Venezuela-trade-can-reach-20b
[28] S. Solano, Sanctions, Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Untold communicative of Iran-Venezuela Relations, teleSUR, 2025, https://www.telesurenglish.net/unold-story-of-iran-venezuela-relations/
[29] Tehran, Caracas deepen strategicties with fresh cooperation agreements, Tehran Times, 2024, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/5066110/Tehran-Caracas-deepen-strategic-ties-with-new-cooperation-agreements
[30] D. Buitrago, V. Sequera, crowd. AI, Iran, Venezuela eye trade increase, sign petrochemical deal, Reuters, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/irarian-president-caracas-kicking-off-regional-tour-2023-06-12/
[31] Maduro offered Trump oil and to break contracts with Russia. U.S. rejected the proposal, CIS., 2025, https://www.wnp.pl/markets/maduro-offer-trump-rope-and-break-contract-with-Russia-usa-rejected-proposals,993337.html#:~text=Maduro%20offer%C5%82%20Trump%C4%99%20and%20request%C3%B3w%20from%20Russia%C4%85.%20USA%20reject%C5%82y%20propotment%C4%99
[32] K. Staszko, Maduro ready to leave? The condition would be amnesty from Americans, Virtual Poland, 2025, https://awareness.wp.pl/media-maduro-gotow-out-under-condition-amnesty-from-American-72197221756384a
[33]https://www.facebook.com/KalbarczykArtur/posts/pfbid0xT4L9EXVa5kQkgETg8yRqbY3WruvAtvLBMw8fZqd1HJba4XtaYWSWL8noxZGm67l
