There is simply a false thesis about Roman Dmowski's expected prorosity in public space. It was born even before Poland regained its independency in 1918, and was established by sanatorium propaganda in the interwar period. It is now reproduced by both opponents of the national camp and by its mindless epigons. Summoning these false accusations, which, in the conviction of fierce enemies, are a sin condemning the end of eternal condemnation, and in the opinion of pseudonationals are even a virtue, is very harmful to the creator of the national thought and highly dangerous to its future in Poland. In this way, a "black" legend is perpetuated, telling a communicative about Dmowski's alleged moscalophile and his co-workers, which serves to stigmatize nationalists as rusophiles. Unfortunately, we may besides frequently encounter a somewhat different phenomenon, namely any of the professed followers of the thought of Dmowski, who realize besides shallow or falsely interpreting the indications left by him, cites his authority to thus justify his flirting with the Kremlin. Therefore, being a “hardened” nationalist, I decided to deal with this harmful myth, which depreciates the historical achievements of our camp and serves to slander people who are honest and sincere in love with Poland, while creating a dubious alibi for contemporary jugglers or blinded lovers of Vladimir Putin.
Dmowski, in the years prior to the outbreak of planet War I, was accused of overcompatibility with the Russian Empire, which was connected with the then ongoing indicative dispute, in which he took a position in support of Russia and its allies in the upcoming conflict with central powers. Dmowski did so due to the fact that he hoped to solve the Polish case as a consequence of the large war in which the possessive states were to fight. And as he said: “We wanted this war, and in the situation in which Poland was located, no 1 has the right to take it against us. We must have wanted the fall of the German power that oppressed us, which consistently went to the complete demolition of our national being, which in all respect of us, whether inside or outside the German state, threw us its brutal ausrotten!”[1].
The leader of the National Democracy felt that Germany was the most dangerous enemy of Poland, as they had the top possible of civilization, economical and military. In addition, he felt that “the attitude towards the Polish people is open and clear in Germany. Poles are the enemy who is about to be destroyed. And this work of demolition is conducted openly, with brutal sincerity on Polish lands belonging to Prussia. In neighbouring countries, the German action against Poles is conducted by secret roads"[2]. This was due to the fact that “the Berlin policy in Poland seeking to master east Europe [...] saw the main obstacle for itself. Hence Prince Bülow's authoritative statement[3] [...] in the Prussian Sejm that the Polish issue is the most crucial issue for Prussia. Hence the frequently repeated voice in the German press that Germany is fighting not only Poles in their country, but with the full Polish nation"[4]. In this context, it cannot be amazing that, according to Dmowski, "the only honest and logical consequence to this was the fight of the full Polish nation against the Germans and the desire to fall"[5]. However, “it did not mythologie German expansion, it did not reflect on its cultural background. He thought that it was simply due to an excess of energy, giving birth to fresh needs and fresh aspirations"[6]. specified conclusions could only be reached by a politician of large measure, who had a good knowing of global relations and understood the mechanisms governing the geopolitics of the time, as well as being able to realistically and without sentiment set the most crucial goals for the reborn Polish policy.
Dmowski was besides convinced that Germany and its dependant Austro-Hungary would endure a defeat in this war, while Russia would come out very weakened, and the winning Western states would decide after the war. But for that to happen, there was a lot to be done to encourage Russia and to keep its military commitment to the Western Allies as long as possible. It was not an easy task, due to the fact that fewer Poles, as well as Russians or French, were aware of the actual degree of the German threat and of their hegemonic plans in Europe. The real war goal of Germany during planet War I was to implement the concept of Mitteleuropa, which was to gain complete dominance over Central Europe, which was to enable its unfettered economical exploitation. It besides established the annexation of areas inhabited mostly by the German population and the gradual Germanization of conquered peoples. And even worse, according to Dmowski, "no 1 apart from the German political leaders saw well what the saints and German plans did not understand"[7].
Dmowski besides felt that “we did not realize Russia’s dependence on Germany. Much was said about German influences in Russia, especially among the people who had contact with Russia, the object was inactive at the end of the language, but these influences were attributed almost exclusively to the large number of Germans in Russia and the position they occupied. It was not possible to measure the factors of a broader political nature that gave Berlin large advantages in relation to St. Petersburg"[8]. According to Dmowski, Russian "outer politics was, due to the fact that it had to be, on the contrary, a Germanophilust"[9], which were mostly infected by the government and court spheres of the Russian Empire. This was due to the fact that “ Russia's relation with Prussia was created on the grounds of the partition of Poland”[10], which fell prey to possessive neighbours, building it at the expense of its powerful position. So it cannot be amazing that for practically the full nineteenth century, the possessors watched over Poland not to be reborn, cooperating with each another in the fight against Polish independency efforts and in the conduct of brutal actions to fund Poles in their controlled areas. This policy enabled, from the time of the Holy Covenant (1815) to the Alliance of the 3 Emperors (1873), assembled by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, to keep the Polish nation in captivity. However, subsequent uprisings, which broke out in the least convenient circumstances and consequently suffered disasters, led to a closer anti-Polish alliance of invaders, who feared the failure of plundered lands. Only the concern of France and large Britain about Germany's increasing power and expansion and Russia's rivalry with Austro-Hungarians in the Balkans led to a serious antagonism between the possessive powers and the establishment of a fresh geopolitical strategy in Europe. 2 hostile blocks formed then: central states (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and Entent (UK, France and Russia), and the invaders yet found themselves on 2 sides of the barricade. It seemed at the time that the prayers of the romanticist prophet “about the universal war” were answered, which would origin the defeat of the possessors and the rebirth of our homeland.
"The desire to take advantage of an emerging opportunity, the fear that an early speech could put it off [...]" pushed Dmowski into actions contrary to patriotic tradition, easy to misconstru, sad to him too. Their essence was in hiding the objectives of political action and in taking up a game with the possessor, in the pursuit of his “surveillance”[11]. Dmowski meant “that Russia not only had a war with Germany, but that it was able to lead it, that this war would end with the defeat of Germany. To this end, it was not adequate to work on the organization of the army which had begun to be conducted – no little political preparation of Russia, demolition of German influences within the state was needed"[12]. Therefore, while being a associate of the Duma, he utilized the Russian Parliament forum to play with the Tsarsk government and "preparing the ground to put the Polish issue in its entirety and to gain for Poland a position of origin in European politics"[13]. Dmowski implemented his plan consistently, even against the attitude of the Polish public, but besides towards the discontent of Russian Germanophiles. In fact, he supported with the Polish ellipse the Act on expanding the enlistment to the Russian army, as he argued that "a policy which she considered essential for Poland the war between Russia and Germany and the defeat of Germany could not refuse a recruit to the Russian state". The declaration echoed widely, especially in Western Europe, which heard that "Poland wants to be a counter-German origin in European policy"[14]. Another time, he advocated the draft law prohibiting the admission of persons who committed political crimes to the army due to the fact that he logically argued that: “We were building the future of the Polish case in the war between Russia and Germany and at the defeat of Germany. Therefore, we could not want the Russian army to decompose by revolutionary propaganda"[15].
Dmowski did not believe that any concessions to our nation could be won in the Russian parliament. He felt that "Poland will be independent before the Kingdom of Poland will receive autonomy"[16]. This was confirmed by the rejection of the Polish Circle's request to grant autonomy, as well as the suppression of the task of confounding state education in the Kingdom. In the end, all illusions dispelled erstwhile the Second Pride was dissolved and the Congressional Delegation reduced from 36 to 12 MPs. He besides summed up his parliamentary work erstwhile he admitted that: “I did not bring a single part of land from St. Petersburg, not a single bill that could be considered a Polish profit. On the another hand, my policy has caused fresh blows, fresh attacks on Poland. For this, if it were not for this ground policy for our action during the European war, it would have been unprepared and this action would have been impossible"[17]. It was the “re-launch of the Polish case into the global audience” that was Dmowski's top accomplishment during his activity in Duma, although the price for his relentless attitude was the deficiency of concessions on the part of the Tsar, as well as its decline in popularity in any circles of our society. An example of this is the description of an event recorded in the memories of Hippolyt Korwin-Milewski, who had a critical attitude towards Dmowski and his confrontational attitude towards Russians. He quoted the account of Emile Joseph Dillon, a celebrated English writer who confided in him that “he was waiting for an audience in the waiting area of Stolypin[18] erstwhile he returned from the gathering of Duma in a state of large excitement and immediately told Dillon that Mr Roman Dmowski of the talker needed to tell the Russian Chamber that a sincere agreement between the Russian and Polish people was very hard due to the fact that we Poles are Europeans and the Russians are actually Asians. And Stołypin repeated respective times: “When so, I will rapidly show Mr. Dmowski, since this Asia begins!”[19].
Dmowski's decisive attitude was a consequence of his designation that "the main task of the president of the Polish ellipse is to fulfil the duties of the non-existent Minister of abroad Affairs of Poland. And there was no another way to look at a man who was convinced that rebuilding Poland was not only possible, but inevitable in a not besides distant time"[20]. He besides acknowledged years later that: “Truly, no 1 but my closest political friends gave me that authority. However, I found the highest authority in my conscience and this allowed me to take responsibility"[21]. Therefore, he pursued his policy in the Russian Parliament until it was effective, but after the Tsarist government tightened the anti-Polish course and truncated the Kingdom's representation by 2 thirds[22], he felt that "a tiny group of Polish MPs in the III Duma could no longer play any role"[23]. In addition, the expanding attacks on his policies by Russian leftist and liberal groups have not been without influence even among nationalists. Dmowski recalled: “The attack was so violent that it shook the ranks of our camp. At the general convention of the Democratic and National organization [...], a resolution was passed to keep me in office, but politics in Duma changed. I said another policy requires another man, I gave a ticket, and I went back to work in the country. And it was very essential for a large setback in the camp. The most crucial task was no longer the political action outside, but the organization of public opinion in the country, which began to endanger the chaos of concepts and complete political confusion. All the more so, [...] in anticipation of the inevitable war began to spread Austrophile propaganda in the Kingdom, forcing it with considerable effort”[24].
Dmowski understood that “Germany utilized all the means to force Russia to submit to their politics. 1 of the most promising was to again throw the slogans of the Polish armed conflict against Russia, slogans sounding loud under the protective wings of the Habsburg monarchy"[25]. And just as he successfully opposed in 1905 the effort to make a revolution on Polish lands, which would drown in our own blood all number to rebuild an independent state being, so above all his actions led to the fact that erstwhile the First planet War broke out, there was no anti-Russian uprising in the Kingdom. Plans for specified an armed appearance on the back of the Russian army were developed in the German and Austro-Hungarian headquarters, and the unwitting tool for this was to be the troops formed under the command of Józef Piłsudski. Later developments showed that the threat was rather real. In the end, erstwhile the Germans failed to destruct Russia from the war by means of the planned Polish uprising, they utilized Lenin, which thanks to their support caused the Bolshevik revolution and led to the conclusion of a separatist peace between russian Russia and central states in Brest on 3 March 1918. As Dmowski rightly pointed out, “The Brest Peace was the culmination of a policy that linked Poland's destiny to Austria and to Germany, which was called “activist” and whose activity was yet expressed as a ram for the slaughter carried out”[26]. These events full showed the dishonesty of German and Austro-Hungarian policy towards Poles, to whom promises were made from the very beginning without cover. Joseph Piłsudski, who, as a consequence of refusing to curse allegiance to both German emperors, was imprisoned in the Magdeburg fortress in July 1917. The First and 3rd Legion Brigades were disbanded and soldiers were interned in POW camps. The bankruptcy of political orientation towards central states besides full demonstrates the rightness of Dmowski's actions, which led to Poland being in the winning state camp at the end of the war and becoming an active associate in the peace conference, where there were no representatives of “old” and “new” Russia, due to the fact that no 1 intended to invitation them there after the “Brzeska betrayal”.
“Germany, Russia and Poland”
Dmowski felt that our politics at the Forum of Duma, as well as “by announcing the book “Germany, Russia and the Polish issue” and by the action in Slavic territory, we went beyond the framework of local, territory policy, we appeared as one, indivisible nation with one, encompassing the full of Poland policy and as specified we stood unmistakably in the anti-German camp. Despite the modest scope of this action – due to the fact that our resources did not let us – it was a step of large importance. erstwhile [...] a decisive minute came for Poland erstwhile the large war broke out, we already had a position in European politics prepared, we had no request to legitimize, explain our motives and prove the sincerity of our attitude towards the fighting parties. From the first minute in the Allied States camp we were recognized as our own, we were shown trust, which gave us comparative freedom to act. If not for our position, proclaimed loudly in 1908, I do not know if we would have succeeded in gaining this position against facts specified as Piłsudski's legions, specified as the noisy manifestations of the Chief National Committee, as at last the later actions of the alleged activists – all the more so that in allied countries throughout the war there were intrigues seeking to undermine our position, to destruct the trust we used"[27].
Dmowski was a realist and went to Duma with no enthusiasm, for as he said years later, “I knew that what was only a hard work for me would be a sweet fulfillment of ambition for many. I knew that what I would do would not be understood for a long time, even among most of my camp's people, that I would gotta usage large efforts to not lose influence and power. any will request immediate prey from me, others who do not believe in these conquests, will require a policy of protest, harsh criticism, assaulting the government at all opportunity, not that they anticipate any effect from this, but that they have moral satisfaction. What I will consider to be the most important, as a affirmative Polish policy, will either not pay attention or will be accepted by an opinion with reluctance and resistance"[28].
The game taken by Dmowski with the Russian aggressor and the desire to usage it to fight Germany required keeping the actual motives of action secret, which was utilized by his enemies, who were not lacking. For example, the memory of Stanislaw Głąbiński, who stated that: “Dmowski had already appeared to be a decisive moscalophile in the Austrian spheres before the planet War. The Ukrainians, Jews and the All-Germans, inspired by Berlin, made specified an opinion to him"[29]. He himself had “a sense that we, whom the opponents called “agreementaries”, “government agents”, “carry servants”, were the most hated camp in Poland by government Russia”[30]. On the another hand, Dmowski's authentic attitude towards Russia reveals his private statements in talks with people he did not gotta hide his actual intentions from. An excellent example of this is 1 of the letters to Ignacy Paderewski from 1917, in which he confessed plainly: “Remember that my “moscalophile” began with the English-Russian entent that I was walking only consistently with England and France, helping as I could to usage Moscals against Germany as long as and as far as they could be used. If there is simply a reward in the life to come for good deeds, then fraternising with cattle, to which no 1 had greater disgust than me, will be counted to me as the top sacrifice of my life, sacrifice not without benefit. And my intuition told me that Russia would not be in the foreground at the end of the war at all, although I did not anticipate it to turn into specified a nasty thing"[31]. An equally meaningful evidence is the message of Dmowski in early 1915 quoted by Adam Heydel, who was to hear from the mouth of the leader of nationalists: “I like Poles who do not know Russian – although I am a Moscalophile. We endeks are allowed to do anti-German politics only due to the fact that we have no sentiments for Russia"[32]. And he was consistent in this belief, for already in 1905, in his letter to Zygmunt Milkowski, he outlined his intentions: “Our main enemy is Russia, and this Russia is now on the outside as well as on the inside in specified a hard situation as it has never been – hence 2 tasks for us: to increase this difficulty of its location and to exploit it, if we can. [...] We're working on disorganizing the carat, and I think it's worth the time and energy to waste. And we are all the more willing to work that we are convinced that no reforms will lead Russia to a good path"[33].
Dmowski was besides accused of pro-Russianism due to his book “Germany, Russia and the Polish issue”, which was published in 1908 and was intended primarily for Russian and French readers[34]. Therefore, for apparent reasons, “she kept quiet about the large intent of Polish policy: there was no declaration in it about our desire to rebuild the state”. Dmowski, after many years, explained the substance comprehensively erstwhile he admitted that: “Political opponents in the country had accused me and the full political camp of denying our independence. However, everyone who read an intelligently and honestly book, in which the Polish issue is presented as one, integral full in all 3 partitions, had to see that the only way to solve the issue which it produced was to unite the Polish lands and rebuild the state. It contained all the reasons for independence, only no motion was made. Why? For a very simple reason. At the time I was writing this book, I was mature, erstwhile politics does what leads to the goal and avoids what distances from the goal. The minute my book appeared was not a minute of realization and did not require a clear definition of our goals and demands. We were in a time of preparation erstwhile we needed to have an impact on the situation in a beneficial way, enabling us, erstwhile the time comes, to set the agenda and to accomplish the goal of our pursuits. A child's policy would be that, considering it essential for the Polish origin to subdue German influences in Russia, she began by putting the independency program in place, by handing her arms to the Germans, who always based their influence in Russia on scaring her with the danger of Poland. And it was essential not to have the slightest thought of the modern political reasoning in the West, so as not to realize that a speech at that minute with the program of rebuilding the Polish state would be accepted as a fantasy, not crucial at all with reality, but besides as a desire to break the relations of Western countries with Russia, and would discourage only any interest in the Polish issue. To specified nonsense neither I nor my companions in political work would be able. And that is why we have managed to organize, in terms of our forces and resources, Polish policy, after a long period of time, in which Poland had no crucial policy worthy of this designation"[35].
Dmowski realized that 1 book would not make a “sudden overthrow in terms and profound changes in politics”. However, he considered it “a essential beginning of political action to be developed in all the fields available to us”. And it should be admitted that "especially in Russia and France, it has taken interest in a broad political issue in Poland, appearing in a fresh phase, and it has drawn attention to those sides of German policy, which the emphasis was on." He besides said: “My book was mostly understood in Poland not only in what I said, but besides in what I did not say. This did not prevent it from causing [...] many assaults, but even ridicule”[36]. That's right, it might seem that after specified an exhausting explanation, we could already close the subject of the expected moscalophile of its author. However, even present there are frequently unfair assessments of Roman Dmowski's achievements, most frequently made by fierce exterminators of Polish nationalism. Unfortunately, we are besides dealing with attempts to usage his legacy by any right-wing “politicians” who are reported to draw inspiration from it for their rusophile. This phenomenon was perfectly explained by prof. Krzysztof Kawalec, who wrote: “All the misfortune of accepting as fact the revealed indications of another times, without remembering their context, or even without a deeper reflection on what they actually expressed, is to advance thoughtlessness and pave the way, or to people haunted, or to those who have no scruples. And it doesn't substance if Mr. Roman's legacy or the First Marshal is the object of this kind of abuse. The effects are similar. After all, it would not be good if the discovery that the indications of our “great” were not applicable present resulted in a desire to reject them as a historical ballast. They have value and they have value. But it is simply a historical value – an important, worthy to know part of the national heritage. And knowing is not only a condition for sound assessment, but besides for critical reflection."[37] This was the critical reflection that Dmowski’s national youth encouraged erstwhile he appealed in 1923: “Beware of Talmudism, keeping to what was erstwhile written. We gotta keep creating, keep moving forward. [...] I myself have already departed far from many of the things I erstwhile wrote. The feature of our camp is in general the constant pursuit of progress"[38].
Neo-Slavic Movement
Dmowski's opponents besides accused him of pro-Russianism in connection with his engagement in the alleged neoslavism. He felt that raising the “Slavic ideology, which was not convenient for Russia with its anti-Polish policy, for Poland presented large benefits” due to the fact that the sincere and honest presentation of the substance to the Polish Slavic peoples “was an alternate to Russia: either to break cooperation with Germany against Poland, to change its Polish policy, or to renounce a more serious influence on Western and confederate Slavic peoples”[39]. At the same time, he realized that the “panslavism itself, so energetically promoted by Russia, was already part of the past. He was struck by the national evolution of Slavic peoples. The increasing sense of national autonomy of these peoples has led to absurd notions of “slavic streams collapsing in the Russian sea”. Slavic solidarity has already been able to trust only on the designation of the autonomy of each Slavic nation, on its respect for it by another Slavs and on the cooperation of these nations both in their civilizational improvement and in defence of their common enemies."[40] Dmowski thus utilized Slavic territory for action against Germany and Austro-Węgrom, and at the same time caused Russia to be compromised against the background of its hostile attitude towards the Polish people. It came to light during the Polish-Russian talks following the Slavic Convention in Prague (1908) that “Russia cannot let the free improvement of Polish civilization in indigenous Poland until this civilization ceases to reign on Russian lands that formerly belonged to Poland. Under these conditions, our inability to interact with Russian nationalists proved to be visible to all another Slavs"[41]. Therefore, it cannot be amazing that another reunion in Sofia (1910) took place without the participation of the Polish delegation, and the thought of neoslavism itself began to fade. In the end, it can be considered that Dmowski had achieved his goal, as he drew the attention of the Slavs to the increasing German threat and made the Western politicians aware of “the importance of the barrier the Slavic nations put on the way of German expansion”. Furthermore, the Russian propaganda argued, which could no longer represent Poles as Slavic traitors, due to the fact that we did not want to be converted to Russians, and besides reinforced the anti-German camp in Russia itself, which began to fight German influences more courageously in its own country[42]. In this context, therefore, it can be regarded as completely ridiculous accusations that Dmowski, erstwhile participating in the neo-Slavic movement, would sale the soul of the Russian devil, as this shows alternatively his large realism and ability to usage this initiative for the implementation of Polish national interests. Similarly, speculations that sometimes appear from time to time depicting Dmowski as a Slavephile, who, from a deep sentiment to Russian ‘brothers’, could patronize modern attempts to revive the all-Slavish idea, of course under the ‘careful’ wings of the Kremlin.
The individual relation between Dmowski and the Russians is best demonstrated by his private opinions on them, specified as the definition of contacts with Russian politicians as "fraternisation with cattle". Interesting insights are besides provided by reading Emile Joseph Dillon’s “Registers”[43], as a consequence of talks with Roman Dmowski from 1917 to 1922. They contain many unflattering remarks by Dmowski about Russians, their stories and achievements. From his statements, there is simply a speech of pessimism about the future of the Russian state, which he felt was incapable to carry out major reforms liberalising interior relations, due to the fact that "if Russia had become democratic, it would necessarily lead to its disintegration". That is why she was to stay a “prison of nations” exploited by the Tsarist or Bolshevik bureaucracy. Dmowski felt that “Russians are partially nomads. They absorbed indigenous peoples, mostly nomadic [...], which consequently resulted in their descendants inheriting certain traits that prove to be permanent. For example, anxiety in a physical and moral sense. The Russian loves to wander. He's never happy with where he is or who he is. Nomads are not builders, creators. On the contrary. They frequently live at the expense of builders and creators. [...] They destroy. They love destruction. They have this in their blood and only generations of culture can eradicate it. In the Russians there are frequently traces of this feature"[44]. Dmowski claimed that “Russian psychology is the psychology of primitive peoples [...]. As long as they live in tribulation, they are good servants. erstwhile the ties are broken, they lose all the brakes, and the cruelty of their individual vengeance takes on the character of perversion"[45]. He attributed this to the low level of culture of the Russian people, which could not be overcome by a comparatively fewer intelligences that "had no roots in men." In his view, the Russian “inteligents were cut off and separated from the people, alternatively resembled 1 of those preaching orders established in the mediate Ages, whose energy and success depended mostly on their complete separation from any layer and peculiar interests. [...] Intelligence was a layer from which 2 hostile groups recruited each another – the apostles of the revolution and elements giving emergence to bureaucracy. It was [Russian] intelligence that planted the seed of the revolution and hydrated it.”[46] In fact, earlier, on the pages of "The Thoughts of a Modern Pole", he revealed the real feelings he had for the Russians, writing, "I have contempt for Moscow for their Asian destructive disposition, for the unceremoniousness with which they are trampling upon the low ages of civilization work, for this east irresponsibility before my own conscience, which in all case allows to have 2 faces"[47]. The statements cited here correspond perfectly with Dmowski's public opinions on Russians, which he did not hesitate to mention to as Asians in his speech in Duma. Nor do they contain traces of sympathy, respect, or admiration for the Russians and their countries, which could someway make the false thesis of his alleged rusophile credible.
That is why we can agree with Krzysztof Kavalce, who wrote: “In view of the motivations of Dmowski’s actions, their logic, yet the opinions expressed privately, sometimes with a very drastic pro-Russian statement, I do not think that he can be considered a pro-Russian policy. He was a kid of his generation, of the home and of the then-rusified school hatred of “Moskal” – although he would have protested against the description of anti-Russian politics, indicating that a mature statesman should separate his prejudices and phobias from the political arena. That he did not always win is another matter, although he undoubtedly took on the truth, that for a policy spoken publically the word is an instrument of action and only in the second place a means of expression of views. The anti-Russianism of Dmowski is, however, not even numerous, confirmed in many independent messages, prejudices and phobias, but revealed during planet War I the program of building Poland as a large state, sovereign, seeking guarantees for its sovereignty and its safety in relations with Western European countries, and in the area between Russia and Germany aspiring to play a function as a local power. The leader of the advention identified with this program, considering the reborn after the large War of the Second Republic as his work of life. This work – not only due to its east border, but precisely due to its aspirations to conduct independent politics – was not compatible with the imperial interests of Russia, as most deciding about the destiny of subsequent views of the Russian elite state. And in this sense, the pronunciation left by Dmowski's heritage is different from the media stereotype he would suggest"[48].
The evidence that Roman Dmowski was not a pro-Russian politician, nor a rusophile, is much more, but the limited size of this text does not let them to be presented. Nevertheless, I encourage people curious in this subject to read rich and publically available technological and memoristic literature, due to the fact that only through an in-depth cognition of the actual communicative can we break false stereotypes that not only distort, but even defile the image of this large Pole.
"Black Legend" by Dmowski
Bearing in head the warnings of Prof. Józef Szujski, who wrote about "false past as a master of false politics", I decided to mention to wicked accusations against Dmowski about his alleged pro-Russianism, which I made with the greater conviction that this false and harmful stereotype is besides abused in current politics. It may seem that this issue belongs to the past, on which only historians lean, examining all item of the biography of the founder of the national camp. However, it would be incorrect to see the case closed, due to the fact that the various ointments of the villains inactive usage these false accusations to depreciate Dmowski's achievements and hinder the rebirth of the national thought in Poland. This is due to the fact that the national political thought under which Dmowski laid solid foundations is simply a threat to the Republic of the circular Table, whose representatives regulation our country. The full establishment of the 3rd Republic, regardless of the organization sign (SLD, PO, PSL, PiS and their mutations), is soaked in the spirit of Magdalena. That is why he implements the anti-Polish policy of "conclusion" with abroad decision-making centres, and parties from mainstream politics disagree only due to the fact that they have another abroad powers from whom they receive orders and gratuities. any served and served Moscow, others served Berlin and Brussels, and there are those who bow profoundly to Washington or Tel Aviv. Therefore, it should not surprise that Dmowski is hated by them, due to the fact that he said, “I am Polish – so I have Polish responsibilities”[49]. And he gave this applicable expression by sacrificing his full life to the service of his beloved Poland. His patriotic attitude and tremendous merits for his homeland are a model for subsequent generations of Poles, and the wisdom and realism of his policies can and should embarrass contemporary politicians who, alternatively of serving the Polish state, practice only in the art of bowing down to abroad ambassadors.
After many decades of silence, “Dmowski becomes a figure recognized, patron of streets, squares, although – remembering the calibre of the character – it is hard not to see that erstwhile it comes to taking a place in collective memory today, he remains far behind his large rival, Józef Piłsudski”[50]. On the 1 hand, this has to do with our post-war past and with the fact that “in Poland, soldiers are liked and valued, and civilian politicians are ignored”[51]. On the another hand, it was influenced by the “black” legend created during the period of the pomajow sanatorium rule, “when it became the object of a kind of propaganda aggression, led by historians (Wladyslaw Pobóg-Malinowski) and journalists – meaningful for the kind of these enunciations was the Pamphlet of Wincenty Romanowski: “Roman Dmowski – worshipper of the devil”[52]. The author of this hideous pashquil came to be known as a fierce enemy of the endeciation, who first dedicated himself to the service of the Pilsudians, and since 1944 completely sold his soul to the communists, becoming 1 of the pillars of their lying propaganda and a prominent associate of the pro-Soviet business apparatus[53]. Currently, his name, as part of the decommunization action, is removed from the names of the streets, due to the fact that he was rightly considered a renegade not worthy of commemoration[54]. another fates were passed by 1 of the leading hagiographers of the First Marshal – Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, who uncritically praised his achievements, and at the same time with stubbornness worthy of a better origin he slandered Dmowski and the national camp. As early as 1933, in his book: “National Democracy 1887–1918. Facts and documents”, which had a clear character of a political pamphlet, he reported that “the younger generation would like to know “what was and, in inevitable consequence, what was the National Democracy in Poland”. Prof. Henryk Wereszycki explained that he "feel not so much a craft historian – he did not have any formal technological education – but a author fighting in the interests of Piłsudski cult"[55], to whom he devoted most of his work. Pobóg-Malinowski was on emigration after the September defeat and his most crucial work was created there – “The latest political past of Poland”, which, according to Wereszycki, is written “with fierce bias, which makes much of the unknown information provided by Malinowski hard to accept as reliable. 1 of the most crucial flaws of the full is besides the fact that Malinowski is curious in personalities alternatively than the improvement of general relations, even political sense of stricto"[56]. In this book, there is simply quite a few content that can be considered virulently anti-endetic. And Dmowski is consistently attributed to Moscalophiluscy and to following almost exclusively ambitious motives, which, in his opinion, were expected to be the reason why he kept throwing logs at the hands of the politician of the State, which was expected to prevent Piłsudski from implementing his “genial” concept. Therefore, it is not amazing that the book “was received on emigration very controversially: with far-reaching and justified criticism, but besides with worship”[57]. In a country under communist occupation, in the absence of literature uncontaminated by the "spirit of Marxism", the smuggled from the West, Pobog-Malinowski's improvement made a large deal, which had its continuation after the "fall" of the commune. Michał Przeperski, a historian from the Polish Academy of Sciences, recalled that: “In the 1980s and early 1990s Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski was a historian who was read. I perfectly remember my father reading evenings in “The latest political past of Poland”. Her volumes, divided into parts, won somewhere in 1990 and read repeatedly – from the beginning, from the inside and from the end to the beginning. Of course, these were not London editions, in our city not available for certain and to this day, but the first Polish edition – legal. I felt a special, instinctive respect for these volumes.” In his opinion, Pobóg-Malinowski “was utilizing a large language, engaging in debates, forcing the reader to gain his own opinion. In respective generations of Poles he awakened the curiosity of history. For those who read it in the times of the Polish People's Republic, it could have been a model of historical writing. Writing vividly, colorfully and without referring to the marginal tradition of Polish communism, he was the antidote for the ideologicalized publications full of half-truths and understatements"[58]. Przeperski besides noted that “in the center of the past of our country from 1864 to 1945 Pobóg-Malinowski placed Józef Piłsudski and contributed to the consolidation of his political legend. While Piłsudski is in the imagination of a historian demiurge of our national history, in Pogod 1 can recognise the demiurge of our history. True, he wrote with a very clear, sometimes even unbearable thesis. present it is written differently, with greater humility to sources, with little momentum"[59].
Yes, this momentum of Pobog-Malinowski and his clear bias in the assessment of our history, in many places challenged by fresh technological research, contributed to the consolidation in Poles' consciousness of the false stereotype describing Dmowski as a rusophila. Many politicians presently playing an crucial function in public life have been infected with the biased imagination of our past outlined by Pobog-Malinowski, which was all the easier due to the fact that he besides branded Dmowski for his anti-Ukrainian attitude and anti-Semitism. And as we know, among today's politicians, there is no shortage of zealous philosomites and Ukrainianphiles who are willing to sacrifice Polish national interests to satisfy their favorites. Therefore, it is so easy for them to accept any content that diminishes and detests the legacy of the national camp, due to the fact that they most likely besides feel to any degree the heirs of the insane policy of sanitation, which led Poland to fall in 1939. 1 consolation is that “today Pogod-Malinowski is read little frequently and with little enthusiasm”[60]. So there is hope that young generations will not be infected with blind hatred of Dmowski, although the authorities do what they can to instill young Poles with an allergy to an end, as an example of which is the fact that since 2007 the IPN has held a competition for the Best historical Debut of the Year in the field of fresh history, which is patroned not by anyone else, but by Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski.
As Krzysztof Kawalec rightly pointed out to the false argument created in the time of the sanitization, in order to defile Dmowski in the eyes of the Polish public, “in a selective way the PRL propaganda and propaganda reached out to the PRL, adding the charge of supporting “international fascism”, although it was besides sometimes presented as a half-time and inconsistent precursor to this form of Polish statehood, which was considered by the Polish People's Republic: a single-ethnic state, of territorial form referring to the monarchy of the first Piasts, politically dependent on the large Brother of the East. It should be noted that Dmowski's reliable analysis of political output did not give emergence to a akin explanation of his views – what is different is what can be found in the origin material, what is different from the needs of the modern state apparatus, combined with the capabilities of the state"[61]. akin actions by power-holders, who do not hesitate in the name of their peculiar interests to scope for lies and manipulation of history, were accurately summed up by George Orwell in his 1984 novel, who stated that: “He who rules the past is in that hands the future; he who rules the present, in that hands is the past.”
Today's political propaganda with large pleasance reaches to the false ones besides coined in the past by Dmowski's enemies, and the people who presently sale these lies, or are ignorant, due to the fact that they did not bother to verify them through a thorough reading of many available technological papers, or are aware of this truth, but they usage lies with premeditation. The deficiency of cognition cannot justify anyone, especially those who, erstwhile educated, have adequate qualifications to benefit from the achievements of Polish historiography. On the another hand, it is morally disqualifying to usage a lie for political benefit. This was an example we faced a fewer years ago erstwhile the ruling Law and Justice Office launched an attack on a group of people claiming to be right-wing people whom he accused of being rusophiles, or even “Russian agent” and “smelling Russian onus”. Government propaganda utilized conventional and powerfully rooted in Polish society aversion to Russia, or possibly even hatred of Moscow to discredit these people in the eyes of Poles. And what we gotta admit, she has achieved in this substance considerable results, as helped by the same people who were the subject of her attack. It is essential to be insane not to realize that any compromising facts can be utilized in political combat, and those are not missing. These included: walks by Grzegorz Braun in Red Square in Moscow, accompanied by a spy expelled from Poland; interviews given by Confederate leaders Sputnik, who is simply a propaganda tube of the Kremlin; trips by Janusz Korwin Mikke to Crimea annexed by Russia and his participation in the reception at the Russian embassy, where he played in the company of specified as Leszek Miller. The summit of rudeness and cynicism was that JKM did not hesitate to make a publically ridiculous message in which he stated: “I am a pro-Russian option, due to the fact that the right was always pro-Russian and Roman Dmowski was pro-Russian.” This message contains the same burden of falsehood as in the anti-endek propaganda, which has long been utilized by people who want to destruct the national idea. specified incidents are even worse than attacks by anti-national environments, due to the fact that they are committed by people who pretend that Dmowski's ideas are close to them, and do so due to the fact that they want to cynically usage the authority of this large Pole to justify their own rusophile. The actual attitude of the creator of the national camp to Russia has already been explained in this article, but I would like to stress again that Dmowski was not pro-Russian and there is no specified message as to prove that he could be a Russian. That is why there can be no justification for those who misrepresent the past of the national camp and usage the work of its creator to make suspicious political cheetahs.
Doubtless, there are besides people who usage Dmowski's work for any another reasons, namely the "old-date patriotes", besides commonly referred to as endocommun, who may have truly loved the "people's homeland", or PRL. Therefore, in times justly past they tried to "marry his political concepts with the realities of the Warsaw Pact". This was an unauthorised abuse, since "before the outbreak of the large War, leading a game whose stages and eventual goal had to stay hidden, Dmowski pushed the elimination of independency slogans from the partisan programs consisting of the democratic-national movement, and besides began to exposure the the thesis that in the face of the threat of the German interests of Poland and Russia are the same, then after 1945, erstwhile Poland was found within the conceptual strategy of dependency, recalling this thesis – presented as a permanent directive of Polish national policy – in fact served as propaganda justification for the situation which Dmowski – in the light of what we know – would never accept"[62]. Therefore, modern attempts to unearth these aborted concepts can only be motivated by the desire to justify themselves to these people from “the mistakes of youth” erstwhile they collaborated with the communist system, as well as to become credible in the fresh political system, to which spreading the false argument of Dmowski's expected prorosity can aid them to any extent.
In conclusion, I would like to say that in Polish public life there are besides many deceptions, lies and disgusting privates that produce an unbearable atmosphere of moral corruption, which dares the various ointments of pashquillants to pour buckets of water on a real authority, which is undoubtedly Roman Dmowski. This unique man in our past deserves gratitude and eternal memory of Poles, for what he has done for us all. Therefore, I could not stay indifferent erstwhile I attributed motivation to Dmowski, which he did not have, as well as views that he never preached. And those who claim to be his "recipients" and at the same time abuse the authority of this large statesman to mask their flirtation with the Kremlin, let them practice rusophile on their own account, for the "speak-making" of the moscalophile of Dmowski does not have and will not have consent.
Poland needs a moral revival, and what “is useful for instilling more modern political class seems characteristic of Dmowski, [...] a tendency to treat political activity in terms of social service alternatively than well-paid profession. In the realities of a not-for-profit country, this would mean not only reducing the cost of operating a state apparatus but, above all, changing the atmosphere"[63]. According to Dmowski, “think about what Poland will be like, not what we will be in Poland. Poland is not built for itself, for its party, or even for its generation. She is the property of an infinite number of generations that made her and that will be the nation. Only 1 in large breakthrough moments will find the right path, who has a sense of work towards specified a nation"[64].
[1] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics and State Reconstruction [in:] R. Dmowski, Letters, Volume V, Częstochowa 1937, p. 109.
[2] The same, Germany, Russia and Polish issue [in:] R. Dmowski, Letters, Volume II, Częstochowa 1938, p. 152.
[3] Prince Bernhard von Bülow – Chancellor of the Second Reich and Prime Minister of Prussia from 1900 to 1909.
[4] R. Dmowski, Germany, Russia and the Polish issue... pp. 151–152.
[5] Same, Polish Politics and the Restoration of the State... p. 109.
[6] K. Kawalec, Roman Dmowski, Poznań 2016, p. 188.
[7] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics..., Volume V, p. 111.
[8] Ibid. p. 115.
[9] Ibid. p. 109.
[10] Ibid. p. 110.
[11] K. Kawalec, Roman Dmowski – different dimensions of the legend, “Independence and Memory” No. 21, 2005, p. 146.
[12] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics..., Volume V, p. 109.
[13] Ibid. p. 102.
[14] Ibid. p. 101.
[15] Ibid. p. 132.
[16] M. Harusewicz, During the Czarski times and after liberation. Jan Harusewicz, Memoirs – Documents, London 1975, p. 333.
[17] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics..., Volume V, p. 97.
[18] Stołypin Piotr Arkadiewicz – Russian politician, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior from 1906 to 1911.
[19] H. Korwin-Milewski, Seventy Years of Memory (1855–1925), Poznań 1930, p. 275.
[20] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics..., Volume V, p. 93.
[21] Ibid. p. 97.
[22] Ibid., pp. 108–109
[23] Ibid. p. 112.
[24] Ibid. p. 133.
[25] Ibid. p. 144.
[26] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics and the Restoration of the State [in:] R. Dmowski, Letters, Volume VI, Czestochowa 1937, p. 68.
[27] Same, Polish Politics..., Volume V, pp. 128–129.
[28] Ibid., pp. 91–92.
[29] Memoir of Głąbiński [in:] M. Kułakowski, Roman Dmowski in the light of letters and memories, Dębo Góra 2014, p. 374.
[30] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics..., Volume V, p. 150.
[31] Letter to Paderewski dated September 2, 1917 [in:] M. Kułakowski, Roman Dmowski... p. 526.
[32] The memory of Heydel [in:] Ibid., p. 479.
[33] Letters to Milkowski [in:] Ibid., pp. 330–331.
[34] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics..., Volume V, pp. 116–117.
[35] Ibid., pp. 118–120.
[36] Ibid.
[37] K. Kawalec, Roman Dmowski – various dimensions... p. 148.
[38] Don't be Talmudists. Summary of Roman Dmowski's speech at the All-Polish Youth Convention in Poznań on 24 April 1923 [in:] Roman Dmowski. Causes – Speeches, Poznań [b.d.], p. 95.
[39] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics..., Volume V, p. 122.
[40] Ibid. p. 121.
[41] Ibid. p. 127.
[42] Ibid., pp. 127–128.
[43] Entries of E. J. Dillon, ‘Glaucopy’ 2006, No 5–6, pp. 7–72.
[44] Ibid., pp. 20–21.
[45] Ibid. p. 59.
[46] Ibid. p. 23.
[47] R. Dmowski, Thoughts of Modern Pole, Lviv 1904, pp. 203–204.
[48] K. Kawalec, The Problem of Pro-Russianity by Roman Dmowski [in:] Between realism and national apostasy. Pro-Russian concepts in Polish political thought, under M. Zakrzywski, Kraków 2015, pp. 325–326.
[49] R. Dmowski, Thoughts of a Modern Pole... p. 4.
[50] K. Kawalec, Roman Dmowski – various dimensions... p. 144.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid. p. 143.
[53] https://www.ipsb.nina.gov.pl/a/biography/vincenty-Romanowski
[54] https://ipn.gov.pl/en/upamatization/decommunisation/changes-names-alice/names-alice/names-to-change/38171,ul-Rome-Wincentego.html
[55] https://www.ipsb.nina.gov.pl/a/biography/wladyslaw-malinowski
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] https://histmag.org/Wladyslaw-Pobog-Malinowski-demiurg-historiography-10326/1
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] K. Kawalec, Roman Dmowski – various dimensions... p. 143.
[62] Ibid. p. 147.
[63] Ibid. p. 148.
[64] R. Dmowski, Polish Politics..., Volume V, p. 156.
