"Only the russian attack on Warsaw was a minute to issue an order for action inside the city. Only external coordination with the inside could bring victory”, writes Gen. Bor. It was feared that the Russians would enter quickly, or that the Germans would rub back in Warsaw. AK commander saw the disastrous defeats of the Germans and did not believe that they could make a turn. On July 27, General Bór sent to the N.W. about the arrest of commanders and the disarming by the Russians of the 27nd territory of Volynska, who fought alongside the Russians against the Germans, did not announce good cooperation. Although, as the gene says. It was believed that the Russians were doing this in areas east of Bug, considered to be their own and going deep into Poland can change tactics. “It would be the top political nonsense. If the fight against Germany had turned into a fight against Russia. We wanted to fight Germany and at the same time explain Russia's attitude towards us".
On that day, the German politician of the Warsaw territory Fisher issued an order for 100,000 people to appear for fortification work. besides the Commandant of the Warsaw-City territory Colonel Chruściel-“Monter” (in 1936-38 a tactical lecturer at the Infantry Training Centre in Rembertów- in a civilian doctor of rights) gave the order of “Alarm” to emergence on that day (returned the following day by General Bora).
Looking from Stalin's position to win Warsaw with the participation of AL, which warms up the patriotic component of Poland and installs PKWN there, it would be a close to the political problem in Poland. That's why Stalin yet agreed to welcome Prime Minister Mikołajczyk in Moscow, who was told that the Red Army was 10 km from Warsaw, Stalin was expecting to take her. So the news of the outbreak of an uprising led by the AK, with the participation of the London Government, dictated to Stalin to wait with arms at his feet and not to assist the insurgents (Gen. Berling's essay removed from his post for zeal, without the means of crossing artillery and aviation support) and the deficiency of approval to land allied aircraft in Soviet-controlled areas (VIII U.S. Air Fleet from England, received a negative consequence from Stalin).
Let us remind that the Soviets stopped and disarmed the AK troops going to the aid of Warsaw. We must besides remember that forces march. Rokossowski was supplemented with fresh units and incredibly superior numbers and equipment over backward Germany. In the second half of August they had a 4-time advantage in artillery and as many as 7 times in men and armored weapons. Only around Warsaw had 2,400 aircraft, compared to German 3,000 on the full front. But the insurgents were to bleed themselves out.
On 29 July, Colonel Julian Skokowski (Left PAL commander) spoke about (!) the escape of the Gen. Bora and his staff from Warsaw, so he includes command of all underground troops in the capital. In the evening of the following day, the radio Moscow and the day later the radio station of Polish communists of the Union of Polish Patriots “Kościuszko” call on the Warsaw population to fight: "People of Warsaw. To arms.” The PKWN Manifesto defined the Communist KRN as the only legal origin of power in Poland, while the Emigration Government in London and its delegate in the country defined the self-proclaimed and illegal authority. The Germans expected to emergence from 29 to 30 July and took strengthening action.
On 30 July, an emissary, Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, arrived to General Bora with pessimistic news of the impossibility of dropping a parachute brigade, larger weapons drop, agreements with the Soviets, adding that Poland is in the Russian sphere of influence and will be occupied by the Red Army. However, he shortly realized that he had arrived besides late, only erstwhile to begin.
DECISION
On 31 July in the morning, General Okulicki appeared at the A.K. staff gathering "round table" and after a study by Colonel Irank-Osmecki ("Heller"-Head of the Second Intelligence Unit of the KG A.K.), and in a very sharp form he abandoned cowardice to General Bor, demanding an immediate order to rise, "Germany is already beaten" (A akin optimist was besides Colonel Rzepecki). Colonel Dypl followed him. J. Szostak (‘Filip’-Chief III of the operational ward) completing: “better to start a week besides shortly than an hr besides late”. Colonel A. Chruściel-‘Monter’ then presented deficiencies in the weaponry, suggesting that forces are besides weak to strike erstwhile Germany is not in reverse, so you gotta wait. The only pessimist was Colonel J.Bokszczanin (the head of the operation of the KG AK), who was, however, outside the capital, primarily did not trust the Russians and negatively assessed the chances of combat.
On that day, a second briefing was ordered at 6:00 p.m. Participants learned about russian troops in Joy, Volomina and Radzymin, the Russians took prisoner D-73 German division in Prague, about panic among Germans in Legionowo. At the same time, it was announced that Mikołajczyk had left for Moscow, the uprising could only aid the Prime Minister resume diplomatic relations.
Gen. Bór asked the delegate Jankowski to approve the decision. This 1 asked what would happen if the Russians stopped, Pełczyński: ”Then the Germans will slaughter us.It’s okay. ” D-ca A.K., Government Delegate, after consulting with Gen. Pełczyński and Gen. Okulicki in the presence of Major Janina Karasiówna, “Haka” , “Bronka” (the head of interior communications) at the request of “Monter” decided at “W” at 1 August 5 p.m. Colonel Iranek-Osmecki (intelligence chief) had already arrived after the decision was made (claps, curfew) and began questioning the ‘Monter’ study on the collapse of German resistance, pointing to incoming fresh armored units. A akin study was sent by Colonel K.Pluta-Czachowski “Kuchaba” Chief V of Operational Communications, God answered: ”It's done. It's besides late to cancel.It’s okay. ”
CONSECTIONS
The intent of the uprising was to control the capital by A.K. to strengthen in the eyes of the planet opinion the right and claims of the legal Government in London to represent and presume power in Poland in the face of the policy of facts accomplished by Stalin on occupied Polish lands. The uprising, especially during the first period, was a kind of festival of Polishness, patriotism and "nationality". There are voices that the uprising was the reason why Stalin did not absorb Poland as 17 republics, as the ZPP wanted with W. Vasilewska at the head, this thought was pushed by the influential Zofia Dzierżyńska.
However, Stalin decided in the spring of 1943 to make a wreath of "national" states in Central-Eastern Europe and to completely comply with them. The intention of Polish leaders was to prevent the establishment of the Moscow PKWN in the capital. Did the uprising erupt due to the fact that Gen. Bór succumbed to the moods of his own nation? Or as Colonel Dypl said. J. Bokschanin (‘Sęk’, ‘Wir’, KG A.K.): ‘it was either recklessness or nerves did not hold out”?
It was not without importance for the choice of the ‘W’ hr that the Jankowski Delegate requested 24 hours (minimum 12 hours) before the Russians entered the civilian authority installation. Should the uprising be interrupted against German savagery and shootings, even without Kombatant rights? (The Declaration of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of August 29, 1944 on the designation of A.K. as allies troops, the Soviets remained at “bandits with the AK). RJN made a proposition to surrender around 10 September, but the Soviets approached Prague and were inactive counting on help.
Poles did not want anything unusual, on 19 August 1944 the uprising in Paris broke out, on 24 August the French 2nd Armoured Division entered Paris, the next day The Germans gave up. Could this generation, which took an unequal fight in 1939, not have taken a fight in August 1944, erstwhile the destiny of Poland was to decide for long years?
Warsaw with the atmosphere of increasing terror, constant threats, continuous shootings, deportations to Germany, humiliating Poles in all possible situation, in counterweight believed in the thought of revenge, the intent of justice, the thought of an uprising believing that the right time had come.
The Russians' actions towards the uprising yet revealed their face to the Allies, Churchill called it the beginning of the “cold war”. This is confirmed by German historian Hans von Krannhals, writing about the Warsaw Uprising: "The Cold War between the East and the West began here and elsewhere.’ Stalin learned of the uprising on 2 August at 1.10 after midnight from the English General Staff, the dispatch included a request for help. Stalin (veteran of the lost war of 1920), knowing the plan "Burza" was an uprising surprised, but inactive on the same day issued a secret march. Rokossowski and the march. Konev, to immediately halt the offensive on the front and to deal only with strengthening the captured footholds. At the same time, he began dancing appearances with the Allies. He hoped that time would solve the situations in Warsaw as he intended.
However, the decision to launch the uprising, stopping the russian offensive, decided on how much the German area would occupy the Russians and how much the Western Allies (despite erstwhile arrangements). By stopping the russian blitzkrieg saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Germans and allowed them to flee west.
Gen. Anders unequivocally judged the uprising to be a meaningless demolition of Warsaw, its soldiers and civilians, calling the decision to start the uprising a crime. However, he himself had decided to hit the well-defended Monte Cassino in spite of the negative opinion of N.W. Gen. Sosnkowski, who did not want the futile transfer of Polish blood to the already (for Poland) failure of war.
Was there a different concept than the demolition of Warsaw and Warsaw? After all, any Germans wanted to put “clin” between the Allies and leave Warsaw with its London government, to throw the proverbial “rat” to the Allies. In Warsaw, the government supported by the West, under Stalin's nose, were specified opinions, but after the assassination Hitler hardened, there were no volunteers to convince him.
Poles lost the uprising, but they did their best, triumph could only be in the spiritual, moral sphere. This time there was no shame for Zaleszczyka, for the government and command escape. They fought to the end but couldn't win. As in their long history, in the uprisings: Kościuszkowski, November, January erstwhile the chances were frequently not greater, they knew what they were fighting for and for what values they would die for. Polish square circle.
In March 1945, Gen. Gehlen (later worked for the Americans), a prominent expert in the east theatre of action, completed a 200-page survey prepared for Himmler on organization, training, tactics, intelligence and communication of the National Army. Falling Germans wanted to learn the art of opposition and fighting under business from the best.
All attempts to contact the Russians were unsuccessful (Soviet spies: Captain Konstanty Kaługin, Captain Ivan Kolos refused to send a message to the Red Army, or sent unanswered). Gen. “Monter” sent a radio station with Lieutenant “Mak” to the Russians, but the contact lasted only a fewer days. Stalin had another plans. On the phase of the millionth town, a decisive political act of Polish-Russian confrontation was to take place in order to yet set relations with the Russian pier. The uprising was besides a desperate effort to deny Stalin's accusations that the AK does not fight Germany, but only fights the russian guerrilla. General Okulicki: "An act was needed to shake the conscience of the world."
Almost the full city was destroyed, about 200,000 people died, museums, archives and libraries burned down. The uprising paradoxically, alternatively of interfering, helped the PKWN communists take power in Poland. Stalin did so at the silent approval of London and Washington. The fact that Hitler did Stalin's wet work in Warsaw does not change the imperialist russian conduct and tragedy of subsequent uprisings: Berlin 1953, Hungarian 1956, or Prague 1968. possibly this bloody sacrifice in Warsaw caused that there was no uprising in 1956 in Warsaw and was bloodless August 80? After all, the Polish state-generated elites were murdered by both totalitarian Bolshevik and Nazi systems.
The Warsaw Uprising was the largest underground military action in occupied Europe, with about 45,000 insurgents fighting. Planned for respective days, it lasted 2 months, 18,000 insurgents died, and about 25,000 were injured. about 180,000 civilian residents of Warsaw died, remaining 500,000 The Germans drove out of Warsaw and the city was practically demolished.
Let us honor the victims and participants of the Warsaw Uprising!
Jacek K. Matysiak, California, 2019/07/31
See also:
The slaughter of Wola, or Polish blood flowed through the streets. Piotr Gursztyn on German crime on the inhabitants of Warsaw in August 1944 [WIDEO]
