We have a round, 80th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising. Ended by a terrible defeat, with 2 faces: self-sacrificing patriots and organizers who, despite good intentions, led to a tragedy they could avoid. It was the last large catch in our history, and it deserves more time.
The fighting began on 1 August 1944. The order to start them was issued under the force of a military group, headed by General Tadeusz Pełczyński, Colonel John Rzepecki, and above all by General Leopold Okulicki, Chief of the National Army, Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski. First of all, they, ignoring the counterarguments of another officers and any crucial people from diplomatic backgrounds, appealed to the large uproar.
The organization itself left much to be desired. They were usually young people aged 20 and less, and 75% of them were unarmed! Even the level of armament of the best troops specified as “Parasol” did not exceed 40%, and it was frequently a weapon of mediocre quality or self-preservation, and Poles had to show quite a few cunning and courage to take specified Germans away.
The insurgents and supporting their civilian population, fighting through 63, did an extraordinary deed. Hitler's announcement of defeating Warsaw in 5-6 weeks Heinrich Himmler compared the fierceness of the fighting to those about Stalingrad, and the commanding officer after surrender of the action of the German officer, seeing the Polish resources filmed with disbelief, repeating over and over again "It is completely impossible". This is the best evidence of the fighting, ready without calculation heroically fighting for the freedom and well-being of the homeland.
Unless the Warsawians have failed expectations, that is no longer the case of the leaders of the uprising. alternatively of cool logic and political pragmatism, they got carried distant with heroic romanticist visions and pressures. At the end of the day, everyone but us benefited. Germany, due to the fact that they gained an excuse to pacify the heart of Poland, which Himmler called “blessing”. The British and the Americans, due to the fact that the alliance with the USSR was more crucial to them, which interfered with Polish stubbornness and independence. Finally, the Soviets, due to the fact that the uprising, although aimed at Germans, was besides directed in the USSR, due to the fact that the goal was to master the Warsaw administration just before the russian army entered. No wonder Stalin stopped the offensive, gaining a pretext in the form of a losing armored conflict on the front of Warsaw just before the uprising broke out and allowing the Germans to do their occupation for him.
We yet lost about 170-200 1000 people – 20,000 fighting and 150-180 1000 civilians. It wasn't without acts of terror. In addition, at least half a million were forced to flee, of which 150 1000 were sent to concentration camps or labour camps, the city became rubble, and the centre of the Polish underground was exposed to serious repression. The Germans lost 1,600 soldiers, with 9,000 wounded.
Of course, the most easy conclusion is the post factum. However, that disasters could have been avoided – changing the form and/or the minute of the detonation – let many earlier warnings show. They were led by the president of the Council of National Unity Kazimierz Pużak, Stanisław Tatar and Colonel Kazimierz Drobik.
Especially the last of these, with the support of Tatar, pointed to the request to agree with the Soviets before they liberated Poland. He argued that having small leverage, but inactive having it, it should be done even at the expense of any concessions, while having much to play—the dedication of the east lands to receiving the western ones; the preservation of power in the country by the London camp at the introduction of communists to the government, alternatively of creating a purely puppet communist government, etc. All the more so, that Stalin at the time officially reported specified a willingness to communicate, and Churchill mediated for his benefit. Both of them (Tatar and Drobik) were accused – in part they may have been right (although it is powerfully debated) – of pro-Soviet sympathy, but in this situation they turned out to be a much more sober assessment of the situation than the organizers of the uprising.
We should mention Colonel Janusz Bokschanin, who repeatedly spoke on the matter, but he lacked the force to break through and Colonel Louis the Musician, who feared that "not only the city would be destroyed, but that this event would compromise our chances of future opposition against the russian occupation. It was clear to me that we were throwing all our forces into 1 battle, to win which we did not actually have the means. [...] The substance seemed clear, however, all time we talked about it with Okulicki, he refused to perceive to us.” Reasonable warnings were not lacking, but yet the will of action and the desire to act at all costs prevailed.
Today it is believed that “Poland has been sold”. And rightly, earlier Polish officials, led by Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk, made a number of mistakes in the assessment of the situation, making unrealistic demands and making Stalin, who was already the master of the situation, lost patience and the British had no political interest in dying for the Polish cause. Whether the russian tyrant would keep his word is another matter, while the United Kingdom as a guarantor of the provisions (which yet did not happen) gave a better chance to enforce them, and in addition, it was a better way than to bring about a situation in which the entering Soviets did not gotta face Polish claims. So, yes, Poland was sold, but Churchill and abroad Minister Anthony Eden did a lot to guarantee that in the current situation Poles played as much as they could, and Stalin was willing to make any concessions, putting tough, ruthless conditions only erstwhile Poles missed their moment, lost the English protectorate and did not have much to offer. And although he most likely would have pursued a puppet Poland anyway, it would have been in a more favourable situation and would have more chance to defend itself against it.
CONCLUSION
The uprising was not a deliberate act of auto-sabotage. Although Okulicki had previously fallen into the hands of the NKVD and – for what it is impossible to resent – he was broken, there is no evidence of his voluntary and informed cooperation with the Soviets. She decided to bravado and want thinking, concerning Allied (and Soviet) aid, displacing cold reasoning and cognition of political-military realities. However, it would be a mistake to shed all work solely on the Okulicki-Pelczyński-Rzepecki trio. She is equally borne by the commander of the AK Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, who, despite his resistance, succumbed to the pressures of his subordinates, giving orders to fight, as well as the Chief Leader, 1 of the heroes of the Polish-bolshevik War Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, openly expressing his opposition by making many valid arguments, who, however, at a decisive minute lacked the courage to ban the uprising.
The work is borne not only by part of the officer's staff, but besides by the political staff, headed by Prime Minister Mikołajczyk and Viscercmier and the Government Delagat of the country of Jan Stanisław Jankowski, who badly played this issue in diplomatic terms. As a result, the uprising, alternatively of showing the strength of Poland, showed her weakness. The highest price was paid by the militants and residents of Warsaw. And they deserve to be called heroes, while leaders and organizers are liable for the end result.
"Kulisy genesis of the Warsaw Uprising" – Jan Matłachowski
“Insanity ‘44” – Piotr Zychowicz
“In the name of what is this sacrifice?” – Jan Engelgard, Maciej Motas
"Warsaw Uprising" – Jan Ciechanowski
== sync, corrected by elderman ==
Wikipedia
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