Neighborhood populism

It is worth looking at the Czech elections and the triumphs of the populists there.

A populist ANO organization was victorious in the Czech Parliamentary elections a fewer days ago. With almost 69 percent attendance, the highest in 27 years, populists led by Andrei Babiš gained 34.51% of the vote. This is as much as 7.39 percent points more than in the erstwhile elections, which ANO lost somewhat then. Second place was placed the centre-right coalition of the Spolu with a score of 23.36%.

The results show not only the triumph of populists. They are besides the failure of anti-Popular groups. Together, the parties and liberal alliances are incapable to form a ruling coalition, with a full of 92 seats in a 200-member parliament. In turn, the ANO with 80 MPs can either regulation minorityly under concessions to 2 “anti-system” groups, or effort to make various coalition arrangements with them. The utmost right of the Confederate type, the SPD, has 15 seats, and the fresh organization in parliament, the Eurosceptic-anti-ecological Drivers – 13.

This advanced turnout, unlike in the fresh elections in Poland, proved to be a weapon of not liberals but anti-liberals. It's a measurement of social aversion to neoliberal government. The attendance increased most compared to erstwhile elections in the ANO organization bastions. A peculiarly large increase in participation in the elections – by 5–7 percent points – was recorded in the Moravian-Silesian state and in the north-west of the country, while without crucial changes in the rich and popular cities constituting the electoral facilities of the Liberals – Prague and Brno.

Again, unlike in Poland, only the 2 largest cities mentioned were places of triumph of liberals. In all another major centres, populists won, starting with Ostrava, Pilzna, Liberec, Olomouc and Czech Budejowice, or third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh among the largest cities of the country. In addition, they usually won there with higher or at least akin results as their overall national score.

It is worth to outline the likely context of specified advanced support for populists in general, including even in large, developed and comparatively wealthy, "local" centres. This context seldom appears in Polish analyses of Czech sentiments and election results. No wonder – the Czech Republic is described in Poland and for Poles almost exclusively by authors with no or somewhat hidden liberal-establishment views. Meanwhile, the causes of populist triumph seem rather clear in the Czech Republic. These are primarily neoliberal policies of formation that have just lost power.

The ruling Liberal coalition carried out a series of “reforms” in the spirit typical of orthodox concrete neoliberalism in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the retirement age was raised – it increased from 64 to 68. Although it has grown little for older workers and for the oldest group of employees, over 57, it is not at all clear, however, that the message to society is clear: you gotta work longer to get a pension at all. In addition, lower ones – for little beneficial to recipients were changed the way they were converted and valued.

Another antisocial "reform" was liberalising labour law for business benefit. The period of announcement from work has been reduced, in many cases only a small over a month. The trial period, i.e. the unstable contract for fresh employees (possibility of dismissal from day to day) was extended from 3 to 4 months. The age of 15 to 14 was reduced, where minors can work casually. More flexible, of course, to the detriment of workers, are now the principles of establishing a work schedule, organising work in different positions, distant work, etc. From 8 to 6 hours reduced the time to take a break in “contingency situations”. Trade unions were against the changes, but the neoliberals deliberately ignored their remarks.

Public services were besides tampered with. Railway stations were liquidated in respective twelve smaller towns, 300 post offices (mainly in the province) were closed and 2,300 people were released from public mail.

All of this was imposed during the regulation of neoliberal plagues across the country, specified as advanced inflation and a large increase in energy prices. Only in the Czech Republic, unlike for example during populists' regulation in Poland, this was accompanied by a mediocre increase in wages (including minimum wage) and a deficiency of major shielding activities. The consequence is simply a real impoverishment of a large part of society. Social inequality has besides increased. Today, in the Czech Republic, about 8% of adult citizens have received bailout from their property due to debt. In absolute numbers, there are 650 000 adults. Together with partners and underage children, the problem concerns about 1.5 million people in a 10-million country.

Liberal media and commentators present the situation in the Czech Republic according to the same bullshit key they apply to any another country. On the agenda, then, are the arguments about right-wingness and utmost right-wingness – in fact, ANO is simply a centre group, in any cultural respects to the left of chadeks co-organizing until recently. Or about the “dark garden” – while in the Czech Republic almost no function is played in the politics of world-view issues in the “Polish style”: populists do not undermine liberal abortion law, there is no reluctance in their transmission towards gay rights, etc. It is simply a skeptical group towards mass immigration, but in Poland, as we know, at this phase of liberal narrative, Donald Tusk is blocking us from her own breast-feeding before "invaders", so I think Babiš may besides be. It is also, of course, pro-Russianism, erstwhile in fact ANO is rather average in this matter, though both doctrinally and due to the increasing social sentiments, it maintains a distance from the narratives of the liberals of hurra-proukrainism and commitment to war. In fact, in the pre-election period and immediately after the win of ANO, even any of the more conscious liberal-establishment commentators began to speech down opinions about the expected prorosity of this formation. And even in the lost camp, there are suggestions to scope out to Babiš in various cases, so that his formation does not conviction him to cooperate exclusively with the far right.

Although the issues of war, immigrants, “west” or ecology/climate are likely to affect the popularity of ANO, the main origin here seems to be the issue of reluctance towards the neoliberal government and their antisocial decisions. Of course, I leave entirely on the side of the "democratic" conspiracy theories from the argument that the crucial factors in the election are "fake news", "Russian interference", "bots", etc., due to the fact that these are third-class issues in the face of the real destructions (anti-)social in the execution of the erstwhile government. Explaining election results specified factors are, on the 1 hand, cognitive helplessness and intellectual capitulation, on the another hand, a clever trick allowing in naive eyes to remove work for their mistakes from liberal environments or rather: for the consequences of their intended actions.

Babiš in the election run powerfully emphasized the message of content: what the government (neoliberals) took from you will be restored to you. Life standard, old retirement age, worker rights. Whether this will be the case – it is not known, but the message is clear and based on a counter to antisocial decisions of the existing power. The arguments that the leader of the ANO, as a wealthy businessman, will not make specified changes, do not, first, ignore the small liberal dimension of his erstwhile governments (self-serving and in an alliance with... social democrats), second, the social and election facilities of his party. They are besides rather grotesque erstwhile spoken by liberal and liberal-left environments associated either with large business and with classes owned, or held by billionaires operating on a global scale, like Soros.

Either way, elections in the Czech Republic had a clear social-class line. This was not only in the rich-island triumph of the Liberals in Prague and Brno, but even more so in the way they were voted elsewhere. The ANO was most triumphant in “Chechach B” – in mediocre and battered regions. The socio-economic structure of the neighbouring country is that social problems frequently concern large urban centres and heavy urbanised areas – places where manufacture has collapsed and occupation losses have occurred. Whether after the fall of the commune, or as a consequence of the “energy transformation” in the liberal spirit that has been going on for years, or in the current situation, the impact on advanced manufacture due to the emergence in energy prices and climate regulation. The Czech Republic, as a historically very industrialised area, inactive retained quite a few jobs, and unemployment is low in the face of demographic change. But recently, the work is growing, and in addition, the work is uneven – what is different is simply a respectable, sensible profession performed on a unchangeable basis not far from home, in a friendly group, and what is another 1 of the "elastic" places of employment, wherever and wherever.

The best results were obtained by ANOs in regions known as Czech poorness epicentres, collapses and falls. It is mainly the Moravian-Silesian, Ustecki and Karlovian provinces, which is almost the full north of the country. It is frequently large cities and dense urban buildings, and at the same time a disindustrialized area – sites of collapse of coal and lignite mining, iron and metallic factories, glassworks and textile factories. For example, in Stonawa, where the last coal mine in the country is being closed, ANO got 58%. In the neighbouring Orlowa, 57%, and in close Karwina, the circumstantial capital of the erstwhile destroyed mining area – almost 60%. The town of Bridge on the other edge of the Czech north, a symbol of the collapse of our neighbours, is almost 50% of the vote on the ANO and well below the national average on liberal lists. Post-industrial state of Ostrava, the 3rd largest city of the country, with 250,000 eligible to vote, is 43% support for populists, i.e. by over 8 percent points more than their national average. besides outside the north of the country, the regulation is almost always the same: the more poor, troubled and marginalised the constituency, the higher its support for populists. While in the South Moravian Voivodeship ANO gained support a bit lower than national, the triumph of liberals in the prosperous and developed For example, Brno corresponds to 45% for ANO in the peripheral border znojem district.

An interesting area is the Moravian-Silesian Voivodeship. It was the only 1 where the electoral threshold in general, and in many (after)industrial cities of the region rather far exceeded the left-wing coalition Stačilo!. It was an alliance of the Communist organization of the Czech Republic and Moravia with leaders of the Social Democratic organization and tiny national-social groups and Moravian regionalists. They went to the elections under the slogans linking social-left to sovereignty. They achieved the score – 4.3% – well below the polls and did not enter the parliament. Their support was lower than 4 years ago, erstwhile separate lists of communists and social democrats gained a full of over 7%. respective factors have failed, including the reversal of part of the electorate of social democracy, as so far there has been a conflict powerfully anchored in past and modern identity between this group and communists. A crucial origin was most likely the generational question – communists and social democrats had an electorate above average age, and for 4 years any of these people left or the wellness condition caused them to abandon political and election activity.

But more importantly, it seems different. Firstly, part of the electorate was lost to ANO, not only now, but in a long-term process. 12 years ago, the Social Democrats were winners of the election, with over 20% support, and the communists ranked 3rd with a score of almost 15%. Today, the leaders of the Social Democrats, before entering into an alliance with the communists, had discussions about taking off with Babiš's letter. The concern of part of the electorate about "voting waste" in the event of a breach of the threshold, which happened to the voters of the communists and social democrats 4 years ago, was most likely besides relevant. However, another origin seems crucial. Populists, erstwhile they are "centres", can fish among the electorates both the far left and the far right. The erstwhile offer a social message, at least non-liberal, the second – sovereignty and dignity, while avoiding utmost attitudes of both camps. The Czech elections showed that anti-system groups with left and right achieved results well below expectations and polls, with any of their support being scanned by ANOs.

As a result, the Czech Republic becomes "a country without a left". This is the second word without left-wing groups in parliament. This means that ruling populists will not gotta make concessions for a left-wing coalition or an informal ally. specified concessions will be for the right-wing radicals. Among my Czech friends, but besides among the public voices, it is not hard to find people who identify themselves as left-wing, while voting in these elections not to the left but to the liberal-libertarian Pirates. This group may appear to be left-wing or left-wing only on moral-cultural grounds, close to individualistic counter-cultural pseudo-leftism, and in addition doing so in a country where, unlike Poland, there is no serious threat to liberal moral freedoms, so there is no argument that they must be defended in an alliance with anyone. Supporting the Pirates alternatively of the "old-fashioned" coalition is not only hitting the lastheads of the left, not only supporting the co-responsible formation for antisocial decisions of the government coalition with their participation from 2021 to 2020. It is besides nonsubjective to support the ANO alliance with right-wing radicals, for which there is simply no alternate in the absence of the left in parliament.

It is also, most importantly, a disregard for the core of left-wingness, or class-social orientation, for the individualist-liberal option. Replace left-wingness as a class interest and political commitment to the underdogs with a large-town-subcultural "style of life". This means supporting an even greater separation of specified “left-wingers” from the planet of work, average people, losers and weaker in the current economical system. No wonder that even rich Babiš is more reliable for the folk class than this kind of left-wingness. Another thing is that Stačilo's mediocre score is inactive the best among anything that in the Czech Republic self-identifies itself as a left, in addition, it is simply a consequence mostly achieved in environments for which the left was formed, not among Prague, Brno or any another freaks and various minorities.

Left-wing becomes increasingly dead and socially unnecessary. It is the name of a disappearing formation, especially in the post-communist area. Classes possessing and persons aspiring to them, modern bourgeoisie, various progressive-cultural environments – they all find representation in liberals, who in the Czech Republic, unlike Poland, are completely free from "old-fashioned" cultural entanglements. On the another hand, people whose precedence is social issues receive an offer from populists who, in addition, are besides culturally closer to them, due to the fact that present the oppression of the folk class is increasingly not only economic, but besides "lajfstajowy" – the unmarried are constantly taught and disciplined for "insufficient" progress, tolerance, openness, etc.

As a result, populists are increasingly playing the function of representatives of the “cursed people of the earth” alternatively of the left. Time will show how they will work in this function in the Czech Republic in the very beginning of the parliamentary term.

Remigius Okraska

Photo in the text heading: photograph by Magdalena Okraska