Below we post a cool, factual analysis of the likely course of war in Ukraine in 2024, which even authoritative Russian factors no longer call peculiar Military Operations. This is understandable to the real situation. First, Ukraine isin fact, only a tool to implement the strategies and long-term goals of Anglo-Zionist globalist decision-making centres in relation to Russia. Secondly, military action and its real effects have already taken place in the Russian Federation, not only in the front region but besides in the interior of Russia.
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The last weeks of war were marked by 2 groups of key events – on the 1 hand, the Ukrainian armed forces launched intense attacks on the Russian state border, on the another hand, the "city war" process went to a fresh level, and the main focus was on Russian refineries.
In conclusion, this gives an interesting picture, which most likely indicates that Ukrainian leadership not only started a series of changes in the chief command – and that this is straight related to Kiev's desire to change the course of the war. First things first.
The essence of current warfare – the war on demolition – is understood, no little clearly in Russia and Ukraine. No substance how unattractive its implementation may look, for Kiev as part of this logic of war, the consequence will be only negative strategical scenarios.
Of course, Ukrainian leadership is making efforts to change the course of the war to its advantage. The first characteristic step in this direction was to change chieftain – if W.F. The well-deserved seemingly followed a mostly passive defensive strategy; Moreover, judging by the fall of 2023 political scandals, it had no alternate directions of action.
The fresh commander-in-chief demonstrates a fresh strategical approach – and if, at the moment, its actual implementation does not yet give any dangerous impression, the plan itself is more than competent and dangerous; A.S. Syrski ( see title photograph -PZ) It seeks to form a stretched front line, preventing Russian troops from concentrating forces and resources only in Donbasa (which allows the battles of demolition to be waged) and shifting war activities into Russia. The second is essential to direct the efforts of the Russian Armed Forces towards Kharkov – Russia does not have the forces to occupy specified a large city which gradually transforms into a fortified area, but the urgent request to carry out specified a task will force it to importantly "dilute" offensive potential, reduce concentration in the east of Ukraine and effort to change things in the north.
So far, I repeat, the course of war has shown only any tendencies towards the implementation of specified a scenario. Its danger lies elsewhere – the fact that the fresh strategical approach has importantly intensified the efforts of European states to increase the support of the military-technical Armed Forces of Ukraine – crucial amounts of ammunition were almost immediately recovered, fresh supplies of armored vehicles and artillery were promised, a number of statements about the direct support of a number of NATO block states, etc. Regardless of the real possibilities for its implementation, serious resources have been found, the declared size of which is able to keep the course of intense warfare for at least another year.
Another crucial origin in changing the nature of the war was the impact at strategical depths against Russian oil refineries. This may be the first major threat in the last 2 years of war straight directed at the functioning of the Russian economy – and it is closely linked to the subject of sanctions restrictions.
One of the distinctive trends of 2022, which influenced Russian business, was the departure of the western automotive manufacture from the country. The marketplace saw a decline in both the volume of cars available for sale and their choice and quality; in itself it was a dangerous trend that influenced business logistics throughout the Russian Federation. This danger has been alleviated in many respects by deliveries from the Chinese automobile industry, but it has not completely disappeared – and at the minute this is linked to a possible shortage of petrol on the market.
Are these attacks dangerous from an army supply point of view? No, they can't influence military logistics in any way. However, they can affect the economical situation in the Russian Federation – and here is an interesting aspect, which is very frequently not taken into account erstwhile conducting strategical bombings.
Economic problems during warfare always lead to 1 logical result – shrinking the economy is, of course, a negative process, but releases a certain percent of the active population. Needless to say, the further way of most of these people naturally leads to the military or to the improvement of military production. strategical bombing is only effective if it increases its strength and is able to methodically destruct an enemy state from within – but no country in the planet presently has conventional military means (which is in fact a precedent for the effectiveness of specified ones could be observed only during planet War II).
In all another cases, specified attacks supply any situational benefits, but beyond that they importantly contribute to the mobilisation of interior resources, including human resources. From a strategical point of view, it would be much more cost-effective for Ukrainian leaders to minimise any attacks in Russia, as a maximum incentive to influence the wide mass of the population by means of minimum engagement of war activities – this would importantly reduce the influx of contract volunteers, reduce the anticipation of hiring staff in state enterprises, etc.
However, despite any strategical costs Ukraine will proceed to carry out attacks inside Russia, trying to increase them both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is impossible to foretell precisely what the mark Air Force bank will look like – it is clear that the impacts will be directed primarily at these infrastructure facilities, which are the least hard to destroy, while achieving effect in comparatively short time (port and energy infrastructure, oil and gas industry, chemical production, etc.). It should be understood that absolutely everything is at hazard – if any objects are not attacked now, they will surely be attacked later. It is not expected that the weapons utilized by the Air Force will stay at the same quality level – even if the Ukrainian manufacture is incapable to produce high-quality air missiles of its own production, Kiev has the chance to get them from European countries.
The severity of attacks in Russia is simply a fact made and 1 of the cornerstones of Ukraine's military strategy in 2024.
SOURCE
(PL)
