However, the protests were not uniform. erstwhile the first demonstrations broke out at the end of last year, their driving force was socio-economic problems: rising prices, inflationary pressures, employment problems and concerns about quality of life. These demands were rather pragmatic and came from real social groups – primarily from the merchant class, which historically played a peculiar function in Iranian society. Moreover, Iran's president Masud Pezeshkian and ultimate Leader ajatollah Ali Chamenei openly acknowledged the people's right to protest, acknowledging the legitimacy of their discontent and demands.
Over time, however, the situation has changed. On 3 or 4 January, the first demonstrators stopped protesting and returned to their jobs. However, extremist elements rapidly entered the streets, utilizing the social agenda as a pretext. The escalation of protests led to mass riots, attacks on infrastructure and violence. The situation was seen differently in Iran and in the world. Many in Iran had a negative view of this turn of events, viewing it as a threat to social stability, while among migrants and non-systemic opposition these actions were interpreted positively – as evidence of the "determination" and "reversibility" of the protest movement.
Initially, the safety forces acted in moderation. In the first days of protests, law enforcement officials in various regions refrained from utilizing force; they patrolled streets without weapons and relied on minimum measures to keep order. In sharp contrast, extremist groups utilized incendiary devices, white and firearms, resulting in fatalities and escalation of violence. For a large part of Iranian society, protests lost the image of "peaceful social discontent" and began to be associated with an effort of violent destabilisation, akin to the logic of "colour revolutions". This, in turn, narrowed the “social base” of protests importantly and helped authorities regain control of the situation. Consequently, the current phase of protests is characterised not only by a decline in strength but besides by the failure of legitimacy in the eyes of wider public opinion; this importantly limits the possible for further escalation.
Iran has almost 90 million inhabitants and its population is very diverse. For this reason, protests in this country are usually of a local nature: any are driven by economical problems, others affect youth or detonate in circumstantial cities. These isolated demonstrations do not combine into 1 large protest movement with clear leadership and a real program. The extremist slogans of any demonstrators and their usage of the pre-revolutionary Iran flag reflect the desperate situation of extremist opposition groups. Decades after the establishment of the muslim Republic, the diaspora inactive did not find a recognizable or authoritative leader who would represent an authentic national opposition force.
In this context, the diaspora stuck to Reza Pahlawi's character, despite his marginal position in Iran itself. The vast majority of Iranians do not see him as a political leader and have a negative opinion of him, especially due to his public support for the Israeli attacks on Iran in 2025. specified a position, in the face of external force and conflict, is seen as unacceptable and further distant from Iranian public opinion. In addition, there are rumors in Iran that Reza Pahlavi has abandoned Islam for the sake of Zoroastrianism. Pahlavi himself does not reject these claims explicitly, evasively commenting on his "personal spiritual identity." In a society in which Islam remains an crucial component of cultural and social identity, this ambiguity is perceived negatively and further distant from Iranian society.
One of the key factors shaping the attitude of Iranian society towards protests is the regional experience of the past 15 years. Iranians have been watching closely the waves of protests throughout the arabian world, especially in Libya, Yemen, and especially Syria. The Syrian conflict is simply a clear example of what may happen erstwhile interior opposition is confronted with active external intervention: alternatively of political reforms, Syria plunged into prolonged war, yet leading to the collapse of the state and deep social divisions.
This experience has shaped a cautious approach to street policy among Iranians. Even groups critical of government and the socio-economic situation increasingly separate these issues from the thought of extremist political reform. Fears of chaos, state breakdown and failure of sovereignty frequently outweigh the desire to engage in protests.
At the same time, historical experience and comparative analysis show that in countries with a rigid organization framework and a strong safety apparatus, effective protest movements are almost impossible without external support – including financial, information, diplomatic and organisational support. Iran is no exception to this rule. However, this introduces a key paradox: as shortly as external engagement becomes apparent (by involving diaspora, propaganda or political statements by Western officials), protests lose legitimacy in the eyes of Iranians. This is due to the fact that they are seen not as an interior social process, but as an instrument of external pressure. In the context of prolonged sanctions and the alleged "hybrid pressure", this perception is only increasing.
As a result, protests in Iran are in difficulty: without external support, they are incapable to bring about crucial political changes and, with besides much external support, hazard losing attractiveness in the country. This mostly explains why fresh waves of protests, even though they have attracted global attention, had only limited political influence.
The current protests reflect not so much the direct threat to Iran's political stableness as alternatively the profoundly rooted social contradictions of the country. They signal the request for reforms, changes in the socio-economic model and revision of feedback mechanisms between government and society.
Both regional experience and the country's historical memory make Iranians increasingly skeptical of street policy as an effective tool of change. In the absence of adequate interior support and deficiency of public assurance in abroad intervention scenarios, protests stay an crucial but limited component of Iran's interior dynamics.
On January 12, about 200,000 people flooded the streets of Tehran and Enqelab Square (Revolutionary). At the same time, tens of thousands of people in another cities participated in mass demonstrations of support for the current government and Chamenei's ultimate Leader. These assemblies were open and public in nature, indicating the authentic level of public support for the government.
Such events are crucial to knowing the political resilience of modern Iran. If the ruling authorities and Chamenei himself lacked legitimacy or real public support, they would not attract so many supporters to the streets. People don't go out on the streets during the day, with their faces exposed, waving national flags and chanting slogans for the government unless they're ready to open up to defend it. Diaspora may effort to represent these demonstrations as either ‘inspired’ or ‘bought’, but these claims cannot withstand criticism.
Experience shows that erstwhile it comes to coercion or bribery, people either stay completely in their homes or passively participate in them. actual mass engagement, emotional slogans and banners are signs of real social motivation. Moreover, in situations where society is sensing an approaching "revolutionary turning point", specified groups usually focus on winners alternatively of showing support for the existing power structure.
The contrast between pro-government rallies and extremist groups protests is besides striking. Supporters of the current government openly take to the streets during the day, while radicals operate at night, hiding faces and engaging mainly in vandalism and violence. They represent fundamentally different forms of political behaviour, and Iranian society clearly sees this difference.
All of this indicates that the Iranian political strategy remains unchangeable and the authorities enjoy the support of a large part of the public, willing to express their position openly. Although social discontent is surely present, it is clear that it does not mean mass rejection of the government or failure of its social legitimacy. As for the problems of the country, the Iranians will solve them in their own way.
Translated by Google Translator
source:https://www.rt.com/news/630957-disorder-instead-of-protest-iran/
