History has accelerated so much that many media are no longer keeping up with the recording of crucial events reflecting crucial political processes. Another chord of ceremony march (neo)colonial empire of France passed almost without echo.
On July 17, General Pascal Ianni, commander of the French forces in Africa, transferred the Camp Geille military base to Senegal during a peculiar ceremony. It was the last French military base in this African country. It was liquidated after the strong remark of local president Bassirou Diomaye Faye last year that Senegal's sovereignty was incompatible with hosting abroad armed forces bases. At the time, he declared a request for French soldiers to leave his state.
However, Camp Geille was besides France's last military base throughout West Africa – a region whose immense area formed the colonial domain of France in the late 19th century. It is symbolic that Senegal, which was its first base in Africa ("four communes" – Saint-Louis – the first mill of 1659, Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque – their residents inactive in the mid-19th century, which was exceptional, received civilian rights), became the last.
The formal regulation of France in West Africa ended in 1960. Guinea declared independency in 1958 without joining the French Commonwealth invented by Charles de Gaulle. It was based on 7 and then 8 countries (department of Senegal and Mali). The another territories declared independency in 1960 and the French Community died shortly after. De Gaulle was very annoyed by the fall of his concept of sustaining (neo) the empire of France, which occurred respective years after the military intervention in the Suez Canal was lifted under force from the US and USSR.
However, the French sustained their influence in the region. They left a monetary unit in the region – the CFA franc, which is “bit” in the erstwhile metropolis and which maintained the influence of the central bank of France on the region's monetary policy. Although any states have introduced their currencies (Gwinea, Mauritania), any have failed on this road (Mali).
For decades, France has maintained political, economic, military influence in the region. A symbol of this may be the destiny of the murdered in the coup, by erstwhile friend of president Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara, France's loudest critic in the 1980s in the erstwhile colonial sphere. A more tangible example was full control of the uranium resources in Niger.
These influences are not only a communicative of decolonization, carried out in specified a way that, according to the passus “Lamparta” – “change everything so that everything remains the same”, nor play the opposites of “earth war”. It's the latest story. erstwhile the large Tuareg revolt broke out in Mali, which then paved the way for the jihadists, inspired by Al Qaeda, the French organized in 2013 a military intervention – Operation "Serwal", which destroyed extremists for a year, before proclaiming the caliphate of the "Islamic State" in Iraqi Mosul. France proved not only capable of rapidly mobilising respective 1000 soldiers capable of combat action, but besides enjoyed legitimacy among both the then African leaders and NATO partners, who provided the essential exploratory and logistical support, without which Paris could no longer survive. The “Serwal” was turned into an operation “Barchan” – in 2014-2022 the French held up to 5,000 soldiers in 5 Sahel states, as part of the fight against jihadists.
A small over a decade after his triumph in Mali, France remained with nothing. She failed to suppress the extremist rebellion in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Thus, Paris and those who were “suspended” under it on the place were besides delegitized.
I described more in April how in the last 5 years France and influences had been repressed successively from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger. The French Orano's failure of control of uranium deposits in the second was peculiarly sensitive.
The distance between France's most likely ally in the Sahel – Chad can be added to the diagnosis at the time. Hissené Habré was an excellent ally of Paris and Washington in the fight against the African ambitions of Colonel Muammat Gaddafi, whom Habré defeated, with prominent support from the French during the infamous "Toyot War" 1986–1987. Equally loyal partner was another military dictator of this country – Idriss Déby. The French had to save his power twice erstwhile the guerrillas launched the Njamen assault in 2006 and 2008. In 2021, Déby was killed at the front of the rebel battle, and his boy took over. However, Déby junior made a return. He “suggested” Paris to take French soldiers, which was done in January this year.
In all these countries, the anti-French turn enjoyed alternatively the support of the street, at least the capital public. France was neither able to guarantee triumph over the rebels nor guaranteed the sustainability of the leadership power, which is now guaranteed by the Russians, and its economical commitment was very exploitative. Regardless of the same nonsubjective of China's commitment to Africa, this commitment takes on more serious forms, giving Africa something that it desperately needs for its improvement – material infrastructure. If the Russians and the Chinese turn out to be inferior to the French on both of these levels, then possibly the area for manoeuvre will open. Not for France, but for the United States.
In June, the Malin authorities announced that it would be the Russian company Yadran to build a gold extraction plant from the fossil ore. The difference is that most of the shares in the company will have an African state, not an investor. Mali has been the second gold miner in Africa so far, but without its own ore processing powers. Now it's about to change.
So is France completely leaving the Black Land? Not exactly. At the another end of Africa, there are inactive 1,500 French soldiers stationed in Djibouti. And it's likely to stay that way. The base lies on the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which is the most crucial maritime way between Europe and South and east Asia.
Krystian Kamiński
