I return to the assessment of the 1830 and November Nights by Gen. Ignacy Prądzyński, who, as is known, condemned the actions of the sub-chambers due to the fact that they killed honest and good Poles. But he besides resents them for not having a plan and not being able to exploit Prince Constantine's infirmities. He writes in his memoirs, which, according to him, had to be done:
"Standing with the ready government, removing and trapping the imperial ministers, mastering Warsaw's arsenal and Modlin to call upon the Polish army and regiments of defender to join in with the uprising against the common oppression, and no 1 without the necessity to kill, to devise measures to prevent Konstanty from in any way from his own hands, who, having extraordinary power over the erstwhile Polish provinces (except Kiev and White Rusi) and the chief command of the Lithuanian corps, scattered in Lithuania in Volyn, was the only 1 ready to draw that corps to the emergence and rise the simultaneous full of the erstwhile Poland; and the known Kharakter of Konstanty was a warrant that he would do whatever he had to do, having assured himself of his person—here are the things upon which the game should have been brought to their attention, here is what they should have been done at the first time of the Ensign's revolt.
Instead, all they did was fight.. The first morning after a terrible night, in which they had so unnecessarily blizzarded themselves, saw them centered close Arsenal, shy, and as if all their courage had already been spent, without the leader, without a plan, they did not know what to do. reasoning only of defense, they worked on a fewer lousy barricades, as if to follow what happened in Paris. They were saved first by the infirmity of Constantine, who, showing at first moments anything of energy, would have quelled specified rebellion. He had the strength to do so."
However, the problem is, and to this Prądzyński, writing these memoirs no longer responds – How could specified a plan be implemented if no of the elder officers and then Polish politicians participated in the conspiracy (Prądzyński himself)? Sam writes that November Night was a “burden”. If so, no reasonable individual intended to turn this brawl into something serious, or de facto war on Russia, at least at first. Prądzyński writes that the key was the Grand Duke of Constanty, due to the fact that his stopping and forcing him to act in favour of “all erstwhile Poland” would give a chance to win.
Could it be a real plan? I think it's an illusion. Incapacitated by Poles Konstanty would wage war with his brother and all Russia? Doubtful. The problem is different – Could this Night have been choked by a “burden” in the bud? And save the existence of the Polish Kingdom in the form given to it by the legislature of Vienna in 1815? due to the fact that that's the only real plan. Any going beyond this framework recognised throughout Europe (including the liberal one, not only among the possessors) was a dream. “Burda” could easy suppress the Grand Duke of Constanta himself, due to the fact that – as Prądzyński rightly writes about it – he had the strength to do so (it was 5 regiments of the Russian Guard, a regiment of Polish horse shooters, a major part of the Polish ft guard).
Why didn't he? Or just due to the fact that he “lost his head”? Not only that. Constanty felt that what had happened had to be done by the Poles themselves, and he felt that the destiny of the Kingdom of Poland was in the hands of Polish alternatively than Russian. And that, in my opinion, was the right position. In 1814 the Polish army fighting on Napoleon's side concluded an unwritten political pact with Alexander I, which resulted in the creation of the Polish Kingdom. The officers of this army were kind of the guarantors of his existence.. In a critical situation in 1830 Constanty addressed them – prove that this is your country, that it is not an existing country only thanks to Russian bayonets. However, no of the erstwhile Napoleonic commanders managed to suppress the “burden” with Polish hands, although practically everyone considered the appearance of the people as madness, which would lose Poland. Even the deaths of six generals killed by the subjects – nothing changed. Seeing Constantine proved that no 1 was able to do the work. Let the Russians do it – Polish generals seemed to speak. Every next day of inactivity made the substance of the Kingdom and its autonomy – increasingly hopeless. He inactive had a chance called the Dictator. Gen. Józef Chodicki, but he besides did nothing, and then had to command, as it were, against himself, in the top conflict of the Polish-Russian war.
The drama of November Night and then Poland was that it survived the first day, until morning 30 November 1830. And it could take respective hours if 1 of the Polish generals decided to rapidly destruct the conspiracy, without looking at Konstanty. erstwhile this worked out, then Constanty could enter the game and save the Kingdom life, having 1 large asset – Poles themselves confirmed that they wanted this country to proceed to exist. But it did not. The authors of the “burden” lost, but not entirely – due to the fact that everything ended with the demolition of a state called the legislature Kingdom, the liquidation of the Sejm and the Polish Army, economical and cultural autonomy. Years later, 1 of the bakers of this November act will say that this was the case.
Jan Engelgard
