Jakub Majmurek: How large is the scale of the defeat of the ACP – the Justice and improvement organization of president Erdoğan, in the Turkish local elections of 31 March?
Adam Balcer: It's definitely a failure, but I wouldn't call it a defeat. In 2015, the ACP won almost 50% of the vote in the general election. This year, looking at the results of the provincial council election, 32 percent. The decline is so very clear. That's the weakest ACP score in her history. In 2002, erstwhile the organization first came to power, it won, 34 percent of the vote – at the time it was a completely different group, since then it has changed definitely for the worse.
In March that year, the ACP lost for the first time as a party. The main strength of the opposition, the centre-left Republican-Ludowa organization (CHP), achieved a better result. However, Erdoğan's formation won almost a 3rd of the vote. In addition, 70% of the state competed together with the small, far right organization of National Action (MHP), which supports the government of the president in the parliament. Without them, the ACP wouldn't rule. Together with the ACP MHP, it has nearly 40% support. And that's a lot, due to the fact that they're most likely gonna run together in the next parliamentary election. In conclusion, the ACP has received a very strong blow, and it is surely wobbly, but it is not on the boards yet.
How profoundly did the opposition "absorb" into areas previously controlled by the ACP?
For example, the Justice and improvement organization lost its 4th city in the country, Bursa, where about 3 million people live together with suburbs, previously seen as conservative and traditional. She besides lost respective medium-sized cities – from 300 to 700 000 inhabitants – which she previously portrayed as “real Turkey”.
In Turkey we have a akin division as in Poland? Areas outside large cities vote for right- populist ACP and cities vote for opposition?
It looks a small different in Turkey. In the south-east of the country, the Kurdish parties traditionally obtained good results. CHP had the highest support on the Mediterranean and Aegean coasts, in resorts specified as Adana, Antalya, Izmir, Mersin. In 2019, she won the capital, Ankara and Istanbul – a city with a suburb of 15 million inhabitants, more than 1 EU country.
This year, the ACP lost respective close provincial coasts in the western part of the country, where it had previously been strong, specified provinces or middle-sized cities as Denizili or Manisa, where the current CHP leader Özgür Özel came from. On the another hand, in a city specified as Şanlıurfa in the southeast of the ACP country lost to the utmost right-wing Islamic-nationalist organization of fresh Prosperity (YRP).
Where did she come from on the Turkish political scene?
Her leader Fatih Erbakan is the boy of erstwhile Prime Minister, overthrown by the soft coup of Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan elder mostly raised Erdoğan politically. This, building his position as the leader of the right, has, however, marginalized his erstwhile mentor.
In last year's parliamentary elections, YRP competed with the ACP and supported Erdoğan as a presidential candidate. During the year Fatih Erbakan, a politician known for his unpredictable behavior, changed the front, broke the coalition, switched to opposition and began attacking the president from the right flank.
Erdoğan is in a way guilty of himself, he besides played with an muslim card. Last time on the occasion conflict in Gaza – although at first he passively watched the situation, in time he radically turned up rhetoric. No wonder there was individual who was willing to scope for even sharper language, attacking Erdoğan as “too soft”. The pandemic, which strengthened the popularity of conspiracy theories in Turkey, especially among extremist right-wing environments, has besides helped to boost the support of the far right.
A fresh organization of Prosperity could seriously harm the ACP in the long term?
Today the Erdoğan organization surely has a problem with it. In many ACP-important provinces in the center and in the east where the cities lie, the organization will request YRP as a coalition player. Let us add that this highly nationalist MHP in any provinces ran alone, competing with the ACP, and that is where it has frequently done better. So it is not known whether she will effort to build alliances another than Erdoğan's formation in these areas.
The ACP so has a sense of political siege. On the 1 hand, the increase in the centre-left strength of CHP, on the another hand the problem on the right flank. Also, as usual, it was not possible to play much in the regions of the Kurds. So if these results were repeated in the parliamentary elections, then the ACP would have a problem. She would most likely lose her power or to keep it, she would gotta search agreement with extremist Islamists and the far right, which weakens her in the center and opens the field of the CHP and smaller parties of the opposition.
What caused specified mediocre ACP performance? Why did the opposition win now and failed last year erstwhile she went to the election united against Erdoğan?
Not precisely united. The utmost left and Kurdish parties went separately in 1 block. We besides had an alliance of 2 tiny nationalist parties, whose candidate won 5 percent of the vote.
Today, the good results of the CHP may have been that voters felt that the strongest opposition organization had to be put on the table. This explanation is besides supported by the mediocre consequence of the Good organization – which broke off the alliance with CHP after the election last year. The Republican-People's organization besides helped replace the leader in November. The fresh leader, Özgür Özel, is more dynamic than his predecessor, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. It comes from the conventional Turkish, Sunni state and is 20 years younger than Erdoğan. The CHP has at the minute respective strong leaders, alongside Özel, the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara must be mentioned here: Ekrema İmamoğlu and Mansura Yavaşa.
It is besides worth noting the highly low turnout for Turkey, 78%. I know that in Poland "low turnout 78%" sounds absurd, but in Turkey there is simply a completely different culture of participation in elections. The March 31 turnout was the lowest since 2004. As can be expected, any of the earlier ACP voters, little active in the country's divided political polarity, remained home.
Why?
What can discourage the vote for a organization he had previously supported, a little politically active voter? First of all, the economy. Last year inflation fell and by the elections in May managed to break it to 40% – again, I know that in Poland the phrase “we managed to break the inflation to 40%” sounds absurd, but that was the scale Turkish problem with expensive. People hoped that, after winning the ACP elections, it would someway stabilise the economical situation, inhibit price increases. However, reforms have been postponed for besides long, and present inflation is 67% in Turkey and everything indicates that it will proceed to grow.
If the ACP had not controlled most media, the judiciary and key state institutions which had not previously been so politicized, it would most likely have paid a very advanced price for all of this at the urns. This control keeps her in the ring. In favour of the ACP, it works that there are 4 more years until the next parliamentary and presidential elections. It gives her time to draw conclusions, regroup and prepare to face the opposition.
And didn't the ACP just pay the price for the chief structure? For not having strong local leaders?
That, too. It's always been the chief party, but there utilized to be a fewer heavyweight players there too Erdoğan. present we have a leader surrounded by a chorus of clapping. The chief is besides utilized as a politician. He's actually ruled since 2003, he's over 70 years old. For Turks who are younger society than Poles, the average age is 32 years “Erdoğan becomes an increasingly anachronistic, “grandfather” policy, especially against the background of its main rivals, aged 40–50.
Local governments have crucial power in Turkey? The ACP defeat changes something importantly in the country's power account or not?
Turkey is simply a highly centralised country and local governments do not have much power. surely smaller than in Poland, not to mention the national states.
On the another hand, the political dimension of these elections was crucial – due to the fact that it was a plebiscite that the ACP lost at attendance, which, although not awesome for Turkey, remained objectively high.
How will power respond to this failure?
Power has 3 options: a stick, carrots and any kind of connection between them. So, for example, it can start to restrict the competences of local governments or make problems with the transfer of money to those controlled by the opposition. If the ACP tries to "eat an appetizer" from the far right, if it moves itself to the right, it will be more authoritative towards the opposition. However, specified a policy of "go to the rhyme" and "behind us only the wall" can be reflected in the support for the ACP among the voters of the measure, especially those of the affected cities.
So there is the option of carrots: to effort to draw an olive branch to the opposition, to reconcile with the failure of large and parts of the mediate cities, and to make any model of cooperation with their opposition authorities. Erdoğan announced this after the election was announced. He said the society had spoken, the organization heard his voice and now he'll work it out. Of course, in a situation of far-reaching polarization of Turkish political life, where many opposition voters have a feeling of harm to the ruling party, for many groups these assurances were completely unbelievable.
You can besides combine a stick and carrot. An crucial origin is the economy. The authority knows that it needs to calm the economical situation, and the screw-up and opposition proceeding is not something that attracts investments and satisfies markets and promotes the improvement of local business. The key question is how capable Erdoğan is present of reflecting on what this yellow card from society meant.
The defeat of March 31 won't trigger in the organization a discussion about whether Erdoğan is the future leader?
If we spoke privately to many ACP activists, especially younger ones, we would most likely hear that they have doubts. In 2028, erstwhile the next election takes place, Erdoğan will be 74 years old. He himself has problem moving again. Elections would should be early, but this option requires a self-solvation of Parliament, and 60% of all Members must be supported. The ACP with satellites controls just over half the places. It is possible that Erdoğan will effort to bend the law, e.g. by collecting Kurd's tickets, which may piss off many Turks. At worst, he'll exhibit the Turkish version of Medvedev, and he'll run the run from the back seat. This will be a large challenge for the ACP, due to the fact that the opposition will lead respective charismatic middle-aged leaders into battle.
In the ACP, a organization with a very hierarchical structure, acting on a clienteleistic basis, there are besides many people who at 1 point of their career began to collide with the glass ceiling and feel frustrated. So the weaker the polls get, the stronger the voices will become expressing doubts about Erdoğan's leadership. Nevertheless, it seems very improbable to me that anyone else could lead the ACP in the 2028 election.
Can elections open the way to Turkey's retreat from the authoritarian path?
Following Erdoğan's 2016 failed coup, the situation in Turkey deteriorated dramatically. In his classification, Freedom home even relegated her to a group of slave states. In fresh years, however, we have been dealing with any thawing, as is besides seen in global rankings. It can so be hoped that Turkey will again become a partially free country. possibly fresh elections have shown that it is, however, a hybrid government that combines democratic and authoritarian elements or alleged electoral authoritarianism.
The ACP can lose the next election?
Maybe. The long-term trend is clear: support for this organization is falling. It is highly improbable present that the ACP will be able to get, like 10 years ago, nearly half the vote. This is linked to social and demographic change. If elections were held only among people under the age of 35, the ACP defeat would be importantly greater.
However, the ACP has its own iron, identity electorate, which will not abandon it unless there are extraordinary scandals. The organization in the next election will not endure complete defeat, but its support may fall to 25–30 percent. If Erdoğan becomes a symbol of this failure, a very profound change can await the ACP.
Erdoğan will not feel the temptation to deal with the opposition by moving further into authoritarianism?
It cannot be excluded that in desperation he will scope for akin measures. But the ACP itself knows what kind of crisis specified a policy can origin in a highly polarised country where many people have legal or non-legal weapons.
It is not an accident, but the complex social, ethnic, cultural, etc. conditions have not changed Turkey to closed authoritarianism. Turkey is frequently compared to Russia in Poland and Erdoğan to Putin. This is simply a failed comparison. Let's see, what the fresh presidential elections in Russia looked likeAfter all, there was no effort to keep appearances that there was any real Democratic mini-competition, no candidate was allowed to be, however, realistically opposed to Putin. This is simply a very different situation from Turkey.
Does failure in local elections someway "outperate" Erdoğan's very assertive global policy?
Turkey is again comparing itself to Russia in this respect. It is actual that, like Russia, it is an assertive country, sometimes capable of armed intervention in another countries or of supporting allies who are at war, like Azerbaijan. But Turkey can fight with individual and then make peace with the hawk. It is not by chance that we will find in fresh decades an example of a Turkish full-scale invasion of the neighbor.
Erdoğan's global policy will limit the economical situation, the request to control inflation and the lira rate more than the consequence of local elections.
Turkey, however, is undoubtedly a regional power that develops its defence industry, working with abroad partners. And regional powers play harder. If Erdoğana replaces another team, it is more democratic, which will most likely lead an global game in a more subtle way, but will not quit the belief that Turkey is simply a erstwhile empire, present the regional power and its abroad policy must reflect this.
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Adam Balcer – Programme manager of the east European College. He runs a podcast. Babel. Multi-Kulti Republic On Tok FM radio. Author of many articles, reports and books on the subject of Islam in Europe. His study No change in the East? Orientation in Contemporary Poland was published by the College of east Europe with the support of the Warsaw office Heinrich Boll Stiftung.
