Brussels wants to put its hand on the defence of EU countries. At the moment, fitting is ongoing, due to the fact that not all governments like the thought of taking on further common debts. And we are talking about 150 billion euros! The leaders so want to present alternate solutions.
The European Council held on 20 March with the heads of government of the EU did not deliver the results expected by the Eurocrats. However, Prime Ministers under the leadership of Antónia Costa discussed the centralisation of supervision of capital markets and another than the options proposed by the EC leader to finance European defence, which was to be created without US support.
On the Common Military Policy, only the findings of the European Council 2 weeks ago were confirmed, referring to the White Paper on European Defence – the 2030 Readyness and the ReArm Europe/Gotality 2030 Plan, which has been loud in fresh days and which inspires quite a few emotion.
During the discussions behind closed doors, it was stated that there was a request to rapidly transfer money to military aid while protecting tight national budgets. EU leaders have asked the Commission for more options to finance the common defence, pointing out that the "long list of ideas" presented just the day before, including the thought of borrowing EUR 150 billion and making even more financial commitments, have not satisfied all the leaders of governments. The French president Emmanuel Macron is pushing for another debt sharing.
Spain and Italy have doubts about collective defence plans. They asked Commission president Ursula von der Leyen about the scope of this cooperation. "We started comparatively narrow, but now this concept has been extended to be ready for 2030" – they were to receive an answer. The thought is to make a European defensive strategy without any support from America, which, as many military experts point out, is not real, which is about to happen.
In spite of Hungary's opposition, countries have announced an agreement on Ukraine. No fresh commitments were made, only a stronger statement. The president of the European Council proposed a provision saying "26 countries have reached a consensus" and Hungary has a "other position" on "how to support Ukraine in achieving peace".
The conclusions of the Kallas Summit on spending EUR 5 billion on 2 million ammunition for Kiev, on a voluntary basis, are not mentioned. Costa asked about the Ukrainian case and the hazard of failing to meet EU commitments to support a associate in the war, stressed that the summit focused on competitiveness alternatively than decisions on the ongoing armed conflict.
Prime Ministers were to agree to increase the competitiveness of the block by reducing bureaucracy and integrating the single energy and capital market. There were large concerns about the “trade war” from the US.
The centralisation of supervision of capital markets has been discussed. Although there was a fear of a “screaming exchange” between Luxembourger Luc Frieden and Macron, the president of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde and the president of the Ursula von der Leyen Commission, however, was not there as a consequence of erstwhile diplomatic procedures.
Luxembourg and another smaller EU countries have long opposed the centralisation of supervision, fearing a "streak" to enable Paris to gain more control of their financial sector.
France, the ECB and the European Commission say that focusing capital marketplace regulation across the EU will let immense savings to be made for productive investments.
The EC suggests that a full integrated "saving and investment union" would increase private sector spending by EUR 470 billion per year. The EC is besides aiming to finalise the banking union.
The issue of "comprehensive partnerships" with 3rd countries was discussed in order to successfully deport illegal immigrants.
However, further engagement in the implementation of plans to accomplish the alleged zero-emission economy by the mid-century has been confirmed.
Common Defence System
However, let us focus on the plan to build a common defence system, without US support.
On 19 March, the European Commission and the advanced typical published a White Paper on European Defence and the ReArm Europe/Gottiness 2030 plan, which one more time provides for the sharing of debt to supply leverage to boost investment in defence capabilities.
The White Paper presents a fresh EC approach to defence. The president of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who utilized to be head of the German Ministry of Defence and had no success in this area, is now liable for the creation of a European safety architecture that all EU countries can trust on.
The state is expected to invest more in defence. This is an chance for economical recovery, not only for armed companies, but besides for automotive companies from our continent and another companies – to strengthen European military capabilities. However, The Union intends to build these capacities in isolation from interoperability and cooperation with the US.
Together with the White Paper, the 2030 Goth Plan was presented, which assumes increased defence and investment in the Community defence industry. It is simply that Europeans, who so far have been 80 percent dependent on abroad weapons, mainly American, want to restrict and make their own military companies, excluding the anticipation of buying fresh weapons outside. This is simply a prerequisite for strengthening the continental defence technology and manufacture base, which is to stimulate innovation.
The Head of the EC pointed out that specified a change in approach is due to the "urgent request for Ukraine's support in the short term". In the long run, it is intended to improve safety and defence in Europe.
The White Paper addresses, inter alia, the elimination of critical shortcomings in the capabilities and construction of the defence industrial base, major investments in defence, defence strategy procurement, long-term readiness of the European defence industry, investment in AI, quantum technology, increased resilience to worst-case scenarios by improving military mobility and stockpiling and strengthening external borders, in peculiar the land border with Russia and Belarus, and building partnerships with countries with akin views worldwide.
The ReArm Europe/Votality 2030 plan sets out ways to spend more than €800 billion on the abovementioned objectives.
The EC wants to increase public backing for defence at national level, offering a little restrictive policy towards countries already facing so much debt (launching the national exit clause provided for in the stableness and Growth Pact, which will supply additional space in the budget to increase defence spending in accordance with EU fiscal rules). In another words, countries will be able to indebted, but only if expenditure is allocated to defence, on the basis of the statistical category "national defence" in the classification of government functions (COFOG); a maximum of 1,5 % of GDP in each year of launching the national exit clause over the next 4 years.
In addition, the EC is expected to borrow EUR 150 billion on behalf of EU countries (New Instrument for Enhancing Europe's safety – SAFE). As with the sharing of debt for recovery after the alleged pandemic, countries will be required to prepare national plans. On the basis of these, they will be provided with multi-annual loans, which will, of course, should be repaid and which can only be spent in accordance with strict EU criteria.
Ukraine will besides be able to apply for money – allowed for joint procurement with EFTA countries – and even countries aspiring to the EU.
In addition, crucial private capital is expected to be raised for investment in the European arms manufacture by centralising and speeding up the creation of a fiscal and capital union. The European Investment Bank will supply more loans.
The European Council in its conclusions of 20 March, referring to the conclusions of 6 March, called for "the work to be accelerated (...) in order to importantly increase Europe's defence readiness over the next 5 years". She stressed that "the stronger and more capable European Union in the field of safety and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security, and is simply a complement to NATO, which remains, for its members, the basis of their collective defence".
US for more defence expenses, provided you buy in America
In October last year, STIMSON Center, American think tank on abroad policy, he stressed that the EU "forge itself in crises" – first the Greek financial crisis, then the covid crisis and now the Ukrainian crisis service to strengthen the EU institutions and centralise the power of the EC.
This analytical centre welcomes initiatives to strengthen European defence. It considers that it is "steps in the right direction" and "The United States should support them". At the same time, it lists a number of barriers and points out that "the success of these initiatives depends partially on the consequence of the United States and Washington's willingness to support European allies in their quest for autonomy."
While both the head of the EC and the president of the United States agree that Europe must be able to defend itself, they disagree on how to accomplish this.
Donald Trump is not only demanding an increase in European defence spending. Even during his first U.S. term, they powerfully lobbied for the governments of the Old Continent to "buy US" weapons. And that hasn't changed at the moment.
Von der Leyen, in turn, is dreaming of the EU becoming a leader in defence research, improvement and procurement. She presented her imagination in July 2024 during a speech to the European Parliament. She was talking about building a "real European Defence Union" and creating a "single defence market".
So there are many misunderstandings between the North Atlantic Alliance's main partners as to the form that European defence should take and how to accomplish this objective.
STIMSON Center analysts point out that the EU will "have to retreat from social policy to free defence funds, encourage the consolidation of defence companies and build assurance in the EU and its associate States. no of these compromises are easy to scope or popular."
Hence, any leaders are in favour of the long-term nonsubjective of building European strategical autonomy, i.e. building self-defence without abroad intervention. However, countries disagree in essential matters, specified as defining the top threats, how to mitigate them by military force, building the possible to face hostile actions, etc.
Part of the political elite – for example in Poland – is opposed to building the EU's strategical autonomy, rightly fearing that the United States would be completely dispossessed from our continent in a situation where the theoretically "autonomic Europe" would not be able to safe itself in the event of Russia's aggression. Fears are not baseless, given the history.
One thing is certain: the EU will not be able to build strategical autonomy and defence capacity adequate to face a possible enemy beyond the east border for a long time.
Its deficiency of resources, there are strong concerns about national sovereignty, there is yet a fear about the US's consequence to these actions.
On the second issue, in the past, the United States has undermined European efforts to strengthen defence under EU conditions. STIMSON Center recalls how in 2018 the Trump administration published a memorandum in which it called on the Pentagon and American diplomats to actively lobby for the sale of conventional weapons abroad. "So in 2019, erstwhile European leaders worked out the details of the proposed projects of the European Defence Fund and PESCO, Ellen Lord, Undersecretary of defence for acquisition and Maintenance in Trump's Administration, and Andrea Thompson, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and global safety Affairs, wrote a letter to the EU with strong opposition. They have identified the language of the [Union] papers as poison. They besides threatened that limiting the engagement of non-EU countries [in EU contracts] could besides exclude any company that uses American technology.”
The United States, on the 1 hand, has an interest in developing and, on the another hand, in limiting European defence initiatives. This is due to the fact that "when US allies buy from US defence producers, production lines stay open and arms production in the US is cheaper".
Needless to say, the current administration is looking for immense savings in the budget (a row of nearly $2 trillion). It is improbable that she would want to increase already the horrendous cost of arms production in her country, while expanding military challenges worldwide. any American decision-makers fear that US influence in Europe will decrease if Washington no longer plays a major function in ensuring Europe's security. Therefore, erstwhile Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki utilized these concerns, saying in the capital of the United States: – European autonomy sounds elegant, doesn't it? But that means moving Europe's centre of gravity towards China and breaking ties with the US..
STIMSON The Center besides has no uncertainty that, in the event of strengthening the European position as a "defensor" of the EU, it will "start violating the areas of NATO's core competence" and "in fact, the biggest point in dispute between NATO and the EU is America's opposition to the EU's treatment as a defence entity".
Think tank He fears that the Americans will argue EU plans, although they support the very thought of militarily strengthening Europe. STIMSON encourages Washington not to defy the imagination of a European "defensor" due to the fact that the US must reduce its interest in the Old Continent, given the request to face many emerging threats in the Pacific.
America "welcomes" as stated in the final remarks of the Washington NATO Summit in July 2024, "EU efforts to strengthen and grow the European defence industry's possible to increase defence readiness. It is in the interests of the Alliance and the United States to have strong European partners, including European industry."
Problems with independency from Washington
British, highly influential think tank Chatham House, in its opinion expressed on 19 March, stated that "with the publication of the fresh White Paper on defence improvement by the EU, clear priorities are emerging to make Europe an independent military power". Action is so being taken to "re-calibrate Europe to become a global power that can defend itself without US support".
Think tank points to a number of problems related to independency from Washington. It reiterates that, despite the work carried out by European countries for many decades on this issue, they have not succeeded.
Problems include the inability to establish the exchange of information between NATO and the EU and the creation of an independent defence force.
This is due, for example, to dependence on American software. "Key data points from US weapons systems are automatically sent to the US. Key software updates depend on US manufacturers and many weapons systems come from the United States. These are problematic dependence erstwhile Europe is considering acting on its own", the opinion states. The EU must enable its defence manufacture to boost capacity and reduce dependence on US systems, by Kajs Ollongren and Armida van Rij.
The authors stress that the media presents a simplified image of the fact that “US are able to run emergency switch and unhook American systems."
By providing detailed information on, for example, F-35 aircraft, which are designed to usage US-produced weapons, it shows that the aircraft is "not realistic in the short term" to adapt to possible European software and weapons.
Many countries have purchased more F-35 5th generation fighters since the war in Ukraine. They all depend on the U.S. government and the US defence firm Lockheed Martin for strategy upgrades. What if the United States does not agree to adapt the aircraft to usage European software?
Today, any European countries have major purchasing obligations towards US arms companies.
Similarly, the situation is in the case of military intelligence cooperation. The tracking and detection of threats to Europeans is usually controlled by the US. any countries are trying to make their own data systems. In any cases, information is inactive automatically sent to the US.
It is now up to the Defence Ministers to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the possible implications of dependence on U.S. weapons, software and intelligence. The point is not to make decisions that endanger the defence capacity of your own country.
The White Paper identifies 7 areas where defence capacity gaps in Europe should be addressed. They are huge. These include "air defence and rocket defence", "artificial intelligence, quantum, cybernetic and electronic warfare".
If Europeans want to integrate different capabilities in the detection of short-range drones, radars, ground-to-air rocket systems and air surveillance, it will take them a long time.
Chatham home points out that “the European Commission seems to have limited knowing of end-users, namely the European armed forces. alternatively of defence manufacture data, the European Defence Heads should be asked to specify the capacities they consider to be precedence in assessing gaps."
There are a number of another problems concerning the already massive debt of any EU countries, which cannot afford to proceed debt. The European defence manufacture is besides not prepared to innovate on a large scale to make many, learning on the modern battlefield of Ukraine. startups, scaling fresh technologies.
Shopping only within the interior market
However, the biggest problem is the exclusion from the orders of non-European entities, as proposed in the ReArm Europe plan for a debt fund of EUR 150 billion. Earlier, there had been a fierce conflict behind the scenes between France and Germany about whether money from the fund could be spent on purchasing equipment produced outside the EU.
Paris demanded that the funds from the Fund be invested entirely within the Union. Germany, which bought Israeli air defence strategy Arrow 3 and leased unmanned aircraft from Israel for billions of euros, and announced its intention to acquisition Patriot air defence systems from the US, demanded that part of the fund be spent on purchases in the EU. The remainder could have been released in another countries.
However, the French option prevailed. The US, British and Turkish arms manufacture were so excluded from European public procurement. Israel will not benefit either.
According to the EC proposal, 65 percent of the cost of purchasing defence systems must be spent in the EFTA countries (European Free Trade Association), which consists of EU countries and Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, as well as Ukraine.
The remaining 35 percent may be spent in another countries, but only on condition that they have a safety and defence partnership agreement with the EU.
Brussels expects the applicable agreements to be signed soon: South Korea, Japan and the United Kingdom. specified an agreement will not be made by the United States, which will not let EU countries to block the sale of any of their weapons systems.
Brussels is moving on. It excludes the anticipation for European countries to acquisition weapons systems entirely designed in a country which does not belong to the EFTA or to sign the applicable agreement.
For now, a debt fund of EUR 150 billion is set up, but it is expected to be extended to up to EUR 500 billion or more.
States will proceed to discuss how the thought of a common "European defence entity" should look in practice. Germany, commenting on the EC proposal, noted that "they do not want to make the impression that they are seeking to separate from the US". The proposal did not like Poland either, but was to be welcomed by France and Italy, hoping to consolidate the European military industry.
EU countries presently spend almost 80 percent of their arms budgets on procurement outside the EU, mainly in the US.
Perhaps Eurocrats have a different purpose, which they are not talking about. The White Paper and the Defence Plan are part of the task to centralise the power of the unelected establishment managing EU affairs within the European Commission.
Consent to a number of actions to strengthen Brussels' competence in fiscal, defence, etc. – in connection with the implementation of the current plan, the details of which rise the most objections may later be changed – will make it possible for the state to velocity up the EU federalisation process by means of facts made, citing the "Ukrainian crisis".
In May 2022, the European Commission and the EU advanced typical liable for diplomacy presented a task to build a defence union and a European army that could operate anywhere in the planet where EU countries have interests. It was then pointed out that it was essential to start first with urgent reforms in the arms industry, based on the French and German industries.
It has already been pointed out that the main focus must be on "joint purchases of military equipment, strategical defence software, as well as building on a European industrial base and licensed defence research". The EU countries would then make their own army that would be able to station and respond in the Indo-Pacific or African area.
Ultimately, thanks to the centralisation of power by introducing qualified votes in the Council and a number of another actions, the EC has the ambition to compete with America in many fields. It so seems doubtful that the United States will let the EU to become completely independent. It is not possible for Brussels to be able to guarantee the safety of associate States in the long term, let alone short-term 2030. Especially due to the fact that he has plans to proceed expanding, including the countries of the highly restless Western Balkans region.
The current plans may have a negative impact on the defence capabilities of the smaller, overly indebted states. They primarily benefit from US and non-European defence systems, which, at least at this stage, are excluded from competing for arms contracts. In addition, there is simply a problem of possible US pressure, and even a deterioration of relations with the main European safety guarantor through NATO.
Agnieszka Stelmach
