Creating a imagination of the future of any phenomenon or process requires not so much broad cognition and imagination, but conceptualization capabilities in a logical, methodological and intellectual dimension.
Knowledge of a historical, philosophical or political nature alone is not enough. This can be seen, for example, by politicians who trust on historical education, by their statements show cognitive helplessness and primitiveness of inference. Even professional researchers are lost in the complexity and unpredictability of processes taking place in the modern world.
A peculiar challenge is the conceptualization of modern Russia against the background of its extraordinary geography and history, with the anticipation of recognizing its contemporary strategical choices. This is not an easy task, due to the fact that in practice there is no cause-and-effect thinking, there is simply a predominate freedom not to say the disinvolvement of narrative, the language has fallen into a trap of conflicting connotations, not competence, but zeal in pursuits, as if the object of the analysis were slandered, ridiculed, inverted.
The shift from positivistic ontological assumptions towards intersubjectivity and social construction of reality has fundamentally changed the patterns of technological knowledge. alternatively of examining the circumstances of phenomena and processes, attention in diagnosis focuses on the personalization of politics. Attributing cognitive aberrations and deficits to Putin relieves politicians and researchers of their intellectual effort to consider the real changes that take place in the structure of the global system, especially among the participants of the "great game" of the power. The number of critical studies (and junk films) devoted to Putin is simply a symptom of specified a boom in rusophobia that it resembles “the Titanic moment”. In front of our eyes, there are profound changes in the decomposition of existing forces, but the “band” of fanatic rusophobes plays to the very end. The "Ice Mountain" plunges politicians and researchers into anti-Russian irrationalism.
Against this background, it is hard to anticipate any affirmative conceptualisation of Polish-Russian relations, both in the short and average term. Despite signals from outside the ocean about possible changes in attitudes, Polish politicians are doing everything to establish themselves in the current course. The casandric or alternatively catastrophic prophecies about Russia's progressive aggression dominate, and the smearing of media space with pseudo-scientists of Russian issues took a tragic character.
It is simply a pity that the candidates in the presidential run cannot be expected to have any fresh air in matters of rationalising policies towards the east. Unless a surprise candidate announces his start in the election that would stimulate any of the opinion to critically think. It is not adequate to repeat the mantra about the request to guarantee Poland's security, as politicians and their media patrons do all day. It would inactive be worth pointing out what way Poland will take to guarantee the position of a compatible partner, having a good relation with all its neighbours, in a changing geopolitical system. The function of an eternally quarreling, hostile and inciter to the conflict of a scout is absolutely harmful in the long run.
Russia's Right
So far, cognitive errors in relation to Russia have done more harm than it seems. Their effect is not only immense simplification, but besides primitive, even simple, prescriptions for solving the problems. fewer people see the insane hazard that a rampant arms policy and calling on Europe as a full to join a military crusade will inevitably lead to a war disaster. Subsequent governments are enslaved by old anti-Russian schemes, not wanting and incapable to revise them psychologically for the fresh situation. Currently, after 3 years of war in Ukraine, 1 cannot pretend otherwise.
First, the war became a rational and effective operation of the Russian Federation. Regardless of the difference of opinion, who provoked whom, the Russians proved in 2022 that there were limits that they would not let to cross Western corporations and countries, based on their vital safety interests. Of course, 1 can disagree with the Russian explanation of the safety space, but 1 cannot pretend that another powers, especially the United States, do not usage the same imperial logic (areas of influence, zones of interest, buffer zones). In fact, Donald Trump exposed it mercilessly, announcing even before taking over the presidency the embarrassing territorial grievances towards Greenland, Canada or the Panama Canal.
Second, the war in Ukraine confirmed the geopolitical size of Russia, which means its constant determination to defend its rations in the Eurasian spacej, with the support and knowing of many crucial countries. As a atomic power, Russia did not let itself to have its state of possession – immense space, natural wealth, multiculturalism – to be plundered or annihilated. Despite the large commitment of the West to Ukraine, as well as the application of complex sanctions and sanctions mechanisms to Russia, it failed to overcome or break. On the contrary, it proves and confirms its power in a unambiguous way, at the price of shed blood by thousands of fresh heroes. The pathos that accompany this uplift deserve separate attention.
Thirdly, defence and expansion militarism remains an unwavering feature of Russian strategical culture. Military effort and method achievements are a origin in economical improvement and the army performs a uniting function towards society. Militarianism masks weaknesses and fear, makes the cult of force the main criterion of assessing people and institutions. Russia remains under constant military-political tension, under force from “Western evil”. Sustainable propaganda mobilization allows to consolidate society and persuade them to be right in the politics of state authorities. To defend the prestige and position of the large state, the Russians desperately defend their importance and are ready for heroic sacrifices.
These 3 resolutions require reflection on the anticipation of building a rational imagination of Polish-Russian relations in the foreseeable future. The condition is to be aware of the intent pursued by the neighbouring state towards the hostile power. If this goal is to last and normalize relations, then any war with Russia – a country highly experienced in battlefields, well armed and militarized and convinced of its geopolitical size and strength – is surely not a rational solution. Even with the support of allies, it is suicidal thinking. It threatens to destruct the material base (territory, population, resources) and to deprive itself of the ability to decide its own political fate. No war on Polish dirt is worth the goals that fools specify in political costumes.
Regardless of the low assessment of the intellectual possible of the ruling, 1 should anticipate any sobering up in Russia's assessments, which may return in a predictable position to a real diplomatic game, and even dictate the conditions for peaceful settlement with Ukraine and the West. Only ignorant and foolish do not see in past the many perverseness of fate, the function of chance and unexpected twists. In these contexts, it is worth mentioning, for example, the old "miracles of the Brandenburg house" from the 7 Years' War.
Out of the periphery
The strategical position of Poland even in the large defence alliance, which is the North Atlantic alliance, condemns it to "peripheral localism", oversensitivity against the Russian threat, loneliness in situations of acute inter-power confrontations, and even individual dedication to the altar of global interests of the powers. That is why it is so crucial to get any intellectual and decision-making autonomy in relation to the arguments of the center of the Western system, or Washington. Is this possible in today's state of dependence and serilism governing the US, NATO and the European Union, another matter? Visitivity, profetism, or visionism let for specified thinking, which allows us to ignore various limitations.
It seems that there are 3 possibilities for developing the situation which will trigger the future initiative of Polish policy towards Russia and may reverse negative trends.
The first involves polycentricisation of the global strategy and rebalancing in the US-China-Russia triangle. It may besides be a bigemonic arrangement between the US and China, forming a kind of condominium with Russia, in which the powers share interests and work for regional stability. erstwhile China, with Russia's support, will be able to challenge America, even in Taiwan, while at the same time ensuring the neutrality of many another countries (e.g. Germany), Poland will be forced to re-evaluate its policy and begin rebuilding relations with Russia. This will besides be linked to the EU crisis, threatening to break down this structure. These are, of course, very free sentiments, which do not take into account many complex conditions, specified as systemic and intellectual ones.
The second option would affect the restoration of the political elite in Poland. It is possible to imagine specified a extremist change, e.g. social revolt, that the old PO-PiS solidarity arrangement will run, and a fresh organization hegemony will be born in its place, with a deviation towards anti-Europeanism and nationalism. Then there would undoubtedly be a chance to recreate an autonomous possible to any degree (of sovereignty there is no way), allowing a revision of the position towards Russia.
The 3rd option is related to the policies of countries specified as Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Austria and possibly Germany, in which political elites, according to the will of societies, begin to alienate themselves from the Atlantic community and search their own modus vivendi in relations with Russia. The question is, of course, whether in the foreseeable position Poland will be able to make independent political elites, given their intellectual enslavement, the western colonization of media, discipline and business.
However, much indicates that during the presidency Donald Trump Poland will lose the name “Winkelrieda of nations” in the Western Crusade against Russia. Then the space for rebuilding the Central European block of countries with Poland will be unveiled, which will decide on pragmatic cooperation with Russia and China, thereby defending itself against selfish protectionism and calculating Western partners.
Learn Realism
From American Realists John Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato It can be learned that rational actors in their abroad policy usage reliable theories: logically consistent explanations, based on realistic assumptions and supported by solid empirical evidence (J.J. Mearsheimer, S. Rosato, “As States Think. Rationality in abroad Policy”, Warsaw 2024). It seems that for Poland conflicted with Russia and its political elite, suffering from a complex of infirmities, the best origin of theoretical inspiration would be the current defensive realism. It is associated with structural realism, the essence of which he laid out in the late 1970s Kenneth N. Waltz (Structure of the explanation of global relations, Warsaw 2010).
Looking from the position of defensive realism, it can be assumed that Russia is not "immanently" aggressive, as it is commonly portrayed (the United States is equally aggressive), but it strives primarily to safe itself. The traumas associated with the two-fold disintegration of statehood in the 20th century and the blood sacrifice of the large Patriotic War (1941-1945) constitute a mythological ideological foundation of its strategy and caution to prevent the tragedy again. The structure of the global system, in which there is continued competition for influence, dominance and primacy, so requires specified a power position to defend the current state of possession. The desire to last sanctions and allows to explain the aggressive attitude Russia has taken towards Ukraine and, as a result, towards the supporting West.
Polish governments of PO-PiS have unfortunately been trapped by offensive realism. Convinced of Russia's persistent aggression, they put on maximizing the defensive effort, which takes on defensive-offensive character. Hence, the belief that the common mobilisation of Western Russia must be overcome and dealt with erstwhile and for all. Unfortunately, this determinism is the essence of the drama that takes place before our eyes. Despite the high-profile declarations of the highest in the past of defence expenditures (he peculiarly specialized in this rhetoric of the Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamish) Poland, however, will never be able to match or defy the power of Russia. This uncertainty is simply a origin of constant frustration and expanding fear, as well as increasing dependence on allied forces, including American forces. It is not essential to convince anyone that specified dependence restricts the freedom to decide for themselves and creates many risks.
Therefore, despite moral discomfort in the case of the front country, which is Poland, the best choice is defensive realism. It reduces risky action as it suggests basing the safety strategy of the parties not only on the maximisation of force, but besides on supporting, cooperative actions. Restoring the assurance of the ruling teams and restoring normality in Polish-Russian relations, even at diplomatic level, will surely take a long time, but it is an inevitable and non-alternative task.
From Lubecki to Bochenski
Political realism in no variety has never enjoyed designation among Polish political and intellectual elites. Exceptions Franciszek Ksawery Drucki-Lubecki, Roman Dmowski or Alexander Bocheński They only confirm this consensus. Various varieties of Messianic ideology and megalomania of Polish nobility led to escape into idealistic swarms. This scheda does not give hope for a extremist change in geopolitical thinking. However, it does not slow down efforts, even narrow social circles, to reconstruct the rationality of policy objectives.
The most crucial of all is survival. The State will not be able to accomplish any another nonsubjective unless it survives in the material and organization condition already achieved. The apparent condition for endurance is constant concern for security. However, they must be regarded as a coexistence value, dependent on the incidental interests and collective efforts of participants in global relations. According to the imperative of Immanuel Kant, peculiar interests, frequently of egoistic colour, must be subject to the Community interests, which emphasize the indivisibility of security. You cannot feel safe alone if your neighbour feels threatened. possibly the negotiations expected to conclude, or even freeze, war in Ukraine will uncover the request for specified a reinterpretation of global security. They may besides painfully callback that all country, including Russia, has its rations and grounds to defend them even at the price of cruel war.
Reaching for defensive reality does not mean trying to mitigate a dangerous rival or even an enemy (appeasement). Although natural in this context are associated with the concessions of Britain towards Hitler in the 1930s, however, each case should be treated separately. There are no simple parallels or repetitions in history. But there are inactive cases of foolish, reckless, or risky policies that show a tendency to harm themselves. Poland has besides much to lose to throw blood and well-being on the scales of its citizens, all the more so due to the fact that for over a 100 years it has not waged a war with Russia and there are no conflicts with it, provoking a common attack. It does not number in the power club either, although any political leaders feel otherwise. The thought of power in a middle-ranking country usually results in an overestimation of strength and opportunities.
The presumption of the rationality of state behaviour gives hope that the leaders of the powers will realize that competition in the field of safety and the conduct of exhausting wars do not make much sense in a globalized global system. As Kenneth N. Waltz (1924-2013, 1 of the most prominent theorists of global relations, wrote in the first sentences of his doctoral dissertation, we see that “there are no victories in wars but only different degrees of defeat” (“Man, State, War. Theoretical Analysis”, Kraków 2023, p. 21). Does the tragic war in Ukraine prove the fact of this thesis?
Prof. Stanisław Bielen
Think Poland, No. 3-4 (19-26.01.2025)
