"Fast, ruthless, brutal, uncompromising, trampling political opponents, but at the same time mild, eloquent, gentle and adored by women" – so during 1 of the historical debates prof. Janusz Odziemkowski characterized Wojciech Korfantego.
It is actual that Korfanty had his full political life, hard and stormy – many enemies he had created for himself, as the malicious say. Is this an accurate assessment? In a way, but if you look at the careers of another Polish politicians of this period, it turns out that the case of Korfanty is not an exception. Did Dmowski and Piłsudski not have many enemies? Were they not the subject of fierce campaigns against them? This was already the case at that time, abundant in expressive and strong form, that specified politicians had enemies beyond measure.
Initially, after 1918 – Korfanty was primarily an enemy of the left, who saw in him the embodiment of “resistance”, “endection”, “anti-Semitism” and “authoritarianism”. His arrival in Warsaw at the head of the Prussian partition delegation (14 November 1918) sparked a serious political conflict. For respective days, Korfanty was king of Warsaw Street, a savior to free Warsaw from socialist rule. “Kurier Warszawski” wrote: “The hero of the day is Korfanty... In those uncounted crowds that scope out to Corfantem, it is like a prayer, like a cry for an act that will save us from chaos. You lead us! You save me! You be the helmman in the storm!... Corfanty has become a symbol of strength for all of us." It was this argument of the force that emanated through him – for the first time he made him stand in the way of Józef Piłsudski, who considered him a dangerous opponent from that minute on. Piłsudski besides had a left behind, which saw in Korfanty the spectrum of “endection”, even though Korfanty was never truly her representative.
So it is no wonder that the leaders of Silesia were insulted and accused. An anonymous brochure entitled "Return in Poland" mentions it: "A career kind without conviction, without ideology, without character. Demagog and first-class provoker. He can pose. He can arrange the enthusiasm of the crowd and hire people to decoup the horse from his cab and pull it themselves... He knows how to set up assassinations on himself. He can strike Germans and place his money in Berlin banks or do business with “Frankowski Brothers”, a celebrated butcher company from the German business that robbed millions of brands in Poland under the German wing. It will be full of devotion, honor and delight to Piłsudski erstwhile he is scheduled to participate in the government, and half an hr later at the Endek rally."
This direction of attack will be something permanent in the practice of the propaganda conflict with Korfanty, only that the socialists will halt this kind of argument after 1926, but the popular propaganda of the Pilsudczyk will make it creatively. Korfanty's second very serious clash with the left-wing MPS and PSL "Deliverance" took place in the summertime of 1922, erstwhile right-wing clubs issued his candidacy for Prime Minister. PPS has put her organization on its feet. It was written: “The government of Korfanty – a government of utmost reaction, corruption, and the most brutal, existence of Prussian methods. Corfants... is simply a man without rules and without moral scruples, demagog with the wishes of a dictator, only knows the methods of police brutality, swindling the worst instincts of a dark crowd in the interests of working classes. Korfante's office is simply a signal for the most hard interior fights and unrepeated harm to Polish abroad policy".
According to PPS, Korfanty's regulation “is freedom for the pascars, it is hunger for the working people, it is police rape and lawlessness, it is repression for the people, and impunity for the nobility and bourgeoisie, it is simply a disgrace for Poland.” Corfante's chief adversaries were Daszyński Ignacy, who was fond of flowery and demagogue terms, but much more threatening was Józef Piłsudski, who, contrary to the principles of parliamentaryism, refused to accept the Korfant's candidacy as declared by the majority of the Sejm, risking even losing his position as Chief of State. Piłsudski, who had an aversion to Korfanty since 1918 – put the case on the blade of the knife – me or Korfanty. specified determination was due to the fear that Corfanty was the only right-wing politician who could even force him to argue Piłsudski's rule. In 1922 the walsudczyks were already after experiences of conflict during the 3rd Silesian Uprising, during which Corfanty as Dictator of the Uprising – by force pacified the revolt of the officers of the POW – Michał Grażyński and Karol Grzesik.
The Corfant did not hesitate to usage his side defender of the complex sailors under command Captain Robert Oszek – arrest the rebel leaders and endanger them with a court of law. The footballers felt this incidental very painfully. Corfanty had already exposed themselves to a extremist and decisive attitude in 1918, now it was even worse. Piłsudski had reason to believe that Korfanty was the politician on the right, who would be capable of alleged direct action in the fight for power. No wonder, then, that the operation to discredit Korfant not only as a politician, but besides as a man – went full steam. The leader of the Silesian chadeks is not only a dangerous opponent, but besides a renegade and dorobkiewicz. There were rumours, spread in circles of thought, that Korfanty took money from the German government during planet War I (such rumours spread among others by Ignacy Daszyński). The attack on Korfanty's story as a politician fighting for the Polishness of Silesia was peculiarly perfidious and, as is known, will end during the Brest trial with a charge of action in favour of Germany.
As early as 1922, these attacks did not meet with knowing among the roots, but the seed of mistrust was sown. For example, the prominent politician of the National Democracy, Juliusz Zdanowski, wrote in his journal: “They are angry at Corfant’s assumption, due to the fact that being the boy of a worker, they cannot be accused of being of a deficiency of democratic origin; and present in Silesia it is hard to be in the masses against his popularity. No wonder that his candidacy is primarily called provocative, so he is inconvenient to them. Only this man is so into his career and so separated from any relation with any bias that I fear always, that it is not known where he can break (...), it gives emergence to any distrust for the future.” You can see a scratch that will deepen over time. The same Zdanowski will compose in the following years that “time to end with Korfanty” and will besides note very unfavourable opinions to him Roman Dmowski.
The relations of these 2 prominent politicians were complicated from the very beginning – they first met in Zakopane in 1903 erstwhile Korfanty joined the National League. But then there was a conflict in Silesia, the victim of which was the Kowalczyk brothers representing National Democracy. Corfanty already at the beginning of his cooperation with ND made it clear – in my territory no 1 else will rule. Then, erstwhile the war broke out – Korfanty did not support the anti-German orientation of Dmowski and kept his loyalty to Germany. Dmowski must have felt this painfully, although in 1918 it seemed that everything was going back to normal, due to the fact that Korfanty stood on the ground of Dmowski's politics and became the leading politician of Prussian partition. It was an illusion – in Silesia the endecia could not grow its wings, due to the fact that the almost full monopoly was preserved by Corfanty. For example, in the 1922 election, the unified right-wing list won 18 seats in Silesia, of which he was only an endek Edward FishermanAnd the remainder are Corfant's supporters from Christian Democracy. Dmowski and ND management would most likely swallow this fact, but Korfanty clearly besides pursued a stand-alone policy on national grounds. His candidacy for Prime Minister was by no means an ND idea. Worse still, during government Vincent Witos in 1923, in which Korfanta and Dmowski sat together – the leader of the Silesian chadetia openly opposed Dmowski about the treasure minister Władysław Kucharskiwho was Dmowski's favorite. After 1926, it was only worse – the evolution of Korfanty to the center and his relation with the Morges Front – made Korfanty an ideological enemy for National Democracy. He himself did not dress up in words, accusing Dmowski of dogmatism and bringing to defeat the National Party.
The case of the crossroads of the roads of National Democracy and Corfantego is very peculiar in this situation, due to the fact that many seemed to be almost emanating of national ethos. Dmowski dreamed of burgher Poland, unromantic Poland – and here came specified a bourgeois politician – Wojciech Korfanty. And it didn't work out.. Was it Corfante's fault? Or did his burgherness not fit with the ND politicians of the Kingdom and Galicia? Corfante's biographer Marian Orzechowski seems to be inclined to the second answer:
“Corfanty had nothing in him that was shaped by the traditions of Polish Romanticism and national liberation spurs. It was distinctly different from many another burgher politicians from his endecies, who verbally refrained from this, in their concepts, the kind of action and the practice of politics were under the overwhelming influence of the experiences of their fathers – participants and epigons of events of the past historical era. Corfanty, a spokesperson for the burgher Poland, was a sober politician with the ability to analyse and measure the surrounding reality. This ability besides allowed him to stay on the surface of political life after many would seem irreparably lost battles and compromises, and it is besides a intellectual key to knowing the phenomenon of the sustainability of his political career for nearly 40 years in highly diverse historical situations and different ideological-political arrangements."
The fact that this could be demonstrated by the gradual submission of the politicians to the ND propaganda of the Pilsudczyk, who saw in Korfanty a silent supporter of the German in Silesia, active in obscure agreements with German capital, defending the autonomy of Silesia against its unions with Poland.
Is there a tragedy in the policy rejected by Poland? Not really. In the 1930s, Korfanty abruptly became highly valued in the PPS circles. Adam Pragier, who participated in the run against Korfanty, wrote about him in his memoirs with the highest reversibility, stressing that after years he put it into oblivion. Corfante's large friend has become Herman Lieberman. Vincent Witos was close to him, though he kept any distance. It is clear that these friendships were caused by the repression of the sanctions. It linked Korfanty to the part of the PPS. On the another hand, erstwhile Korfanty died, and it was perceived as death provoked by the sanitation—it turned out that the animosities between Corfanty and the planet of politics did not substance much. The ceremony of the leader of the Silesian people was attended by many delegations of the National Party, which showed that the deeper into the people – the more popular Korfanty was. It was his top asset. Unliked among the elites for whom he was frequently sad, he was a god and a model for simple people.
Jan Engelgard
In the photo: Wojciech Korfanty during the visit of president Stanisław Wojciechowski in Silesia (1923)
