Wirtel: November Uprising, or Polish suicide goal

myslpolska.info 2 years ago

In the Polish mentality we have a cult of subsequent uprisings – a bad decline after the 19th century, and especially after the romanticist era. It is rather common to think that all the scraps were crucial and needed, regardless of their outcome. Like in amateur sports – little about the score, the participation itself matters. In the opinion of the average Pole, the uprising proved to the evil possessor that brave Poles would never always accept slavery, that we would never give up, that to the last drop of blood, etc. We deficiency realpolitik reasoning (which Roman Dmowski tried to teach us). specified a cool, logical analysis that would make you think – would all uprisings pay off? or was there truly a better alternative? If you look at this second way (a profit and failure account), you might find that any uprisings should not have erupted. For example, 1831 (from the first, earlier year of clash, named November).

Not so terrible Russia

The average Pole (especially in the south of the country), erstwhile asked about "good" and "bad" invaders, would have no problem responding. Austria will prove to be a “good” (or benevolent) in contrast to “bad” Prussia and especially Russia. This was true, but until 1860, that is, in Franz Joseph's time (whose monarch granted the freedom of the subordinate nations any of the must, saving the state from the crisis).

Just after 1815 (when the Vienna legislature divided Polish lands after the Napoleonic Wars), the situation was just ... precisely the opposite. The Poles had the least freedom in the Austrian Galicia, the Zakarpackian state governed by orders from the politician and the governors. The remnants of self-reliance were maintained by Wlk. Fr. Poznański under Prussian occupation, where the possessor initially respected at least separate offices and languages. And by far the population of the Kingdom of Poland, under the sceptre of the Russian emperor, was the best.

The Polish Kingdom (from the way the legislature was called) was a separate – although dependent – state. However, the union with Russia (the emperor of Russia was of the office of king of Poland) had his own parliament, government, army (!!!), money and law (including the liberal constitution, the unthinkable thing in Russia at the time). After the Napoleonic wars, the country woke up to life, and the symbol of the revival became the University of Warsaw, then created.

It was not a sovereign state (in terms of abroad policy it was dependent on Russia, that is, the emperor-king), but its political conditions were much better than those imposed after the partitions in 1795 (when different parts of Poland became simply provinces of possessive states). No political existence under the partitions has always reached the equal degree of autonomy as this Kingdom (except for the Duchy of Warsaw, which, however, had a very short lifespan).

So it must not be amazing that the song [God, something Poland] was the anthem of the Kingdom, where in the chorus we sang – Our King save us, Lord! (with the Russian emperor in mind).

Far from Perfect

If it was so good, why was it so bad? – it would have been a bit malicious to ask. Well, the Russian aggressor did not stick to the law very closely, after 1820 introducing e.g. preventive censorship, and by spying on students. The large Duke of Constanta (the Emperor’s brother, chief of the Kingdom army, and the country’s actual large ruler) has besides done much harm. His degrading behaviour led many subordinate officers to suicide, and gradually became 1 of the more hated figures in Poles.

The main “winemaker” on the another side was romanticism—ideologies proclaiming the praise of rebellion, heart attack and “measurement of force on intent”. It was simple for young people to rebel against the evil tyrant, and kidnap the people, and the good God will be with us (for how else would he do it?)

This has besides been the consequence of an eternal conflict of generations. For the “old” (now colonels, professors, senators) the situation was not so bad (they could compare the autonomous Kingdom with the dissertational misery or the chaos of Napoleonic wars). For “young” (students, literates, lieutenants) the reality was unacceptable – here in the army is the arrogant Duke of Constanta, censorship cuts out incorrect articles and poems, and the old staff blocks the anticipation of promotion ...

A good Bad Beginning

The direct reason for the outbreak of the fighting (at the end of November 1830) was the plans of the emperor-king, assuming to send Polish troops to the pacification of the rebellious Belgium (just fighting for liberation from the Netherlands). fewer people know that the revolution was led by people aged around 30, and among the first victims killed by insurgents were six Polish generals (!!!) soberly and critically assessing the revolt.

The first mark of the conspirators was naturally the Duke of Constanta, who failed to get to him (his escape, however, raised joy). erstwhile news of the rebellion arrived in St. Petersburg in December, 1 had to decide – either fight or ask for mercy.

In January 1831 the Polish Sejm deposed the Russian emperor, depriving him of the title of Polish king. This meant, first, restoring independence, second, an open war with Russia. Thus Poland (4 million people) faced Russia (45 million) at the back with hostile Prussia (12 million). This clash could not win, due to the fact that the aid of France (just after the next revolution) was not to be counted. And it must be remembered that from the west we did not border France, but with Prussia.

A short time between the detronization of the ruler and the subsequent fall of Warsaw (meaning a fewer months 1831) was the only historical minute in the 19th century erstwhile there truly was a sovereign Polish state. Due to the large disparity of forces between Poland and Russia (supported quietly by Prussia) this Polish country was not written a long life.

It couldn't have worked.

After the monarch was deposed on Warsaw, the Russian army (more than 100 thousand) led by Field Marshal I.Dybicz started. Stopped in the bloody conflict of Olszynka Grochowska (February 1831), she returned east (not so far distant again, due to the fact that about 100 km). The breakthrough minute for the uprising was the conflict of Ostrołęka (May 1831), after which the strategical initiative passed to the Russians permanently. Not wanting to storm Warsaw again the shortest way, the fresh Russian chief I.Paskiewicz went around it from the west. The Russian army crossed the Vistula River in the Włocławka area (the crossing helped build the servants of Prussia), and the two-day storm of Warsaw (September 1831) marked the defeat of the uprising. Its end was determined by crossing the Prussian border close Brodnica by the Polish army, and the surrender of the fortresses of Modlin and Zamość (October 1831).

The 1831 run revealed respective talents among Polish generals (J.Przydziński, J.Bem, and especially I.Przedziński). Poles besides won a number of victories in smaller, local clashes (although under Stoczek or Igania). So the question arises – if not for the conservative attitude of the commanders, if the chief leader was such, for example, Prądzyński, would the uprising win?

The answer is unfortunately negative. At most, the 1831 run was to be won, followed by further clashes. And the disparity of forces between Poland and Russia was besides large, so that by 1833 at the latest no decisive defeat would come. Especially since in the utmost case with “brotherly help” there would come Prussia, which independent Poland did not want at the time (the prize could receive respective border counties – Kalisz, Częstochowa or even Płock).
Thus, the uprising fell after little than a year, and Poles came to pay the price for the young romanticist leap. And this price is rather advanced – thousands of broken résumés and a liquidated state.

It wasn't worth it. It wasn't worth it.

The lost uprising did not mean returning to the erstwhile status. It meant a deterioration (and it was drastic). The Kingdom of Poland was incorporated into the Russian Empire, from a separate (although dependent) state becoming a specified state of possessive power. Parliament, government, army, constitution, and even university in Warsaw (rebellied with rebellious youth) were abolished. Separate institutions were gradually liquidated, e.g. converting voivodships to state or introducing a Russian measuring strategy and scales. For 25 years came the era of I.Paskiewicz's rule, the conqueror of Warsaw appointed as the Tsarist governor. Needless to say, he did not stand out for his attitude toward the conquered population.

Thousands of Poles were sent to Siberia or incarnate into the Russian army, from which there was usually no return at that time (an era of reform, shortening military service from 20 to 6 years, came in Russia until 1870). In a better case, the erstwhile insurgents were waiting for the mediocre “on the Parisian pavement” (the large Emigration counted about 10 1000 Polish elite). This was the price that Poles paid for the suicide uprising, which could not have been successful.

It is besides worth to mention an informative example from the constitutional era – a trial before the Sejm Court in 1828. A group of Poles were accused of treason due to the fact that the prosecution understood the activities in the Patriotic Society. However, the Sejm court acquitted the defendants, ruling that this activity does not mean treason. The Emperor-king, though angry, respected this sentence.
After 1831, however, the Kingdom was governed by the law of martial law, according to which the politician was entitled to punish the death of Poles even without a judgment.

As you can see, before 1830 even the monarch himself had to number with the will of the Sejm, and after 1831 his subordinates were masters of life and death of the subordinate population. It's hard to accept it as a change for the better. Just like expropriation, displacement or exile of Polish elites, and sending Polish privates to service (now in a abroad uniform) somewhere in the Caucasus.

What if I were a model of Finland?

A part of the Polish society (this ruso-phobic part) believes that the evil aggressor was lying in wait for Polish freedoms anyway, and would surely crush them at the first opportunity. specified an opinion, however, contradicts the facts. Well, alongside the Kingdom of Poland there was a akin state creation – the Grand Duchy of Finland, besides dependent on Russia (and formed respective years earlier, after the war with Sweden).

The Finns did not think to rebel against the authority of the Russian emperor (there were less of them than Poles, and from Petersburg to Helsinki is much closer than to Warsaw). The Protestant (and mostly peasant) nation took on the groundwork, guarding its separateness. Finland did not go badly on this, just in the 19th century becoming a modern society. Interestingly, another Russian rulers did not want to violate Finnish autonomy (such as Alexander II even preserved it, for which he inactive has a monument in Helsinki). Until 1890, a short period of rusification had come to an end, which was brought to an end by the 1905 Revolution (reintroducing Finland's full freedoms). Another revolution in 1917 enabled the Finns to separate themselves from Russia and establish an independent republic in 1918.

If Poles had listened to their generals and senators in 1830, alternatively than Wysocki's conspirators, they would not have gone badly. The Autonomous Kingdom, which existed for the remainder of the 19th century, would spare Poles specified dubious attractions as the rusification of education, the exile of patriots to Siberia or the power of corrupt tsarist activists. The railway network would surely be much better developed, serving the interests of the Polish economy alternatively than Russian generals. And the judaic population would be going to a large degree to colonize if at that time Polish schools and universities existed.

The existence of a separate kingdom would surely have a affirmative impact on the lives of Poles in another partitions – neither Austria nor even Prussia would have gone besides far in Germanization, having the Polish state, the Polish army, and the Polish lobby in Petersburg.

Finally, in 1914 the Polish Kingdom (then the country of Nadwiślański) had more than 10 million people. Had it maintained the position of the 1830s, it could easy have issued over 300,000 armies. It is not hard to measure that the importance of Poland would already be greater (and the road to independency would be easier) than with 15 1000 volunteers in the Polish Legions under the orders of Austria.

What a nasty disaster.

The November Uprising is praised as 1 of the heroic Polish raves – and should be condemned as 1 of the most harmful events in our history. Before 1830 the destiny of Poles was not perfect – after 1831 it became much worse, just in the direct consequence of this unfortunate uprising. utilizing football terminology, it would compare them to an effective goal, but suicidal. Anyone who prefers military vocabulary could find them with a good shot, but on his own foot.

What is most likely the worst, this defeat taught Poles nothing. It was just after the November Uprising that the cult of a beautiful loser (again a romanticist fault) began to spread. The consequence of this mentality was another unsuccessful spur – the grotesque uprising of Kraków 1846, the tragic uprising of January 1863 or in the distant position – the most disastrous Warsaw uprising of 1944.

It is hard to avoid the bitter conclusion that Poles failed to pass the Realpolitik exam in 1830 (and the example of Finland proved that it was a much more reasonable way). The full curiosium is Podchorzego Day, celebrated present at military academy on 29 November.
Thus the future officers celebrate the anniversary of the rebellion, and it leads straight to the defeat of the army and nation (about a year later).

Let us remember the emergence of 1831, but let us remember them as they were – unnecessary, lost and ended with a very bad change (i.e. the liquidation of the statehood). If this emergence is to teach us something, let him teach us a short conviction – POLAK, turn ON THE THINK.

Michał Wirtel

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