Piotr Wójcik's text is the consequence of cooperation between political criticism and independent Polish and Hungarian editorial offices, in which we look at crucial issues from the position of both countries.
On October 15, 2023, Law and Justice prevailed in the parliamentary elections, and for the next 2 months it was assumed to stay in power. Although for all observers of the Polish political scene it was clear that Jarosław Kaczyński's group had no coalition capacity, The Law and Justice Department hoped to convince 1 of the another parties not only with positions, but besides with resources gathered for 8 years.
However, it turned out that the organisations, environments, social coteries, contacts and circumstantial media, which were developed at that time and financed by public funds, were of no avail to the 3rd party. Announced by Kaczyński long before 2015 the construction of a fresh elite that Hungary She rapidly and efficiently turned into a classical oligarchy, failed at nothing. The PiS was incapable to offer possible coalitionists anything that the coalition with the Donald Tusk group could not provide.
PiS did not change the Polish model to oligarchical, it simply shifted the border to something that can be contractually called a democratic kleptocracy, which has existed in Poland in varying degrees already since 1989 and continues to this day, despite the change of power. For the past 3 decades, we have had a strategy in place where the political environment that holds power has fundamentally been trying to steer the country in a more or little good direction, but on the occasion they put quite a few effort into appropriating their members and members on public resources and protecting the peculiar interests of the most influential groups of their electorate. At first glance, this looks rather akin to Hungary, so during the full period of the Kaczyński party's rule, Warsaw and Budapest were thrown into 1 bag. In reality, however, Poland is simply a different country in which the hegemony of 1 political-social environment would be surprising.
Positions roundabout
The main instrument of the proprietary of politicians in Poland is to fill their own people with intrepid positions in state-controlled companies and organizational units, so that for a time they will receive good salaries, which will enable them to importantly improve their financial position as well as the position of the full environment. On high-income seats, politicians regularly transfer donations (limited by law) to their group, and the organization itself benefits from becoming more financially independent, so it is harder to intimidate or bribe their opponents.
In these strategical places there is simply a regular roundabout of positions. Personnel changes are officially justified by substantive reasons, but it is clear that the queue is moving smoothly so that each influential associate has an chance to "make more". The main function of political leaders in Poland has ceased to be to make a country's improvement strategy, and appropriate management of controlled positions has emerged to guarantee that all faction in the organization is satisfied. The rulers know that erstwhile the opposers come to power, they will cut them out of all their jobs and come again for 4 or 8 years dry. It is so essential to prepare for “wintering”.
A good example is Małgorzata Sadurska, who was a longtime associate of the Law and Justice and besides a associate of the Supervisory Board of the Social Insurance Institution for a short time. In 2014, she was given the chance to apply for the mandate of a Euro MP, which in Poland is besides utilized to appropriate politicians, but did not win it. In 2015, she received the position of president Andrzej Duda's Chief Chancellery. She resigned 2 years later to be able to sit on the board of the state's insurance giant – PZU. In 2020, she became an additional associate of the supervisory board of Bank Pekao, which the PiS government had previously redeemed from Italian Unicredit. In 2024, however, the fresh power cancelled it from both positions, so Sadurska decided to return to the Labour Office in Lublin, but from where she was besides released.
In Poland falling from specified a advanced horse does not surprise anyone, due to the fact that the III of Poland is not, was not and most likely will not be an oligarchy system. At the most, the financial safety of parts of the environment can be ensured in the above manner, and the finances of the parties, which are inactive based primarily on budget subsidies, can be somewhat improved. Of course, the Law and Justice Department decided to make a kleptocracy, subsidizing the environment with money from various types of government funds. This mechanics is not fresh in Poland, but Kaczyński's organization moved it to an unprecedented level. Even before the change of power, the program of the Ministry of Education, which the opposition referred to as "Willa plus", was loud. Friendly foundations received respective million zlotys each to acquisition properties in order to conduct various educational activities. Zbigniew Ziobry's environment thus utilized the Justice Fund, controlled by the Ministry of Justice.
From the beginning, however, it was known that this was a very risky way to self-depreciate. Government grants to NGOs are inactive public funds which must be spent in a contractual manner. Foundations besides cannot manage their assets in a way that is incompatible with their statutes. Of course, there are methods of embezzlement of government grants and foundations' assets, but authors of specified fraud exposure themselves to serious criminal responsibility. Fr Michał Olszewski, whose foundation Profeto received a full of PLN 66 million, among others for the construction of a centre for victims of crime, spent more than six months in custody and threatened to stay in a regular prison. Criminal liability besides threatens 2 PiS Members: Marcin Romanowskiwho managed the Justice Fund and Dariusz Matecki, who by the prosecutor's office could collect remuneration for a fictional post in State Forests (total approx. PLN 160 thousand) and the foundations created by his Szczecin social comedy were eager to collect ministerial grants.
PiS has made a quantitative, not qualitative change
Irregularities, which may in any cases scope up to respective twelve million zlotys, are fatal transgressions, acting destructively on the public domain and worthy of severe punishment. However, these are insufficient amounts to make an oligarchy, and against the background of the sums controlled by the real oligarchs – rather ridiculous. fundamentally inactive within the framework of the democratic kleptocracy in Poland since 1989. The Law and Justice Office simply increased the scale of compliance with public funds, i.e. it made a quantitative alternatively than qualitative change. In order to make at least 1 comparatively serious oligarch in the country on the scale and prosperity of Poland, it would be essential to have at least a fewer tens of billion zlotys, that is, incomparable to what was embezzled in the time of the Law and Justice.
Public procurement is utilized to make oligarchy, not subsidies from ministerial funds. Viktor Orban built his oligarch network by creating a smooth and unchangeable mechanics for transferring to selected entrepreneurs a immense part of government contracts. By report Transparency global Hungary companies belonging to László Szíjja won public contracts in 2018-2020 with a full value of over 626 billion forints. We're talking about PLN 6.5 billion in just 3 years. During the period analysed by TI Hungary, Szíjja took part in tenders worth 914 billion forints, i.e. two-thirds of the money they requested.
According to TI, László Szíjja won 10 percent of the full value of public contracts available in 3 years. Lőrinca Mészárosa acquired another 7 percent of this amount. And that's all without taking into account the businesses belonging to the 2 gentlemen's family. The 3rd place in the ranking of the Hungarian oligarchs was Gyuli Balásy, whose companies earned 3% of the public contracts analysed, i.e. the state paid them 254 billion forints, which is well over 2.5 billion PLN.
Meanwhile, the loudest case of the transfer of government contracts to a friendly entrepreneur in the time of the Law and Justice Government is the scandal associated with companies belonging to the clothing maker Red is Bad Paul Raccoon. The government strategical Reserve Agency was to acquisition from him in a non-trading mode power generators for Ukraine for PLN 350 million, which the Szopa would get in China for a sum respective times smaller. Together with RARS, for 3 years, orders for about half a billion zlotys were to be placed in Szopa companies. If the prosecution's allegations are confirmed, it is, of course, a huge-scale financial scandal – most likely the largest in the past of the 3rd Republic. However, even the biggest financial crisis is not the same as the strategy and long-term pumping of friendly private companies.
Polish governments towards the media
In Poland only the largest companies of the Treasury have a position comparable to the east oligarchs. PKO BP and Pekao banks and PZU insurance banks are many times larger than the largest Hungarian companies, specified as Moll and OTP. They are immense and highly influential entities, which on the 1 hand are controlled by the government and on the another hand are listed companies, so they are subject to advanced standards of accounting, transparency and reporting. Basically, therefore, it is not possible to do what the current power is keenly pleasing, as they besides have many smaller shareholders who do not intend to be deceived. However, there are a number of ways to usage tiny amounts on a case-by-case basis, which, due to the size of the SP companies, will be virtually unnoticed in their balance sheets.
One of the most crucial instruments for the peculiar usage of State Treasury companies is the plan of advertising policy. By control NIK, which has been critical of power since 2019, has not received advertising from SP companies, although in 2017-2018 it received a full of over PLN 23 million and was the 3rd largest contractor. The collection of TVN ads was purely political play, but could not jeopardise the existence of a immense television, now owned by American giant Warner Bros Discovery. She can truly be threatened by the current financial difficulties of the US parent company. PiS besides tried to push through the alleged Lex TVN, which was to force the sale of 51 percent of the station's shares by (then the same) Discovery. However, the bill was vetoed by president Duda, most likely not without American influence.
However, collecting TVN's government advertising did not mean flooding Kaczyński-friendly tv money. The inactive vast majority of advertising funds went to the 2 largest stations in Poland – the government TVP, which then favored the power of the Law and Justice, but now the power of the fresh coalition, and the private and fundamentally neutral Polsat, whose main owner and billionaire Zygmunt Solorz-Żak politically tries to play various pianos. In 2021, TVP received PLN 26 million for media services, Polsat PLN 24 million, and the friendly PiS tv Republic only PLN 1.6 million. For 8 years PiS governments were incapable to make any private broadcaster who would be a serious player in the media marketplace in Poland. In late 2023, the writing media even appealed to viewers for money.
A serious written average was not created until the current Donald Tusk government took over TVP, which redirected the giant stream of viewers to Tomasz Sakiewicz's station. In September of that year tv Republic was second The most popular The news channel in Poland, after TVN24, recorded a 43-fold increase in the number of viewers compared to 2023 – from 5.5 1000 to 238 1000 viewers. So no 1 provided as much money to PiS media as the minister of culture of the fresh government coalition Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, who brutally and unannounced took over TVP Info, so her irritated viewers threw themselves to watch tv Republic. However, it is worth remembering that it is only an information channel, and its share in the full tv marketplace is little than 5%. With independent, private broadcasters – TVN and Polsat – who have plenty of another channels and streaming services, Sakiewicz's media cannot compare.
The fragmentation of agriculture and strong local governments defend against oligarchisation
In addition to the pluralistic media marketplace and the immense function of state companies, another origin protecting Poland from oligarchization is fragmentation of Polish agriculture. The embezzlement of funds from the Common Agricultural Policy is 1 of the foundations of the oligarchy strategy for Hungary. As shown investigation The “New York Times”, the oligarchs of Lake Balaton absorb a large condition of the CAP money that is intended for their country. Victor Orban had a crucial part in this. "He sold hundreds of thousands of acres of state agricultural land, most of which were politically linked allies. Technically, it was an auction. [...] However, fewer farmers were able to afford large plots,” says the text of 2019. The buyers included the aforementioned oligarch Lőrinc Mészáros.
By data Eurostat, agricultural properties exceeding 100 hectares have a full area of 4.5 million hectares in Hungary. In much larger Poland only 3.6 million ha. Polish agriculture has a completely different model, based on tiny enterprises, which frequently tactically join cooperatives to compete with larger companies. This can be economically inefficient and is regularly recalled as a origin of weakness of Polish agricultural production, but from the point of view of democracy it is very healthy.
Of course, Polish farmers are an influential social group, but they express their emphasis by means of grassroots protests, blocking the streets with tractors or dumping manure from offices. This can be onerous, but this is simply a much better situation than informal negotiations, bribery, or social systems. erstwhile the Polish authorities tried to negociate with farmers at the beginning of this year, 10 or more of them appeared in authoritative cabinets and it was even hard to identify the leader.
Poland besides has a much stronger local government. This is not just about our polycentric settlement distribution, which results in as many as 37 cities above 100,000 inhabitants, which can be themselves a very serious player of local policy, and the 12 largest 1 creates the Union of Polish Metropolis, which regularly joins national policy. In Hungary, little than 1 5th of the inhabitants live in Budapest and there are only 7 cities with 100 to 200 000 inhabitants outside the capital. However, the division of competences is more important.
Local governments in Poland are among the strongest in the EU. On the occasion of taxation reforms, the Law and Justice Department wanted to subdue them by converting any of their own income into government investment grants, but the strong political position of the local government was not affected. The distribution of competences has not changed substantially, and local government units in Poland inactive deal with most public services. By data Eurostat, in 2023 the revenues of Polish local governments amounted to 13.1 percent of Polish GDP and were the sixth highest in the EU. In the case of Hungary, it was only 5.8 percent and sixth place from the end.
Of course, there is besides democratic kleptocracy in local governments. 1 example is the exchange of positions in supervisory boards between Wrocław, Gliwice and Tychy. The late detained president of Wrocław Jacek Sutryk was on the supervisory board of the Tyki aquapark, and the erstwhile president of Tychów Andrzej Dziuba on the board of the Wroclaw Zoo. This does not change the fact that cities are a very crucial subject of Polish politics, and their rulers frequently refrain from organization associations, representing local committees. During the times of the Law and Justice, the largest cities, usually governed by the environment close to the opposition, were a key bastion for her to wait out the thin times. Now a akin function for the PiS will be fulfilled, among another things, by the state in the east of the country, where Kaczyński organization retained power in the Seymikas.
No Polish oligarch candidate
Another interest which the government in Warsaw must deal with is trade unions. He frequently rightly complains about the low union in Poland, which according to data The OECD is only 13%, but it is inactive higher than over Balaton (8%). In addition, trade unions are widely present in crucial economical areas – energy, mining, wellness care or even retail. In this way, trade union centres can have far more influence on national policies than the union ratio would indicate. It was the trade unions that required a number of changes crucial to workers during the first word of office – the restoration of a lower retirement age, trade-free Sundays or an absolutely crucial minimum hourly rate that drastically reduced the circumvention of minimum wage rules.
Poland besides has a very diverse economy, with many strong private companies from different sectors. Companies specified as the gaming CD Project, Dino discount network, LPP clothing maker or Allegro online store are respective times larger in terms of stock capitalization than Hungarian Molla, which could barely fit into WIG20 and capitalization resembles a network of inexpensive Pepco stores.
At the same time, the ever-increasing Polish private sector has shown no momentum to consolidate companies from many different industries within 1 powerful group, which is typical of oligarchs. The richest Pole Michał Solovow with a property worth PLN 27 billion in 4 times smaller The Czech Republic would be in 5th place somewhere. another leading businessmen specified as Biernacki (Dino), Starak (Polpharma) or Marchewka (CD Project), fundamentally stick to their industries. Meanwhile, the richest Hungary and friend of Orban Lőrinc Mészáros operates everywhere – in energy, hotel industry, media, tobacco sales, too sponsoring football clubs and inactive being mayor of Felcsút.
The possible candidate for Polish oligarch would undoubtedly invest in the most profitable and privileged industry, i.e. development, but so far even it is rather fragmented, and among the largest 20 Polish companies we will not find any strict developer. The most frequently mentioned in this context Zygmunt Solorz-Żak shows political ambitions and operates in many different industries, but is influential mainly due to having 1 of the largest tv stations, and his assets (about PLN 8 billion) does not look peculiarly awesome even in the context of Polish billionaires. Not to mention the hegemony of State Treasury companies, which are now so large that no of the Polish rich people could afford them.
Poland is simply a menagerie of various, frequently exhilarating social groups, with the interests of which subsequent governments must count. However, there is simply a widely understood state over the Vistula River, which is clumsy and backward, but is by far the strongest actor in the local social life. Even if PiS actually wanted to make an oligarchy, it yet strengthened the position of the state, for example by buying up 2 leading banks – Pekao and Alior – which gave the government control over most of the sector. Key resources and political influences in Poland are assigned not to circumstantial names, but to offices which, in turn, are full of competing environments. erstwhile they get to power, they bend the law and usage the state's resources mostly for peculiar interests, but no is able to become strong adequate to be replaced.
Both under Kaczyński and Tusk, the burning problem of Poland for many years, is not the hazard of establishing an oligarchy or rejecting democracy, but moments of scandalously mediocre quality of public domain management. rather many systemic injustices consequence solely from the fact that further government teams are afraid to step on the toes of interest groups, which in the constant Nadwiślana push have gained the strongest position.
