The second half of November 2022 marked the least activity of the parties on the battlefield so far.
The pages seemed to look forward to replacing the autumn sun with the winter frost. Neither Russia nor Ukraine recorded crucial advancement during this period on any section of the front.
On the Kherson Front...
signs of deescalation were observed. Russian sources on Telegram reported the movement of Ukrainian forces to the Zaporosian and Donbasque fronts. Ukrainian politician of Lugansk Oblast Serhij Hajdai In turn, he informed about the transfer to the base of this section of the fighting lines of Russian air-desant units withdrawn on the right bank of Dnieper. This information was later confirmed by Russian channels on Telegram (where the decision to "fill" the Lugansk front was besides criticised by lightly armed air-desant troops, while it would be more appropriate to deploy heavy-armed formations there).
Ukraine during the period discussed here conducted with the aid of precise tactical ammunition the firing of Russian supply lines, weapons warehouses, military infrastructure and places of concentration of Russian troops, as it had done earlier on the right bank of Dnieper. In the long term, this threatens to paralyze the communication with Russian forces in Crimea and strategically cut off the peninsula from the remainder of Russia, as it had previously happened with Russian forces on the right bank of Dnieper.
According to unconfirmed reports initially, on the night of November 12 a unit separated from Ukrainian 73. The Centre of Marine peculiar Operations was to land on the Kinburn Peninsula in the area of Pokrowskie and decision inland, towards the village of Heroiskie, but yet be repulsed by Russian forces. On 14 November, photographs were revealed documenting movement by Ukrainian peculiar forces at night on motorboats. 21 November spokesperson for confederate Armed Forces Command of Ukraine (SHU) Natalia Hiiumenich confirmed that Ukrainian forces are active on the Kinburn Peninsula and its most distant part – Kinburn Kosie.
The peninsula is the last fragment of Ukraine’s Nikolay territory occupied by the Russians and is at the same time “strategic gateway ” to defender the escape of Dnieper and confederate Bug. Thus, the possible control of this point by Ukrainians would be a painful prestigious as well as a geostrategic blow to Russians. However, this script is unlikely, as the Ukrainian side would have a problem with supplies operating on the confederate side of the mouth In addition, the Kinburn Peninsula is simply a swamped area.
Dam Front
The stagnation besides prevailed in November 2022 on the Zaporosian front, where the parties have been applying an undeclared ceasefire for respective months, while concentrating considerable force there. Media speculations talk of a possible Ukrainian offensive on Mariupol, but it seems unlikely. Alternatively, the attacking Ukrainian units would be flanked by the facilities in Crimea and the Donetsk Basin and Russia by the appropriate Russian forces, at hazard of being “closed in a boiler”. The Russian Spring offensive appears to be more likely in this direction to flank Ukrainian forces fighting on the Donbast Front. The concentration of Ukrainian forces on this section of the front is possibly to block specified a Russian strike.
On 20 and 21 November, there was a shelling of the Zaporoska Atomic Power Plant, which the parties traditionally accused each another of. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) She called for the demilitarisation of the facility and the creation of a protection region around it, which would de facto mean the Russians leaving the power plant. On 23 November, manager of the IAEA Rafael Mariano Grossi met with manager of Rosatom Aleksandr Woronkowo. The content of the talks was not disclosed, but on November 27, Ukrainian Energoatom manager Petro Kotin stated that the Russians were preparing to evacuate the power plant. This message sparked a wave of angry comments on the Russian Telegram, but further events do not confirm specified a development, so the message should be considered a successful action in the framework of the "information war".
Donbaski Front
The hardest fighting took place in November 2022 on the Donbast Front from Soledar to the north to Marijinka to the south. There, the Russians exert a strong emphasis on Ukrainian forces, seeking to master the full Donetsk region, allowing president Vladimir Putin to declare “win” and give an excuse to get Russia out of the war. On 18 November, Wagner's forces and the battalion "Sparta" of the Donetsk People's Republic (DRL) occupied Opytne. The front line besides moved in favour of the Russians in Bachmut, Piervomajski, Newelsk and Marijince. On November 23, Wagner broke the Ukrainian front at Andrijiwka, winning Zielenopilja and Ozarinivka and moving towards Kurduivka and Andrijiwka. The Russian channels on the Telegram even informed about the business by the Russians of the Temporary Jaru through which the supply lines of Ukrainian forces defending themselves in Bachmut are running, however, these reports do not seem likely. On the another hand, the Ukrainian side reported a counterattack on November 30, in which it was to recapture the luxuriant confederate districts of Bachmut and gain a foothold in Ivangorod.
Luhansk Front
On the confederate side of the Lugansk front, information about the Russians' capture of Spirne in late November came out, but the sponsor of Wagner Evgeny Prigożyn deposed them, stating on 29 November that the village was inactive under Ukrainian control. dense fighting without a clear resolution took place during this period throughout the Swatwe-Kreminn section.
On the northern section of the Luhansk front, Swatwe and the P66 and P07 roads were heavy attacked, but not able to break the strong opposition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (SZ FR). On 16 November, the Ukrainian 95th air strike brigade made a tiny decision of the front in favour of the Ukrainian from Makijka towards Płoszczanka. In turn, Novoselivski was to be occupied first by Russian 144. motorized division of guards shooters, then reflected by Ukrainian 92nd Mechanized Brigade.
Bombing the back of the front
The Russian strategy seems to be moving towards breaking the Ukrainians' will by destroying the country's energy infrastructure. To this end, Russia besides carries out periodical shellings of civilian objects of Ukraine. On November 17, the Russians performed 5 air strikes and 25 utilizing cruise maneuvering rockets in the dynepropetrovsk, Odski, Zaporosian and Mikołajowski circuits. Among another things, a civilian gas distributor was the object of the attack.
On 23 November Russia attacked thermal power plants and another critical infrastructure elements in Kiev, Lviv, Ivanofrankowski, Winnietsky, Odski, Mikołajowski, Kherson, Zaporosian, djeepropietrowski, Kirowograd, Sumski, Czerkaski, Poltavski and Kharkiv utilizing 5 drones and 70 rockets maneuvering cruise. The attack resulted in power, heating and water supply interruptions. Power outages besides affected temporarily northern Moldova.
Ukrainians besides attacked the Russian Federation's energy infrastructure in the Kursk Oblast on 29 November. A fire of 11 rockets caused power outages in the towns of Suja and Koronevo.
The Russian strategy has not so far brought a breach of the Ukrainians' will to defend themselves, but the first symptoms appeared on November 18; the inhabitants of Odski territory blocked 3 local roads until November 21, protesting as though mainly not against the war on Russia, but against corruption and inefficient distribution of energy by the local Ukrainian authorities.
On the another hand, it is worth noting that the discussions accompanying the successive aggressions of the Atlantic bloc to date highlighted that "war is not won by air strikes alone". The German bombings of Britain during planet War II did not break the opposition of the English. The English bombings of Germany from the second half of planet War II did not in turn break the spirit of German defense. Yankee bombings of North Vietnam did not prevent the US defeat in the "war to exhaustion" in confederate Vietnam.
On the another hand, the western bombings forced the surrender of Serbia in 1999 and enabled projankes forces on land to defeat the Taliban in 2001 and Muammar Gaddafi 2011 The impact of air strikes on national morale so seems to depend on its strength. present in Ukraine, additionally controlled effectively by the safety Service of Ukraine (SBU) it seems more akin to Vietnamese from the 1960s. than the Serbian or Libyan of our time.
Maintaining possible by Russia
Repeated regularly propaganda voices about the exhausted Russian rocket production possible were, meanwhile, falsified in November 2022. Minister of Defence of Ukraine Olexi Reznikov stated that Russia has produced since the beginning of the war 120 Calibr and Kh-101 rockets and 360 Kh-35 rockets. According to reports from the Yankee press, Russia inactive has the resources of microchips and another electronic components essential to produce precision rockets. Russia would besides be expected to usage the Kh-55 atomic warheads, which, however, fills with conventional cargo.
On November 19, "Washington Post" reported Russia signing an agreement with Iran on the production of Iranian combat drones in Russia. This appears to be a reaction to the depletion of the resources of the Iranian combat drones in Russia's possession, as indicated by the lower strength of the Russian usage of this weapon in November than before.
Despite the end of formal mobilisation, Russia is conducting paramobilization activities. The administration of criminal establishments in Russia reported that in October and November 2022 the number of prisoners decreased by 23,000, indicating that many of them could have hit the front. They besides receive calls to military commissions for January. There was speculation in the Russian blogosphere about possible full mobilisation in 2023. According to 1 commentator, only mobilising at least 2 million soldiers and shifting the economy to war tracks will enable Russia to win over Ukraine.
On 29 November, the regular Beast portal reported Wagner's recruitment of volunteers and mercenaries in the Central African Republic. However, there are besides repeated reports of deficiencies in training and equipping Russian “mobians” treated virtually as “gun meat”. Wagner is only expected to supply 2 weeks of training. 1 of the films available on the Telegram shows Russian reservists complaining that they were sent completely without preparation for the Luhansk Front, after which they left themselves there by their commanders.
Page Losses
Confirmed with photograph material by Proukrian portal Oryx site hardware losses were in November 2022 for Russia: 1523 tanks, 3250 combat vehicles, 198 command points and communication stations, 25 dense mortars, 520 artillery installations and vehicles, 159 multi-guided rocket launchers, 63 aircraft, 71 helicopters, 151 drones; the corresponding figures for Ukraine were in November 2022: 374 tanks, 1048 combat vehicles, 7 command and communications stations, 174 artillery installations and vehicles, 32 multi-guided rocket launchers, 55 aircraft, 23 helicopters and 53 drones. This data must be seen as, first, incomplete, second, distorted (pro)Ukrainian (auto) censorship.
30 November European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen stated that Ukraine had so far lost in the war 100,000 soldiers. According to the fresh York Times, Russia has spent US$82 billion on it since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, which represents a 4th of its 2021 budget. Reports from the same origin say that 300,000 reservists held under arms cost Russia $1.8 billion a month.
Trying to silence “patriots”
There were besides various reports of Kremlin's actions against its own "civil segment". Among another things, the control of imports of dual-use goods specified as weapons, footwear and civilian drones, which "patriotic" environments in Russia bought poorly equipped units of mobilized reservists, was increased. On 1 December, the national safety Service (FSB) prohibited the dissemination of any forecasts of the situation at the front, information on cases of corruption, supply shortages and lawlessness in the SZ FR. The SBU besides claimed that the Kremlin is planning to establish a competitive mercenary company against Wagner.
In the context of the expanding criticism of the ineptness of the Russian command, Minister of Defence FR Sergei the Shoygu, as well as F.R. president Vladimir Putin, this surely indicates the want to pacify the possible "patriotist opposition" by the Kremlin. Vladimir's inept, defet and kunktarian squad Putina may effort to silence the “pro-war” segments of the Russian public and the channels on the Telegram to prevent the emergence of the “patriotic” opposition.
This is besides indicated by the assassination of Russian deputy politician Kherson on November 9. Kiril Stremusov (officially, he was to ‘die in a road accident’) whose performance is sometimes attributed to Russian peculiar services or local pro-Russian oligarchy. The importance of saying Yevgenija Prigozhina critical of the 1990 thieving privatization. Vladimir Putin besides seems to number on a war-ending agreement with the US and NATO (more than Ukrainian heads), which would most likely happen with criticism of "patriots". The above-mentioned actions of the Russian authorities may in fact be the preparation of land under specified a capitular agreement.
Western Ukraine support
Similar dilemmas seem to have no Atlantic bloc, continuing and even extending Ukraine's hardware and financial support. On November 16, president Joe Biden asked the U.S. legislature for an additional $37.6 billion support for Ukraine. On November 18, US$56 million support was provided by Finland. On November 23, the US reported the launch of 26 support packages for Ukraine including ammunition for mobile rocket artillery systems (HIMARS) and anti-aircraft systems (NASAMS), 150 anti-drone dense device guns (HMG), 200 precision 155 mm artillery missiles, 10,000 120 mm mortar missiles, AGM-88 HARM radar destroyers, 150 Humvee, over 200 current generators.
On November 19, the UK delivered 120 anti-aircraft guns and anti-drone equipment; On November 20, France delivered 2 (sic!) air defence systems Crotale; 21 November Luxembourg delivered an unknown number of Humvee, on the same day Turkey delivered precision ground-to-earth rockets TRG-230 with a scope of up to 70 km, on multi-guided MLRS launchers; UK then announced the transportation of Brimstone-2 missiles; 23 November UK Secretary of defence Ben Wallace study on the transfer of 10,000 artillery missiles and 3 (withdrawn from usage in the UK) of Westland WS-61 Sea King helicopters to Ukraine; Germany is to transfer ammunition to the multi-guided MARS II rocket systems; Norway has delivered the M109 Haubice and 55 1000 winter uniforms; Belgium has transmitted 10 combat drones; Germany has established a supply center for the Ukrainian army in Slovakia, the Czech Republic has declared training an additional 4,000 Ukrainian soldiers.
In the diplomatic field at the beginning of the month, Russian side was compromised erstwhile the Russian Federation withdrew first on 29 October, after Ukrainian attacks on the Black Sea Fleet carried out from the marine corridor of Odessa utilized for the export of agricultural produce, from an agreement not to attack that corridor (green deal), but only to return to the agreement on 2 November, and to extend it for another 120 days on 19 November. After returning to the agreement on 2 November, Moscow claimed that Kiev had undertaken not to usage the corridor to attack Russian targets, however, the Ukrainian authorities publically denied specified a commitment.
Meanwhile, on 1 December Turkey closed the Black Sea Straits for oil transport without adequate insurance, which, in the context of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation, de facto means a blockade of Russian transport. From 5 December, only oil transports under the ceiling set by the European Union (EU) can flow through the straits, which in practice means Turkey joining EU sanctions on Russia. The simplification of Russian oil imports was besides announced by China, on which Russia hoped.
Summary
In November 2022 Ukraine clearly retained a strategical initiative in the war inactive under way in its state territory. In the absence of crucial shifts on the front, the parties supplement the shortages, regroup forces and mobilise resources. Ukraine seems to do this more strongly, however, which is most likely due to the Ukrainians' awareness that they are fighting for the endurance of the political expression of "Ukrainianness", while on the Russian side there is inactive a deficiency of awareness that the war launched against Ukraine is existential for Russia as well in its erstwhile geopolitical formula.
Progressive degradation of military and civilian infrastructure Ukraine will most likely not lead to a collapse of Ukrainian statehood or social revolts, as the existence of Ukraine is effectively sustained by the West with much greater resources than Russia, and Ukraine itself is, as it seems, effectively controlled by the SBU. Russian air strikes, on the another hand, can lead to humanitarian crisis and civilian population suffering.
Russia's global prestige and its power position have been ruined by the inept war in Ukraine. This is seen in a marked weakening of Russia's position in the Black Sea, where Russia is no longer a dominant power. erstwhile Turkey refused to pass through the Bosfor Strait into the Black Sea of the Russian cruiser ‘Wariag’ and destroyer ‘Admiral Tribuc’ on 7 November, both ships had to return to Vladivostok, where they had previously arrived.
A possible breakthrough in war for Russia would be possible if the state was full mobilised and moved to war. For the effects to be seen in spring and summer, this process should begin now. In the event of failure or hold of these actions, possible Russian successes on the front appear unlikely.
Ronald Lasecki
photo. izvestia.ru
