Ukraine — between the hammer and the hardwood (1)

myslpolska.info 3 months ago

The article consists of 3 parts. The first gives a geopolitical panorama of the war in Ukraine, where at first glance Russia clashes with Ukraine.

However, the problem is deeper, namely the question of whether the West will hold its planet hegemon position, or whether a fresh multicenter planetary order will be born. Part 2 seeks to shed light on the process of forming the national consciousness of Ukraine, which was formed in the fight against Poland and influenced by the Polish-Russian conflict over Ukrainian territories. Finally, the 3rd part talks about the decisive period for the formation of Ukrainian statehood, which was the end of planet War I, and formulates hypotheses as to why many Ukrainian efforts to make their own state existence have not proved effective.

Part one: Problem Panorama

Started on 22 February 2022 according to the Russians "special military operation", according to the West simply the war in Ukraine, has been the consequence constantly since the beginning of the presidency Vladimir Putin gust of tension between the West and Russia. Ukraine since the unconstitutional interception of power in February 2014 by pro-Western forces has become an instrument of Western aggressive policy towards Russia. The measurement of this aggression is the expansion of NATO's military block to the east. Since the end of the Cold War by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989, NATO has lost its right to exist, as its main opponent – the russian Union just fell apart. However, in the 1990s, at a time erstwhile Russia went through the difficulties of transformation without being hostile to the West, its armed arm, NATO absorbed Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and in 2004 Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and the Balkan countries were members of that organization. 1 cannot neglect to announcement that all these countries are erstwhile socialist countries and their process of integration into the Natovian structures is simply a process of military rounding of Russia. And here we can ask a perverse question: why did NATO losses not invitation Russia itself? Russia's participation in the Natovian structures would surely let many problems to be avoided, and so we have a peculiar war (a conflict of Western and Russian looks) in Ukraine. Abstract from the military connotation of Russia's peculiar operation in this war, Ukraine is simply a victim of the collective activities of the West, for which unfortunately, after 2014, it voluntarily agreed, lending its territory to the installation of NATO military infrastructure not for reasons friendly to Russia.

The West tries to get distant with its work for the situation, presenting Ukraine as a victim of Russia's imperial ambitions, but the reality is that Ukraine has become a territory of struggles between the Imperial West and defending its state of possession of Russia. And it shouldn't be confusing that Russia attacked. The interior contradictions of Ukraine in the form of persecution of the Russian population, which the West-sponsored coup of February 2014 revealed, have shown that Ukraine is incapable to bear the territorial and cultural heritage of the Ukrainian Socialist russian Republic. Furthermore, its openly unfriendly policy towards Russia compromised regional balance.

Russia's attack was so anticipating the dangers that Ukraine's functioning suggested and constituted a defensive action in the classical take-up of Carl von Clausewitz that the best form of defence was attack. Thus, although at first glance in Ukraine, Russia fights Ukraine, but in fact through Ukraine the West fights Russia. Firstly, his policy led to this conflict, and secondly, the military absence of the Natovian troops is only a consequence of Russia's atomic power (we saw NATO's military force destruct Serbia, Libya, Iraq, etc.), and does not mean that NATO states are not fighting. They fight, sanctioning economically, financially and culturally Russia and providing Ukraine with all kinds of logistical assistance. What is the point of this war for the West – 1 can only wonder, especially since virtually no war fight by NATO and its leader, the US, has been successful, and too the conflict tightens Russia's alliance with China, which is seen as the main Western opponent.

Presentation of the parties involved

The conflict of interests of the powers translates into an interior situation. mostly speaking, part of Ukrainian society is pro-Russian and part is pro-Western. In this interior conflict Ukraine suffers the most. If, in the first period after the dissolution of the USSR, pro-Western and pro-Russian tendencies persisted in the balance and independency of the Ukrainian state was the denominator of the agreement, then the forceful takeover of power by the pro-Western forces in 2014 constitutes a breakthrough in the common relation of 2 communities. For pro-Western radicals, pro-Russian Ukrainians ceased to be Ukrainians.

First of all, they were restricted from the anticipation of utilizing Russian, a language that was utilized since birth for many. Secondly, a alleged counter-terrorism operation was launched against the rebels against the fresh power of the Donbas regions. It is crucial to have terminology assimilation of the opposition of the population to unconstitutional changes, to terrorism. Paradoxically, those who have violently seized power call terrorists those who argue undemocratic methods of capturing power. However, the most crucial thing here is that the level of common tolerance of both parties within the Ukrainian conflict has fallen to zero.

A clear confirmation of this is the refusal by subsequent Ukrainian governments of direct talks with the separatist regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. As a result, pro-Western proselytes excluded pro-Russian Ukrainians from their knowing of the Ukrainians, while for the latter, threatening their cultural recognition and frequently their lives Ukraine has not only lost value, but has become a dangerous opponent. The Ukrainian conflict is so a two-axis conflict: first – the West and Russia clash in Ukraine, secondly – the Ukrainians clash, although I uncertainty that the pro-Russian 1 cares about the present Ukraine, it seems that as before the Mayan coup, they defined themselves as Ukrainians with Russian roots, so now they just became Russians, which will be apparent not without affecting the territorial scope of post-war Ukraine.

The current chaotic situation is the consequence of a long-standing historical process in which the erstwhile century seems to be decisive, and within it events specified as the end of planet War I, planet War II and the dissolution of the USSR. These events built the current Ukraine and their analysis from Ukrainian, Polish and Russian position will be the subject of an article.

Historical lighting

The conclusion of planet War I is of peculiar importance for Ukraine, as for the first time in past since the Kiev Russian era Ukraine has appeared as a state. The demolition of Kiev's Rusi in the 13th century by the Mongol invasion resulted in the first seizure of it by Lithuania and then to the company by Poland, which united with Lithuania another Unia, besides treated the second as an chance to legalize its possession of Ukrainian lands. The most crucial of these Unions, the Lublin Union, pushed Lithuania into the function of a smaller partner and enabled the Republic to besides culturally assert these lands. As the most crucial component of Ukraine's territory was Orthodoxy, shortly after the Lublin Union, the process of its de facto liquidation was launched through the creation of the alleged Unity Church.

This was done in 1596 during the alleged Brest Union. The Brest Union formed a church that combined Catholicism with Orthodoxy; ornamentation remained Orthodox, but the essence became Catholic. In another words, at the cost of accepting the Orthodox ritual, the Unitsky Church was to accept the dogmas of Catholicism and the authority of the Pope. The Brest Union is an example of Jesuit social engineering, in which Poland one more time becomes a victim of Vatican geopolitics. another examples include the implantation of the Order of Teutonic Knights in Pomerania, the lost conflict of Varna, otherwise the very successful performance of Jan Sobieski close Vienna, or the concept of Poland as the foreground of Christianity.

In the case of the Brest Union, it not only led to bloody divisions within the framework of Orthodoxy, but besides made the burning efforts of the integration of the Russian society in the form of the Republic of the 3 Nations (Hadzia Union). In addition, the concept gained its own dynamics, ceasing to service the interests of Poland (if always served) and was utilized by the possessive Austria. Maria Teresa renamed the Unity Church into the Greek-Catholic Church in order to build, not Russian, but in the future of Ukrainian social consciousness, which in times of planet War II showed uncontrollable hatred for everything Polish.

Holy Republic and Chmielnicki Uprising

Furthermore, the defence of Orthodoxy against Catholicism was 1 of the reasons why Bohdan Chmielnicki He asked Russia for protection, as in a moment. Let us remember that this period, i.e. the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century, is the alleged golden age of the Republic. In the early 16th century, he paid tribute to Zygmunt I Old Albrecht Hohenzollern, transforming the Order of Teutonic Knights into lenna of Poland, and in 1611 in the individual of Tsar Wasyl Shujski Zygmunt III Russia paid tribute to the vase. In another words, Poland dominated the region and could do what it wanted, or at least so it seemed to it, due to the fact that in little than 50 years the glory of the Republic of Poland became a façade so as not to say passed distant with the wind. 1 of the most crucial reasons for this degrengolada was the Ukrainian case. Terminological note: talking about Ukraine in the 16th and 17th centuries is premature. The territories that we mention to as Ukraine between the 10th and 13th centuries constituted Kiev Russian. They were then formally seized by Lithuania and Poland until the 17th century. I compose “formally” due to the fact that at that time the militarized society of the alleged Cossacks, who valued their independency more than belonging to the Polish-Lithuanian union, and – and this fact confirmed their separatistism – the Crown authorities did not see them as Poles.

As a result, we had territories, but not people surviving them. The situation became increasingly inflamed until yet the large Chmielnicki uprising broke out in 1648. In 2 aspects, it proved significant. Firstly, it exposed the military weakness of the Republic, which proved incapable to overcome it; secondly, it internationalized the Ukrainian case. Russia joined the game as a defender of the Russian society, as well as the protector of Orthodoxy. Chmielnicki developed diplomatic contacts with all the countries for which the Ukrainian case, in the guess of weakening Poland, mattered. He corresponded with the Tatar Khanate, Turkey, Austria, Sweden, Prussia, France, Venice, Seven-garden. As you can see, he could realize the political situation of Europe at the time and place in it the function of Ukraine, which was not only a origin in weakening the Republic, but besides an informal subject of global law, which was to prepare its future independence.

Part II. Polish-Russian conflict and improvement of Ukrainian national consciousness

A peculiar function here should be attributed to Russia, which was the origin of her pedigree from the Kiev Rusi and so saw the successor of her territories. Annihilation of Kiev's Rusi by the Tatars and the opportunistic appropriation of its area by the Polish-Lithuanian Union were seen in Moscow as events that disrupted the average order of things. This average order of things was the right of Moscow to have Russian territories. As a result, 1 of the creators of the Grand Duchy of Moscow Ivan Kalita (1288-1340) formulated a political concept of collecting Russian lands, which the next rulers first of the Duchy of Moscow, and in time the Russian cities tried to implement. Of course: the Polish-Lithuanian side viewed the concept as an unauthorized and just justifying Russia's expansionism.

Mutual accusations of expansionism could continue, maintaining the position quo, i.e. the increasingly de jure regulation of the Republic of Ukraine, if not for the Ukrainians themselves, i.e. at that time Cossacks, did not decide to take matters into their own hands, thus creating a Ukrainian case. As it was said, Chmielnicki was the 1 who empowered Ukraine, making it a European problem within Poland. The fact that the Republic of Poland was incapable to militaryly crush the uprising led to the sanctioning of the comparative independency of Ukraine. As a consequence of the congregation agreement in 1649 ending the first phase of the Chmielnicki Uprising, Hetmanat or territorial government of Naddnieprzańsk Ukraine was created (over the main river of Ukraine – Dnieprem, another name of the Left Coast Ukraine, facing the mouth of Dniepr). The government governed the rights of military democracy, its leaders were chosen by the Cossacks' Assembly and constituted – can be said utilizing modern language – a protostate form of Ukraine.

National recognition of Ukraine

It is significant, as we see, that the process of national recognition of Ukraine was born in opposition to Poland. We become ourselves, fighting the opposite. Unfortunately, Poland was the origin of social enslavement and suppression of Russian spiritual society from the Ukrainian perspective. Russia, by the Perejasławska settlement of 1654, wanted to accomplish that Chmielnicki was the origin of liberation. Naturally, the Perejasław settlement was perfectly part of the Russian concept of collecting Russian lands. The settlement guaranteed the Cossacks considerable freedoms, a importantly expanded registry (the Cossacks' number at the state's salary), although it besides prohibited its own abroad policy. The second was only valid on paper; already Chmielnicki treated it rather freely, let alone the another hetmans, especially Ivan Mazepwho made a secret agreement with King Charles IX of Sweden, taking action to harm Russia. In another words, for Ukrainians, surrendering to Russia was a method not only of freedom from Polish dependency, but besides of building their own statehood.

End of the Golden Age of Poland

The Perejasławska settlement was the origin of the 13 years of the Polish-Russian war, from which although militarily the Republic came out victorious, it was politically incapable to disprove its military advantages. Especially since at the same time she faced the Swedish flood. Let us sum up: the war with Sweden, the war with Russia, the uprising in Ukraine, conflicts with the Tatars and the lentils of Turkey – Seven-garden, reluctant Poland Brandenburg in the west, in the north to the detriment of the Republic acting as a pane of Poland Prussia, which was soon, due to the fact that 3 years later, after the Perejassan settlement, counting on the state of flax were freed. The situation was so very hard and launched the process of the collapse of the Republic, as interior conflicts in this Rokosz Lubomirski were imposed on the complex global economical situation with an incredible conflict at Mątwami in 1666, where the rokoszans hatched a flower of the Polish army. The Republic of Hegemon region turned into a boy to beat. Politically, it became so weak that the military-winning conflict with Russia paradoxically sanctioned territorial Polish losses. As for Ukraine, its influence on the decisions of peace in Andruszów, and then the area of Grzymultowski, was nothing. The neighbouring states, ending the war among themselves, deprived Cossacks of subjectivity in matters of their homeland.

Division of Ukraine into Law- and Left- Coast

In another words, Polish-Russian agreements have de facto become the partition of Ukraine, due to the fact that these countries have shared this area. Looking at Dniepr, the main river of this country, Russia occupied the left-coast territories, and Poland the right-coast Ukraine. No curious parties were satisfied with the agreements. Poland felt that it lost what was due to it. Russia felt that it did not regain what it had, and Ukraine did not become independent. The consequences of this cutting translate into knowing of Ukrainianity. The right-hand side is more open to the West and through the Unicki church more open to Catholicism, while the Left-hand side is pro-Russian and accepting the Orthodox church. For historical integrity, I should mention that erstwhile Poland saw the bankruptcy of its policy, it tried to save itself from the alleged Hadzia union, which our historiography tries to compare with the Lublin union.

The aim was to give the Russian people rights that would align them with the Polish and Lithuanian people. There was talk of the Republic of the 3 Nations, in which the national and spiritual diversity of our country would find its organization reflection. Although the thought was right and many Cossack expectations would have become meaningless, no of the parties took it seriously. Poles did not intend to put it into practice, and the Ukrainians as if they knew that it would not be put into practice. In another words, nevertheless desirable and on time, the Hashic union is unfortunately simply a historical anecdotal. Further geopolitical changes, including the partitions of Poland, had to spetry this situation of the Ukrainian state's absence, with the difference that Poland itself disappeared under the partition. Yeah, he wore a wolf a fewer times...

Polish partitions. Habsburg national policy and Moscalophile

Part of the right-wing Ukraine, namely the erstwhile dukedoms of Halic and Vladimir, became part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. For Austrians, due to their linguistic diversity, possibly the Duke of Halicia became Galicia and the Duke of Włodzimierz – Lodomeria. In general, it can be noted that the Austrians' attitude to the geography of Poland was alternatively free; not only that Halicz became Galicia, it was inactive included in Małopolska and Krakow. I am writing about this due to the fact that the Habsburgs had a policy aimed at assimilation of land owned by the effort to depolonize their occupation; for example, the erstwhile capital of Poland, Kraków, did not even become the capital of Galicia. The Habsburgs chose Lviv to give meaning to the little pro-Polish cultural centre.

Second, they were going to derusify the Russian lands, and they were considered to be both the Halic and the Vladimir principalities. As a result, they supported regional differences, sought ethnographic specificities indicating the cultural diversity of the Russian society, which was to look at Vienna with admiration alternatively than Moscow. The Russians answered with the concept of a tamed Russian (in the sense of: dominated by a German), but looking at the improvement of national socialism in Ukraine, which has its roots there, it is not possible to say that their russification efforts were effective, although alleged Moscalophile in the process of acquiring the hearts and minds of Galician Russians had considerable success. Moscalophiles emphasized the cultural unity of the Russian people and proved that Russia is simply a state providing the best economical and cultural improvement of all Russians. Religious-ethnographic social engineering of the Habsburgs stood in constant opposition to Moscalophile.

Ukraine is an arena of conflicting geopolitical interests

This very sketchy version of the communicative Ukraine shows that it is simply a country whose influence on its own destiny was, if not none, simply very limited. First Poland, then Poland with Russia, and erstwhile Poland did not happen, Austria appeared. And this is just a state of European provenance. It should be added that for the Crimean Khanate Ukraine was a Jasyr reservoir, and for Ottoman Turkey the area of expansion, not to offer the second freedom. Acting in specified an unfavorable environment, in which the closest neighbors posed the top threat, firstly, the attitude towards them as time went on became more hostile, secondly, possible aid had to come from afar.

An example is the Ivan Mazepa mentioned, who, during the large conflict between Sweden and Russia, placed on Sweden. The failure under Poltava in 1709 accelerated the process of russification of Ukraine, which, as was concluded, valued its own independency more than being part of the Romanov empire. However, Russia owes its current Ukraine to its south-east territories, which were conquered in the fighting against the Crimean Khanate, which was liquidated in 1784 and the Turkish Empire. Donbas has been developed since the mid-18th century, Odessa built in 1794, and Sevastopol built in 1783.

Andrzej Klunik-Nowak

Think Poland, No. 11-12 (16-23.03.2025)

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