It is hard to explain the last volts in American politics, this time against the conflict in the mediate East, actually indirect, and later even direct participation in it. Another rhetorical stunt by Donald Trump, however, tried hard to explain Trumpist and his likely successor, J. D. Vance.
The ambitious vice president even formulated a short, three-point, specified Trump doctrine, announcing that it would constitute the inviolable foundation of United States abroad policy for decades to come. Let's take a fast look. Her first point seems beautiful rational. Trump's administration is expected to clearly and transparently specify the interests of the United States. The clear definition is intended to focus primarily on economical benefits (foreign policy economicisation), that is to say, simple calculation: with which actors of global relations are worth working with Washington and with which not very much. This first step is to be defined by another. There is no place here for ideological issues, missionaryism imposing on another Western political patterns, so characteristic of erstwhile American administrations.
The second point is diplomatic negotiations maintained in a pragmatic tone. Their character was highlighted by a fewer months of the peculiar typical of Trump Steve Witkoff, conducting talks with Iran, Russia and Hamas. Witkoff found it rather logical that negotiations without knowing and considering the interests of the another organization are meaningless. He argued that this was the very presumption he had made by talking to the opponents of Washington.
Point 3 is the usage of armed forces, though rather specific. erstwhile negotiations do not lead to the nonsubjective of the authorities, according to Vance, it is essential to show force, preferably with precise and fast strokes. The American Vice president declares that specified military operations must be carried out immediately, unexpectedly and devastatingly for the opponent. Their goal is to scare him or to destruct certain key objects. Under no circumstances can they trust on a long-term commitment to hard conflict resolution.
All these assumptions in explanation sound even realistic. Problem in applying them in practice. Let's look at American action against Iran. The question of the atomic programme of this country was to deal indirectly with American interests in the region. The overall destabilisation of the Gulf area may have led to economical problems for Saudi Arabia and the United arabian Emirates, i.e. crucial economical partners of America in the neighbourhood. However, it is worth recalling that no 1 provided any evidence of Tehran's alleged attempts to get atomic weapons (in contrast – United States National Intelligence has argued that specified evidence does not exist). The civilian atomic improvement programme was in no way a hazard to American interests. The U.S. took part in an ideologically motivated conflict, although they disown ideology. They supported the implementation of the circumstantial edition of Zionist ideology represented by modern Israel.
Perhaps they have successfully realized the second point of Trump’s doctrine? Despite Witkoff's attempts, they lost their credibility erstwhile it turned out that their Israeli allies had aggressively attacked Iran without seeing another circular of talks. Finally, point three. Did American strikes scare the Iranians? Definitely not; 1 might even get the impression that they besides mobilised and cemented them. Did they destruct the Iranian atomic program? On the contrary, Iran withdrew as a consequence of their cooperation with the global Atomic Energy Agency, leaving all control in this regard. The real effects of the American bombings are besides a very controversial issue.
Trump's doctrine may sound logical. However, Trump himself is very far distant from implementing it. The current policy of the United States would most likely be better described in the category of chaoticism described in the doctrine of acceleratorism. In this model, we are dealing with complete, incomprehensible interior chaos, spit out conflicting messages at the velocity of a device weapon and make completely mutually exclusive decisions. All points to the fact that – contrary to the opinions of supporters of the existence of the "secret, thoughtful plan" of the White home – there is no method in this chaos.
Mateusz Piskorski
photo of The White House
Think Poland, No. 27-28 (6-13.07.2025)
