Conversation with Vasily Kaszyn, candidate of political science, manager of the Centre for Comprehensive European and global Studies of the National investigation University “Higher School of Economics”.
What were Ukrainian command, government and society's expectations of counteroffensive?
“In the summertime Ukraine’s Armed Forces were to invade Crimea, specified were propaganda, maximum counteroffensive targets. But they had nothing to do with real planning. Real expectations were that the offensive would rapidly worsen the strategical position of the Russian troops and make the conditions for negotiations with Russia on ending the armed conflict from the position of force. This view was shared not only by Ukrainian leaders, but besides by the Americans, whose position was decisive on this issue. It was assumed that the Russian troops would receive a blow that would make their situation worse and then Russia would be forced to negotiate. Apparently, the breach of the ground corridor in Crimea was considered a maximum task. The targets of the offensive seem to have been considered rather realistic by both military and politicians: they seemingly expected a measurable consequence to be achieved within a fewer weeks of the start of the offensive. And everything that happened later was an unpleasant surprise and disappointment for both Ukraine and the United States.
The offensive was announced early in spring. Why was her beginning so delayed?
There were any crucial factors. Firstly, Russia managed to impose a long and exhausting conflict on Kiev about Artemisk [Bacht], which mostly took place in unfavourable conditions for Ukraine. Ukrainian leaders have made serious mistakes, considering the large political importance in the defence of Soledar and Artemis, which have been declared "fortress". They said there was no Ukraine without Bachmut. After taking specified strong political positions, Ukrainian leaders were trapped, resulting in a crucial failure of strength and resources.
Secondly, the nature of Russian troops' actions has changed importantly since spring. We have analogs of American precision JDAM bombs, UMPK planning bombs, the usage of maneuvering ammunition has increased dramatically, generally, there are more precise weapons, modern means of reconnaissance and control. All of this could not have led the Ukrainian side to believe that better preparation was needed. Moreover, their losses simply began to grow, it was harder to gather the essential equipment.
What tactics did Ukrainian command usage in counteroffensive planning?
– As far as we know, they have tried to exploit the experience gained since the beginning of the conflict. Ukraine's Armed Forces carried out many attacks by investigating Russian defence and attempting to find delicate points in it to further grow the offensive in these areas. Russian forces were besides attempted to extend along the front with attacks on ‘old’ Russian territory (regions of the Russian Federation bordering Ukraine, ŁRL or DRL before the start of the peculiar operation). These attacks were not fast strikes, their goal was to capture the bridgehead. During the attack on Grajvoron in the region of Belgorod, Ukrainians dug trenches and brought weapons there. seemingly the goal was to distract Russian forces from another sector and weaken defence in key areas.
But these measures were not adequate to weaken Russian defence. In addition, the erstwhile experience of offensive the Armed Forces of Ukraine to positions of Russian troops is now irrelevant They had previously attacked tiny formations with low defence depths could have covered tens of kilometers, and our positions were very poorly equipped from an engineering point of view. This has nothing to do with Russian defence in the summertime of 2023. Now the defence plan has been carefully prepared, fortifications have been built and military equipment has been improved. many balance of forces has besides changed – although, of course, Ukraine inactive has more troops in the fighting zone, but there is no advantage anymore.
The first days showed that the tactics chosen by Kiev did not work. Why hasn't that changed?
We're dealing with a crisis. This is somewhat akin to the situation from planet War I, and is linked to the fact that military technology has gone far ahead in improvement and military thought has fallen behind. Neither side has an thought of breaking a well-prepared defense. This is shown perfectly by many Ukrainian failed attacks. The soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine simply die in minefields under artillery fire.
We can besides callback the failed attempts of the Russian offensive on Ugledar in January 2023. We besides do not have the ability to conduct maneuvering operations effectively. But we're on the defensive now, and time is on our side now. Kiev, on the another hand, depends on external supplies that are not infinite, and is now facing the demolition of the economy. Human losses are besides large, human resources are much smaller. Ukraine cannot wait long, strong political force is exerted on it, the West demands results. The military is forced to attack and uses the methods and tools it has. If individual can formulate an algorithm to break down modern layer defence without an air advantage, it will be a immense accomplishment of military thought. But now no 1 knows how to do it. And that's why we see senseless bloody attacks in the spirit of planet War I erstwhile people are sacrificed to get a fewer miles.
Why Ukrainian command chose direction Zaporozhes to the counteroffensive, where Russian armed forces waited for the attack and prepared a serious defence line?
– This is clearly the only direction in which Kiev could accomplish a political consequence that would find the result of the full Ukrainian campaign. In another areas, advancement either would not have immediate effect or would be highly hard to achieve. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine had made strong advancement in Zaporozh – even without cutting off the land supply corridor for Russian troops from Crimea – then conditions would have been created for negotiations with Russia from the position of force. At least that's what Ukrainian leadership thinks. Of course, these assumptions may be wrong, due to the fact that Russia, in the event of failure, could respond with a sharp escalation of war effort and the introduction of fresh reserves.
What was the decision to defy the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?
– Many-month training and general increase in professionalism and method equipment of the Russian Armed Forces. A powerful defence strategy was built and an analysis of the mistakes made. In addition, the partial mobilisation and active program of attracting contract soldiers improved the situation with the number of soldiers. As a result, the arrangement of forces just changed. Most likely, the Armed Forces of Ukraine initially did not have adequate troops to carry out specified an operation, they simply did not full realize it yet.
Is defensive tactics accepted by Russian command last fall correct?
- Yes, absolutely. In general, if we come out of the fact that on the 1 hand we increase military production faster than the enemy, and on the another hand we inactive do not have the solutions that would let us to accomplish a fast breakthrough, the best solution is to trust on war to exhaust and slow destruct both military equipment and enemy forces. Even military equipment 1 to 1 will be increasingly hard for them.
Will Ukrainian strikes in the Zaporosian direction continue?
– There is now any political imperative: to accomplish at least limited small success to show that the Armed Forces of Ukraine inactive have the chance to proceed the war for a long time and defeat Russian troops in the future. Suffering specified dense losses, practically without progress, will be very costly politically for Ukrainian authorities. Ukraine is in a very hard situation due to a sharp decline in the standard of surviving of the population and large human losses. And moral and political factors are very crucial to her, they say, a small more effort – and we will win.
In general, political factors dictated many actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including, for example, attacks on the Crimean bridge, terrorist attacks in Russia. They do not have much military significance, but are intended to influence Ukrainian society and strengthen its will to fight For Ukrainian leadership, the worst thing is full demoralization, erstwhile people realize that not only losses are very large (everyone already understands it), but besides realize that there is no hope of victory. Then the fall could come. Therefore, even a tiny success with the capture of any turning point will announce that the objectives of the counteroffensive have allegedly been achieved.
Will Russia keep defensive tactics, or should we wait for offensive action after the end of the first phase of Ukrainian counteroffensive?
– I would propose that we decision on to the offensive erstwhile we come to the conclusion that Ukrainian resources are importantly depleted, their possible is limited, a large part of the equipment is destroyed, and the reconnaissance brigades are defeated. Then there will be conditions for a strong offensive, but so far Russian leadership has been careful.
In the summertime of last year, the Ukrainian command announced an attack on Kherson, but the main blows were yet struck in the Kharkiv Oblast. Can this happen again? Do Ukraine's Armed Forces now have reserves that command can operate?
– They undoubtedly have reserves for the offensive in another directions, but the work of the Russian side on creating a fortification network and strengthening the defence was not limited to Zaporozh. In addition, Ukraine's Armed Forces are presently dealing with a local Russian offensive close Kupańska, where Ukrainian leadership had to even announce the evacuation of the civilian population. It is rather possible that now it will only be about saving forces to counter Russia's possible offensive actions.
Can we measure the serious losses suffered by the Armed Forces of Ukraine?
– There is evidence in the form of video recordings showing the demolition of equipment, and their number is increasing. There are besides indirect indicators, specified as the activity of Ukrainian authorities in carrying out mobilization activities: the intake is very active, there are grabs on the streets. Action is besides being taken to limit young people aged 16 to 18 leaving the country.
All this suggests that Ukrainian losses are crucial even in relation to the full number of Ukrainian mobilization resources. And seemingly they're growing. We can see that attacks take place all day and we know that Ukrainians do not have effective tactics for carrying them out. According to polls, 76 percent of Ukrainians personally know individual who died on the front. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are moving forward, but they do not have proven tactics of this offensive, they do not accomplish large successes and, as you can see, the backless losses are very severe The failure assessment can only be assessed if interior papers of the another organization become available, they are hard to measure on the basis of available data. All we can say is that they are very large and the exhaustion of Ukrainian mobilization forces is approaching.
Is Ukraine's Armed Forces able to defend officers with these advanced losses in mind?
– For all we know, they're protecting them. Officers' share of the failure is not much. Armed Forces officers of Ukraine appear much little on the front line than ours and die much less. This applies to officers of all levels, especially generals. Of course, the Ukrainian command staff bears losses, the number of obituary increases, but these losses are not critical. They'd run out of soldiers alternatively than commanders.
Is the quality of Ukrainian infantry falling with mass mobilization?
– Armed forces of Ukraine effort to keep advanced quality experienced personnel in individual formations, effort to usage them sparingly. Their approach to staff is mostly very diverse: there are people who are not peculiarly valued, and there are those who are valued. Of course, the overall quality of people falls with all fresh wave of mobilization, and it surely does. But the spine of experienced fighters remains. And they're capable of a lot.
Can losses during this counteroffensive break Ukrainian society? How long can he keep his will to resist?
– The experience of military past says that it is almost impossible to foretell the point of intellectual breakdown. There have besides been utmost cases, the best known example is the Paraguayan War between 1864 and 1870, which ended in almost full extermination of the male population of the country. But even erstwhile the children were sent to the last battles, Paraguay didn't break down. There are the other examples: any participants in planet War I, against the background of hardships and losses, experienced revolutions and abandoned ranks.
In order to carry out specified forecasts on Ukraine, sociological investigation is needed, and in a war country it is impossible, and in addition, you request to have a detailed thought of what is happening in the elite and in relations between Ukraine and its allies. We cannot hope that Ukraine will abruptly "empty". We gotta presume they can send people to the slaughter as long as they have them. The crisis can only arise due to the exhaustion of resources or a completely catastrophic decline in their quality. Although there are already mentally sick and disabled among the mobilized Armed Forces of Ukraine
This means that there are no changes in society after the first stages of the counteroffensive have failed?
– We do not have reliable sources of information about precisely what is happening in Ukrainian society. any incidents, for example, erstwhile people on the street beat up military registration and recruitment staff, say nothing, is unclear how massive this phenomenon is. There is any frustration and fatigue, they grow. But whether they can turn into complete apathy, panic and the desire to hide from it at any cost is an open question. So far Ukraine has been able to supplement its armed forces.
After the failure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, can the position of Western states on the supply of military equipment change?
“The stakes of the West in this conflict are besides high. Russia's clear triumph will have global consequences, in fact the collapse of the old planet order. And this is unacceptable to the West, so the determination to support Ukraine is very large. But it doesn't work that hard anymore, if the West sees Ukraine's Armed Forces fighting badly, they'll halt giving money. The fact is that there are also applicants for assistance and resources. In particular, it is Taiwan. Taiwan has a powerful economy and it does not ask for money, but western countries are forced to redistribute arms supplies due to the fact that Taiwan urgently needs arms, and it is fundamentally more crucial than Ukraine. A sharp tightening of Taiwan's problem could lead to a simplification in the number of weapons that can be transferred to Ukraine. But erstwhile that happens, we don't know. most likely to be expected next year, after the Taiwan election.
Can Ukraine go further, say, in the United States, where next year's presidential election is scheduled?
– Ukraine is crucial to Washington and the conflict in Ukraine is important. But if the president changes in the United States, his administration will have more area for manoeuvre, she will be able to make any compromise with Russia, which will declare Ukraine's partial victory.
The decision to deliver F-16 fighters to Ukraine seems to have already been made, the only issue is its time. How long will it take West to train pilots?
The pilots could start preparing in advance. Many of the things that were said earlier, specified as the installation of Storm Shadow missiles on Ukrainian combat aircraft, were prepared earlier, the first usage of missiles occurred shortly after the first authoritative statements of their delivery. It was the same, by the way, with tanks. You do not request to take all these messages as a good coin and do not anticipate long procedures. Ukraine can have planes very rapidly But they will be aircraft with comparatively old modifications that are technically inferior to modern Russian fighters. Besides, the West won't be able to give as many planes at erstwhile as possible to change the power system. It's just an improved replacement for the Ukrainian russian aircraft we're destroying.
Will fresh supplies truly be able to change the situation on the front, or will it be another “wonderful weapon” whose main effect will be propaganda?
– due to the fact that they are western fighters, they can carry a full scope of Western guided weapons. This is not the same as russian MiG-29 and Su-24 already heavy worn out, which, of course, Ukrainians adapt to the usage of this weapon, but with a number of restrictions. Here a full scope of weapons can be utilized normally. This, of course, will increase our losses and make difficulties for us. But it will not be possible to change the overall situation, due to the fact that we will have both a quantitative and qualitative advantage in the air.
What weapon could the West give to bring about the real success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?
– There is no single weapon strategy that would radically change the situation on the front, supplied in limited quantities. In order to change the situation on the front, it is essential to change the full strategy of forces. This requires a complete reinforcement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and saturation with fresh types of weapons in immense quantities. And the production capacity of Western countries is limited. They even cover the current needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the limit of their capabilities. There is besides exhaustion of reserves.
The long, full-sized land war was a shock to both us and them. We started to increase the production of weapons, but we had a base, due to the fact that we kept any production capacity through crucial arms exports. In the West, the same thing is done, but there, the increase in military production involves a large number of bureaucratic restrictions and the request to link the interests of the state and private companies, which require a warrant of advanced request over the long term. There are besides problems with labour shortages for industry. All of this does not let increased production to full meet the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We request a completely different scale of commitment. And now in Europe tanks are only produced by Germany. It is now hard to saturate the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as it was during planet War II, the Korean War, and even the Vietnam War, erstwhile lots of thousands of pieces of equipment were delivered. The industrial base has shrunk.
What is the point of attacks in Ukraine's port infrastructure after refusing to renew the grain contract?
– There are a fewer issues in this story. Firstly, it seems that Ukraine has truly utilized the grain agreement to store a large amount of military material in port warehouses due to the fact that we have seen powerful secondary detonations after attacks on ports. Secondly, the attacks on ports are the safest way to keep maritime blockade, due to the fact that the combination of coastal anti-ship missiles from Ukraine, sea drones and NATO's targeting of targets makes our fleet operations in the northwest part of the Black Sea rather dangerous.
Another crucial point is the weakening of economical possible Ukraine in the long term, which in turn will make it hard for Americans to implement all kinds of post-war projects of Ukraine into a fresh Israel and saturate it with weapons. At the moment, the Ukrainian economy as a full is destroyed. At the end of last year GDP fell by 30 percent, this year the situation stabilised, but from the economical activity that remained in Ukraine, most of them are only a byproduct of their war effort.
There's quite a few aid coming to Ukraine, but for weapons and military equipment. These tens of billions of dollars are exchanged into hryvny and utilized to pay wages and benefits of all kinds, which keeps Ukraine on the surface and comparative currency stability. This money is spent in the country on certain goods and services, which gives the impression of economical activity, but in fact it is simply a galvanization of corpses. If this aid goes down, activity goes down. Part of production in Ukraine remains, but there is not much. There is simply a sharp shrinking agriculture, there are tiny remnants of metallurgy and defense. In the post-war period, on this basis, erstwhile there is no work in the country and a large part of the population fled to Europe, it will be hard to recreate a powerful anti-Russian bastion in Ukraine
What can we anticipate in the future? Has the war on exhaustion already begun?
– In fact, it's been going on all along. The strategy of the war on exhaustion was chosen after the unsuccessful first phase of the peculiar operation, erstwhile it was impossible to break up Ukraine and impose favorable peace conditions on Russian conditions. Only models of her conduct change, and for the first months she was tried to run minimal costs, keeping Russia at peace erstwhile not only there was no mobilisation, but besides contract soldiers retained the right to be released from the army, many of whom benefited in early 2022. Based on the results of the Ukrainian offensive in the Kharkiv region, it became clear that it would not be possible to keep this regime, well, we rebuilt the war model, carried out partial mobilization and changed the legal framework, accelerated the expansion of military production and built the defence. Now we collect this fruit.
Behind: lenta.ru
Photo by RIA Novosti
