Poland stands out against the background of another countries of our region, especially Hungary, the deficiency of private oligarchs subordinate to political parties, but besides subservient parties. The owners of the largest private companies in Poland tend to avoid politics or effort to live well with all authority. It is simply a affirmative phenomenon that strengthens democracy and separates parties from the peculiar interests of individuals or companies. In Poland there were no favourable conditions for the formation of oligarchy besides due to the fact that private companies operate on a limited scale and are developing beyond strategical sectors of the economy. This causes their owners neither to have adequate resources nor motivation to engage in politics.
An crucial origin to keep this clarity is the strategy of financing political parties from the state budget. Thanks to public subsidies, Polish groups do not gotta search support in business, which reduces the hazard of systemic clientelist relations. Although the problem of lobbying, including classified, inactive exists, its scale is limited compared to countries where parties gotta trust on private donors. Another benefit of the current backing strategy is that organization dependence on private donors introduces systemic imbalance, as those with poorer electorates are in a worse position than those with more prosperous electorates.
The increasing problem of politicising state-owned companies
Despite the above advantages, the Polish organization strategy suffers from another problem – it is the politicization of state-owned companies (SSP), i.e. Treatment of individual companies as political “heads”, which is distributed between individual ruling parties and frequently their factions. The problem is crucial due to the fact that state companies are the biggest players in the Polish economy. On the list of the 20 largest companies listed on the Polish stock exchange in Warsaw, almost half are SSPs. They make about 20% of Poland's GDP and are key players in strategical sectors – energy, transport, banking, insurance and another sectors. specified a crucial function of the SSP has historical causes – the scope of privatisation in Poland was smaller than in the Czech Republic. In addition, support for maintaining state ownership in key sectors has been increasing for years, given the function of SSP in government economical policy.
In positions not only in supervisory boards, but besides in boards, people with low competences are frequently designated, which limits the improvement possible of SSPs. In addition, frequent staff exchanges consequence in a deficiency of continuity of activities, as well as long periods of stagnation due to the request for subsequent boards to familiarise themselves with the position of SSP. Frequent staff changes, not only immediately after the fresh government's acceptance of power after the election, but besides during the government's duration, due to various political processes or factional disputes within the power camp make it hard to implement a long-term strategy. In many SSPs in fresh years, changes in the position of president have been more frequent than the classical investment cycle.
This is due to the fact that any business decisions are made from political logic. Sometimes these decisions are "only" non-optimal business decisions, but they besides happen in a business incomprehensible way (e.g. investments in a coal power plant in Ostrołęka).
The problem is besides the “hand” control of the SSP by interference of politicians in individual decisions, which blurs the division of management and supervisory functions. For example, after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the suspension of imports of Russian PKP Cargo coal, which is simply a major shareholder of the state, received a political commission to distribute coal from seaports across Poland. Although the State's interest was clear, it was not consistent with that of the carrier. The company could not comply with the contracts in force at the time on the reasonably liberal rail freight market, losing its credibility and counterparties to competition, the consequences of which are inactive being borne by the company (there are considerable efforts to improve the position of the company).
Even assuming the active state action through the supervisory ministries of the companies, the government should not be active in the day-to-day management of companies, but should let companies to full operate in order to meet their objectives. Meanwhile, the practice is the opposite. Supervisory authorities do not specify the mark and then do not enforce it, but interfere in individual decisions, including, of course, staff policy.
Finally, politicisation makes it hard to conduct an optimal dividend policy, subjecting dividends from income to political objectives. The definition of the function of state-owned companies as tools for the country's economical policy requires the adoption of a surplus (residual) dividend policy by the State's Treasury, which assumes that dividends are directed only to the part of the profit that cannot be reinvested effectively in the company. However, in practice, the dividend paid is higher as the State Treasury as a shareholder receives additional gross to finance non-SSP-related objectives. It is due to the ‘draining’ of the SSP that investment is limited, e.g. capital-intensive investments in energy.
Polarization deepens the problem
Moreover, although there is no “hard” evidence, there are indications, built on the basis of journalistic reports, that the problem of politicisation is increasing. This process first shows an increase in the number of positions under the political spoil strategy in a given SSP. Secondly, this logic is extended to institutions that have so far stayed distant from political games. Thirdly, the number of people with limited competence who manage SSPs increases.
This problem stems, among others, from the progressive political polarisation. Elections have become not only competition between programmes, but besides a clash of tribal emotions, in which voters more frequently forgive abuse of the party's "their" due to the fact that they treat the SSP as a resource of political rivalry. specified an atmosphere favours the casting of companies with people associated with individual parties and the usage of SSP as a political tool.
Control over state companies allows ruling parties to reward members' and sympathizers' loyalty, as well as providing resources to finance marketing or sponsorship projects. For example, marketing expenditure PKN Orlen Between 2020 and 2020, it increased almost twice, creating controversy over the objectives of these funds and possible links with policy. likewise in another companies, specified as the Polish Energy Group or Lotos, crucial increases in promotion budgets have been recorded.
Although the usage of state-owned companies may benefit the ruling party, it does not give emergence to a fundamental advantage which would importantly impede the opposition from taking power. Elections of October 15, 2024 show that a change of government is possible even erstwhile the SSP is politically used.
Tyrania position quo
The problem of politicising the SSP is hard to solve due to the fact that it is not in the interests of political parties in Poland. Naturally, opposition parties criticise this phenomenon in decision-makers, but erstwhile they come to power, the benefits of entering this strategy are large adequate that nothing changes, even if the media emphasize the hypocrisy of politicians.
The parties decide to respond only in cases of utmost pathology and only erstwhile the media uncover them. This has late been the case in Totalizator Sportowy, where there has been a change of directors at regional level in addition to board exchanges. The fresh were powerfully associated with individual coalition parties. This case shows that the problem of politicisation is not only about the highest positions in the company, but besides about the mediate level, i.e. people who are frequently outside the radar of the public.
The request for complete depoliticisation seems unrealistic in Poland today. The only thing that's within scope is to make incentives to limit the most far-reaching pathologies. Although it won't be easy to do. Among experts dealing with SSP topics, the frequently highlighted advice is the adoption of procedures to hinder the politicisation of SSP in the form of open competitions, stenographered and accessible to the public, and the introduction of a public proceeding institution. This does not warrant the appointment of competent persons, but raises the costs of nominations for completely non-essential candidates. This can at least to any degree reduce the harmful effects of filling state-owned organization companies with denominations.
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Paul Musik – president of the Jagiellonian Club, in which he has been active since 2009. Graduated from political discipline and global relations at the Jagiellonian University, where he besides completed the Interdisciplinary Doctoral Studies "Society-Technology-Environment". Author of technological and analytical publications on energy and abroad policy in particular. associate of the Open Eyes economical Summit Program Council, as well as the Stakeholder Board at the Institute of Politics, Sociology and doctrine at the University of Economics in Krakow.
