Michał Sutowski: Why did the coalition of SPD, Greens and Liberals break up in Germany? Is the authoritative reason, i.e. the disagreement of the second organization to increase the deficit in the next year's state budget real – or is that a pretext?
Klaus Bachmann: It was alternatively a combination of different circumstances, although of course the budget was this visible and real cause. The full communicative began almost precisely 1 year ago, in November 2023, erstwhile the national Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe ruled that the government was not allowed to transfer money – talking about EUR 60 billion – from the covid fund to climate policy. It meant that specified a fund would should be created again, and for this, the approval of the opposition, or CDU, was needed.
And without that, without specified an out-of-budget fund, would it just be missing money?
Exactly. Hence, in the Green and SPD circles there was a concept to simply rule, completely in accordance with the constitution that we have Notlage, or emergency. This would not have extra-budget implications, for example for human rights or civilian rights. It wasn't about sending troops to the street, it was about violating the fuses in a constitution that usually reduces acceptable debt.
And cover expenses, like climate protection, from debts?
That's what they wanted to do, but Finance Minister Lindner and his FDP were against it from the beginning. The dispute continued for a long time, and shortly before the dissolution of the coalition from the Ministry of Finance came to the press a leak of the manifesto of economical policy liberals from the FDP, which contained a number of demands completely unacceptable to the coalitions.
This was expected to be a consequence to the stagnation of the German economy: reducing the reporting obligations of companies in terms of climate protection, reducing CIT, eliminating solidarity tax, cutting subsidies on green industrial policy, but also, for example, on Intel's Magdeburg factory. Sounds like the anti-programme of the erstwhile coalition.
Nevertheless, any public discussions, meetings and negotiations have begun, or something of this full "economic return" coalition could actually implement. no of this worked out, and after Lindner's decisive conversation with Scholz, the chancellor resigned the finance minister. Scholz announced that Lindner had breached his trust many times and made demands unfulfilled. Lindner said that the Chancellor wanted to force the budget "extraordinary state" on him – and as a consequence the FDP came out of the coalition, outside Volker Wissing, minister of digitization and transport.
So it was actually about differences in economical policy?
In the FDP there are many opponents of various Green and SPD redistributive policies, but besides of climate policy, specified as the ban on the production of combustion cars after 2035. This is not only due to economical views, but besides to climate negationism – specified reasoning is present in the FDP and not in the coalitions. There is besides an ad hoc context. The FDP in the last regional elections to the east flew out of the Landtags and consequently increased force on Lindner to radicalize the transmission.
Is it hard to be extremist in government?
Apparently, she won the faction, according to which a clear profile can only be obtained outside of the government, so as not to be liable for what this 1 does, to be able to cut off from it. It was all the easier for Lindner that he had no problem taking work from now on – he withdrew from the alleged Jamaican coalition with the CDU/CSU and the Greens already in 2017, which led Angela Merkel to create, after many months of fighting, the government together with the SPD. Of course, the polls are more crucial than the personalities, and they now have little than 5 percent in the rankings and they number that as opposition they will get more.
Does this calculation make sense? The early elections to the Bundestag, as we already know, will be truly soon, due to the fact that on February 23rd, and in the meantime, it is inactive Christmas.
I don't think they're going to make it, due to the fact that for weeks now we see what the CDU is up to – they're going to want to tighten up the debate and run an election run against the Greens to lead to polarization between them. The consequence is likely to weaken support for the Greens from 1 and the other. Alternatives to Germany On the another hand, but with a ricochet he'll get an FDP. I say ‘ricochet’ due to the fact that it is always a possible coalition for chadeks, but in polarization logic, a bit like Poland, tiny parties hazard falling under the electoral threshold.
But the Greens aren't coming, are they? In the polls, they have a reasonably certain, two-digit score, although of course much below 14.8 percent, which they received in the last election.
The Greens, although besides flown out of 1 regional parliament, are firmly embedded in the west, while the FDP, which is inactive on the brink, may fall out of parliament for a longer period.
If the chadek run is to be targeted in the Greens, who will they be making a coalition with after the election?
The plan is to make a coalition with the SPD, of course with the Chancellor from the CDU – that should be adequate for most.
Early elections – present we already know that they will take place on February 23 – are very for CDU/CSU, and very not for FDP.
Yes, but the second led to them. But they're not on the SPD's arm either, even though they won't admit it out loud. After all, if you take poll results as a good coin, and they are rather unchangeable in fresh months, then the Chancellor will almost surely be Friedrich Merz, and Olaf Scholz at best, he will again be Minister of Finance, just like he utilized to be in the Merkel government.
Will the fresh government, with leadership, be willing – and able – to take on Germany the greater burden of Ukraine's assistance? With Lindner in the lineup, that was alternatively difficult.
Scholz actually utilized the argument that if the demands of liberals were to be met, there would be no request to aid Ukraine, unless social spending was cut. But it is clear that the Ukraine case has not led to the collapse of the coalition and that a fresh coalition will not be concluded around this case after the election.
I understand, but will these elections change from a political position towards Ukraine? The government will most likely be more in control.
If the CDU and SPD rule, it'll be as it was, due to the fact that it's the same coalition that built Nord Stream II. Though present it is forbidden to mention it due to the fact that people are getting offended.
As I realize it, the fresh speech by author Marko Martin, who, at the celebration of the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall by president Steinmeier, repelled his support for the task – and called NATO maneuvers on the east flank “scalling” and “inciting war”. And in 2016. But is specified a coalition the only option available?
No, due to the fact that the polarizing run against the Greens besides does not regulation out a coalition with them. At 1 time, in Germany, the “bony” was easier, due to the fact that as there were de facto 3 parties, the 1 that won was the 1 that formed the FDP coalition, but for the “big coalition” from 1966 to 1969. Now we are closer to the Dutch model, where parties can make governments in very different configurations. The CDU would be most convenient to enter a coalition with a weaker partner from the SPD-Green pair, although of course much depends on the course of coalition talks and the degree of possible concessions. It is known, however, that there will be no red-green government, due to the fact that there will simply be no majority for it.
In the elections behind the ocean, immigration and the state of the economy were major themes, both of which were clearly conducive Donald Trump.. Will these besides be topics of the nearest run to the Bundestag?
Yeah. As far as the economy is concerned, there has been a panic in German media. Something visible and tangible has happened, something experts have warned against for many years: Germany is losing digitization and changes in the automotive market, the full transition from the production of interior combustion engines to electrical engines and then further, e.g. to hydrogen, does not take place in Germany. If a German client wants to buy something like this, the German maker pays way besides much. Or buys a car from the United States or Japan.
If it's nothing, why is there a panic?
Because group layoffs started in Volkswagen and Mercedes. So far, it's been played in spite of the ears, and now you can't pretend due to the fact that people are standing on the streets and protesting. Only that politicians respond as if we were in a situation 20 years ago, and we were now facing a large deal of unemployment, whereas in fact it is acute for those who are being released.
But the macroeconomic indicator, low unemployment, does not always aid the 1 who is losing his job.
Sure, but there's a very low probability that thousands of people will be on the street without any classes. Our economy lacks hands to work and this is very frequently vacancy where vocational education is required. Infusing these jobs is simply a challenge for public policy, but not a origin for panic.
What about migration?
Exactly. The number of asylum applications has dropped by 45% year-on-year, and we are discussing this as if we had the second year of 2015.
Nevertheless, perception matters. Does this mean that in the run you will discuss in Germany whether the CDU has a good thought to save the German industry?
I guess perception is the only thing that matters. Therefore, I am afraid that this will be a discussion of who will pay more to the declining industry. If the CDU-SPD coalition governs, they will alternatively effort to save what is, the erstwhile for “nationalistic” reasons, and the second for more “social”.
And do the Greens and the SPD have any chance of defending themselves against the polarization that the CDU will want to impose in the run to dominate both?
This was the main reason why the Greens did not themselves origin the coalition to break up and leave the government – at least the SPD is not attacking them now. If they must co-ordinate, at least on this front they have a minute of peace: they only have a run against the CDU, possibly against the AfD. And there's a good chance that with this kind of polarization, AfD will lose too.
Can the SPD benefit from Olaf Scholz yet deciding to end the coalition?
At first, it looked like this, but erstwhile he started to key the issue of the vote of assurance and the election deadline – we were talking about the March deadline – it stopped. He long had the image of a hesitant, undecided politician, and the full organization appeared as führungslos, which means no leadership.
I late saw an interview with him, and I had the impression that I was seeing the end of Angela Merkel, who was moving an election campaign, demobilizing social democrats. She did it by completely ignoring them and pretending – or possibly she wasn't pretending, but she truly felt it – that whatever happens in this world, she doesn't care. Scholz is now trying to play this: there's this Trump in Washington, but what's bothering you, you can negociate with him. The planet is falling apart, and he smiles and pretends nothing happens.
Merkel pulled a twelve years in this way.
But at a time erstwhile it seemed effective. Plus, I remember Merkel trying to shut down atomic power plants overnight, under impulse. In my opinion, it proves that she had no nerves of steel.
I late met with the thesis that Trump's triumph in the US could affect German public debate, among another things, in specified a way that it will "normalize" utmost right-wing solutions in migration policy. Is that possible?
It will “normalise” much more, and it will do so throughout Europe. On the regulation of law, standards of liberal democracy, independency of the judiciary. People can now say that Trump won democratic elections, and as a candidate he said openly that he would throw out judges, officials, that he would regulation like a dictator, revenge on his opponents, that he would massively deport immigrants. He did not win by a hair or by a coincidence, he won in an absolute number of votes, according to electorate votes, he won the Senate, he most likely won the home of Representatives in a moment, and the ultimate Court had already planted rather legally.
But that means what? That there would be voices in Germany, for example, to limit the powers of the Karlsruhe tribunal?
On the contrary, due to the fact that just securing it is 1 of the projects that the current coalition of SPD and the Greens wants to push together with the CDU even before the fresh elections – due to the fact that then it may be besides late. It's about getting AfD influence on Karlsruhe's cast. At least they understood that Karlsruhe not only limits their power, but besides protects against the unlimited power of their opponents. In a somewhat malicious way, this is precisely what PiS did not realize in Poland in 2016.
I understand, therefore, that all of Trump's arguments about actual democracy and order in courts or offices are alternatively arguments for AfD.
A small too. Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance.
Does the "sanitary cordon" around the various possible coalitions continue? Is there a ruling coalition at national level involving AfD or BSW?
At the national level, their support is not needed for anything, due to the fact that according to the polls, these 2 parties share around 25%. It may besides happen that the BSW, as a consequence of very acute polarisation, like the FDP, will lose a lot and even fall out of the Bundestag. I think that their fresh successes are a bit of a coincidence: if the order of the Landtag elections were different, if they had first been voted in the Western Lands, they most likely wouldn't have had specified a success either in the East. They were carried by a favorable wave.
In another words, in this election this quadrangle of the mainstream organization will hold power?
Yes, and this ‘sanitary cordon’ at land level only covers AfD. We do not yet know what will consequence from this in Saxony and Thuringia, as it will appear, for example, that BSW cannot be ruled, but it can besides be ruled in no another way, i.e. without AfD. Especially in Thuringia, there may be a situation where there will be no BSW coalition or that the BSW will fall apart, to which it is most likely close, and not adequate votes.
What then?
Theoretically, there may even be a BSW and AfD government, due to the fact that arithmetically they have a majority. It could besides be a number government, supported quietly by the BSW or by any BSW group, or 1 that will look for the majority here and there – and abruptly it turns out that AfD supports any solutions. By the way, this is simply a very large unknown erstwhile the number government of the SPD and the Greens will operate until the elections to the Bundestag. They hope they will find support in the parliament that the CDU will supply them. But what happens if, at any vote, it turns out that this minority, red-green government has a majority, but only due to the fact that a fewer twelve AfD Members voted for any project? We're gonna do a reassumption and say we don't want those votes?
We talked about the fact that immigration in Germany present is simply a problem of perception alternatively than real, but what does it mean for real politics after elections? Will Germany further tighten migration and asylum policies if the CDU coalition is in charge?
I think they will try, but external and constitutional legal constraints for specified a policy are very strong in Germany, much stronger than in the United Kingdom, France, let alone the United States, which are not organization to any human rights convention. In Germany, this is all subject to regulations that the government itself cannot change. I so anticipate that they will effort to carry out demonstration actions, like alleged permanent border checks, which are mostly fiction. They reduced the number of refugees a small bit due to the fact that it's not so easy to get to Germany from Poland anymore, but I don't think it's possible to hold it, just missing police officers. You'd gotta hire twice as many to actually control the border.
What about climate policy? I realize that the Greens will be weaker than they are now, and that the US will be strengthening the overall trend of opposition to climate policy. What direction can shifts go after elections?
These policies will surely continue, which make the price of renewable energy lower than from non-renewable sources. From a purely economical point of view, quite a few things will stay the same, due to the fact that the price of energy is vitally crucial to manufacture and households. As for the climate issue, I am afraid that we have completely distanced ourselves from the goal of 1.5 or even 2 degrees Celsius warming, not only as Germany, but as the full world. And that means that alternatively of preventing catastrophes, we're going to pay to remove their effects, like, for example, recent floods.
Can there be any change in the attitude to atomic power in Germany?
No, for the simple reason that even the companies that own or own these plants do not want to restart them. any companies even opposed an extension of their activities by a fewer months erstwhile the government made the applicable decision after cutting off the Russian gas supply. Energy companies inactive received compensation for closing blocks during Merkel's reign, so erstwhile it turned out that it would be useful to have another six months of their operation, it was opposition due to the fact that decisions had already been made and people were slowed down. I considered speeding up my exit from the Fukushima atom as a manifestation of a panic attack, I was never an opponent of atomic energy, but in Germany this cookie was already eaten.
Finally, I'm going to ask you about east politics. Will Germany, in its fresh political configuration, be prepared to finance Ukraine's safety to a greater extent, or possibly even – signals of specified expectations flow from Washington – keep a military presence in its territory, e.g. to defend any demilitarised zone?
I cannot see the imagination of specified a German government that would agree to the latter, but neither will have to, due to the fact that the Russian government will not agree to it. Whoever it is – any UN mission, the European Union, a group of states – would yet mean that NATO soldiers would be stationed close to Russian borders. I don't believe Putin would agree to this in any way as part of the truce negotiations or the frost of the conflict, due to the fact that that's why he's fighting this war. How is he expected to explain to people that he won, erstwhile right on the another side of any frozen front there would be NATO Army units, and that's most likely 20 years, due to the fact that that's what we're talking about today. Unless the Chinese truly stand there – but I do not know a country or a conflict in which a greater number of Chinese peace forces would be involved.
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The Secretary-General - Politologist, historian. He worked as a correspondent for abroad media in Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania and Brussels. It publishes in the “Electionary Gazette”, the weekly magazine “Politics”. He is the author of books on European integration and the latest past of Europe, among others. Problem with Gulliver. Why Germany is getting bigger and Europe is getting smaller (2021).
