Jakub Majmurek: The results of the elections in Germany are a large disaster for the left?
Rafał Chwedoruk: I would say that the European left is at all acquainted with defeat, but for a fewer exceptions. Even Labourers in the UK won, winning less votes than in erstwhile elections, which were considered Jeremy Corbyn's defeat.
The German left is traditionally characterised by dichotomia, so the answer to this question depends on what pole we are talking about. We can talk about The defeat of the SPD, the disaster of the Sahra Wagenknecht Movement (BSW) and the triumph of Die Linke.
Let's start with the SPD. How large a disaster is this?
This is the worst consequence in the full post-war past of the party, and even since the 1980s, erstwhile there was a completely different ordination, women had no voting rights and there were bismarck laws aimed at socialists.
Equally crucial is where her constituents sailed away. The investigation shows that mainly to CDU, in much smaller numbers to Alternatives for Germany and Die Linke and BSW. If voters are lost to a force that was traditionally the other pole of the German political scene throughout the post-war German history, then the organization has a problem not with the campaign, not with tactics, but with strategy and identity.
What does it say?
We must go back deep into the past of German social democracy. The SPD was raised in the shadow of the regime. First, this Bismarckian, who banned the activities of the socialist party. But at the same time the Bismarck Reich was a law-abiding state and socialists utilized it. They couldn't run as a organization for the Reichstag, but they could have been single activists. The law did not prohibit workers from creating choirs, sports clubs, tourist associations – as a result, a fascinating planet of diverse social organizations centered around the party, organising free time of its constituents almost “from cradle to grave”.
The regulation of law then saved the SPD. The organization appreciated its importance. For the first time in 1914, voting for war loans, following the words of the emperor, who then said that "he saw no organization but the Germans themselves." For the second time in the 1930s, erstwhile she realized besides late that the 3rd Nazi Reich was not the Bismarck Reich and this time the regulation of law of the left would not help. The SPD paid dearly for it.
How does this translate into modern politics?
This culture of legality and the regulation of law has been reflected in the political life of the national Republic: on the 1 hand, based on the polar rivalry of the CDU/CSU-SPD, on the another hand, on a considerable degree of consensus. The Socialists accepted many of the key solutions that the chadeceds had introduced into German law and political customs, making it easier to make large coalitions.
In fresh years, large coalitions have ruled, making SPD voters more and more able to see the CDU not as a key rival of the SPD, but besides a partner to whom 1 can even vote.
The second origin of strategical SPD problems is related to the economical reforms of Schröder's government from 1998 to 2005. They mostly allowed the German economy to be brought into globalisation. At the same time, they led to the departure of Oskar Lafontaine's faction, which together with the post-communist PDS formed present Die Linke. This besides marked the departure of the Emerytian and Workers' Electorate from the SPD. This process has been going on since the 1950s, but has accelerated at the turn of the century, erstwhile the SPD – alternatively of becoming a critic of globalisation, marketplace excesses, commercialization – adopted an agenda to reconcile with capitalism in its globalized form.
There is besides migration. German social democracy traditionally opposed all forms of xenophobia, on the another hand, migration and its negative effects concentrated in Germany in the working world, erstwhile traditionally voting on the SPD, districts of large cities where rental prices – and let's remember that in Germany most people, unlike in Poland, live in rented apartments – are the lowest.
And what function did SPD play in the defeat A negative assessment of Scholz's policy?
It is surely an crucial factor. possibly past will justice Scholz much more graciously than the voters, seeing in him a policy that helped prevent the 3rd planet War, but the meanders of his policies towards the war in Ukraine proved to be simply incomprehensible to the German public. due to the fact that Scholz first tried to save peace, then support Ukraine, but so as to prevent escalation, e.g. in the form of the usage of atomic weapons by Russia.
There was no uncertainty about any deeper contradictions in the identity of the SPD as a organization that, on the 1 hand, co-created an active German economical model, based on inexpensive natural materials from Russia, and on the another hand was always a pro-Western, pro-American option. The war revealed interior divisions in the organization and electorate around these issues.
It is worth noting that SPD results in the erstwhile GDR this year were catastrophic. The scale of declines in poorer regions in the north – in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg – is astonishing. 1 wonders if the SPD did not take the way of the Italian Democratic Party, which present has actually become a regional party, with support centered in Emilia-Romania and Tuscany.
Where does SPD support focus?
Mainly in large northern cities Germany, like Hamburg, Bremen, Hannover, Brunswick. That's inactive SPD number one. These are the last bastions where the organization can be certain of anything, although the first always defeat in the Bundestag election with the Greens in another historical SPD bastion in the north – in Kilonia, and a further decline in support in Munich, which was always a red drop in the "black" sea of Chadeck Bavaria. The Greens besides outrun the SPD.
What about the social profile of SPD voters? What kind of electorate was left at the party?
They're mostly retired employees. Like most conventional parties in Europe, the SPD is based on "grey heads", which raises concerns about the future of the organization – its electorate simply dies out. Additionally, budget workers: teachers, officials, etc., which is characteristic of leftist parties in the west of Europe. The SPD inactive has intellectual-studential footholds, but not at the same level as in the golden decade of social democracy, in the 1970s.
The organization mostly returns present to where it was a 4th century ago – with the same dilemmas and voters. But it is besides a formation that ruled and will co-create the government, so this year's consequence is not a complete disaster, but a disaster.
Why did the SPD next to the FDP pay the highest price for Scholz's rule? Greens have little support.
But these elections were besides a failure for them. They were expected to pursuit the SPD, but they only took 4th place. There was besides a clear dichotomy in her electorate. any attracted Die Linke – which helped greatly what is happening in connection with Trump's second term. But quite a few it went to the CDU. The township curious not only in the maintenance of the estate, but besides in the quality of life, who had previously voted in the Greens, felt that the more effective defender of his interests would be the chapedencies. Similarly, the SPD electorate broke. The laborer part fled to chadecia and BSW, the novel-left part to Die Linke.
The fresh large coalition won't be a problem for the SPD?
The function of a smaller partner in the ruling coalition may or may not be for a organization with specified an extended camera that needs to be maintained from something. Furthermore, the presence of AfD in the Bundestag will supply justification for the large coalition. At least for the SPD – the coalition can prove to be more politically costly for chadeks. But there's no choice either, due to the fact that CSU ruled out governments with the Greens. Chadecja recorded the second worst score in its history, so it will be a "great coalition" only by name.
Let's go to the another players on the left. Is this the end of the Sahra Wagenknecht Movement?
One of Die Linke's leaders asked after the election if the division was not a mistake and whether Wagenknecht could not now return to Die Linke, replied "we have not yet considered it". This diplomatic consequence best sums up today's political strength of the BSW.
Why didn't the movement cross the threshold?
Firstly, they are now co-organising in Thuringia and Brandenburg, which has weakened the advantage of anti-systemality. Secondly, German elections require a large bureaucratic effort – and this is inactive a young formation. Thirdly, problems with the centralist character of the party, focusing it on the figure of the leader – which is different from another German political groups, based alternatively on mass membership.
Another origin is populism. BSW had a working, unaffluent electorate. In tiny and medium-sized cities, he has mobilised an extraordinary number of 400,000 new, previously unvoted voters for specified a tiny formation.
But that wasn't enough.
No, due to the fact that the structure of the present society is that a akin romanticist task of resurrecting the old-style social democracy with the slightest hesitation becomes questionable.
The situation is precedent - never before have a organization with little than 5 percent been so short to enter the Bundestag. And in conditions where, as a consequence of bureaucratic turmoil, a large proportion of Germans surviving abroad could not speak. 1 wonders if all curious parties could vote, the BSW would not have crossed the threshold. possibly then we would receive a completely different Bundestag, where CDU/CSU and SPD would not have a majority. Wagenknecht raises this argument, but there is no legal way to do anything about it.
The complete failure of the BSW and the success of Die Linke does not invalidate the diagnosis of Wagenknecht, that it was incorrect to go left in a "woke" and that it must combine its economical message with a more conservative approach to specified issues as migration?
It will not cancel, due to the fact that although Die Linke was successful, she only shuffled old cards, losing 350 000 voters to Wagenknecht. She gained half a million votes from the SPD and as much as 700,000 from the Greens, which is simply a real phenomenon. due to the fact that until recently, outside Saara Lafontaine's home country Die Linke was a organization of East Germany. Its symbol was the East Berlin districts of Hohenschönhausen and Lichtenberg, where many erstwhile Stasi officers lived.
This year Die Linke not only increased support in her bastions in the east, but besides became a serious player in the west for the first time, where it had not previously counted. The support even increased in historically Chadetic Stuttgart.
This is another coup in German politics – Die Linke entered the new-left electorate of the SPD and the Greens in the west. I think it besides helped how the attitude towards this organization changed due to the increase in AfD power. For a long time, Die Linke was the organization presented as extreme, unfit to rule. She even had problems with the German Constitution Protection Office. expanding support for AfD increased mainstream media acceptance for Die Linke.
He besides helped Trump. due to the fact that Die Linke with his anti-American tradition could have presented itself as an option capable of most consistently opposing the politics of the current American President.
On the X portal, I was told that Die Linke's leaders were either young women who were perfectly moving on social media, or eighty-year-olds whose Wikipedia slogan includes a comprehensive section of “Stasi cooperation charges”. Does their electorate look similar?
Yes, it is. It can be said that Die Linke fulfilled the slogan of the year ’68 “request the impossible” and made a pro-social, reluctant migration erstwhile associate of the Socialist Unity organization of Germany from Lichtenberg vote as much as a 20-year-old student from Friburg, curious in legalizing marijuana and the rights of non-binal people. Although possibly the only thing they had in common was that both this 80-year-old and the grandparents of this young female demonstrated against the Vietnam War – on 2 sides of the Iron Curtain.
But I would not draw very far conclusions from this electoral alliance, due to the fact that it is not known how it will turn out. Die Linke will inactive gotta act reactively, referring to SPD and Green policies. due to the fact that there's a hazard she'll lose the electorate she took from them in this election. At the same time Die Linke was undoubtedly successful. I'd even say he's the only winner of this election.
Not AfD? They've doubled their support.
AfD can't accept these choices as his victory, due to the fact that the consequence is nothing. They doubled their support, but they inactive don't have coalition skills, and there's no indication that that's gonna change. The consequence is not large adequate to force the weakening of their insulating sanitary cordon. For the CDU, the situation erstwhile it is in the mediate – between Trump AfD and anti-American Die Linke – is very comfortable.
What have these elections shown in general?
The weakness of the German elite. They are present a force of inertia, stableness of the system, electoral ordination. Political fragmentation, how fewer votes are represented by the "great coalition", shows that the factors that unite German society are becoming little and less.
This is simply a serious concern for the Germans. The country will be ruled by 2 parties who have actually lost the election. The legitimacy of specified a coalition will be weak, its governments may be accompanied by a feeling of collapse, in crisis situations conducive to extremist forces.
What are the major challenges facing the German left in this term?
Everything depends on the economical situation and on how the war in Ukraine ends. due to the fact that it is clear that in a fewer months any agreement will be negotiated.
The SPD, playing with words about reason and threat to democracy from the AfD, will effort to defend its participation in the government. Trump's administration will push him into anti-Chinese, possibly at the price of any concessions in access to Russian natural materials. Die Linke in turn will attack the government with anti-Trumpian slogans and proposals to save the German economy by Economic cooperation with China.
This polarization can be beneficial for both SPD and Die Linke, but it will be very hard for the Greens. Besides, Germany with a strong, independent Green organization is an evenant in Europe – possibly this experimentation will be over in any time.
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Rafał Chwedoruk − political scientist, habilitated doctor of humanities, associate prof. of the University of Warsaw.
