I don't believe in ending the conflict in Ukraine. Trump and Putin may temporarily frost war activities – most likely mainly from the Russian side – but this will be at most another series of agreements launched in September 2014 in Minsk.
Between Ukraine and Russia, there will be a "hybrid war", most likely with occasional armed incidents in the form of cross-border shelling from both sides, Ukrainian sabotage, diversion and terrorist attacks in Russian territory and in the erstwhile Ukrainian territories annexed after 2014 by Russia, possibly besides an occasional "penal" rocket and drone attacks from Russia to Ukraine.
The reasons for recognising the probability of specified a improvement are the situation in the Donetsk Basin in 2014-2022 as well as events akin in nature to the conflict over the Mountain Karabach (1988-2023). The current front line, which runs about on the rivers of Żrebieć, Bachmut and Dniepr, is not a demarcation based on any crucial geographical, raw-industrial, administrative, ethnic, linguistic or spiritual factors.
Power imbalance
The current frost of war in Ukraine on the terms of the Yankee dictatorship is so only an awesome fanfaronade on Trump's part, with a fondness for which it had already become known during its erstwhile word (a bombastic summit with Kim Jong Un in Singapore in June 2018, which yet did not bring any results).
It is not healthy to have the same consequence of the events in which the war provoked by Ukraine and Russia started ending the United States, being its only actual winner. The outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine crossed out the Eurasian economical and infrastructure projects binding Russia and China to the European Union, which was the biggest threat to the influence of the Atlantic thalassocracy.
The U.S., which brutally threw Ukraine on the ground raising the awareness of Zelensk during his visit to Washington, D.C. who in the present planet strategy has real causative power, with another whim Trump can throw Russia or any another Eurasian centre just as figuratively as present Ukraine making it clear to its leadership that it is the Yankees who presently have the strongest cards. The basic lesson of political realism is that weakness provokes a weak projection of force.
The recipe for peace and cooperation in Eurasia is so not the "pro-Russian" squad in Washington (which can change the course to anti-Russian itself or be replaced by another crew that will do it for it), but the balance of the fatal global imbalance of forces, which presently lacks a centre of force that would balance the overwhelming land of the Yankee Moloch. specified a centre can appear by internally dynamizing Eurasia through the common integration of its main strength centres (Paris-Berlin-Moscow-Bekin).
Conflict-ogenic factors from Ukraine
The Ukrainian side will not accept the territorial losses. Even if Zelenski agrees to halt the war or is replaced in power by individual who will do it for him, they will stay uncompromising and militant Ukrainian nationalists. The full past of the Ukrainian state so far illustrates its general Dyspepsia and secondary to the real power entities in Ukraine. The authoritative Kiev will so not be able to control the territory of armed and capital groups which are formally under its authority. The situation in Chechnya from 1996 to 1999 may be repeated when, after the authoritative end of the war, the country became a space of penetration of revolutionary muslim groups and interviews of hostile Russia states and a mate of forces trying to destabilise Russia and undermine its regulation in the northern Caucasus.
In Ukraine for ‘deep country’ creating real political architecture in this country can be recognised as pro-Western national-liberal intelligence, capitalist oligarchy, nationalist groups and native and western peculiar services. no of these groups are curious in normalising with Russia; so far they have pushed even those Ukrainian presidents who declared at the beginning of their word that they would not enter it (Kuchma, Yanukovych, Zelenski) or removed them from their position erstwhile resisting their pressures (Janukovich).
At the most simple level National-liberal intelligence Ukrainian and Nationalists identify themselves with the thought of Ukraine as a western state; based on civic, national, regulation of law, constitutionalism and tri-division of authorities, rationalism, individuals as entities of political and social relations, modernism and civilizational liberalism. This thought is the other of the thought of Ukraine as a country of the Russian World, so in today's context – remaining in orbit of the influences of the Russian Federation, or in more conventional terms – part of the Russian Empire.
Ukrainian issue Capitalistic oligarchy is more complicated due to the fact that it originates from the russian inactive economical bureaucracy and as specified was originally oriented towards the Russian Federation. However, the weakness of Russian capitalism resulted in Ukraine's capitalist oligarchy becoming increasingly powerfully associated with the Western capitalist system, which could offer it more than the Russian side. Moscow tried to base its influence in this country on Ukrainian oligarchy, but yet it turned out that it had besides weak cards. However, unlike intelligence and nationalists, the western orientation of Ukrainian capital is utilitarian alternatively than identity. In another words, Russia would be able to gain this group again, strengthening its attractiveness to it.
About Western (and Ukrainian) services, they aim to destabilise the Russian Federation through actions involving the promotion of terrorism, diversion, sabotage and anti-Russia extremism. The most spectacular example of specified actions was the blowing up of Nord Stream 2 in September 2022, although there is simply a wider spectrum of actions, mostly geared towards transforming Ukraine into an anti-Russian irredents. Due to the confidentiality of specified actions, we can only speculate about the actors involved, but it is easy to identify centres peculiarly curious in the political and even territorial unity of the Russian Federation: England, France Macrona, Poland, Baltic republics, anti-Russian oriented Muslims (mainly from the Caucasus but not only), Georgians, etc. It is most likely that it is the centres that peculiarly frequently express the desire to break up Russia that are active in the efforts to do so.
The summary for which I want to guide the reader here is simply a request for the structural alternatively than secondary nature of the Ukrainian conflict. At least 2 (and most likely three) of the 4 members of the Ukrainian "deep state" realise that the implementation of their national imagination Ukraine as a western state requires the demolition of the Russian force centre in its current form. For Russia, who longs for the Orthodox empire, will always be a threat to the westernized Ukraine – due to the continuity of ethnic, linguistic, spiritual and geographical space between both countries.
Conflict-ogenic factors from Russia
On the another hand, having a broader geopolitical awareness of the elements in Russia must realise that Russia's future depends on the control of all Ukraine – but possibly Halyczyna (Lvivian, Tarnopolski, Ivanofrankowski of the present Ukrainian state). The rate of conflict in Ukraine (the Ukraine conflict) is not to master 1 or another village in this country of which we would never know existed if not for the present war, nor the physical and human demolition of Ukraine, but the political subordination of this country of Moscow. Russia with its subordinate Ukraine (and Kazakhstan – let us mention the OUBZ flag, which was carried out in January 2022, would become an empire and advance to the level of a global player.
In turn erstwhile 80% of the territory Ukraine will be in the western sphere of influence and will be saturated with Western civilizational, economical and military infrastructure, it will be hard to talk seriously about any Russian power. alternate to Moscow and an anti-Russian-oriented Russian and Orthodox centre in Kiev besides means disorganization of an autonomous Russian civilization. Let's remember that 30 years ago Samuel Huntington noted that Ukraine is simply a "turnover country" and its possible westernization would mean the end of a separate civilization named "the Orthodox one" by it.
September 2022 Russia formally annexed Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporosian, Khersonian circuits and even fragments of Mikołajowski (the second was not represented at the ceremony in the Kremlin on September 30). Of the above, the Russian side now full controls the territory of the first of these circuits. The formal annexation was preceded by Putin's statements threatening the atomic attack in the event of a threat to the Russian Federation's territory, and it took place under Ukrainian counteroffensive conditions completed by the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kherson, so it should be understood alternatively as an act of Moscow's threat to Kiev, which was most likely intended to prevent the Ukrainian counter-offensive action at the time, but it created legal facts in both Russian constitutional and global law – so it will act as an inflammatory factor, even if the parties straight and indirectly active in the conflict in Ukraine like not to remember the consequences of this act.
Therefore, both conscious elements in Ukraine, Russia and the West must realise that Russian-Ukrainian conflict is simply a “zero-one” existential conflict, from which only 1 organization can come out alive: or Ukraine (although within the current truncated borders) will stabilise as a western national state, Russia will then be sentenced to fall, or Russia will subdue Ukraine, cleansing this country from liberalism, nationalism, penetrating its hostile peculiar services and influences of western capital. No intermediate condition will be stable, so it will not be a solution or resolution of the conflict, so it will not be able to end it either.
Raphael delusions
By the way, opinions (often exaltated or sentimental) should besides be addressed polemically. pro-Russian enthusiasts, looking into the current state of things "the triumph of Russia". With any approximation you can (maybe) talk about Russia’s leadership on the front, although this claim would only be based on 2 grounds: the victories of Russia in battles of no strategical importance (not breaking the front) and frequently repeated for respective months in the media reports of alleged human resources exhaustion of Ukraine.
However, this second condition is rather weak due to 2 factors; first, after declarations and steps about cutting off the US's hardware and financial support for Ukraine, we are already talking about the exhaustion of financial and material reserves not of the human Ukrainian side, and secondly, the same centres which present mark the implosion of the Ukrainian state 2 years ago preached with equal conviction thesis of the expected depletion of material reserves (racets, ammunition, etc.), human and financial Russia and the expected collapse of the Russian invasion, which we know did not happen.
As I mentioned above, the war rate in Ukraine is not Artiomovsk or any another Awdievka, but Kiev and control of all Ukraine. Russia has not achieved specified a position, so You can't talk about her geopolitical victory.. 80% of Ukraine was explicitly included in the Western sphere of influence during the war, including the probable takeover of Ukrainian uncommon earth deposits by the US. It would be absurd to claim that this condition corresponds to Russia's intentions or that it was included in the assumptions of the "Special Military Operations"—it is in fact a denial of the objectives set by Putin in his ultimatum against NATO of December 17, 2021.
Russian achievements in Ukraine are a textbook example "pyrrus victory", in this case, which means the accomplishment of a (presumed) advantage on the front, while at the same time a complete geopolitical failure, summing up in a de facto failure. Russia besides "wined" the war (it joined about 109,000 km2) and it besides "lost" (it failed to overthrow the authorities in Kiev or cut off the majority of Ukraine from the West).
Even little clear Assessment of the effects of the war on Ukraine so far. The officially declared objectives of the defence war by Zelenski and then the counteroffensive was to keep political independency from Russia and regain the territorial unity of the state. The first of the objectives was achieved with the repelling of the Russian offensive in Kiev at the turn of March and April 2022, the chances of the implementation of the second fell with the defeat of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the second half of 2023 (a chance to regain Crimea, which was not, in fact, ever, illusory). Ukraine lost about 20% of pre-war territory and respective (if not several) million citizens who left for the West or remained in areas occupied by Russia. Let us add to this hard to estimation human losses on the front and demolition of infrastructure. Ukraine has so besides "lost" (she has suffered territorial, human and material losses) and "win" (she has maintained independency from Moscow).
Of course, you should not believe with Declarative Reasons for War, since Ukraine's alleged "accession to NATO and the EU" was apparent to all sober observer. On the another hand, the alleged Russian desire to "defence the inhabitants of Donbas" is besides simply an ideological spell, since Russia has not even attempted to "liberate" the full Donetsk circuit since 2014, and in September-October 2022 abandoned the Charkovsky without much opposition and in November of the same year besides Cherson, leaving there "to feed" the Ukrainian safety services and nationalists of its local collaborators. So let us repeat here that the war is about the submission of Ukraine to Moscow, not whether Ukraine will be in the EU, whether it pacifies Donbas or who will control this or another town on Loca Desert.
Delusion of the Involved
After dealing with pro-Russian enthusiasts, let us now mention to conservative Westerners, sometimes referred to as “offensive realists” and enjoying the shift of Western influence to the east in the face of the weakness of the “adversary” (i.e. Russia). Let's start by saying "offensive realism" is not any realism. His spokespersons reject the value of a systemic balance to extend the influence of their centres of force, forgetting, however, that the structural conditions of the stableness of the distribution of forces are expressed in the systemic balance they ignore. Laying down or extending vectors forces beyond the structural framework allowing these vectors to stabilise is nothing more than dispersal of force or, in another words, waste it.
Realistic criticism is based on the designation of this regularity ‘mighty overload’ means extending the influence of a given force centre to areas which drain the forces of specified a centre or which it is simply incapable to stabilise. In history, there are many examples of specified a “powerful overload”: Spain in the 16th century in the Netherlands, Britain in the early 20th century in South Africa, The russian Union after planet War II outside of Eurazia, the US at the beginning of the 21st century in the mediate East, yet – and this is the basis for realistic criticism of the Republic of Both Nations and then politics of Józef Piłsudski – Poland in the 17th century and later in the first half of the 20th century on Ukrainian steppes.
With respect to the conflict in Ukraine, these structural considerations should be taken into account: Russia and Ukraine (and Belarus) belong to the same space ethnic, religious, to a large degree linguistic and historical, there are no crucial geographical barriers between them – Putin wrote about all this in his essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" published in July 2021. In another words, the inclusion of Ukraine in the western sphere of influence – as Huntington noted years ago – would be tantamount to the annihilation of an autonomous Russian civilization and the annihilation of a Russian centre of force.
Ukraine as a space of Western influences so has no chance of stableness with sovereign Russia. The Western conflict with Russia over Ukraine is inevitable, its escalation to the level of war is very probable. In view of the strength of Russia, specified a conflict – whatever form it would take – would gotta extend for years or even decades (or be very violent – the script “MAD” does not fall within the limits of a rational strategy) and the failure of Russia, as the present war proves, would not be prejudged. So here we are going to conclude that cannot simply, utilizing Russia's weakness, "move" the Western border to the east, including Ukraine.
We can effort to destruct the Russian force centre by pushing the westernization of Ukraine. Only that this is an undertaking as realistic as the effort to westernize Iraq after 2003: creating a conflict smoldering with different strength years or decades, which yet took out the powers drawn into it, just as subsequent wars in Ukraine in the 17th century exhausted the forces of then Poland. It is recognized by Donald Trump and (real) realityists like Mearsheimer, without repeating pseudorealist errors ("offensive realists") like Condoleezy Rice or Donald Rumsfeld who at the beginning of the century dragged the U.S. into Afghan and Iraqi swamps.
The American payer rather rightly does not want to drain his pocket into a war without end, in a country he could not even point out on the map and Donald Trump's squad rather rightly does not want to lead to U.S. extermination with the power to participate in the conflict, a possible triumph in which Washington would have little meaning than power consumption to mention to this triumph needed.
An offensive (pseudo) realism is all the more irrational that there is an alternate to realism – recognizing the structural conditions of the distribution of forces and proposing a political architecture based on them that would have the chance to survive. specified a realistic solution which would besides be the lower limit of conditions accepted by Russia (which the Kremlin repeatedly made clear) would be Ukraine's extra-block and neutral status, giving Moscow a warrant that this country will not be utilized as a rebound to more or little open attacks on Russia.
This is the imagination of actual realists (i.e. those taking into account the structural conditions of the distribution of power vectors in east Europe) and achieving specified a condition would most likely have prevented war ( Russia attacked Ukraine, which is oriented against it for a reason, alternatively than Kazakhstan or Mongolia – countries with a long border with Russia and which are strategically crucial to it, while comparatively sparsely populated, besides militarly, having rich resources, having a large Russian number at the northern border like Kazakhstan, or in any case affected by Russian language specified as Mongolia).
Conflict in Ukraine and Poland
Finally, let us mention to the impact of the war in Ukraine on events in Poland. With distaste but now without surprise I noticed that Conservatives – from those who are public people, after those whom I observe on social media – they identified Poland's welfare with the triumph of the West and considered Russia an enemy. Sometimes this is justified "civilised" in 1 of the 2 variants – either the conservative is actually liberal and identifies himself with liberal civilization (then his argument is at least consistent) or he is simply a traditionalist and his assessment of the state of affairs clearly diverges from facts, based on desire, delusions, fantasies and prejudices. In both cases, it would be a waste of time to mention to specified attitudes here.
In another variant, however, there is an argument that the triumph of the West would be good for Poland, due to the fact that Poland's affiliation to the western block is good due to the fact that it allows to catch up "economic delay" to the West. specified an argument in the conservative's mouth is not on the spot, that he must be aware that Poland's integration with the West has its price in the form of internalization of liberalism. From 1 of the more celebrated conservatives even erstwhile I heard that it was necessary, in general, to endure a liberal political and liberal culture to be on the other geopolitical side than Russia.
Conservatives, meanwhile, always prided themselves on that cultural issues and – mostly – "spirit" placed more than economical issues. rather rightly, due to the fact that economics, sociology, social psychology and the explanation of civilization already in the early 20th century recognized the dependence of economics on moral, cultural and spiritual factors. It should so be clear to the conservative that the distribution of culture and organic social ties by liberalism will yet be reflected in the failure of the society affected by the demographic, economic, intellectual, spiritual dynamics, etc.
The importance of the war in Ukraine is so precisely other for Poland, than the conservatives claim (I will dedicate a separate column to conservatism today). Good for Poland Clearing her from liberalism. An environment conducive to this would arise in the situation of clearing as many another countries as possible of liberalism – especially those geographically close to Poland – and weakening the impact of liberal centres in the world.
Russia's triumph in Ukraine and its submission Moscow would mean clearing this country from liberalism (and flagism – so besides solving the issue of the burial of Polish victims of Ukrainian genocide): it would lose the meaning of the 3 divisions of the authorities, the ideology of "human rights", the liberal "elections", etc. Russian troops over Dniester and not over Siewiert Donet are besides a possible exit of countries specified as Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey from the Liberal Block. This may besides be another presidential election process in Moldova and Romania. Finally, it is simply a probable shift of Serbia's policy vector to the east.
Poland would so be adjacent to the non-liberal Russian empire (the Kaliningrad Oblast, Belarus, Ukraine), non-liberal Slovakia, possibly even non-liberal Hungary (in Zakarpacie) and in its surroundings it besides had non-liberal Turkey and Serbia. Tusk, Kaczyński and Wipler-Mentzen-Bosak would then be a much little credible political option and Braun would most likely be 1 of the political favorites, like Georgescu in Romania. The perspectives of the Antiliberal Transition in Poland would so improve considerably.
Ronald Lasecki
photo of wikipedia
