Taiwan chooses the head of state. Who will win and how will Beijing react? [talking]

krytykapolityczna.pl 1 year ago

Jakub Majmurek: On Saturday the Taiwanese will elect the president. Why is this a global election?

Marcin Jerzewski: For example, due to the fact that the most advanced semiconductors are produced in Taiwan, all the electronics we have in our pocket or on our desk most likely have components coming from this country. Consequences we saw during the pandemic erstwhile the break in semiconductor supply stopped the production of many of the most technologically advanced goods. In addition, the Taiwan Strait is 1 of the key shipping routes of the global economy.

If the inhabitants of the island do not choose ‘actually’, it can happen conflict with China? China's president Xi Jinping spoke in his fresh Year's speech about "the inevitably unification of China". Was that a informing for the Taiwanese?

The authorities of the People's Republic of China have not utilized akin rhetoric for the first time, as president Xi himself speaks regularly. The PRC is dreaming of what it calls the ‘great revival of the Chinese people’, its key component would be the attachment of Taiwan to mainland China.

Beijing's behaviour present is much little aggressive than before Taiwan's first Democratic presidential election in 1996, as Chinese rockets fell just off the territorial boundary of the island's waters. Now we are not in danger of a script that Taiwanese will elect fresh authorities in January, and that China's invasion of Taiwan will begin in February.

Xi Jinping, on the another hand, sends a clear message that Taiwan's Democratic Progressive organization is not a partner for the PRC today, and if its candidate wins, he will not be able to reconstruct relations with Beijing at the highest level.

The DPP candidate, current Vice president Lai Ching-te, is more "independent", and his main rival with Kuomintang, Hou Yu-ih, more "prochinic"?

It's not that simple. In Taiwan, a survey has been conducted since the early 1990s on how residents imagine the future of the island. And the vast majority for 30 years have wanted to keep the position quo. That is, a situation where Taiwan is not formally an independent state, but in practice functions as such. Both the independency and the principal, unification attitude are marginal. It is crucial to realize what is happening present in Taiwanese politics.

This dominant attitude reflects the policy of the 2 most crucial Taiwanese parties. The DPP is not an independency party, just as Kuomintang is not a union organization – both want to keep the position quo, but interpret it differently. The DPP considers that the position quo should be maintained by hazard diversification and deepening relations with partners specified as Japan and the United States, and more late with Europe and Southeast Asian countries. Kuomintang is in turn of the opinion that Taiwan could benefit from normalising relations with Beijing.

In 8 years of government ending the second word of president Tsai Ing-wen with the DPP, Taiwanese-Chinese relations deteriorated?

They've made it worse, but let's remember that we have 2 partners in these relationships. And over the last 8 years, not only Taiwan has changed, but besides China, which is becoming an increasingly aggressive player internationally. As reflected in the relations over the Taiwan Strait. It was the Chinese side that suspended dialog with the government of president Tsai after she came to power in 2016. It was Beijing who ignored attempts by the president to resume it.

Given how China has changed, we have no warrant that if Hou Yu-ih of Kuomintang had come to power – theoretically more open to cooperation with Beijing – his attempts to stabilise relations would have been positively accepted by the PRC. Beijing could consider Hou's triumph as an chance to increase force on Taiwan. For example, to re-sign a trade agreement on the service sector between 2 parties rejected during the 2014 sunflower revolution.

An example of how the expression “one country, 2 systems” has been dealt with in practice in Hong Kong, is not building peculiar trust in Taiwan in China as a partner, is it?

Events in Hong Kong, proclamation of the National safety Act and brutal suppression of ongoing protests in 2019 and 2020 shocked Taiwanese residents. The Hong Kong case played a key function in the 2020 elections. Then DPP said, "If you don't vote for the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan will become the second Hong Kong."

Now this subject sounded less, besides due to the fact that it became uncomfortable for the ruling party. president Tsai promised to accept refugees from Hong Kong, but Taiwan failed to fulfill that promise.

So how does Beijing respond if a DPP candidate wins? Can he get economical sanctions? He'll organize military exercises around the island, like in 2022 after visiting Taiwan Nancy Pelosi, the then talker of the home of Representatives?

We can surely anticipate various hybrid actions to intimidate Taiwanese people. This is already happening: Chinese People's Liberation Army aircraft violate the island's airspace, Chinese spy balloons fly over Taiwan. China is besides trying to influence Taiwan's public opinion through media specified as TikTok, disinformation and deepfaki. Lo Chih-Cheng, a candidate for parliament from the DPP in Banqiao, found this to be a rich Taipei bedroom. individual released a deep fake – a pornographic movie starring him.

On the another hand, I do not anticipate armed pressure, even in the form we saw in 2022, erstwhile China organized exercises around Taiwan with the shooting of live fire. As far as economical force is concerned, it should be remembered that the PRC is utilizing stick and carrot tactics towards Taiwan. Therefore, on the 1 hand, exports of food products from Taiwan to China were late banned, on the another hand, the marketplace for fruit from respective districts voting historically for DPP was opened.

The relation to the PRC is the main dividing line in Taiwanese politics?

Yes, that is the main criterion on the basis of which the inhabitants of the island make their choice. It's not ideology, it's hard to talk about left or right in Taiwan.

In these elections, however, there is simply a terrible tiredness of young voters in this form of political scene. They would like politicians to take care of their surviving matters in the end alternatively of their relation with China. due to the fact that there are problems.

Taiwan is simply a highly developed economy, but with comparatively large income inequality. Inflation is presently advanced and salaries are not keeping pace with rising prices. Especially the earnings of young people who are mostly not high. The large problem is housing prices, especially in Taipei, where many young people from all over the island come looking for work.

Are the parties trying to respond to these expectations?

The DPP announced the alleged National Hope task and Fair Society Program Warm Taiwan. For example, it assumes an increase in subsidies for childcare up to six years old and backing tuition for pupils and students from poorly earning backgrounds. However, I have the impression that the DPP completely does not realize the scale of its negligence in social and housing policy.

In response, Kuomintang began to talk more about his housing policy, e.g. about subsidies to buy the first flat or about the credit without his own contribution. However, no programme has been officially announced so far.

This all contributes to the apparent apathy of the youngest voters.

There is simply a 3rd party, the Taiwan People's Party. She raises these social issues?

Yes, although it's a populist organization alternatively than a social party. She is very close to business environments, and is best suited for local elections in Hsinch. It is simply a city in northwest Taiwan, where the advanced technology manufacture is concentrated, including semiconductor production. There is simply quite a few capital and the highest average earnings in the country – higher even than in Taipei.

The good ratings of the Taiwanese People's organization in the polls – taking strong 3rd place – show Taiwanese fatigue of the polarized policy towards China. The organization does not have a clear policy on this issue, it simply talks about pragmatic relations.

Who's supporting her?

First of all, young people. In these elections we see a clear departure of young voters from the DPP to the Taiwanese People's Party. In turn, elder voters, after 50 years of age, mostly support Kuomintang. This is simply a organization emphasizing Taiwan's cultural ties with China. Younger people, especially those who don't know life outside democratic Taiwan, don't feel so powerfully about these relationships anymore.

Kuomintang's support is besides touring in the north of the island, due to the fact that in the 1940s, migrants from mainland China settled there and the dominant language spoken in homes is Mandarin. In the south, where there is more native population of Taiwan, DPP dominates.

It can be said that both major parties in Taiwan are parties of nationalism: Taiwanese DPP and Chinese Kuomintang.

What is this “Taiwan nationalism”? To identify with democratic Taiwan or indigenous people and island history?

It connects both dimensions. surely Taiwanese identity is linked to the 1990s democratic change. Many Taiwanese people are convinced that Taiwanese identity can only be within a democratic regulation of law. But the cultural component is besides important.

For the modern Taiwanese identity, it is besides crucial that the island's culture is not limited to Chinese influence. In Taiwan there were Austronesian communities, there are even hypotheses that it was from Taiwan that they set out to colonize the Pacific or specified areas of the Indian Ocean as Madagascar. The current government emphasizes the unions of indigenous peoples of Taiwan and Austria – for example, it organises cultural exchanges with Maoris from fresh Zealand. The government officially recognises 16 indigenous communities, and in Parliament 6 of 113 seats are reserved for the island's indigenous population.

Japanese, Spanish, Dutch influences can be added to this. Which gives emergence to the construction of Taiwanese identity, which makes it a separate entity from China.

How many inhabitants of the island identify with Chinese and many with Taiwanese nationalism?

This has been studied regularly since the early 1990s. You can choose 3 options: whether you feel Chinese, Taiwanese or Chinese and Taiwanese. Only Taiwanese recognition is growing, the another 2 are falling. People identifying exclusively as Chinese in the last survey were only 2.5 percent.

The DPP is frequently seen as a pro-American party, but wouldn't the States like Kuomintang to win and relations over the Taiwan Strait to calm down a bit?

It is actual that the DPP is considered more pro-American, but during the presidency of Tsai Ing-wen Kuomintang clearly tried to change this perception. In 2022 again (after closing in 2008, erstwhile Kuomintang returned to power) the party's representation in Washington opened, during the run the organization candidate Hou Yu-ih made a journey to the States, which had previously been an action typical of DPP candidates.

Surely any of the environments in Washington may be afraid about Lai Ching-te's historical statements. He has always been more pro-distance than the mainstream DPP, in the past even called himself "a modest individual for Taiwan's independence". But that was in a time erstwhile he was neither vice president nor prime minister but mayor of Tainan City.

The DPP wants to show to the Americans that it will be able to warrant stableness over the Taiwan Strait by selecting a candidate for vice president. She is Hsiao Bi-khim, daughter of Taiwanese and American, until December last year she served as the actual Taiwanese ambassador to the United States. She is very respected in the United States, has the opinion of a politician capable of pragmatically shaping relations with China.

How does Beijing see her?

Very negative so far. It is 1 of the fewer people from the top Taiwanese policy that China has sanctioned – it cannot travel to the PRC and the peculiar administrative areas of Hong Kong and Macau.

The European Union has a policy on Taiwan?

How almost the full planet adopts the politics of 1 China – this is not formally recognising Taiwan. At the same time, it advocates maintaining the position quo in the Taiwan Straits, does not agree to its violation by either organization – either as a consequence of China's invasion or Taiwan's unilateral declaration of independence. Overall, the EU on Taiwan is weak and divided, which is besides the consequence of Chinese diplomacy, which applies the rule of division and governance.

While the European Parliament is Taiwan's most friendly body, the European Commission and the European External Action Service adopt a very cautious policy. The Commission did not even agree to launch a consultation on the bilateral investment agreement sought by president Tsai Ing-wen and supported the Europarliament.

How is Taiwan in Polish politics?

Today, our cooperation with Taiwan is almost exclusively on an economical level. Unfortunately, we adopted a very conservative explanation of the rule of 1 China. It is formulated by a 1997 document, signed by president Kwasniewski, who understands the rule of 1 China in rule as well as Beijing.

The 2018 MFA guidelines on cooperation with Taiwan accuse Taiwanese diplomats of trying to manipulate Polish officials and politicians – in my opinion wrongly. They besides powerfully reject the anticipation of contact with Taiwan at government level, at ministerial level. This, however, is not a problem for those recognising the politics of 1 of Germany's Chinas, who in 2022 sent their Ministry of Science, Bettina Stark-Watzinger of the FDP, to Taiwan.

A well formulated policy of 1 China allows for much deeper cooperation between Poland and Taiwan in many areas than today. I hope the fresh government sees possible here.

What consequence do you anticipate in Taiwan? In the polls he led Lai Ching-te, but Hou Yu-ih reduced the differences to a truly tiny level.

At the moment, there is already an election silence in Taiwan – no polls can be published 10 days before the elections. Then we won't know until Saturday. It is worth remembering that the election decides regardless of the consequence the first round, so Lai Ching-te can safe a victory, even by winning a very tiny advantage of the vote.

At the same time, elections will be held for parliament. And here, the DPP may not have a majority. The president of this organization will gotta deal someway with Kuomintang and the People's organization of Taiwan. The president appoints a minister of abroad affairs and abroad and defence policy has considerable area for manoeuvre, but he needs a parliament, for example, to pass a budget.

You said He's not expecting an invasion yet.. So, what will happen in the relations over the Taiwan Strait in the next 4 years?

I anticipate a continuation of Chinese policies of intimidation and misinformation. Therefore, the fresh island authorities will gotta put emphasis on media education, but besides social policy making Taiwanese society more resilient to the Chinese information war.

Marcin Jerzewski Politologist, Sinologist. manager of Taiwanese branch think tank European Values Center for safety Policy. Taiwan Analyst NextGen Foundation. Graduated from the College of global Affairs of the National University of Chengchi in Taipei, a scholarship from the Ministry of Education of Taiwan, he besides studied at the University of Richmond, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and Beijing Pedagogical University.

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