Throughout the centuries, many beliefs, doctrines and planet views have been created that deserve the name of idiotic, but it is only late that humanity has been given a position that can be called with full work "perfect idiotism", i.e. a model amalgam of all quarter-inteligent superstitions, caricatures, frost and absurdities concerning, nomen omen, the question of reason.
Well, this "perfect idiotism" is simply a sincere belief in the alleged existential threat to humanity associated with the emergence of the expected "strong artificial intelligence", containing an impressively complete set of metaphysical and epistemological superstitions, shallows and vulgarization. Among the most crucial of these are:
1. Identifying intelligence with computational capabilities.
2. Convincing that the improvement of intellectual possible does not require confrontation with unique and inactive fresh experiences, but only an expanding rate of spinning in the data processing reel.
3. The belief that there is simply a quantity transition to quality above a sufficiently advanced calculation capacity threshold.
4. The belief that above the sufficiently advanced threshold of mechanical complexity is transformed into an entity.
5. The claim that the choice of intelligent – or even of course intelligent, and so default – is the physical elimination of a little intelligent being by being more intelligent, suggesting that the model of intellectual perfection should be the algorithmic Doctor Mengele.
6. The claim that the quintessentialness of highly intelligent behaviour is primitive, eliminating the pushing into physical space.
In conclusion, the fear of the creation of an algorithmic god of doom represents a perfect illustration of the embarrassing blind alley in which a man can get free of all the intellectual tools for making a thoughtful reflection on what makes him a unique resident of the planet of visible things.
However, it is comforting in this context to know that at a time erstwhile self-proclaimed "intellectualists" are prepared to preach these preposterousities seriously, the broad masses no longer care for the opinions of "intellectualists". In another words, even if they sometimes carelessly repeat akin opinions heard in the mass media, in practice they wave at them and live as if they never had contact with them.
So the embarrassing reasoning of reasoning has this bright side, that almost nobody thinks of it as something thoughtful. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that in times of panic of humanity, the demolition of the "strong artificial intelligence" of humanity does not endanger at least the demolition of the strong natural folly that implements in the approval of the masses its next "saviour plans".
It may not be much, but it should be appreciated that in the final account the fear of fantastic technological dystopias turns out to be much more futile than the seduction of collective utopias – and since the second has already destroyed its intellectually seductive potential, 1 can hold the hope that everyone will increasingly be liable for the effects of his eventual thoughtlessness only personally. For moral reasons, it is simply a desirable condition – even if it was inadvertently reached.
Jakub Bożydar Wiśniewski
