Introduction
The subject is important, that it is straight and physically connected with the safety of Poland and the life and wellness of Poles. There's a multi-faceted real war going on outside our borders where thousands of innocent people die and their property is turned into a rubble. An aggressive bandit roSSja attacks innocent Ukraine by killing children, women, robbing and raping women and children. This is an unprecedented scale of genocide, according to authoritative assessments of the UN's agendas and the democratic world. The war is not only in Ukraine but besides affects NATO countries including Poland. We remember a massive hybrid attack on Polish borders from Belarus. Russia attacks Poland not only economically, for example by cutting off gas, but besides in an agential way through its active and dormant agent, as evidenced by the arrests of putin agents in Poland by ABW.
However, according to the media, not all hostile actions and directions aimed at weakening Poland's defence potential, economical capacity, alliances in NATO and with Ukraine are being reported. Full misinformation utilized through anti-Polish pro Russian websites, dissemination of anti-Polish disinformation materials, lying and even prepared through or for the usage of Moscow are to bring a affirmative effect for Polish enemies. Inserting social media materials to advance the actions of an enemy state – Russia in the form of e.g. statements of prominent politicians like Lawrow or Putin and others – is besides propaganda and disinformation. What to do with specified facts? How to defend yourself against them? Many ask themselves questions....
I was besides provoked to compose this material by comments of the russian trolls attacking our country on many web portals, due to the safety of Poland, or all of us.
The Presidents of the Republic of Poland spoke about the contemporary Russia and its role;
"Russia is not a average country, it is not a average state, it is an aggressor country; it requires decisive action from the global community," said president Andrzej Duda, who visited the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia.
"We know well that present Georgia, next day Ukraine, the day after next day Baltic States, and later possibly it is time for my country, for Poland! We were firmly convinced that membership of NATO and the Union would end the Russian appetite period. It turned out not to be a mistake," said late Lech Kaczyński in August 2008, speaking at a demonstration in Tbilisi in the face of war aggression from Russia. From today's perspective, you can see how right those words were...
The West was besides naive to believe Vladimir Putin's good intentions. Putin was dishonest erstwhile he assured his loyalty to the free planet value system. In fact, they were dreams due to the fact that the erstwhile KGB colonel always despised democracy. From the first days of his presidency Putin with manic stubbornness prepared to resurrect the authoritarian empire of evil.
As a secret service representative, Putin believed he would be able to renew the empire in the post-Soviet area with the aid of his agentship. It was a substance of his full life... And he made all effort to have FSB and GRU agents (the Chief Intelligence Board) of the Russian Federation take up executive positions in all republics of the erstwhile USSR. But the "colour revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine undermined his belief in the omnipotence of secret political influence methods. The nations of Georgia and Ukraine have shown opposition to pro-Russian dictatorships.
One of the creators of "Nowiczoka", Wił Mirzajanov, in an interview with the Glavcom portal.ua commented on his attitude towards Russia, which presently actively uses this poison. The scientist was forced to travel to the United States in the 1990s, but continues to actively follow the political processes taking place in Russia, reports Glavcom.ua.
“The Russian Empire is an empire of evil. It continues to enslave my Tatar people and another [nations]—the Bashkir people, the Komi people. And you all know how tense he keeps his neighbors, how he conquers Ukraine. It besides threatens the Baltic countries. This is an empire of evil, above all, I justice Russia this way”
Today, Western countries are increasingly convinced that Russia's and Putin's policies are going to rebuild the erstwhile power of the russian Union. The methods utilized to accomplish this, many have already called bandits even by genocide.
What's it truly like?
The attack of russian trolls on Poland continues and is very dangerous.
National media and net portals, as we read in the media, have long warned against attacks of paid russian trolls no little dangerous than Russian Armoured Divisions. These actions aim at weakening the defence of the state, our security, ruining the economy and full dependence and subjugating Poland to Russia. This, as literature states, is indeed an unspoken silent war. Therefore, min. in the country Cyberspace defence Army and specialized agencies of State Protection Services and peculiar Services were created.
The case of Russian trolls, or actually Russian agent attacking Poland, has been known in the media for a long time. But these attacks have never taken on this powerful force of demolition before. Polish-speaking portals led and paid from Moscow are, however, dangerous for Poland than "armed and well-trained alleged green people" conducting military and diversional activities blowing up bridges, destroying roads, paralyzing the energy system, etc.
It's trolls and a russian agent online. Many media have late raised this weight problem, including Independent.pl quoting the statements of many politicians or people liable for our safety.
Independent.pl writes present quote:
"Portal permanently engaged in the Russian information fight against Poland one more time scares Poles with American soldiers," tweeted Minister-Coordinator for peculiar Services Stanisław Żaryn. This is not the first equally lying communicative on this site.
Author Hana Kramer cites an example of nipponese Okinawa, where residents “live in constant fear of the presence of American military ‘grey’.
"The text convinces that U.S. troops stationed in the territory of Poland are a origin of trouble. The author suggests that soldiers are a threat to Poles" "The article fits into a series of akin publications of the above-mentioned web page" - Żaryn notes. The title reads: “American ‘gray’ in Poland. Government doesn't want to learn from another people's mistakesIt’s okay. ” – Passes Independent.pl (https://independent.pl/398471-p...(link is external))
Many publications have already been written about an agent that harms the interests and safety of Poland and its alliances or average alleged pests hostile to our country, many reports have been shown... many books have been written.
The average Pole assumes he knows everything better. That he wouldn't be fed by any Russian troll from a catch. surviving in that belief, she takes a sip of Russian bullshit. We explain, for example, how to admit misinformation and not be led by the nose.The authors of the “fejeks” are well-paid people, professionals in their industry, who eat specified “experienced” for breakfast.
Enough to mention the net investigation Agency. Under this innocent name lies the largest mill of Russian trolls, or at least the largest 1 known to the West, which had seen only this and this in excessively hospitable Russia. The method of action is simply a simple - purposeful misleading of the reader or viewer. The site that prepares something like this is hoping for any benefits, these benefits can be tactical, strategic, image, political. This may be an effort to cover up the subject or introduce a given substitute subject to the public debate. The benefit of the action – two, 3 – must make it seem from the bottom up, or authentic, and so the reader is subject to it. This trait is peculiarly dangerous.
The key to online trolls is simple. On the Polish net there are, possibly for years, a number of false accounts on social media (and not only) that are calculated to present Russian propaganda. We have always been aware of this phenomenon, but in fresh days it has increased on an unimaginable scale. These accounts present a coherent communicative and turn it over to a clapping to carry out the Kremlin's interests efficiently in the region.
The subject is important, that it is straight and physically connected with the safety of Poland and the life and wellness of Poles. There's a multi-faceted real war going on outside our borders where thousands of innocent people die and their property is turned into a rubble. An aggressive bandit roSSja attacks innocent Ukraine by killing children, women, robbing and raping women and children. This is an unprecedented scale of genocide, according to authoritative assessments of the UN's agendas and the democratic world. The war is not only in Ukraine but besides affects NATO countries including Poland. We remember a massive hybrid attack on Polish borders from Belarus. Russia is attacking Poland not only economically, cutting off gas, but besides in an agential way through its active and dormant agent, as evidenced by fresh arrests made by ABW.
However, according to the media, not all hostile actions and directions aimed at weakening Poland's defence potential, economical capacity, alliances in NATO and with Ukraine are being reported. Full misinformation utilized through anti-Polish pro Russian websites, dissemination of anti-Polish disinformation materials, lying and even prepared through or for the usage of Moscow are to bring a affirmative effect for Polish enemies. Inserting social media materials to advance the actions of an enemy state – Russia in the form of e.g. statements of prominent politicians like Lawrow or Putin and others – is besides propaganda and disinformation.
Examples and specifics ? materials on this subject are many and are available here any selected e.g.;
http://pressmania.pl/who-w-sie...(link is external)
http://pressmania.pl/large-s...(link is external)
https://technology.journal.p...(link is external)
https://www.speedtest.pl/wiado...(link is external)
https://oko.press/Russian-pro...(link is external)
https://polskieradio24.pl/5/12...(link is external)
etc...
What to do with specified facts? How to defend yourself against them? Many ask themselves questions......There is, in my opinion, a simple answer to that question what?
“If anything raises your suspicions...
Do not hesitate to compose to us about this “... quote from Homeland Security.
https://form.abw.gov.pl/fm/for(link is external)...(link is external)
I will remind you of the scope of the Act of the peculiar Services – it is the Agency for interior safety and Military Counterintelligence (http://needu.edu.pl/in...(link is external) ) and so :
The interior safety Agency (in accordance with Order No 73 of the Prime Minister of 26 June 2002 on granting the Statute of the interior safety Agency – M.P. 2002 No 26 item 432 and subsequent amendments) is an office of government administration serving the Head of the interior safety Agency and acting in accordance with its orders, decisions, orders, instructions and guidelines and under its direct direction.
The interior safety Agency (in accordance with the Act of 24 May 2002 on the interior safety Agency and the Intelligence Agency – OJ 2002 No. 74 item 676 and subsequent amendments) is competent in matters of the protection of the interior safety of the State and its constitutional order.
The tasks of the ABW include:
* recognising, preventing and combating threats to the interior safety of the state and its constitutional order, and in peculiar to sovereignty and global position, independency and integrity of its territory, and state defence,
* investigation, prevention and detection of crimes:
*spying, terrorism, violations of state secrecy and another offences detrimental to national security,
* the economical bases of the State,
* Corruption of Public Functions as referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Act of 21 August 1997 on the limitation of the conduct of business by persons exercising public functions (Journal of Laws No. 88, item 554 and item 106, item 679, 1998 No. 162, item 1126, 1999 No. 49, item 483 and 2000 No. 26, item 306), if this may reconcile State security,
* for the production and marketing of goods, technologies and services of strategical importance to national security,
* illicit manufacture, possession and trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives, weapons of mass demolition and drugs and psychotropic substances, in global trade, and prosecution of their perpetrators,
* to carry out, within the limits of its competence, the tasks of the State safety Service and to execute the functions of the national safety authority for the protection of classified information in global relations,
* obtaining, analysing, processing and communicating to the competent authorities information which may be of crucial importance for the protection of the interior safety of the State and its constitutional order,
* taking another actions specified in separate laws and global agreements.
The activities of the ABW outside the borders of the Republic of Poland may be carried out in connection with its activities in the territory of the State only in the scope of carrying out the tasks set out in paragraph 1 point 2 of the Act of 24.05.2012 on the interior safety Agency and the Intelligence Agency.
https://bip.abw.gov.pl/bip/zak(link is external)...(link is external)
Basic tasks of the SKW) are set out in Article 5 of the Act on the SKW and SWW.
These include:
1. the recognition, prevention and detection of military personnel engaged in active military service, SKW and SWW officers and employees of SZ RP and another MON organisational units, crimes:
– against peace, humanity and war crimes as defined in Chapter XVI of the Act of 6 June 1997. – Criminal Code (Journal of Laws No. 88, item 553, as amended), as well as another laws and global agreements,
– against the Republic of Poland as defined in Chapter XVII of the Act of 6 June 1997 – Criminal Code, and specified acts against abroad countries which guarantee reciprocity,
as defined in Article 140 of the Law of 6 June 1997 – Criminal Code,
— as defined in Articles 228-230 of the Law of 6 June 1997. – Criminal Code if they may endanger the safety or combat capability of the SZ of the Republic of Poland or another MON organisational units,
– against the protection of the information referred to in Chapter XXXIII of the Act of 6 June 1997. – Criminal Code if they may endanger the safety or combat capacity of the SZ of the Republic of Poland or another MON organisational units, as well as specified – – – – acts directed against abroad countries which guarantee reciprocity,
– as defined in Article 33 of the Law of 29 November 2000 on trade with abroad countries in goods, technologies and services of strategical importance to the safety of the State, as well as for the maintenance of global peace and safety (Journal of Laws 2004 No 229, item 2315), related to terrorist activities and another than those mentioned in point (a-f) which undermine the safety of the defence capacity of the State, the SZ RP and MON's organisational units, as well as States which guarantee reciprocity;
2. liaising with the Military Gendarmery and another authorities entitled to prosecute the offences listed in point 1;
3. carrying out, within the limits of its jurisdiction, the tasks specified in the Act of 5 August 2010 on the Protection of Classified Information (Journal of Laws of 2010 No 181, item 1228);
4. obtaining, collecting, analysing, processing and transmitting to competent authorities information which may be applicable to the defence of the State, safety or combat capacity of the SZ RP or another MON organisational units, to the degree specified in point 1, and taking action to destruct identified threats;
5. conducting radio counterintelligence and cryptographic protection and cryptoanalysis projects;
6. to participate in the planning and control of the implementation of global disarmament agreements;
7. the safety of military units, another MON organisational units and soldiers carrying out tasks outside the state;
8. the protection of the safety of technological investigation and improvement work commissioned by the SZ RP and another MON organisational units and the production and marketing of goods, technologies and services for military usage ordered by the SZ RP and another MON organisational units, to the degree specified in point 1;
9. taking measures, provided for the Warsaw Stock Exchange, in another laws, as well as global agreements, which the Republic of Poland is bound by.
The tasks of the SKW besides include the designation and detection of crimes committed in cooperation with soldiers active in the military service, officers of the SKW and SWW or employees of the SZ RP and another MON organizational units. The activities of the SKW outside the borders of the Republic of Poland may be carried out in connection with its activity in the territory of the State only in the field of performance of tasks specified in the Act.
The Military Counterintelligence Service shall cooperate with:
General Staff of the Polish Army and another organizational cells of the Ministry of Defence and commanders of the types of SZ RP, military districts, military garrisons and military units;
the applicable authorities, services and institutions subordinate to the Minister competent for Home Affairs;
the applicable bodies and organisational units subordinate to the Minister competent for public finances;
the applicable authorities, services and institutions subordinate to the Minister competent for abroad Affairs;
other bodies, services and institutions authorised to carry out operational and investigative activities.
https://bip.skw.gov.pl/skw/obs(link is external)...(link is external)
According to their statutory tasks and competences, the State Protection Service is appointed to defend and defend the Republic of Poland in the scope described above.
So why get emotional and tense if we read or read material or news that we think comes from the alleged misinformation war conducted by Russia or another countries that are not friendly to us, e.g. Belarus? From substantive assessments of materials or information to which you have suspicions that they may harm Poland, NATO and its alliances is in accordance with the laws in force in Poland the Agency for interior safety and Military Counterintelligence Service. In these State safety Services, the applicable experts will measure the material or information professionally and take appropriate steps. What the peculiar Services Coordinator Mr. Żaryn repeatedly and publically called for.
The reader or web blogger does not have the right qualifications or the ability to measure materially the materials of the alleged Moscow agiettes posted by trolls or enemies of Poland or people not mentally balanced or accidentally hostile to Poland... or materials defaming our country, we are not only bound by GDPR, etc...
You have read the appropriate material that raises your circumstantial doubts and suspicions you study on the above listed print link of ABW and a short doubt, that's all. No emotions, no nerves, no stress. . According to the law... and the Polish's own conscience.
New UN report:
"Russians utilized torture rooms in Ukraine. They utilized civilians as surviving shields ” A fresh study by the Organisation for safety and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documented the discovery of torture halls in Bucza. A recording on which the Russian military cuts off the genitals of a related Ukrainian prisoner of war appeared on Thursday in Russian propaganda sources. It is reported by Ukrainian media as another evidence of the gruesome war crimes committed by the Russian side. Ukrainian and global investigative journalists are trying to identify the Russian soldier who committed the crime. The case is besides reported by Western media, stating that they are not able to verify the recording. Russian propaganda was delighted to show how a group of inhumans crippled Ukrainian prisoner of war. That's all the planet should know – Russia is simply a country of human-eaters who enjoy torture and killing. The fog of war will not aid the executioners to avoid punishment.”
Russian intelligence wanted to derail trains in Poland. Spies were recruited online.
Russian intelligence organized a spy net in Poland, which obtained data on arms shipments for Ukraine. The spies were amateurs, recruited online. The plans of the GRU included derailment of trains, arson and assassination," he stated "The Washington Post".
A network of spies was broken by Homeland Security. 16 people have already been arrested in this case, the first detention took place in March 2023.
Fortunately, the most extremist plans of the Russian services failed. In this respect, the full operation proved ineffective. It's different erstwhile it comes to collecting data on arms shipments. The Russians had access to them almost on an ongoing basis. The intent of the operation was to disrupt the supply of arms and military equipment to Ukraine.
In Poland, services disclose small information about this. Stanislaw Żaryn, Deputy Minister of peculiar Services Coordinator, provided only messages about the arrest by ABW of further persons collecting data in strategical places in Poland – in railway stations and sidings, in sea and air ports. It was besides known that any of the arrests took pictures of transports, and others installed cameras along the railway lines.
The last individual detained in this investigation (in early August) was a Belarusian citizen Mikhail A. According to Czaryn's information, the spy had previously worked in Russia, but besides served prison sentences there. He volunteered to the GRU himself and offered to cooperate. In Poland he conducted the designation of critical infrastructure facilities, mainly military facilities and distributed Russian propaganda materials.
That's what we know from the Polish services. However, the article "The Washington Post" shows the whole, rather amazing mechanics of the GRU.
Created on an ongoing basis, the spy net was mainly based on amateurs who executed orders for money (small ones), at first not knowing who they worked for. Russian spy intelligence was searching... the network. Especially on the social network Telegram. There, users were lured with simple occupation advertisements. They did not pay any peculiar attention to the another announcements, comments and junk information that was full of them. The main uses were those channels on Telegram, which were visited by immigrants and refugees surviving in Poland.
The GRU utilized a mechanics of circumstantial outsourcing, which Russian services have been practicing for respective years, especially in Africa.
The point is that the contractor is simply a individual (or entity) who does not associate with the payer at all in the first instinct. And who in Poland present surely does not associate with supporting Russia? Those who see her as an enemy.
That is why the GRU began to propose "work" to immigrants, at a time erstwhile many of them sought any means of livelihood after leaving the country. According to the Washington Post findings, among the detainees are Ukrainians, Belarusians and 1 Russian. Most are very young people, they are on average 20 years old. The youngest is simply a 16-year-old.
The contractors did not uncover who they were or who they truly worked for. The recruited first gave tiny tasks, specified as spreading propaganda leaflets or painting graffiti on the wall.
The passwords were simple: "POLSKA
They were expected to fuel anti-Ukrainian moods, especially in cities close to Ukraine, e.g. in Lublin or Rzeszów. Amateurs who executed orders and sent pictures to the payers for proof were given further tasks. For pay, of course. Financial motivation was the most crucial for performers. They were paid in cryptocurrency or through transfers to hidden bank accounts.
The next tasks were more difficult. any bought smartphones and cameras. Others began to travel across Poland to spy on traffic in key places. They photographed railway stations (e.g. in Rzeszów), airports and ports (in Gdynia and Gdańsk). At this stage, they realized that they were most likely spying for Moscow. According to the talks of the Washington Post journalists with Polish investigators, any mentally detained people dealt with the situation in specified a way that they considered their actions to be harmless and meaningless. They were besides to fear withdrawal from cooperation with Russia.
In the following weeks, any performers were commissioned to deploy video cameras along the most crucial (for arms transport) railway lines, but to keep the cameras unnoticed.
One of the cameras was found next to the tracks passing close the village of Buszkowicz, respective kilometres from the border crossing in Medyka. Out of the clump, the lens spotted the passerby, notified the service. It turned out that the active video camera was powered by solar batteries. And the recordings sent automatically, to a cloud of data, available online for people who knew the password.
Polish services began searching another sections of strategical railway lines. 2 more cameras were found: 1 on a tree close the railway bridge, another filming traffic on the railway siding. Homeland safety stopped the first suspect. erstwhile he gave information about another members of his group, the arrests of the first spies began. However, according to . In this respect, the operation was planned professionally – recruited amateurs were divided into cells, each having 1 leader, and its members usually did not know each other. The correspondence was encrypted. The leader was no longer an amateur, but a individual consciously cooperating with Russian intelligence. Despite the breakdown of the structure, any group leaders stay unknown.
The most serious actions of the spy net were to be: derail trains, arson, and even assassination. These plans were to appear in spring erstwhile Ukraine planned to counteroffensive, and supplies of armored equipment, including German Leopard tanks, were going through Poland. Detailed instructions were found on how to deploy derailment devices and in which places. The locations were selected to derail the trains, even if they were going at small speed. It is known that at least 2 of the GRU-recruited spies agreed to participate in specified actions. However, the derailment of the train was never successful. And even though the service inactive hasn't found the equipment to hit the tracks. So it is not known whether they yet reached the performers.
Court records on the spy net have been classified, not even known where the suspects are. Details only concern suspected Belarusians. Their names were revealed by Belarusian state media, while announcing the innocence of the arrested. The network of spies has been developed since the spring 2023, in cooperation with Polish, Ukrainian and American services. However, it is already known present that even though the grid was broken, Russian services did not quit their activity in Poland.
Only a week ago, the ABW stopped 2 Russians, who in Krakow and Warsaw were spreading propaganda leaflets, this time encouraging to join the ranks of vasners. The materials were given in Moscow, and they were to be paid for their defiling – provided that they first send the payers pictures to prove that they had done their job. They besides received instructions on where the flyers should be found. It's the same pattern as the 1 known from the broken spy grid. It is not known how many more GRUs have recruited for this kind of action. In addition, fresh recruits are likely to continue. The Russians failed to disrupt the arms supply chain to Ukraine, but they obtained no problem with the strategical infrastructure in Poland. A description of the operation of the spy network shows how crucial specified information was to Russian intelligence.
And whether and how the GRU continues to usage net portals based not only in Poland with highly rusofophilic attitudes, where bloggers claiming to be ‘pseudo Poles’ They spit on Poland, alliances, NATO, while praising everything that Russia and the putin bandit itself. These people are attacking Ukraine's fight for liberation from the tyrant putin and his murderers. Isn't this portal a susceptible ground to recruit an agent? Are bloggers themselves of specified portals about rusophile views not the state's large base for GRU to recruit them? There are many associations and questions here. I hope that the Agency for interior safety – specified reported cases examines, solves and final effects we see in the media – arrests of spies... as given in this material examples above...
"MURE FOR THE POLISH MUNDUR"
Based on:
https://www.onet.pl/information...(link is external)
https://citizen journalist...(link is external)
https://citizen journalist...(link is external)
https://citizen journalist...(link is external)
