Polish and European entities bought fertilizers from Russian concerns connected with chemical supplies for the arms manufacture after 24 February 2022. According to Virtual Poland, trade brought them up to EUR 7 billion during the war, and the ABW warned against possible diversion in the area of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście.
Russian companies made money during the war
Virtual Poland established that European companies, including Polish companies, purchased urea and ammonium nitrate from Uralchem and Eurochem companies besides after the launch of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to the portal, both entities belong to a group of 5 manufacturers liable for more than 75% of chemicals needed by the Russian manufacture for the manufacture of explosives. The recipient of any of these natural materials in Russia was to be the company Specchimia belonging to the state-owned company Rostec.
The scale of business was huge. According to the findings of the ND, Russian chemical companies obtained between 2020 and 1926 from the sale of fertilizers to the European Union from €8.5 to 10 billion. Between 6.5 and 7 billion euros were allocated for the period after the Russian attack of February 24, 2022. The states declared solidarity with the attack on Ukraine, but money continued to flow to the Russian war device sector.
Poland's sanction gap
ABW and National taxation Administration were curious in Polish entities cooperating with Russian suppliers. However, the service could not simply halt the trade. The owners of the companies were subject to restrictions, but Uralchem and Eurochem themselves were not included in the EU sanction list. On National List maintained by the Ministry of abroad Affairs was placed in April 2022 Eurochem Poland. The decision was made at the request of the Head of ABW.
According to the WP, more than a 4th of Russian fertilizers were imported to Poland from companies participating in the explosive production chain. erstwhile president of the Azoty Group Andrzej Skolimowski told the portal that the import of fertilizers from Russia and Belarus increased from 300 000 tonnes per year between 2009 and 2016 to a million tonnes between 2022 and 2023. In the following year, it was to be 1.5 million tonnes, and in the first half of 2025 another million.
Customs duties and quotas were only introduced later. Before the regulations were sealed, a wide window for evidence import was created. This is an example of sanctions built so that the formal restrictions on the owner did not gotta halt trading with its sector.
Warning on Świnoujście
The most serious thread concerns port security. According to the ND, ABW warned the authorities about a diversion script utilizing ammonium nitrate. The services considered an detonation close the Świnoujście LNG terminal or the detonation of the freight depot by persons recruited via Telegram. This does not mean that specified an assassination was carried out. However, it shows what kind of hazard the State has analysed.
The mention point was the Beirut disaster of August 4, 2020. An detonation of 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate in the port killed 218 people and injured about 75,000 people. The ND talker associated with the Polish services pointed out that the merchant vessel could carry between respective 100 and 30,000 tonnes of this substance.
Polish critical infrastructure is already under force from Russian hybrid activities. The NSA besides warned against the threat to Ukraine's aid routesand European services signalled the anticipation of Russia investigating NATO borders. In this context, the control of cargo, ports and trade links is not a bureaucratic addition. It's part of the state's defense.
National interest requires strict rules
For Poland, the rate is double. It is about the money that the European marketplace could supply to the Russian manufacture working for the needs of the army, and the safety of ports and energy terminals. The State cannot be satisfied with checking that the name of a peculiar company is included in the Union list. It must examine owners, recipients, intermediaries and the actual movement of goods.
The Brussels sanctioning strategy proved besides easy to circumvent. Poland should not wait for the EU procedure to catch up with the threat. Sovereignty begins with the ability to self-close the gap erstwhile trade strikes national safety and indirectly strengthens the state conducting the war just beyond our borders.
Source: Virtual Poland, Interia Events
Source: Interia Events
