To begin with, what choice we had in the 1930s, practically until the tragic September itself. On the occasion of the fresh anniversary of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, I one more time recalled a number of fundamental issues:
Was the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact unfavourable to Poland? Of course he was. Was this agreement so different in global relations as to diabolize it to this day? No, global relations are implemented in this way. Has Poland been able to regulate its relations with either the 3rd Reich or the russian Union in advance in order to avoid the adverse effects of the agreement of these countries? Yeah, she did. Did she usage any of these options? Nope.
Outcomes from the crisis – II RP
This and all discipline from August 23, and as a consequence besides from September 1 and 17, 1939. The tigers are not guilty of eating the huntsman who went into the forest without guns and ammunition. And they will not blame erstwhile his grandson refuses to repeat the same feat. It was then the Polish Minister for abroad Affairs Joseph Beck could and should have made a pact with Molotov or Ribbentrop, or preferably both, alternatively of believing in alleged Western guarantees.
Analyzing the cold options favorable to the Second Republic of Poland for exiting the geopolitical crisis of the 1930s – so they looked like this:
- Cooperation/an alliance with the Soviets (to avoid war or to win it during the Czech crisis). This solution was undoubtedly the best and full within the scope of the Polish diplomacy. Only political will was lacking, not only under the influence of the West.
- Neutral block under the direction of Italy (or for the hold of war, assuming a geopolitical action preceding Anschluß). This option was besides powerfully opposed by the Anglo-Saxons, curious in bringing Italy into the war as their colonial rival.
- defensive Polish-German agreement (to direct German aggression towards the West, not for any "common march to the East" against the USSR). Russian historians, however, are inactive searching for a secret Beck-Hitler arrangement, due to the fact that they simply can't realize that it was possible to conduct specified a policy as the end of the Second Republic, without even trying to diplomatically reassurance. The explanation that this was only and only foolishness of the Polish political class does not fit into the heads of serious analysts of global relations.
Finally, at 9.999.999.999.999, among the options available to Poland in 1939, the historical policy of Minister Józef Beck, including his trapping himself into the form of alleged British safety declarations, whose real intent was to convince AdolfHitlerto start a war with aggression against Poland. This goal, as we know, has been full achieved by London.
Meanwhile, the authoritative historical policy of modern Poland inactive dominates the uncritical affirmation of Beck's policy, despite the fact that it has just led us to historical disasters and the current disastrous position of Poland.
System errors
Of course, the primary origin of the September II disaster was the fundamental misunderstanding of the geopolitical position of Poland, resulting in fatal errors in abroad policy. However, the pace and course of the failure was besides affected by a number of interior factors, at least 1 of which was systemic and resulted from the organization of the end-of-life sanitization. Simply, the ruling triumvirate of the II Republic of Poland did not supply itself with basic information.
– abroad Minister Józef Beck did not realize that the Polish Army was not adequate to supply the facilities for his pseudo-powerful diplomatic games;
– General Inspector of Armed Forces, Marshal Edward Blades-Rydz He did not know from Beck that the diplomatic situation was so bad and that there was no time for modernising the army and experimenting with its command;
– Minister of Economy, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski At all, he was not informed by Beck and Rydz about what was going on, so he was active in economical planning (nb. inactive under the dictatorship of the western financier, though in a patriotic shell), as if we were facing decades of peace and there were no urgent needs of the WP.
The September disaster was so a systemic error, in which, of course, external influences, pressures of economical circles or activities of the open agentship can be seen, and these were Polish errors.
Rhetorical Question
The current situation, however, is completely different and there is no 1 among the politicians of the 3rd Republic that is even akin in format or patriotism to the leaders of September 1939. They made disastrous mistakes, but were undoubtedly patriots, overestimating only their own skills and meaning. These moderns are alien agents, people and organizations who make no independent decisions or patented fools, a product of a organization strategy that promotes stupidity, small smartness, opportunism and deficiency of own opinion. In abroad policy and defence strategy of the 3rd Republic of Poland, its managers do not so make mistakes, but on the contrary, they act entirely planned and intentionally against the safety of the state and the Polish people.
The question of an alternate so remains purely rhetorical. Yes, we could retreat from the first line of Western-Russia confrontation without an agent in power. We could cut the privileges of Ukrainian displaced people in Poland. We could engage in a real peace process, not only to end the war in Ukraine, but above all to reconstruct and make the economical cooperation with the East beneficial for Poland. Finally, we could halt sponsoring the American arms manufacture and the Kiev oligarchs, and save the resources we have given to even the most neglected interior sectors, especially housing and wellness protection. We could do anything, but we won't, due to the fact that the 3rd Republic of Poland is an agent even more than the end of the Second Republic with stupidity and arrogance.
Internal front
In the same draft budget for the year 2025, in which as much as PLN 187 billion is foreseen for military spending, i.e. evidence 4.7% of GDP, which makes this budget bill truly pre-war – 37 billion for interior safety needs were besides recorded. Are the compradors so afraid of the people they are entrusted to lead? They are cowards, but they are doubtful.
Polish society has proved for the last 35 years that it is not capable of effective social protests. We are besides embroiled, we are effectively divided, we are disposed to meet individual material needs, but even the difficulties in achieving this goal do not lead us to cooperation and activity. Yes, the power will defend itself against society, it besides increases its level of surveillance and censorship, but this now seems to be an excessive caution. On the another hand, it is simply a natural process to strengthen the interior front in relation to the expected imminent direct war effort. Of course, besides in utmost conditions, 1 can anticipate to see what symptoms of Poles' discontent, mainly due to the surge in costs of life or the expected even increased influx of immigrants.
For now, however, the authoritative optimism dominates, that Poland is developing in a planned way, “as if it is alive” and “not worse”. It is this tendency to power that the current ruling coalition and otherwise is besides a problem for the government and the majority of the parliament. While number groups of supporters of the ruling parties can be satisfied with spectacular gestures aimed at predecessors (such as the removal of the Law and Justice a large part of the backing from the state budget), the voters of the centre, desiring hot water in the taps and political stability, can easy discourage partyial games, which are not accompanied by real economical improvement. In specified situations, the natural tactics of the rulers stay to flee forward, even in terms of the external threat and in terms of the usage of the Russian policy of PO-PSL-Lewica, does not disagree in the least from that implemented by the Law and Justice.
In the meantime, if we can truly talk about the threat of safety of Poland, both internally and abroad, then its origin is not Moscow (unless indirectly), but Kiev.
Ukrainian threat
Poland was, is and will be increasingly threatened by Ukrainian rematch. It is simply a paradox only apparent that Kiev, in the absence of successes on the Russian front, can afford to face specified a submissive and obedient ally (actually a servant) as Poland. And yet, the political inferiority demonstrated at all step of Warsaw towards Kiev only encourages the multiplication of Ukrainian claims and demands. A tender confession by the Minister of Defence, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamishathat we already gave the Ukrainians all our weapons – it is simply a surviving incentive to attack. due to the fact that if we have nothing to defend ourselves – only a fool would not benefit. In particular, as opposed to Warsaw, which is persistently silent about the Polish number in Ukraine or the legitimate claims of Polish property owners left in Kresy – Kiev stands in the position of large Ukraine, from Nowy Targ, Przemyśl, Chełm and Rzeszów to Don and the Caucasus. The governments of the III Republic did not want to support the regaining of Polish property in Lviv, Łuck, Stanisławów, Rowne and Tarnopol (which is proposed by the Kresowe Trusteeship) – now the Ukrainians are making themselves pay for Chełmszow, the full Zakerzona and Operation Vistula.
Minister’s message Dmitro Kuleby For Campus Poland is not a leap or a slip of speech, but a message to Poles that Kiev wants more from us. Much more, though it seemed so far that he had already received everything. In his speech, the Ukrainian diplomat (?) actually made territorial claims to Poland, calling "Ukrainian territories” Lublin, Podkarpata, and Małopolska, where an anti-Banderian Vistula Operation was conducted in 1947. However, the authoritative reaction was as good as it was not at all, and, for example, in the mouth of politicians of parliamentary opposition, the words of outrage sounded peculiarly dishonest, as they led to specified a far-reaching push of Kiev envoys.
The defence of Operation Wisła, which was the only way to destruct the Ukrainian Insurgency Army's gangs, comes to the authorities of the 3rd Republic, it is hard that Polish actions against the Ukrainian underground had already taken place as “communist crimes”. This blinded anti-communism, which has always been a propaganda tool of the CIA and MI6 in Poland, was to form the basis for cooperation with Ukrainian Nazism, of course on anti-Russian blades. An effort to rehabilitate flagism in Poland proved to be 1 of the fewer defeats of the Western agent, who had to give way to the historical memory of the Volhyna Rzezi and another crimes of Ukrainian Nazis against the Polish nation. However, we can be certain that the problem has not disappeared, due to the fact that alongside the Anglo-Saxon agentship – Among the political elites of the 3rd Polish Republic is besides swarming with banner influence agents, including the descendants of the uppers and the CNS uncatched during Operation Vistula. For them, the large Ukraine reaches further to San and the advanced Vistula and Poles will inactive gotta face this threat.
Alternative
In the same speech Kuleb impertinently compared Operation Wisła, i.e. the “crime” of offering the Ukrainian number in Poland better houses and farms, in areas without panic UPA – to the Volynska Rzezi, in which the same UPA, supported by Ukrainian villagers murdered nearly 200 1000 Polish neighbors. In a way, the Kiev Minister besides assured that his government "no problem with continuing exhumation in Volyn" – there is no, due to the fact that neither did he start them, nor does he lead them, nor does he agree to them even the slightest intention. These words besides remained completely unanswered – due to the fact that there are traitors at the helm in Warsaw. And after all, if Operation Wisła truly was partially a payment for the Volynian Sculpture, then no of the Poles would have mocked the Kiev side, and traitors on Polish side would most likely have fallen.
Unfortunately, but we had besides frequently for hajdamaks besides soft a heart, even erstwhile they understood only the harap and the sharpened stake. It would be time to return to these proven methods, but the Warsaw agent is in the way. So we would gotta start by making our own yard and then drive out the strays who want to insult us. And this is truly the choice facing Poles: either a war that threatens the continued existence of the Polish people, or peace, which brings a chance to free ourselves of interior enemies, drop dependence on strangers and rebuild their own potential.
We failed to reverse the destiny of planet War II. But we inactive have time to avoid the third.
Konrad Hand
