I don't think anyone knows the answers to the title, and what's worse is that any people don't want to know it. As we already know today, although in the first weeks of the conflict in Ukraine any thought of ending it sprouted in both Moscow and Kiev, this hope was rapidly put out by Boris Johnson. and direct force from the UK & U.S. not only not curious in peace, but clearly determined to proceed the war, to which the Ukrainian authorities were yet forced/involved.
Who doesn't want peace
As a result, more and more Western observers reflect on the apparent paradox of Western engagement in Ukraine, indicating that it is definitely insufficient, even for Kiev to take over a strategical initiative, not to mention any winning breakthrough, but perfectly suited to the script of sustaining the smoky war, like the 1980s Iraqi-Iran conflict, about which coverage in tv news was reported somewhere between the tractor exhibition and athletics and weather. Meanwhile, the rulings of analysts incapable to comprehend the Western strategy duplicate a mistake that possibly would have recognized the strategy of historians similarly. It is simply a mistake to presume that the West expects Ukrainian triumph and that it wants peace. If the US and the UK were to search peace, then
- (a) would not lead to war;
- (b) would let Ukrainian-Russian ceasefire as early as spring/summer 2022.
If nothing like this happened, the targets must be different. This presumption is much more meaningful than insisting that everyone in Western capitals abruptly lost contact with reality.
Historians should have this apparent association with the outbreak of the large War. The Reichs of Researchers inactive cannot realize how it is possible that specified a dry diplomacy as English did not save peace, although she could do so with 1 telegram to Berlin (which was asked even by the French). However, abroad Office has not done anything like this, and researchers are inactive looking for reasons for specified a mistake, alternatively than accepting the apparent explanation that it was not a mistake, but a deliberate and deliberate action to escalate and spread the European and then global conflict.
What end of the war?
No, after 2 years since the explosion, we are no closer to peace, due to the fact that that is not the intent of this war set by its right perpetrators, namely the United States, the UK and NATO. But does the another war party, Russia, have a imagination of ending the conflict? We can ignore Ukraine in these considerations, despite appearances it is not an entity, but only a place of conflict, without any decision-making power. It was the presumption that the Ukrainians had specified strength, or at least they could regain it, that it was a Russian mistake to plan the first war goals, based on the belief that if they shake well in Kiev, the ferocious oligarchs would fall distant from it, and neutralisation and denazification would be considered by the Ukrainians themselves to be in line with their vital interests. From today's perspective, specified a plan seems embarrassingly naive, but everything indicates that this is precisely what the first Russian thought of fast war looked like without extraordinary war consequences.
This plan expired with engines of Russian tanks that did not occupy Kiev erstwhile they had the chance to do so and was yet thrown off the table along with the fiasco of Istanbul Russian-Ukrainian talks. But the question remains what happens next, to which no 1 can give a reasonable answer. This is somewhat akin to the situation with COVID, erstwhile not erstwhile did the only sensible question arise: what condition will be considered the final end, how many of these “infection“ Then what percent of societies are to be implanted, saying what must happen to halt tormenting people and the economy? We didn't know that for 2 years, and we never yet found out, due to the fact that COVIDa shot from a tank Putin, which was alternatively not premeditated erstwhile the pandemic circus began to last for 2 years.
Similarly, we do not know anything today: what would be Kiev's victory? All we know is that not burning Moscow, not getting Donbas, not taking over Crimea, so what: fixing the front, not so much broken by the Russians as leaving by deserting Ukrainian troops? Besides, I don't think the Russians know how and where to end it – on the full Dnieper line? On the Dnieper line and with Odessa? On the overturn in Kiev, on reaching Zbrucz, or on Bug? And what happens next, erstwhile you think there's peace somewhere beyond another river, due to the fact that this time there's no next Reich Chancellery to put a flag on it and say, "Well, we did the right thing, time to go home!It’s okay. ” Unless both sides (i.e. the West and Russia) have already worked on a well-known strategy of playing chicken, turning it into an option who will sooner get tired and has greater potential, that is, in the script closest to the Western large War. Then another villages in Ukraine, to which Russians enter after Ukrainian desertion, are of small importance, due to the fact that villages in Ukraine, Poland, Romania almost as many as conscripts in Russia, so all of this can take a long time.
And the worst is that there is invariably a deficiency of any Polish strategy towards specified permanent conflict.
What's next?
Poles are most likely the last of the consumers of the final propaganda “Kiev victories” in any indeterminate but surely triumphant dimension. The inactive dominant transmission of the main stream of the III Polish Republic is the anti-Russian vision Ragnarök, the eventual Victoria of good forces, after which “Russia will be gone.” or something equally ending the story. Just arguing with the reality that this war would last, cost Polish taxpayers – according to the minister's exposé Applebaum – at least $9 billion, not counting expenses for the maintenance of Ukrainian displaced persons in Poland, and not to mention losses suffered by Polish farmers, carriers, cement industry, etc. The thought itself, the question about the future of the multimillion-dollar Ukrainian mass in Poland, was rejected in advance at best as a defeatism, and mostly simply as "Putinism” and “onucismIt’s okay. ” You couldn't ask what was going on?! in 2022, and this is inactive a question at least not in place 2 years later!
It is not for us to end the war, as it should not be for us to keep it, which unfortunately happens. We cannot say that we have nothing to do with the beginning of the conflict, for no 1 else, like Radek Sikorski He played an unholy function during the 2014 Kiev coup, the first installment of events that we are experiencing. But we will not end this war, even worse, even if we are to become its active side. Just, The III Polish Republic is not a sovereign state, so it cannot decide war and peaceEven erstwhile it concerns her. After 2 years, however, we have the right, increasingly clear and burning, to request a clear state strategy against the consequences of this war, the most severe for Polish citizens and the Polish economy.
Of course, there is besides no chance of a strategy that is only sensible, coming down to 3 decisions:
- Away from the war itself.
- Full protection of the Polish marketplace against competition from Ukraine.
- The Ukrainian displaced persons in Poland are no longer privileged.
However, we have the right to ask the managers of III of Poland what they plan to do next. We cannot be amazed that since there is no clear thought at the end of this war, neither Vladimir Putin nor Joe Bidenneither Donald Trump, or the City of London, the more they won't have a individual like him. Tuska, Applebaum or Kaczyński, however, continuing the current policy of ignoring the real threats (exaggerating those imaginary ones), reducing costs and constantly lying to citizens – leads to a consecutive way to disaster. This 1 is already noticeable, even erstwhile looking at indicators specified as a drastic decline in industrial production in Poland, which is the consequence of the increasingly severe breath of the superior German economy. This truly cannot be covered indefinitely by disputes about a Silesian mating or sticking any climasvir to asphalt. The crisis will deepen, and Poles are as unprepared for it as for continuing the war in Ukraine. Of course, its conclusion was and is in the vital Polish interest, since it does not appear to be specified a scenario, in that case there is simply a question of how to function in the realities of prolonged and possibly permanent and escalated global conflict. The fact that we have already become accustomed to the war relation at the level of boredom does not change anything in this respect. People even got utilized to concentration camps, the full problem was how to last in them, how to get out of them and how to live on.
This war will go on, or it will turn into another one. The current crisis may be deeper and longer than the erstwhile one. And we're inactive dancing on a volcano, seduced by the appearances of a small so-called-stabilization.
Konrad Hand
