Russian syndrome as a determinant of Polish mentality and Polishness is simply a tragic syndrome. This was demonstrated in a superb way by Jan Engelgard in his late published book, bearing the title with the introduction of a subtitle: “Russian syndrome. The case of Gen. Anton Denikin from a historical perspective”.
At the same time, he presented the historical and political context of the formation of this syndrome: the anti-Russian policy of the chieftain of the Polish state towards the 1917 revolution, expressed in his refusal to support the national revival in Russia after its outbreak and the armed opposition of whites against red. Refuse to support Russian patriots against the actions of Bolshevik usurpers aimed at the civilizational foundations of Russia. The book is an explanation of Polish-Russian relations determined by a negative attitude Józef Piłsudski not only to Tsaric Russia, but besides to Denikin, leader of the white camp, confirmed in the events of 1919, providing a triumph for the Bolsheviks.
Engelgard's explanation is based on materials applicable not only to the researchers of history, but besides culture, civilization, or even – and possibly above all – anthropology. Among them, it is crucial – apart from texts A. Denikina with the brochure “Who saved russian power from destruction?” at the head – published in 2021 a volume of memories of a schoolmate of the white leader – Stanisław Karpiński “Bad Times. Diary 1924-1943", as well as chapters: "Funting into a cat and mouse, or mission of Gen. Karnicki" and "No talks with Moskals".
It is clear from the author's documented message that the Polish mission to Denikin, created in the summertime of 1919 by Piłsudski, was a smokescreen, camouflage for Warsaw's secret activities, justifying the refusal of assistance for white people fighting anti-civilizational Bolsheviks. Picanteria gives this twisted thought to the warden of the state that the mission's objectives were not known by the general who led it. Engelgard writes: “Piłsudski, erstwhile ordering the creation of a Polish mission to Denikina, did not inform almost anyone about the intent of the mission and its tasks. General Aleksander Karnicki, and most of the officers under his command, did not know this” (p.99). In fact, the mission was of a spy nature, and its intent was propaganda justification for refusing to aid – as the author argues in the explanation of his book. To justify this, she was to supply strategical and tactical military and political arguments which were to co-play with the dominant political discourse in Poland from 1919 to 1920 thesis that "white" Russia "did not recognise Poland's independence".
Engelgard, referring to documents, proves that it is simply a false thesis, duplicated – unfortunately – later and now by Polish historians. He stresses that the most crucial thing in this substance is as the authoritative first paper of the celebrated Manifesto of the large Prince Nicholas Mikołajewicz of 1/14 August 1914, announcing the “Rebirth of Poland [...] free in its faith, language and self-government” (p. 30). 2 another papers confirm the first: the message by Prime Minister Ivan Goremykin of 1 August 1915 at the Duma gathering on the creation of Poland on the rights of autonomy and the order of Nicholas II issued by the army and fleet on 25 December 2016. The most crucial document, Engelgard emphasizes, was the order of Nicholas II to the army and fleet of December 25, 1916, which states that: “Russia has not yet secured the accomplishment of the objectives set by the war: the casting of Constantinople and Straits and the creation of a free Poland, composed of all 3 parts, so far separated” (p. 32). Piłsudski could not have been unaware of these documents, as he could not have been unaware of the Polish origin of Denikin – from his parent Polka – and of his pro-Polish views.
However, the anti-Russian vector in the east politics of the chieftain of the Polish state prevailed the argument of papers and the logic of geopolitics. Above all, he had a intellectual and moral dimension. Denikin himself correctly assessed it, writing in his brochure “Who saved russian power from destruction?”: “In this way, in the light of historical truth, “the fight against the Russian response”, “the advanced historical task of liberation of the Ukrainian people”, “the failure of Denikin to admit the state independency of Poland”, etc., etc., all this proves to be just an unsuccessful camouflage of national egoism. In these terrible days, the problem was simply a solution to the terrible dilemma due to its simplicity and nakedness: Is it to advance Russia’s national rebirth or at least not to disturb it? Or could it favour the slavery of communist Russia and its partition?... Bolshevism prevailed” (p. 337).
Piłsudski chose the second option. That was the legitimate belief of the white leader. General Karnicki's mission in the south of Russia not only did not lead to military cooperation with Denikin, but it became a spy mission. "The game of cat and mouse with Denikin himself – Engelgard writes – avoiding, making unrealistic demands – was everyday. So what did the mission staff do? Collecting information, that is, openly, spying” (p. 132).
This game with Denikin accepted all political options. Piłsudski camp has not encountered any political opposition in Poland – above all in the parliament – including from the National Democracy. Even her politicians – Engelgard points out – did not propose to interact with Denikin, but only to establish political contacts with him. This was emphasized by leading journalists on the Warsaw Newspaper, accusing the left of cryptobolshevism, due to the fact that at the same time the Bolshevik conschachts were kept by Julian Marchlewski. In support of this minimalism, the author quotes Wasiutine Bohdan from his article “About Politics towards Russia” (14 and 15 August 1919): “Therefore, treating our relation with Russia is madness and crime. It is characteristic that those who most publically condemn any anticipation of establishing relations with the Russians belong to the erstwhile Germanophile camp. Poland must have a major front facing either against Russia or against Germany and must decide on a line of guidelines for its interior policy. I don't think it's any political line to reject the very thought of negotiations with Denikin or Kołczak" (S. 153).
However, specified voices were isolated. Author discusses them in chapter Joseph Mackiewicz a crusade to defend “white” Russia, exhibiting the statements and publications mentioned in the title of writer, and Mariana Zdzechowski. As he emphasizes, the second – a philosopher, an expert in Russia's history, correspondence with Lw Tolstoy and maintaining relationship with the most outstanding Russian philosopher Santa Bierdiaev, who lived after the Revolution of 1917 on emigration – he was the first "so thoroughly and in substance challenged the dogma of the deficiency of an alternate to Piłsudski's policy against "white" Russia in 1919" (p. 204). However, those voices were not heard. She won the rule: no talks with the Moscals, besides valid at the Paris Peace Conference. It resulted in an effort to press charges of treason against Roman Dmowski and his colleagues, conducting only “consultations” with the Russians.
This political and geopolitical aspect is most crucial in Engelgard's book and should be the number 1 subject for historians' deliberations. In contrast, for the investigator of culture and civilization, it has the meaning of 1 of respective determinations defining Polish-Russian relations during the First planet War and the Bolshevik Revolution. It is equally crucial in this case that Poland and Russia belong to 2 different cultural circles. Different, but not opposed, for both have Christian foundations, visible above all in the anthropological and axiological dimension. In both cultural circles moral norms were shaped on the basis of Christian ethics. From a cultural-civilization point of view, this vector is of paramount importance, even dominant in the assessment of the attitude of Polish authorities to the Bolshevik Revolution, or more specifically to the white camp in 1919. The Polish policy of this time did not meet the moral norms of the same for both civilizations – Latin/Christian, which was praised by Poland and Turkish-Byzantine, which it defended against the atheistic Bolshevik “white” Russia with Denikin at the head.
"The game of cat and mouse" which Piłsudski led with him in the breakthrough year not only for the Bolshevik Revolution and the destiny of Christianity in Russia, but consequently besides for its threats throughout Europe, was a game based on moral falsehood. Her inspiration was the desire to retaliate on the “Moscals” for the years of Poland's captivity, as well as for the tsarist repression that Piłsudski suffered in the 1980s and 1990s – the arrest in Vilnius in 1887 and the conviction for 5 years of exile to East Siberia for his association with the revolutionary terrorist organization Narodnaj Wola and her participation in the preparation of the assassination of Tsar Alexander III. A five-year stay in Siberia did not change his leftist views and anti-Russian attitude. The second strengthened, as he expressed his refusal to support white Russia.
He gave the Russian syndrome a fresh form in Polish consciousness – a misconception towards the same highest values that formed the mentality of both the Polish and Russian people for centuries – towards Christian moral values. At the level of these values Piłsudski lost to Denikin, and his political win was short-lived – it was removed into the shadow of the 1920 event. Moral betrayal always has an epilogue bearing the signs of punishment. Piłsudski did not foretell that the Bolsheviks, whom he favored at the minute decisive for the course of the revolution, will not spare Poland after the triumph over the whites. Without fear of moral punishment, he did not foresee that those who in the frenzy of the dismantling of civilization did not spare their own nation and state, the more they would not spare the abroad nation and state – Polish – shaped by the same hated ethical values.
The far-reaching and tragic consequences of their triumph in the revolution were predicted by Denikin, informing Poland of the 3rd Reich's agreement with the russian Union shortly before the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. This white leader did not fall after their defeat in “Polish syndrome” and did not change his pro-Polish views. “Anton Denikin,” Engelgard writes, for the remainder of his life, could not get over the lost chance for Russia and Poland to defeat the Bolsheviks together, as well as the failure of the anticipation given to us by past of a friendly arrangement of Polish-Russian relations. However, he never attacked the Polish people in any publication. On the contrary, he always emphasized that the Polish nation would be the victim of the short-sighted policy of Józef Piłsudski" (p. 308).
The historical importance of Engelgard's book is undeniably and 1 should hope that it will not be ignored in the context of Polish historiography, as was the case with Karpiński's diary and the irrationally negative relation between Piłsudski and Denikin, as the author of the "Russian Syndrom" in the chapter About the Polish discussion on Gen. Denikin. In the author's dimension, the set of material-witnesses presented by Engelgard confirms the author's feature communicative contained in his 2008 fresh "The Curse of General Denikin". At the same time, it confirms the thesis formulated by Denikin in the aforementioned booklet that russian power saved Poland from non-existence in 1919, thus perpetuating the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution.
The book was published at the minute erstwhile one more time the Russian syndrome decided on the direction of Polish policy launched in 2014 by Polish authorities against Russia. Earlier, the syndrome had come to light after the collapse of the USSR, erstwhile Poland – alternatively of demanding to justice Ukrainian genocide on the citizens of the Second Republic and to exhume its victims, joined the orange revolution in Ukraine organized by the United States and their allies against its unions with Russia.
Since 2014, this Russian syndrome in the form of rusophobia now covers not only the full line of political establishment from right to left – the exception is Grzegorz Braun – but besides people of science, business, media, culture, education, education. All those who accepted for their manifestation – on the 1 hand patriotism, on the another hand cosmopolitanism – russophobia, which was tricked us by transatlantic propaganda. Not all those who spit on Russia, Vladimir Putin And the Russian people are followers of the Soviets. Moreover, many Polish rusophobes are her opponents. However, their rusophobia expands the space of its impact, they stand in 1 camp with supporters of the irrefutable, inviolable cult of Piłsudski. They play together on a squad that went on work with a Hegemon planet hating Russia.
They supported those who destroyed Christianity in the mediate East and patronized the broadcasting of the anti-Christian face of Europe. And even though most of them invoke Christian values, they all do everything to guarantee that the Western war against Russia in Ukraine ends with its defeat equivalent to its destruction. It is not crucial for them that it is the only power in the planet that actually defends Christianity through both its government and social moral norms and culture. So can the curse of Denikin be fulfilled and a moral-metaphysical punishment is expected? The decision-makers have forgotten this dimension or deny its existence, although almost everyone wants immortality after death. Is it possible without a court?
Prof. Anna Raźny
Jan Engelgard, “Russian syndrome. The case of Gen. Anton Denikin from a historical perspective”, Warsaw 2024.
Think Poland, No. 49-50 (1-8.12.2024)
