Jakub Majmurek: Will the president visit Andrzej Duda Was China a success? If so, whose? The president? Chin?
Adrian Brona: In my opinion, this visit was of very small importance for Polish-Chinese relations, Poland gained small on it. However, it can surely be seen as an imagery of China and the president himself.
What did China gain from it?
First of all, they have shown that they have another partner in Europe ready to conduct a policy of kindness towards China. To date, Western countries, although they had extended interests in China, were not afraid to criticize them on issues specified as politics towards Uighurs in Sinciang, human rights violations in Hong Kong, expansion in the South China Sea, or support Russia after Putin's invasion of Ukraine.
President Duda, outside the Ukrainian thread, did not rise any of these topics during this visit. For this he kept repeating how impressed he was with Chinese economical development.
Were those critics of the president's visit correct, who indicated that he accepted the Chinese point of view during the visit?
In fact, in any places the president spoke like he was reading a Chinese textbook. For example, during the lecture at Fudan University in Shanghai, Andrzej Duda praised China for not having territorial disputes with their neighbours, and if they even have them, they decide them peacefully – even though politics in the South China Sea is simply not true.
Then why do you consider the visit a success of Andrzej Duda?
Because thanks to it, he strengthened himself in Poland, presenting himself to his supporters as a statesman, individual who can talk as equal to Xi Jinping, leader of the second in terms of the importance of the state in the world.
You said that this visit was of small importance to Polish-Chinese relations. Agreements on visa-free travel up to 15 days unlocking the export of Polish poultry or intended to lead to the creation of a Polish-Chinese dictionary are not important?
In my opinion, not so much erstwhile we look at the full Polish-Chinese relationship, it's all small. This does not mean that these agreements will not be of crucial importance for certain groups in Poland and China.
Contracts on poultry exports are crucial for the industry, as many companies will benefit. Work on the dictionary is crucial for translators – I talked to respective Polish-Chinese translators in fresh days and they were truly excited about this information.
Many people will besides benefit from visa-free travel. Remember, however, that our trade with China amounts to $50 billion. Of which the majority – about $47.5 billion – is our import from China, and only $3.5 billion export of Polish products to the Chinese market. Neither the facilitation of poultry exports nor the visa-free movement will fundamentally change these proportions.
If we compare president Duda's current visit with the 1 from 2015 and president Komorowski's visit from 2011, then we will see that then akin economical agreements were signed much more, due to the fact that several, not several.
Since then, the geopolitical context has changed. There have besides been allegations against the president that he speaks of China as if nothing has changed since 2015.
You could get that impression a small bit. The context has indeed changed. I personally believe that Polish-Chinese relations have been in a state of suspension for about six years. The 2008-18 period was a decade of admiration in rule of the full Polish elite Chinese economical wonder.
Politicians of almost all options then saw a chance in China to diversify Polish exports, which, as a consequence of the economical crisis, clearly suffered from a long of Western Europe. They besides hoped to attract Chinese investments – at that time Chinese capital poured out of your mediate East and was invested worldwide.
But these hopes did not materialize. The common relations were aggravated by the pandemic, which frozen China's relations fundamentally with the planet and the war in Ukraine in which China supports Russia in all possible way, but to send its own forces to Ukraine.
All this caused that the enthusiasm to cooperate with China has weakened importantly among the Polish elite. The voices that we request to work closely with China, due to the fact that this could be an chance for us to find a non-European partner and for an additional engine of economical development, are becoming weaker. On the another hand, Poland is not peculiarly active in criticism of China. The president is no exception, nor is the government peculiarly eloquent in matters specified as violations of Uighur rights.
The President's visit was criticized by supporters of the government coalition, but it was cut off by Tusk praising Andrzej Duda. There's a consensus among our political class on China?
For a good fewer years. Of course, they are more critical of China and more enthusiastic about cooperation, but there is besides a clear mainstream. The evolution of Radek Sikorski was interesting, who as a Euro MP could be very critical of China, but after taking the seat of the head of the MFA greatly softened his rhetoric.
I think if Tusk went to China alternatively of Andrzej Duda, this visit could look very similar. Although Tusk as erstwhile president of the European Council and of the European People's organization could feel obliged, for example, to rise the situation in the South China Sea.
So, what can we do with China today? due to the fact that on the 1 hand, we hear that we should fight to increase exports, make joint investments, especially in the most technologically advanced areas, and on the another hand, the rivalry of our most crucial ally, the United States, with China, makes akin cooperation peculiarly difficult.
This is not only a substance of rivalry between the States and China – which has stabilised at least at the economical level in the last fewer months – but besides of increasing distrust towards China by the European Commission and many European countries, including as crucial as France, which has become a supporter of the introduction of anti-dumping duties on products from China, for example on electrical cars. There is besides an even more increasing Chinese protectionism following the pandemic, which besides contributes to the fact that our trade balance with China looks like it is.
The increasing distrust between the West and China makes possible Polish investments in China or joint Polish-Chinese ventures subject to risk.
In what way?
In specified a way that a joint venture with China in the field of advanced technology can land on even an informal blacklist, that Poland will be subjected to force from the States to halt specified cooperation. As is happening present with Chinese investments in the semiconductor sector, and in a minute the Chinese biotechnology sector may be happening.
Today it is hard to find specified areas of cooperation with China, which, on the 1 hand, would give the Polish side a chance of crucial profits, and on the another hand were free from controversy, would not pose a hazard of securitisation by our western partners. So I cannot answer what we should focus on economical cooperation with China present – who will be able to answer this question will most likely become a very wealthy person.
Can we play anything politically in China? You said that the president did not criticise China, but I do not think that the Chinese will care what the president of Poland thinks about their policy in the South China Sea or in Sinciang.
They most likely wouldn't care, like Poland's position on persecution of Christians – which in China actually takes place – but an ambitious, developing state that wants to have a serious position on the global phase should not avoid a position on akin issues. So I think that Andrzej Duda lost his voice in these cases.
He spoke to president Xi about the war with Ukraine and the situation on the border with Belarus. Is there anything we can do about China?
We must realise that any time ago China made a strategical decision to cooperate with Russia in order to change global order. This cooperation is highlighted at all Putin-Xi gathering and translates into concrete actions. China, through bilateral trade, helps Russia ease the burden of sanctions and bypass any of them. On the global stage, they repeat Russia's narrative, blaming NATO for causing war and supporting Russia in the UN.
China has made this strategical decision even before the war and has not changed it despite the criticism from all over our region and the expanding number of EU countries. So if, despite criticism in 2 years, China has not changed its policy, it will not change it under the influence of president Dudy's conversation with president Xi.
Although it is good that this conversation has taken place, due to the fact that experts agree that issues raised by countries specified as Poland in talks with Chinese lower-level diplomats do not always scope president Xi. It is good that the president presented our position straight to Xi Jinping, although China has so far changed its policy only erstwhile they were afraid of serious economical repercussions.
Similarly, we have small emphasis on Belarus?
I am skeptical of our possible to influence China in this area for 2 reasons. Firstly, as our bargaining card, we point out in this context that a railway transfer between China and the European Union is taking place across the Polish-Belarusian border. The problem is, from a Chinese perspective, it's not that important. Rail transport from China to Europe is simply a promoter of Chinese abroad trade. Of these promotions, 88% of the goods stay in Russia and Belarus, no further west.
Nor can we close our marketplace for Chinese products, due to the fact that trade policy is EU competence and akin decisions are made at European level, not at national level.
Secondly, Belarus has a very good relation with China and Lukashenko personally with president Xi. China doesn't like to push its close partners, if they do, it's alternatively indirect. This can be seen in the case of North Korea, which is even more dependent on China than Belarus and not always operating internationally in accordance with Chinese interests, or Iran.
In conclusion, did Andrew Duda rightly fly to Beijing?
Although the visit will not be of large importance for the future of our relation with China, it is good that it took place. We have given our position not only to Xi, but to the wider elite of the Chinese ruling party, specified relations must be built and sustained. It is good that the Chinese entrepreneurs were met, that the Polish voice sounded in the economical forum in Shanghai and Dalian.
How did president Duda's visit receive Chinese media?
It was surely not presented as specified an crucial event as Emmanuel Macron or Olaf Scholz's fresh visits. If we take the issue of the "People's Journal" into hand – this is the authoritative KPCH diary – the day after the Duda-Xi meeting, we will announcement that the memo from the gathering came to the front page, took about 1 3rd of the 1st. The remainder was devoted to information about the same day of the joint Xi conference with Chinese scientists.
W China's function of the press, especially party, is mostly to defend Xi Jinping's image. So Duda's visit was presented in it as proof that president Xi is the husband of the state to which another European leader comes as a petent after Macrona and Scholzu.
What is China's strategical goal present in relations with Poland?
First of all, to keep a situation where we are an easy outlet for Chinese exports. Secondly, the consolidation of the situation in which Poland does not join the Czech Republic, Lithuania and another Baltic states – the countries of our region most criticizing Beijing. Contrary to the appearance of China, who is very curious in global prestige, specified criticism hurts.
Does Duda’s friendly policy towards China conflict with the Trimorese plans?
Our region is very divided on China. On the 1 hand, we have the Baltic States, Hungary or Greece, which has always powerfully blocked any criticism of China of the EU.
Andrzej Duda mentioned during his visit about Trimorz, I wonder if China will now take this topic. Will they in any way support the Polish integration plans of this region. Until now they have not done so, they have had their own platform of cooperation with Central and east Europe. I do not think this policy will change substantially, although they may make any symbolic motion to appreciate Andrzej Duda in the last months of his presidency.
What will most affect our relation with China over the next 5 years?
War in Ukraine. This is simply a fundamental substance for our safety. If China does not change its policy towards Russia and Ukraine, I do not think that Polish-Chinese relations will take on fresh affirmative dynamism.
I will say more, even if the conflict in Ukraine ends, then Ukraine can spoil Polish-Chinese relations. For example, due to the fact that Polish and Chinese companies will compete for contracts in the construction of Ukraine after the war. We gotta prepare in general that China can increasingly be an economical competitor and a rival for us. We'll even compete with them to attract the same investments.
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Adrian Brona – expert on Polish-Chinese relations, PhD student at the Faculty of global and Political Studies of the Jagiellonian University.
