Writing a biography of a inactive surviving and active policy is an highly dangerous task, and with large risk, due to the fact that its future behaviour, statements and decisions can destruct the full biographical narrative. And surely an effort to closely trace Vladimir Putin's biography is an undertaking almost from the point of view of the heroic author (unless the author is simply a propagandaist and inexpensive pashquillant, and there are many). It was taken up by British writer Philip Short. Did he avoid apparent traps?
Correspondent and its sources
Englishman Philip Short has for years been a correspondent for leading British media (BBC, “The Economist”, “The Times”) in Moscow, Beijing and Washington. He presently lives in confederate France. Years of work, among others in the capital of Russia, resulted in quite a few contacts that would be truly hard for any another author, including 1 who would come from academic circles. Short is simply a journalist, but at the same time a man who combines skills typical of his profession with the systematicity and clarity supported by sources of speech, characteristic of scholars. He had previously been introduced to a wider group of readers as the author of the biography Pol Pota (Polish edition: Pol Pot. Fields of Death, Warsaw 2016), Mao Zedong and François Mitteranda.
On the biography of Russian president Short worked for a long 8 years. He conducted respective twelve interviews and interviews with analysts, erstwhile officials and diplomats, as well as with people who met Putin in earlier periods of his life and activities. He added besides reading countless speeches, interviews and recordings of the Russian leader. He besides reached for the press (although with a certain Anglo-Saxon type, a gravity towards the media in Russia, akin to the liberals there) and the work of another journalists and scholars, besides Russian.
Formating experiences
When any reflect on the tremendous weight Vladimir Putin puts on the russian triumph against Nazi Germany, they frequently forget the past of his own family. Of course, there are so many specified stories in Russian society that they grow into collective memory and historical identity. The later Russian president had heard about the destiny of his household even as a kid during the siege of Leningrad. That's erstwhile 1 of his older brothers died in infancy. “Listening to these stories, Volodya understood what his parents had gone through” – writes Short. To these experiences of oral household past can be added the guerrilla conflict of his father in close Estonia, in the ranks of the diversion group.
Later Putin was raised by Leningrad street; as we know, he was actually 1 step distant from becoming 1 of the hooligans and choosing a completely different model of life. His father was in the Communist organization of the russian Union, but—like his mother—he was besides a simple worker. Peace in a municipal flat on Baskowa Street, Spartan conditions and dangerous vagrants – this is the experience of the majority of Western planet leaders who shaped Putin in the youngest years.
Philip Short then describes how the current Russian leader avoided the age and surroundings of threats by practicing martial arts (judo, sambo) and an example of learning, including German. Later there was an application to the City State safety Committee (KGB), without any knowledge, from the proverbial street. It was there that he was told, half joking, half serious, that before applying to the russian peculiar Services, about the work he dreamed of, he should graduate, preferably legal. He went to Leningrad University anyway. After his completion, he was admitted to the KGB, in which he was initially active in interior security. Is it him that any people want, somehow, was he peculiarly shaped? “Putin was already Putin before he began serving in the KGB” – writes Short. And he's most likely right.
Little talking, lots of listening
From the accounts of people who knew him from an early age, an image of a man who is hidden, introvert, very seldom showing emotion and striving to keep full self-control. possibly these qualities can be linked to the athletics that he practiced – the east martial arts behind which the full doctrine of life stands.
After spending years in Germany, Vladimir Putin retained a certain sentiment. Among his closest friends were many Germans, not only those he met as Stasi officers in 1980. 1 of them was Franz Sedelmayer, a young Bavarian businessman who started investing in St. Petersburg on the verge of transformation. Short cites the words of his characteristics of the Russian president: "He was curious, of course very attentive. And he always kept control of himself and the situation. He was different from people. He was like a chameleon. He created for them a mirror reflection showing him the way they wanted to see him. He was good at getting information from people, but he approached with reserve to talk about 3rd parties. He wasn't a man to open up. He kept his private life private. He kept the wall between his friends and his family. He never talked about his parents, his wife. I can't remember a single case of him telling me something fresh about his private past.".
Self-control and interior discipline besides manifested itself in the regular lifestyle of the Russian president. Short describes the fixed elements of Vladimir Putin's day schedule: "When he was not travelling, he started his day in Nowy Ogariev with half an hr of exercise, where 20 to 30 Olympic pools flowed. If possible, he later trained for another hr – either at home after breakfast, for which he usually ate grits, or at the gym in the Kremlin, after lunch, which consisted of kefir and fruit. Regardless of where he was, he tried to practice all day from an hr and a half to 2 hours. His passion was swimming’.
Putin's physical fitness was accompanied by excellent memory and intellectual efficiency. His interviewers reported that he usually appeared without any notes, but he was well prepared. erstwhile German ambassador, Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz He recalled: “We talked a lot in private. He never took notes. But if he said he would do something, it was done”.
Minimum conflicts
Philip Short extensively describes Russia's gigantic problems with corruption and another public administration pathologies. He analyses Putin's reactions to peculiar scandals. The image of the Russian president's personnel policy emerges from them.
The biographer cites his words about not being utilized to cultivating resentment, assuming that present opponents may be allies in the future. An example is the assignment of liable tasks Vladimir Surkov, previously working for Putin's oligarchic enemy, Mikhail Chodorkowski. In addition, he felt that throwing people off their jobs did not mean that they would be better off. A typical consequence to the next crises was to decision their perpetrators to another positions. In this respect, Putin's leadership is the other of any dictatorship that is based on fear and uncertainty of the subordinates.
At the same time, there is no uncertainty that Putin has brought many of his friends and trusted people from the time erstwhile he was a deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, or from the erstwhile KGB service companions. Besides, his staff policy was to pool resources from different backgrounds and spheres. As Philip Short claims, he sometimes reached for friendly oligarchs (e.g. Olega Deripasta is Arkady Rotenberg), sometimes after the Petersburg Liberals, and another time after representatives of force structures, or young technocrats promoted from the province.
Demand of respect and non-interference
"The estimation was fundamental to Putin. Whether in the boys' years on Baskova Street or for Russia as a large power, the request to be respected was a constant rule in his life” – writes Philip Short. From the biography of the Russian president emerges a image of a man who constantly demands a partnership, an equal conversation, a place for his country corresponding to his scale. Over time, it passes through the process of expanding emancipation, freedom from complexes towards the alleged West. It is adequate to draw attention to the evolution of the rhetoric of fresh years in relation to abroad affairs: first, we were constantly talking in Russia about "our partners" in order to destruct this, in time, having nothing to do with reality, but having more to do with wishes, the word for others, more corresponding to the relation of the alleged West to Moscow and the nature of their relations.
Another value stressed continuously by Vladimir Putin over the years was sovereignty, besides understood as discord to external interference in interior political processes and events. Russia's experience in this area did not appear only at the beginning of this century, along with alleged coloured revolutions. It existed before and was much closer. It is worth mentioning what Philip Short writes about the 1996 Russian presidential election: "To guarantee that Communist governments, the United States and the governments of another Western countries did not return, they supported the Jeltyn campaign. In a sense, it was nothing new. During the Cold War, both Russia and the United States attempted to influence the elections in the countries of the opposing camp. For the first time, however, the West tried to influence the election result in Russia itself. The methods utilized were usually within the average interstate relationship: secret loans, the accelerated payment of loans to the global Monetary Fund, president Clinton's authoritative visit during the election run and the sending of US electoral strategists to Yeltyn's staff on request. However, there was a precedent that struck Americans 20 years later, which should be remembered.”. Of course, Short here refers to accusations made against Moscow to support the candidacy Donald Trump in 2016.
However, as he claims rather rightly, Russia's rejection of the democratic principles so celebrated in the West has just been accomplished with the hands of the West. Boris Jelcin. This must be remembered by accusing his successor Vladimir Putin of breaking democratic standards.
Liberal European
The very crucial conclusion of reading Philip Short's book is based on a immense amount of analyzed material with Vladimir Putin's statements that in fact the president of Russia had a clear taste for European liberalism for most of his life, understood sometimes in a simplified and somewhat stencilary way. In the ancient Russian dispute of occidentalists with Slavicphiles, Putin was trap. His pattern was closer. Peter the Great than Ivan the Terribleif you scope for totemic figures for both camps.
While inactive working at the KGB resident in Dresden in 1980, "Putin claimed that private property was crucial. To motivate people, they must be allowed to rise wealth and give it to their children. If the economy is to develop, there must be competition" – writes the biographer.
According to Philip Short, the pro-western liberal beliefs of the Russian leader were not ideologically motivated, but – like many of his another views – purely pragmatically. He simply acknowledged that transformation to the Western model, joining leading economical and political forces, copying their solutions would enable Russia to take the right position in the planet order.
Open on Washington.
But that's not all. Vladimir Putin declared himself repeatedly not only as a European but besides as a politician willing to cooperate with the whole, widely understood West, including his Anglo-Saxon core. This was besides the case for the United States. "Putin's interest in better relations with America was not something to show – it was real" – writes Short about the beginnings of Vladimir Putin's presidency. In his first year of presidency, he pointed out that Washington was no longer an opponent for Moscow but a partner. The Russian president's biographer maintains that this was besides related to individual relations with George W. Bush, recalling the latter's words about the Russian equivalent of 2000: “I looked into a man’s eyes. I found it very direct and credible. We had a very good conversation. I was able to see into his soul: a man profoundly devoted to his country and his well understood interests.”.
Cooperation became even more intense after the September 11, 2001 planet Trade Center bombings. Putin then stated that not only the United States but besides NATO is ready to treat as an ally in the fight against terrorism.
Washington doesn't want cooperation.
The erosion of common relations began with a wave of colorful revolutions in the post-missile area, with an orange revolution in Kiev headed. The Americans did not take advantage of the chance of the Russian leader's attitude to cooperate closely with them. Nor did the declarations made at the beginning of Bush's second word help; the American president acknowledged in the spirit of neoconservative hawks that 1 of Washington's primary tasks now would be to support the "democratic" movements around the world.
"Russia no longer exported its ideology and value system. The United States did it instead.” – notes Short and lists a number of US interference in political processes in the post-missive area.
Washington not only rejected Moscow's outstretched hand, but besides did his best to prevent Russian-European cooperation in various areas. Especially in the energy sphere. "It has been an American horse since the Reagan administration, who tried to block the construction of gas pipelines to Western Europe in 1980. However, this has now taken on a fresh dimension, due to the fact that in addition to geopolitical issues, Washington sought European outlets for US liquefied gas (LNG)" – writes Short.
Putin's biographer acknowledges that the Russian leader was not able to get free of the illusions about the anticipation of cooperation with the West until 2006, after nearly six years of presidency. He hesitated a long time; "to the hardhead, like Sieczyn or Patruszew from the very beginning, they doubted the interest of Western governments in a real, partner dialog with Moscow. Putin took his time to admit their skepticism as legitimate”. Analyzing the behaviour of Russians and Americans, Short yet concludes that “The conclusion was that Russia stood side by side with its allies erstwhile they were in need. America did not do this”.
"Despite American claims, the shield was only defensive by name. In fact, it was an integral part of the offensive possible of America" “The British writer writes about the installation of the alleged rocket shield in Romania and Poland, which led to a further tightening of relations on the Moscow – Washington line.
Has anything changed in Russian-American relations erstwhile in the White home he sat down unwarrantedly as Pro-Russian Donald Trump? "The demolition of military balance mechanisms accelerated after Trump took office. The paradox was that it was for the president, who talked constantly about the request to improve America's relations with Russia, the relation deteriorated much faster than for his predecessors" – Answers Short.
Summing up considerations about Putin's disappointment with the alleged West, Philip Short recalls the words of the Russian president addressed during the 2017 discussion of the Welsh Club to an American scholar: “Our biggest mistake was that we trusted you besides much. Your mistake was to admit this trust as our weakness and abuse it”.
Soviet geopolitical disaster
As we know, Vladimir Putin's relation to the russian past is rather ambivalent. Short recalls that the first shock associated with the collapse of Putin's empire survived inactive in the German Democratic Republic, seeing that Moscow's omnipotent so far has not been able to halt the decomposition processes of its east German ally.
Another shock suffered after returning to the country. Estonian nationalists then placed border posts in the area located in the Russian national Socialist russian Republic. On the lands where his father was a guerrilla during the war. At the time, it seemed unimaginable to him the emergence of independent Baltic states.
Philip Short refutes another story in his book, associated this time with Putin's celebrated 2005 statement, in which he was to state that the dissolution of the USSR was the largest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century. "As he later maintained, speaking of disaster, he meant only the humanitarian dimension" – emphasizes the British. It is hard to disagree with it, given the many unequivocal criticisms of the russian era of the Russian President's statement.
Conservative Putinism
In time, as Short rightly notes, Vladimir Putin’s views have evolved. From clear liberalism, he was moving towards increasingly decisive conservatism. In addition to the already mentioned pragmatism, Putin had definite, crystallized beliefs over the years. Philip Short comes to the conclusion, as Prof. Andrzej Walickithat a set of beliefs and sources of inspiration characteristic of the Russian leader can be distinguished.
Its undoubted part is the attachment to Orthodox Christianity, despite the multi-denominational nature of Russian society. Short claims that the Russian president is undoubtedly immersed in Orthodox religion, possibly influenced by the current metropolitan Tichona Szewkunova. “It was customary for him to say goodbye all time Satan was mentioned, widespread among Orthodox monks, but alternatively not among lay people. The Kremlin reported that Archimandrite Tichon, a superior of the Sreten monastery located close Lubianka, became a confessor of Putin. 10 years younger than the president, wearing a red-brown beard and pony-bound long hair Tichon denied these unions, but Pugachev, who introduced them to himself in the late 1990s erstwhile Putin was head of the FSB, said that undoubtedly the clergy had close access to him.” – writes the British biographer.
A well-known manager besides convinced the Russian leader of conservative ideas Nikita Michałkov. He was the 1 who recommended him to do the work of a conservative, emigrating thinker. Ivana Iljina. Putin's views besides shaped the reading of 19th and 20th century spiritual doctrine classics – Vladimir Solovyov and Nikolaya Bierdiaeva, as well as a historian Vasily Klulewski.
Short claims that over time Putin had more and more elements of the belief that he was facing a massive mission. He cites unusual, emotional statements about Russia and concludes that “It was not the president who said it, but the priest-king”.
Red lines
From the very beginning, Putin pointed out the further promises made by Washington to halt NATO's expansion towards Russia's borders. It wasn't just Russian politicians. As Short recalls, the opponents of the alliance's expansion were "George Kennan, Richard Pipes, Jack Matlock and Strobe Talbott, who warned that the short-term benefits of joining NATO in the Central and east European countries would be outweighed by long-term harm in relations with Russia. A akin opinion was conveyed to the CIA White House”.
The red line designated by Vladimir Putin himself was the question of NATO's expansion in the post-missile area, but for the Baltic countries, with which he had to accept membership. So it was Georgia, but above all Ukraine, which Putin devoted quite a few space in his deliberations for years, recognizing it as a country inhabited by a close, fraternal nation and a natural ally. In 2008, the current CIA chief William Burns He was an ambassador to Moscow. Short cites a passage from his memo from this period to the Secretary of State Conoleezzy Rice. "The accession of Ukraine to NATO is the most bright of red lines for Russian elites (not just Putin).After more than 2 and a half years of my conversations with key figures in Russia, from concrete from the darkest corners of the Kremlin to the harshest liberal critics Putin, I have not yet met anyone who would not consider Ukraine in NATO as a direct challenge to Russian interests. At this stage, awarding the Road Map to Membership (MAP) would not be considered a method step, but a strategical glove. The current Russia will answer this" – wrote the later chief of intelligence.
The first signal, after Putin's celebrated speech at the Munich safety Conference in 2007, that Moscow takes these red lines seriously was her operation in Georgia in the summertime of 2008. As Philip Short rightly points out, "the war, which the media and Western governments later referred to as the Russian invasion, was started by Georgia, not Russia".
Ukraine
Philip Short, on the pages of president Putin's biography, consistently points out provocative actions towards Russia that have resulted in the current armed conflict phase.
"Paul Wolfowitz was no longer in power, but his ideas survived. Carl Gershman, a longtime president of the National Endowment for Democracy, called Ukraine the “biggest prey” of America that had been pulled out of Russia's embrace. A fewer years later, in charge of Ukrainian politics in the White House, Aleksandr Vindman referred to it as a buffer state – “a odor against Russian aggression in east Europe, crucial to the interests of the United States and NATO” – reminds me. In Washington, the hawks' faction, deaf to the warnings of the realists and experts of Russia, yet prevailed.
In the context of Ukraine, but besides of the Russian counter-terrorism operation in Syria launched in 2015, Short notes the resounding divisions between Washington and the Old Continent. He mentions Emmanuel Macroniewho, like the Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to admit that "Despite the American view, Russia was not in Europe's long-term interest".
Short besides describes the situation after the overturn in Kiev in 2014. Writing about Donbas, he rightly points out that the separatist opposition movement there was hard to control by Moscow, having a somewhat chaotic, sometimes anarchist character. This besides had future consequences, especially as Kiev declared that it was moving distant from implementing Minsk agreements.
Myth Trial
Short is far from idealizing Vladimir Putin. He believes, however, that the attribution of his actions and his guilt must be based, at least, on circumstantial evidence. The second authors of most texts about modern Russia do not care at all.
According to them, it was already possible to get to Putin's power thanks to allegedly organized (operation of the false flag) terrorist attacks in a number of Russian cities in 1999. Short clearly notes that, if this were the case, the Russian national safety Service would have organised without major problems a false confession to commit acts of panic by the then-combatant Chechen separatists and Islamists fighting Moscow. Nothing like that happened. "What seemed ironly undeniable, based on irrefutable evidence, indicating that the Kremlin was behind the demonic strategy of killing its own citizens to hand over power to its chosen candidate, does not withstand trial with a closer look" – writes the British biographer.
Another story cast down by a British writer is the thesis about any immense wealth and assets of the Russian president. "His future is guaranteed, as was Jelcin's future, not money, but by those who will replace him. There are also reasons to uncertainty that Putin has any crucial private property. As president, he has access to anything he wants” – writes Short.
A sober description alternatively of demonization
Short was inspired by the words of the American historian he quoted while working on the biography of the Russian president, Richard Hofstadter, which at the tallness of the Cold War noted that his fellow countrymen (let's add – after them the full alleged Western world) had a tendency to perceive the opponent in terms of "a model of absolute evil, a kind of amoral supermen, wicked, omnipresent, omnipotent, cruel, profiting from the evil he does".
This does not mean that Vladimir Putin's latest biography is free of bias and error. Firstly, it is clear that the selection of sources was dictated by certain sources. The most crucial of them is the belief that public life in Russia has been completely corrupted, presented from a point of view resembling a diagnosis and rhetoric Alexey Navalny. This does not mean that Russia is not consumed by corruption, but it is worth pointing out that it is not someway unique in this lewd regard. Secondly, Short's biography, for apparent reasons, left out in rule the sphere of Putin's relation with the non-Western world. However, it is hard to imagine that the author could scope for Chinese sources as freely as after Anglo-Saxon. Thirdly, there are mistakes at work that could be avoided by a good editorial and correction. They concern any dates, names and location of events.
All of this does not change the fact, however, that in modern times the book of a erstwhile BBC writer can be read as an antidote to propaganda exudations of hatred and surrealist texts appearing on the Russian president in Western media. Short shows Putin as a man with his weaknesses, characteristics, but at the same time being individual who, against the background of many leaders, so-called. The West is much more interesting, not only in terms of views and function in the world, but besides in personality. For this reason, it would be worth seeking a Polish translation of the biography of the Russian president. Meanwhile, the author announces that he is taking on another challenge – a biography of the Chinese leader Xi Jinpinga. We're waiting.
Mateusz Piskorski
Philip Short, Putin, Henry Holt and Co., fresh York 2022, p. 864.
