The war on Ukraine will undoubtedly be recorded on the pages of past as highly false, and researchers, military historians will have an highly hard task among the materials of conscious disinformation of the militants to reconstruct its actual course.
It is no different with the fresh Ukrainian winter counteroffensive of 2026, known from the name of the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, who took over personally its command, the Syrian offensive. However, for the first time in 4 years, in order to be able to spread a propaganda communicative appropriate to the effect of the action, the Ukrainian side has applied a full "information cover", without so characteristic of its war propaganda of drone films and land documenting the success of reflection at the hands of Russian localities. After 3 weeks of its duration, we received condensed information from General Syrski, immediately duplicated by mass communication channels supervised by 72 Center for intellectual Operations and Information peculiar Forces of Ukraine, with large success in Ukraine, reflection of 400 km2 of territory and 7 localities on the border of the Zaporosian and Djepropietrowski circuits.
Not only that, on-call Polish propagandists spreading Ukrainian narrative, but more so, in the face of objectively limited successes of this counteroffensive, question in general the information about the counteroffensive, bringing it to the "series of local tactical controversies", of course the successful Ukrainian side. So we have the typical fact of the facts and the fact of the screen.
So let's effort to analyse the winter operation of Ukrainian troops with the distant eye of a scientist, cold, without unnecessary emotions disturbing the nonsubjective image of reality. 1 should look at this issue analytically and not in a way characteristic of the propagandist columnist, who unfortunately dominates the Polish information space. Although this is said to be a social request for specified messages, only specified “works” order and pay for our editorial offices.
A methodological and theoretical issue. Was there a controversy or wasn't there?
The comparison and comparison of military theorists, including Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Jomini and Clausewitz, leads to the conclusion that war is both art and science. In science, war art is an component of military sciences, part of widely understood safety sciences, built with appropriate literature and methodology.
The martial arts counter-offensive is simply a large-scale tackle operation (counter-attack), undertaken by the opposing organization straight after stopping or resisting the offensive (attack) of the opponent. This is simply a transition from defensive action to offensive action, aiming not only at stopping the enemy, but primarily at breaking up his strike groups, forcing him to retreat and taking the initiative.
Let us now examine the Ukrainian operation through key aspects of the counteroffensive in terms of the explanation of martial arts:
- Objective: The task of the counter-offensive is to “interrupt the enemy's plans for further progress”, to break his forces and to dispel beyond the occupied runs.
The operation of the Ukrainian group implementing the winter operation consisted of a defending 17 Army Corps, which was reinforced by a relegated Central Strike Corps commanded by a notorious colonel Valentina Manko. The intent of the Ukrainian operation was to halt the Russian “East” group (front equivalent) offensive directed at Zaporoże. The Russian group broke down at the end of 2025 on 2 episodes of the Ukrainian main line of defence on the Ganczur River and headed west to attack the town of Oriechowo fortress. Ukrainians after arresting Russians went on 7 February 2026 to counterattack to destruct Russian burglaries and exit the rear of the “East” Group to “cross the enemy’s plans” and break up his troops, going to the rear of the General’s group Andrei Ivanaev.
The intent of the Ukrainian operation so fulfilled the counteroffensive characteristics
Moment of transition: It occurs after the enemy's attack operation has been discontinued, erstwhile the enemy is exhausted and its supply lines stretched.
Is that the moment? Yes. The Russian “East” group of General Andrei Ivanev had elongated supply lines and only brought logistics into the area. It was losing momentum. It's been in constant attack for at least 8 months.
Scale: Control can be operational (in a smaller section of the front) or strategical (on a large scale changing the destiny of war).
Ukrainian forces are 2 army corps in the combined force of about 20 military brigades, carrying out attacks on 3 different sections of the front, each in the belt of several, or even respective twelve kilometres. The scale of the attack was clearly operational.
Being: According to explanation (including Clausewitz), the counteroffensive is considered the most effective way to force the attacker to abandon his plans.
General's head Syrian Alexander And the Ukrainian staff had that purpose? He did. General Ivanaev must have abandoned his plans? Read about this below
To sum up, was Ukrainian winter operation 2026 a counteroffensive on the grounds of martial arts? She was and only a bitter propagandaist, and specified in Poland could claim otherwise, writing that they were local Ukrainian controversy.
Forces of militant parties, plans and course of Ukrainian winter Syrian counteroffensive
The Ukrainian operation (controfensive) was carried out on 3 sections (three directions) separated from groups pursuing separate tactical objectives, but operating within 1 operational objective. The main objective, very ambitious, was to break up the forces of the Russian East Group, go out to its rear and force the retreat to the east. The goal was to reflect the town-fortress of Hulaypole.
The episode of the northern counteroffensive, widest, focusing the largest Ukrainian forces.
The Ukrainian strike was carried out with air support (attacks by gliders of Hammer and JDAM satellites) and artillery. They were carried in a lane of 30 km to the wing of the Russian ‘East’ group, in order to exit into operational space, that is, the deep back of the Russian front towards the city of Hulaipole.
The following Ukrainian forces attacked in the above-mentioned belt of attack:
95 Armed Forces Squadron
82nd Infantry Squadron
92 Assault Brigade (former 92 Mechanized Brigade)
214 Assault Battalion
from the elite assault corps and
67 Mechanized Brigade
23 Mechanized Brigade
31 Mechanized Brigade
17th National defender Brigade
Distributed forces 783 and 118 Territorial Defence Brigades
5th Battalion of the 114th Territorial Defence Brigade.
Together the Ukrainian forces had about 27–30 battalions, including safety and support troops, this provided about 30,000 bayonets.
Support for attacking troops was provided by: 60 Artillery Brigades and 420 and 424th Battalion drones "Swarog".
The Ukrainian troops, attacking from the rung of the river Vovcza, achieved a number of tactical successes, captured the village of Wolcze and Alexeyevka. Continuing the attack south, they reached the village of Kaliniwskie, for which they fight.
On the left wing of this deep penetration, Ukrainian assault groups managed to break through from the recently acquired village of Sosnówka into a line of villages defended by the Berezowo-Ternowe Russians. After digging in the north of Ternow and a strong artillery attack and FPV drones practically on all building in the confederate part of the village, Ukrainian forces broke down Russian defence and moved further south, taking full control of the village. From there they effort to approach westward towards the village of Bieriezova and southward towards Zaporoza. So far, without much success.
Further west, after retreating at hazard of the Russians' lap, Ukrainian forces cleared the remainder of the village of Werbowe and began a march south of the Janczur river tributary through the fields towards the Skotovataya Gorge.
The Russian 36 Self-Governance Armed Rifles Brigade is heavy defended here as part of the 143rd Mechanized Rifles Regiment from the 127th Mechanized Rifles Division.
Additionally, Ukrainian troops strengthened their positions in the village of Wysznev and the close tree line, starting an attack on the villages of Privile and Kryptonic.
Further to the west, Russian troops mostly ended withdrawing from their cape in the area of the village of Andrijiwka, which enabled Ukrainian troops to enter and occupy the villages of Ostapivska and Andrijiwka, thus securing the western bank of the Gajczur River in this sector.
Attacking from there, Ukrainian troops of the 92nd Assault Brigade cleared the Russian survivors of the village of Niechajiwka and began fighting for the villages of Danyliwka and Jehorivka, but the concentrated forces of the Russian 5th Independent defender of the Armoured Brigade effectively stopped further advancement of Ukrainian troops.
In the above-mentioned northern section, in the face of the overwhelming Ukrainian forces, they defend themselves, frequently in the lap at the points of resistance, a battalion of 69 Independent Świrsko-Pomorskie defender Brigade. The front of the Russian defence stabilized the retreating from the front of the bridgehead around Andrijiwka 36th Mechanized firearm Brigade and the main forces of the Russian 5th Independent Guarding Armoured Brigade.
Additionally, in order to support the defence, the commander of the Russian ‘East’ Group, General Andrei Ivanaev directed the following units here:
186 Reserve firearm Regiment Mechanized
1440 Reserve Infantry Regiment
78 Specnazu Company
Battalion from the 14th Specnaz Brigade and the 5th Guarded Military Army unit of the 127th Mechanized firearm Division, specifically: 143th firearm Regiment, 77th Reconnaissance Battalion.
Together, the Russians now have about 15 battalions on 25 February to halt the Ukrainian offensive in the north. Along with the rear units and the securing it Approximately 16–17,000 bayonets.
Central West Episode
Ukrainian troops captured a strategically crucial Ternidae village and lying next to Kosiwiecwe, thereby eliminating an highly dangerous Russian breach in their main defence line on this front stretch. Despite many units intended for countering Ukrainian successes here are smaller than in the north. In fact, after 2 weeks of defensive action, the Russians recovered and in fresh days moved on to strong counterattacks.
Ukrainian troops utilized Russian penetration tactics on this section and tiny groups of Ukrainian soldiers are present in a large area at a depth of about 20 km, reaching the village of Pawliwka and Uspieniwka. Russian troops did not panic, accepted circular defence, and Ukrainian units in the rear are destroyed by Drones and operators of the Russian specnaz from the 14th GRU Brigade.
Following an approach from the Russian 5th Self-Gronded Armoured Brigade, which supported the defence of the 37th Self-Gronded firearm Brigade, the Ukrainian Russians braked. Especially since 60 and 64 firearm Brigades went on both flanks.
In fresh days, Russian command has directed the 218th Tank Regiment from the 127th Armoured Division here from Hulaipola. The combined attack of the 60 and 37 Mechanized firearm Brigades and the 219th Regiment battleships wrecked Ukrainian troops and the Russians drove a deep wedge into the Ukrainians' main defensive position, capturing the village of Rizdwianka. The Russian troops on this episode thus regained their initiative.
Russian troops fighting on the aforementioned episode:
5th defender Battalion of the Armoured Brigade
60 Mechanized firearm Brigade
64th firearm Brigade Mechanized
37 Single firearm Brigade Mechanized
main forces of the 14th Specnaz Brigade
218th Tank Regiment of the 127th Mechanized firearm Division.
Together, the Russians have around 12–15 battalions, along with support units about 14,000 bayonets.
On the another hand, the Ukrainian impact group in the composition of:
475 Storm Regiment
24th Storm Regiment
33th Storm Regiment
1st “Da Vinci” Assault Regiment
210 Berlingo Storm Regiment
from the Assault Corps
and units of the 17th Army Corps defending themselves here:
110 Mechanized Brigade
105 and 122 Territorial Defence Brigade.
The full is supported by the 411th Unmanned Air Ships Regiment “Jastrubi”.
Total approx. 20–22 battalions. With safety units, support units, rear units, about 18,000 bayonets.
South Ukrainian winter counteroffensive
After 3 weeks of fighting Ukrainians on this episode were not only repulsed, but on the following days of their counteroffensive The Russians beat them in encounter battles, forced them to retreat and captured 2 towns.
Ukrainian forces:
from the Assault Corps fought here:
24th Aidar Assault Regiment
225 Storm Regiment
48th Assault Battalion
of the 17th Army Corps:
102nd Territorial Defence Brigade
106th Territorial Defence Brigade
142 Mechanized Brigade
260 Territorial Defence Brigade.
The support was provided by the 44th Artillery Brigade and 2 regiments of unmanned aircraft.
Total about 20 battalions, with rear units about 17,000 bayonets.
On the Russian side, the 5th Guarded National Military Army defended itself, including the well-proven 127th Mechanized firearm Division and 38 and 57th Mechanized firearm Brigade.
A full of about 15 battalions heavy supported by artillery from the 305 Guarded Artillery Brigade and from the 872nd Artillery Regiment. With rear units approx. 14,000 bayonets.
The Russians besides utilized the 11th Air Army bombing regiments that worked intensively on this episode.
Russian troops took the first momentum of Ukrainian assault and lost the village of Staroukrainka. They then counterattacked the battalions of the 38th Mechanized firearm Brigade and the Feasible 218th Tank Regiment, stopping Ukrainians. In the following days, in gathering battles, the Russians defeated Ukrainian forces, capturing the village of Zaliznicy and the front fundamentally took a static form.
In conclusion, Ukrainian winter Syrian counter-offensive after 3 weeks of fighting achieved average success. The Armed Forces of Ukraine recovered about 10 localities and about 90 km2 of their territory.
Second, for more than 2 weeks, Ukrainians stopped the “Dual-Wastody Express”, that is, the attack of the Russian “East” Group.
Commander of Ukrainian Assault Corps, Colonel Valentin Manko, was dismissed in the first days of the counteroffensive and command was taken personally by the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Army General Alexander Syrian.
On the Russian side, the work of the Russian “East” Group staff and the general’s leadership skills should be noted. Andrei Ivanaev.
The Russian commander, acting with his tired front troops leading the attack for months, detached from the main supply bases of the group, acting under winter conditions, under the advantage of the opponent in a 2:1 ratio, and on sections of the breach 3:1, under conditions of failure of a large part of the efficient communication at the lowest level (exclusion of Starlink terminals), was not beaten.
Russian units did not panic, as in the fall of 2022 under Kharkov, and defended themselves in the lap and did not pay attention to Ukrainian tiny maneuvering groups that penetrated their deep backs. The liquidation of these groups was carried out efficiently by an army specnaz (14th Specnaz Brigade), including with the aid of many drones and wards in the detachment, reserve and in the second throw.
On the right wing, in the north, where the Ukrainians achieved their top successes, the Russians in full order withdrew from their outstretched, endangered positions, creating a fresh front line easier to defend. The maneuvering battles conducted by the Ukrainian side under conditions of their large numerical advantage and continuous further attacks may consequence in the Russians losing further villages in this direction, but there is no chance of breaking the front and moving Ukrainians into the operational space of the East Group.
General Ivanaev, however, did not let General Oleksandrov of Syria to meet the main nonsubjective of the counteroffensive, which is to break his own offensive operation. Russian troops on the key Western section for them after the first defeats stopped Ukrainians. General Ivanaev correctly deployed his reconnaissances, which effectively concentrated and at the right time, which is crucial for martial arts, carried out controversies against the breach made by Ukrainians, crashed the invading Ukrainian troops and forced them to retreat in the 3rd week.
Due to the specificity of the fighting in the 4th year of the war, the dominance of FPV drones, war parties operate tiny infantry groups with fewer armored vehicles. Thus, there are no attacks conducted by armoured-mechanized columns, hence the losses in the equipment of the militant parties are comparatively small. It is estimated that Ukrainians lost about 150–180 vehicles and 1500–2000 wounded and killed soldiers in their counteroffensive. Russian losses in force live against strong fire of Ukrainian artillery and many drones are similar, in equipment lower.
The winter Ukrainian counter-offensive clearly expires and the active actions of the Ukrainian side are observed only in the northern section, where it objectively inactive has prospects for further success. The Ukrainian side, in the course of its winter counteroffensive, has achieved limited field successes, but so far it seems to have failed to meet the ambitious objectives set for it by the Ukrainian command. The Ukrainians have released besides small force to grow as large an operation as they have planned. The heroic attitude of the soldiers of the Ukrainian assault battalions, their soldier's dedication, and their different boldness in carrying out their actions proved insufficient to effectively carry out the tasks set by the staff.
The resignation of Colonel Walentyna Manko, commander of the Ukrainian Assault Corps, is alternatively the search for a “scapegoat”. Another commander in specified and not another conditions would not have achieved radically greater successes either.
Apparently in the planning phase, the negative effect of the failure of communication by the Russian side based on the ‘Starlink’ terminals was overestimated in the Ukrainian General Staff and units of the Russian army fighting in the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
The troops of the Russian “East” Group, veterans from the Far East, the personnel of the units conducting complex, successful offensive operations for nearly 2 years were not beaten by Ukrainians by the “mobików” unit from Lugansk in the fall of 2022 fleeing from them under Kharkiv, Balakleja and Izium. These were not Russian laziness military units based in parts of the young, untrained conscripted “West” groups seated in unfinished, robbed by corrupt fortified politicians of the Kursk circuit, broken by Ukrainians in August 2024.
This time, in the 4th year of the war, the Ukrainian counteroffensives were faced by professional, experienced Russian staff of the “East” Group, and on the ground came to fight the Ukrainians with old, experienced frontists with advanced executive discipline and advanced morale of troops relating to offensive successes for 2 years. Not without meaning, as during the arrest of the large Ukrainian spring-summer offensive of the year 2023, was the tenacity and soldier's sacrifice of those fighting in defence of Russian soldiers.
Krzysztof Podgórski
