After planet War II in the West, it was considered that anomalies derived from the block division of forces only concern the communist side.
All abuses against global law and the limitation of sovereignty of superpowered states have been explained by the request for consolidation to keep interlock balance. The United States, utilizing the thought of defending the “free world” at all costs, sought to keep a leadership primate in the Atlantic and Western Hemispheric zones. In turn, the russian Union, as an ideological power, attempted to impose its model on weaker countries under the banner of "ideological solidarity", losing its confrontation with stronger capitalist states.
After the break-up of the east bloc, before China even challenged the West, it was pretended that despite the violations of global law by the US, they remained inactive a "good-willed hegemon", under the leadership of which the Atlantic community effectively defends the interests of Western oligarchy. In time, it turned out that the belief in democratic global order is simply a large fraud. The fact became increasingly clear that democracy in global relations was fiction, and global order is hierarchical. Over time, the effects of globalisation and dynamic concentration of forces outside Western powers led to a fresh polarization and the emergence of a multipolar system.
This phenomenon entails the request for deep reassessment of the concept and imagination of the order to date, as well as its most crucial elements. The supremacy of force over global law causes that sovereignty, which is primarily a legal construct, as an attribute or qualitative feature of countries formally equal to each other, is completely relativised. It is advanced time to realize that this is simply a comparative and gradual value, depending on the actual position and participation of the country in the global distribution of forces.
There has never been a "rule of sovereignty" in global law, or even more nations, as they effort to convince people not only media but besides academic textbooks. Only the formal equality of state geopolitical creations has been established, following the pattern of treatment of individuals within the human race. With time, legal equality, referred to as "syphernical equality" (at the Second Hague Conference in 1907), was at the core of the standard system, codified in 1945 in the United Nations Charter. However, it never meant real equality, much little sovereignty of all states (in the sense of their sovereignty and power).
Liberal Imagination
This means that countries have never treated each another on the rule of common equality due to their tremendous differences in material attributes. As permanent geopolitical actors, above all the powers, they are guided by the objectives they gotta accomplish and act with differentiated means, and the relation between them is truly based on extremist inequality and asymmetry. Confused by the idealistic view of reality and the mythology of global law, students of political discipline and global relations, while besides titled lecturers, contaminated with “liberal delusion”, are incapable to admit that the common treatment of states in fact depends not on formal rules, on any derided “syphernical equality”, but on what each of them generates power in the arrangement of forces and on how much their visions of global order are convergent and how competitive.
The subject of the participants' structure is complicated by the dynamic pluralization of the global system, as well as their heterogeneity. As a consequence of the processes of globalisation and internationalisation of social life, states have ceased to be the only drivers of change processes and stabilisation of the global system. They have besides grown various constellations of non-state players whose links in the form of networks of capital, production, communication, flows, movements, but besides institutions or structures limit the powers of power and decision-making of states. It is not known from now on that the power and power of many corporate giants is greater than the insignificant possible of states with the position of protectorates, customers and vassals of large powers.
Only large powers have been defended against the degradation of status, which have been the supporting structure of an global system, based on spatial forces. Although they are variable over time, they always strive to accomplish the highest-ranking status, forming part of the global leadership elite. They usually have a willpower (and inherited from generation to generation by determination) and the ability to effectively transform existing reality. It should not be surprising, therefore, that their competition, competition, combat and cooperation constitute the axis of global action.
As Henry Kissinger wrote, the classical American diplomacy, the power-shaped power hierarchy of forces is the only natural regulator of stabilisation and balancing processes in the global system. The past of Western political thought, especially the Anglo-Saxon world, provides many sources on this subject, which were small absorbed in the non-Western world. Notabene, there has never been a work in the Republic devoted to analysing the aspirational, operational and argumentative interests of the state, to diagnosing the global environment of Polish abroad policy or strategies of endurance towards hostile neighbours.
Poland's Marginal Position
Poland has been out of their scope since the very beginning of shaping modern rules for the functioning of global sovereign actors. In the mediate of the 17th century, erstwhile the foundations of order based on equal position of power were laid, then the Republic of Poland lost its importance, became increasingly marginalized, and political elites, active in interior and external wars, had no force to influence the consolidation of fresh institutions of diplomacy and law.
The participation of the Polish State in the processes of shaping subsequent views of the global order with all age was becoming weaker. In the dismemberment era, Poles could not even mark their presence in the process of legitimizing the “powers concert”. In the 20th century, although statehood was rebuilt, it was unstable and susceptible to fresh occupations. It was unfortunate that subsequent systemic formations (post-war Poland, the Polish People's Republic and the 3rd Republic) denied and contradicted the continuity of Polish statehood, which opens the way to subsequent addictions and relativisation of sovereignty.
Also, modern Poland does not have a permanent place in geopolitical ranks. Hopes to build a power position do not stand a chance of fulfilling any dimension of power – economic, military or motivational. In a situation where most of the social wealth is in abroad hands (industry, banks, transport, trade), it is not adequate to trust on the Gross National Product, as it itself does not supply autonomous action in initiating anti-weight processes against the top powers and corporate giants. Poland itself has been deprived of initiative and effectiveness, basing its vital interests exclusively on the Euro-Atlantic direction, adopting voluntary ready and unfair rules of the game, dictated top-down by the strongest and giving up complementary solutions.
Today, erstwhile the crisis of trust in Atlantic relations and the wave of surprise and disappointments in the attitudes of the American and European leaders are at hand, it is clear how damaging it was to base strategical reasoning on ideological dogmas of selfless allied solidarity, detached from life by partnership rules or double standards.
In addition, the political circles of the country, reconciled with the position of Comprador, naively acknowledged that European integration, dictated by the old powers and abroad interest groups, would lose its egotistic face and guarantee equal conditions for economical growth and prosperity for all countries. Meanwhile, as disarmingly recalled in Davos on January 21, 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, integration processes are utilized to build fresh dependencies, while recourse to moral standards throughout past is just an ideological tool, masking the practices of utilizing force and subordination under the appearance of defending Western civilization.
After the end of the “cold war”, an illusion was created about the triumph of liberal democracy on a global scale. A celebrated Diagnosis Francis Fukuyama From the late 1980s and 1990s, the "end of history" was intended to consolidate the belief that after the Cold War confrontation it was possible to build a "liberal" global order based on peace "for its own", respect for contracts and the selective protection of human rights. A satisfying integration experimentation in the form of the European Union was intended to give hope of improving it on an ever-wide scale.
In time, it turned out that the global strategy was increasingly deviating from the rules established between the victorious powers after planet War II. Despite the increase in power of China, as well as the reconstruction of the power position of Russia, Western powers have long failed to admit that in the organization sphere these rules, including the principles of the United Nations Charter, are losing their normative and functional power. Structures designed to defend global peace and security, especially the UN and many specialised organisations, have become servile agendas towards the most powerful. In their bureaucratic inertia they survived longer than the ideas that brought them to life.
Dealing With Realities
Against this background, we should not so much consider the effective opposition to destructive actions and revalue the crew Donald Trumphow much to apply to them a thoughtful premise strategy to play as much as possible for themselves. To face the top powers – in this case the USA, Russia and China – does not even give emergence to communities specified as the European Union, nor to defend the state of possession, nor to guarantee the sustainability of safety guarantees. It can only accelerate the fall of the “collective” West and intensify global confusion.
Paradoxically, the decomposition of the existing agreements of forces and the return to the power primacy policy means an chance to revise pro-war attitudes among the most ideologicalized participants of global relations. At the same time, the fresh handing out of the roles of the great-powerful could advance the division of work for maintaining peace in various parts of the world, as well as bringing to order all the instigators of war who considered the reinforcements and wars to be the flywheels of their development.
As a consequence of ideological motivation in search of the enemy and blurring the borders between the various threats of force usage and actual aggression, the war has for respective decades been considered an apparent means, supporting the expansion of Western corporations, accompanying the implementation of advanced technologies, as well as the acquisition and functions of the state by corporate conglomerates, peculiar services and tech-media companies. In an acceptable but controversial interpretation, had it not been for these motives, president Trump felt that Russia would not have been provoked to attack Ukraine in 2022.
Ukrainian Trap
The drama of Polish politics is that it became a hostage to the Ukrainian-Russian War on its own accord. This has drawn further governments not only into massive ad hoc aid, at the expense of their own society, but besides leads to the intensification of exhausting armaments on an unprecedented scale. Since decisions on the acquisition of arms or the production of arms are not subject for apparent reasons to any critical debate, besides limiting tendering procedures, we are, in fact, dealing with the avoidance of government responsibility, which exposes society to abuse and horrendous debt. But erstwhile the strategical priorities of the leader of the Atlantic alliance change, any frivolities about the inevitability of the Western War with Russia lose meaning.
However, the war has become a convenient and desirable alibi for the actual introduction by the authorities of "exceptional states", i.e. restrictions on civilian rights and freedoms. An striking example is the functioning of the president of Ukraine, who can proceed in power as long as the war continues. Doubts about the rightfulness of his political decisions are ignored, as the makiavelist rule that "the end justifies the means" has been widely adopted. Restoring peace could mean not only the end of authoritarian self-government practices, but besides the rejection of a prescriptive management strategy in which state spending is under the sole control of corrupt governments.
The time is coming erstwhile Polish politicians will gotta realize the negative consequences of poorness in society as a consequence of the rising cost of arms and war aid, which could consequence in the outbreak of social protests and the delegation of existing authorities. This will force the rulers to revise the doctrine of sovereignty and security. alternatively of repeating the phrase about the usage of "full sovereignty", it is essential to halt fooling ourselves and to make it clear that the exclusive competence of the State is presently very limited due to the processes of common dependence resulting from obligations negotiated and imposed by individual and collective protectors. 1 must yet see how limited Poland is by abroad lobbying, penetration of another people's peculiar forces, not only Russian, and perfidious diplomatic games. These are topics worthy of serious strategical reports, not of constantly " sweeping under the carpet".
National safety (internal and external) is undoubtedly a correlation between the sovereignty of the state and, more specifically, the decision-making autonomy of the ruling and bilateral and multilateral alliance guarantees. However, if this autonomy is limited by service to the strategical interests of the United States or the European Union, the guarantees of survival, integrity and identity protection are rather shaky and abstract. The reassessment of American strategy shows that the credibility of allied commitments is dynamic and variable. The old 1 is the fact of the Western powers that states do not have permanent enemies, nor permanent friends, have only eternal interests.
Time to go down
In creating a fresh doctrine of sovereignty and security, it is so worth reaching out to the disgusted by all means by mainstream political realism, but besides to show pragmatism and rationalism in assessing the global position and complexity of geopolitical conditions. Despite the shouts of blasphemed liberals at all critics of unilateral dependence of Poland on Western protectors, the intellectual and moral opposition must be overcome in order to see the many strengths and values of one's own position as a country of "average" rank in the global game.
Poland in the economical and political sphere can specify itself as important, due to the fact that naturally "equipped" and infrastructurely prepared "connector" between East and West, a desirable associate in regional communities, in which its economical and commercial possible can influence balance and balance of interests. It is simply a pity that, for reasons of ideological blindness of rusophobia and uncritical loyalty to Atlantic players, the benefits that transit cooperation could bring to Western Europe with China, India or Central Asia was completely abandoned.
In this context, the attitude of Poland as a "serious state" should be reviewed, not the many cateries of eternal insurgents and zagons, to Russia and Belarus. The perception of these countries as “not present” and “uninvited” in the global environment of Polish abroad policy brings only mediocre moral satisfaction to another vassalized to Western governments. It affects long-term interests of both sovereignty and security. Poland itself deprives itself of counterbalance in situations of force from its supposedly "reliable" protectors and allies. The aspects of the rebirth of German Machtpolitik or Ukrainian revisionism are not insignificant here and they request to be taken into account prospectively. Despite the "eternal coldness" in relations with Russia, a realistic view of the possible of cooperation in selected sectors, which will bring greater benefits to self-interest than moral glory among "false" friends, must already be risked. The alternate is only to act against one's own harm, to transcend common hatred and destruction.
Currently, in Poland, it is fashionable to disgust Donald Trump's transactionism attitude. It loses sight of the essence of modern global relations. Transaction is natural for the exchange of any values on a commercial basis. And she is not far from preying on the counterparty's weaknesses, including hostile acquisitions of his assets. No guarantees or profits arise from altruism, pathetically verbalized friendships, partnerships, or allied or brotherly solidarity.
On the contrary, they are the consequence of selfish calculation, calculating, cunning and cynicism. The zealous defenders of the transformative leadership of America, which they associate with the administrations of erstwhile presidents, forget that beyond profit they always had another motives in mind, equally dangerous, though frequently camouflaged. Through various means and treatments, permanent dependence in the ideological and applicable sphere was sought, causing changes in the systems of state values and behaviours, as expected by Hegemon. There were common forms of vassalizing subjection and one-way flows of political will. It seems that Trump's top merit in this respect is to name things by name and to break the illusion of a "fair and peaceful planet order" and a selfless relationship and partnership.
Prof. Stanisław Bielen
Think Poland, No. 7-8 (15-22.02.2026)
