March 2025 on the fronts of the war on Ukraine will be recorded in the past of ending Ukrainian presence in Russian territory, in peculiar the Kursk region.
Clearly, it ends for any 8-month-old epopey, for others the "war brawl", the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which began with a amazing attack on the first days of August 2024. It is worth tracing historically what was at the base of the Ukrainian offensive in Kurszczyń and how it ran and how it ended.
And I'm besides going to zoom in, on the basis of the residual data, on how the alternatively bold Russian counteroffensive operation, which is now ending in front of us. Finally, I will sum up the military costs of this 8-month Russian-Ukrainian clash in the alleged Kursk operational direction.
- Ukrainian assumptions and forces that entered and maintained the breach at Kursk
From the very beginning the Ukrainian attack towards Kursk aroused mixed feelings and assessments from experts. While these assessments were balanced in the beginning, the critical assessment dominates after 8 months. Why? This controversial Ukrainian operation was already at advanced hazard at the planning stage, and its assumptions were dominated by a political-propagandic origin alternatively than a purely military nonsubjective pursued on the basis of the principles of war art.
In the summertime of 2024, the Ukrainian army was in a deep defensive position. As a consequence of the winter Russian offensive, 2023/2024 lost a number of territories in this town the fortress Avdieevka. The Russian “Centrum” Group went to the pokrowska prefield. The morale of the army and society fell.
Under these conditions, the political leadership of Ukraine, headed by president Zelenski, forced army commanders General Alexander Syrian offensive operation directed to Russia within the limits before February 2022. It was expected to prove to supporting countries, including US president Joe Biden's administration, that the Ukrainian army is capable of offensive, effective and allowing even occupying indigenous Russian territory.
However, to carry out these purposes, he needs more weapons, ballistic missiles and maneuvering missiles, and consent to carry out attacks with precise long-range weapons in the territory of the alleged old Russia, i.e. within the limits before February 2022. The success was to rise the militant spirit of the Ukrainian army and the will to defy Ukrainian society.
It was assumed, which later turned out to be a missed hypothesis, that the Russians in order to displace Ukrainian troops would weaken forces on Donbasa, break offensive action there.
Detailed satellite data provided by the U.S. allowed to find a poorly cast section of Russian defence in the Kursk region. In addition, as the subsequent Russian investigation showed, as a consequence of corruption on a immense scale, the quantity and quality of Russian fortifications built far removed from what was on paper. Similarly, the cast of the border, fewer and poorly equipped.
Ukrainian staff with the support of NATO advisers developed a bold offensive operation, which would let maneuvering groups to capture the Kursk Atomic Power Plant in Kurczatów and extended areas of the Kursk Oblast under favourable conditions. The power plant and acquired Russian land were to service as a bargaining card for exchange for the Zaporozh atomic power plant and the land acquired by the Russian army.
However, the uncontested Ukrainian advancement of the first days was stopped by the Russians. The offensive destiny has settled the heroic defence of the Russian 9th firearm Regiment mechanized on the basis of the construction of a female penal colony in small Loknia and the defence of the village of Korniewo. Commander of the 9th Mechanized firearm Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Cziebnio fell in covering the retreat of the remaining defenders died. For his heroic posthumous attitude, he was awarded the star of “Russian Hero”.
A full of 1,400 km2 Ukrainians occupied the territory. Relatively, however, the Russians rapidly shifted a number of air-desant units, marine infantry units, and units located in the depths of Russia. These troops were commanded by General Alexander Lapin's “North” group.
Overall, since September 2024 Ukrainians have fought defensive battles in the province, trying to keep the state of possession. The Ukrainian group active in fighting in the Kursk operational direction counted about 30-35 1000 soldiers. In principle, not all brigades fought there, but only groups of 1 or 2 battalions and support units. Any stories about the 50,000-70,000 Ukrainian army group can be inserted between fairy tales.
Currently, OSINT data in the Kurdish Armed Forces operation Ukraine under strategical and Operational Command ‘North’ shall participate battalions of the following units:
Elite Mechanized Brigades: 47 Mechanized Mechanized Brigade “Magura” (equipped with M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2A2 combat infantry wagons “Bradley” ODS), 17 dense Mechanized Brigade (ex 17 Armoured Brigade equipped with Leopard-2 tanks and Swedish combat infantry wagons CV-90), 21 Mechanized Brigade.
Experienced, well equipped and trained units of air-desant troops: 82 Self-propelled Infantry Squadron (equipped with British Challanger-2 tanks, U.S. Stryker transporters and German combat infantry wagons “Marder-1A3”), 95 Armed Forces Squadron, 80 Armed Forces Squadron.
Battalions from 41, 61 Mechanized Brigades and 92 Assault Brigades are present on the front, For the fighting on the border of Sumszczyzna and Kurszczyzna, there were 101 , 106, 116, 129 Territorial Defence Brigades. There are elite commandos from 4 and 6 Ranger regiments, as well as 210 peculiar Regiment “Berlingo”, 22 peculiar Battalion, 54 Reconnaissance Battalion, 253 Assault Battalion, Chechen Volunteer Battalion “Sheik Monsur”
Ukrainian support provided: 49 Artillery Brigade and 80 Support Brigade and 4 battalions of assault drones.
- Russian thought of "blooding out" the Ukrainian army elite and its implementation and plan of the Russian final phase of counteroffensive operation in March 2025
After the first shock caused by the Ukrainian attack, the failure of respective 100 prisoners, including most of the soldiers of the basic service, the Russian side began first to halt the Ukrainian attack, then its isolation and destruction, and then the final phase – to throw out outside the state border.
The way in which Russian actions are carried out in the Kurszczyz region indirectly “converses its author”. His position in the Russian command system, experience and trust as he is pleased, are additional arguments to be attributed to the plan to expel the Ukrainian army from Russia on the territory of the Kursk region. Who is it? About the General Alexey Kim. An unmedial but influential figure in the Russian army.
Aleksej Rostislavovich Kim was born on 21 September 1958 in 1979, he graduated from the Higher Military Officers' School in Moscow, which he finished with distinction. He served in Afghanistan as commander of the reconnaissance platoon and then a reconnaissance company. Upon his return, he was assigned to survey at the Military Academy. Frunze, which he finished with a gold medal. He went to Germany to join the Western russian Army Group. After the fall of the USSR in 1992, he fought in Tajikistan, where he showed up as commander, but was besides injured. Following these events, Colonel Kim was appointed chief of operations department and deputy chief of staff of the 58th North Caucasian Army Military District.
The next phase of General Kim's military career was the Second Chechen War (1999–2000). He was the chief of staff there, the first deputy commander of the Western Joint Force Group in the North Caucasus. During the fighting, General Kim was severely injured in the chest and after recovery, in designation of his outstanding planning skills, Alexey Kim is directed to survey for the elder commanding staff at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which ends in 2003.
From 2008 to 2014, then Colonel Alexey Kim served as Deputy Head of the Armed Forces Academy of Arms of the Russian Federation for educational and technological work. He trains many officers and current commanders of the Russian army, hence his nickname “general professor”. In later years, he holds crucial command functions, the FR Force Quota in Syria. Surprisingly, he does not participate in the planning work on peculiar Military Operations, which was done by the Shojgu people, and Kim as Walery Gierasimov's man, the Chief of General Staff, was on a “side track”. Not long.
After the defeats of the Russian army in 2022 under Kiev, Kharkiv and Khersonszczyz, they reached out rather rapidly after this skilled commander, a trusted friend of General Gierasimov – who took command in 2023 of the Combined Command of the peculiar Forces of Operation in Ukraine.
Already on 11 January 2023, Alexey Kim was appointed as the first deputy commander of the Joint Group, Walery Gierasimov. He is the author of the winning Russian winter run 2023/2024, as a consequence of which the Russian army won, among others, the city of Avdieevka fortress.
Where do we see the planning way of General Alexey Kim's Russian Army operation in Kurszczyz?
Well, General Kim is simply a supporter of systematic theory, long-term, suppression of the capabilities of the Ukrainian army's militant units on a given section of the front, by conducting rocket attacks, artillery attacks, and utilizing drones for logistics. In this patient, time-consuming, academic way caused the de facto overpowering of Ukrainian forces, which lost their ability to conduct an effective long-term defensive operation and forced her to retreat from Kurszczyna. For specified weakened forces, leading the most hard maneuver that the retreat has carried out an instant attack.
The "General Professor" is simply a strong support of firepower and impact into the depths of the opponent's group, long-range artillery, rocket systems and bombings, and this is what we have been observing for months under Suja. General Kim avoids risks and prefers to apply systematic force alternatively than to search one, risked operational solution.
"General Professor", a systematic action, possibly boring and not effective, but effective, managed to immobilize Ukrainians under Suja, deprive them not only of ammunition and fuel, but even food. quite a few wounded that couldn't be evacuated, etc. Morale fell, and the will to fight was slim.
Conjunctive attacks reduced the area of Ukrainian army possession over time. He besides consistently attacked Ukrainians at the base of their break-in, which led to the transportation of the Ukrainian group taking place the only supply road (R-200 ) and 1 side road that had been under russian fire control since February. Yeah, artillery, mortars, but besides FPV drones and drones on a light kind Prince Vandal Nowgorodski. Under these circumstances, the forced retreat of the Ukrainians was a substance of time. It was waiting.
When the subordinates of Admiral Kastiukov (the Chief Executive of the General Staff of the FR Army – erstwhile GRU) took data about the time of the Ukrainian retreat from the part of the northern appearance at Suja, the Russian side proceeded to implement the plan so that this "manewr" on the pre-established convenient runs did not end on them, but to expel Ukrainians from Kurszczyzna, which actually happened.
- The final Russian operation to push Ukrainian troops out of the state border.
Russian troops around Suja commanded General Walery Solodczuk, to which the local command of the ‘Kursk’ Group was subject. After graduating from Leningrad Military School Suvorov, Solodczuk joined the Riazaan Air-Desant Force Command School, which he graduated in 1992. He advanced from platoon commander to regiment chief of staff. In 2004, he graduated from the Academy of Armed Forces of Russia. In 2012, he graduated from the Military Academy of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. 2012-2014 – Commander of the 7th Guards of the Air and Storm Division[3]. In 2015-2017, Deputy Commander of the 5th Army of the east Military District.
In 2017-2020 – Chief of Staff of the 36th Army of the east Military District, stationed in the Buriation Republic. From January 2020 to May 2022 – commander of the 36th Army. He presently served the rank of Colonel General and is an officer of good fame among subordinates and superiors.
To carry out the counteroffensive, the Russians directed many units. Including units of paratroopers from WDW: 76 Guards Airborne Division, 106 Guards Airborne Division, 11 Independent Airborne Brigade and 83 Guards Airborne Brigade, 56 Guards Airborne Regiment 7 Airborne Division and elite – 45 peculiar Forces Brigade of WDW.
Under Kursk, they fought the “murders” with the 155th Pacific Marine Infantry Brigade, the 810th Black Sea Fleet Marine Brigade, the 177th Caspian Marine Infantry Regiment.
The full was completed by mechanized troops: 34 Guarded firearm Brigade Motorized, 22nd firearm Regiment Motorized 72nd firearm Division Motorized and 1220 firearm Regiment Motorized from 3rd firearm Division.
According to the OSINT data, Specnaz Aida (Czechs), 2nd Guarded Brigade of Specnazu GRU, Volunteers Volunteer Brigade, 204 and 78 Rosgwarii Achmat 9 Self-Self firearm Regiment, subdivisions of 72th Division of Mechanized Rifles. The support was provided by the 52nd Artillery Brigade.
In total, the Russians concentrated about 40-50 1000 soldiers and officers to the counteroffensive + counting about 4-6 1000 North Korean Support Corps soldiers
Final phase of Russian counteroffensive
In February, as the Russian troops converged, the Ukrainian burglary approached the base of a 7-10 km distance from the supply road.
On the Russian right flank, the 83rd Guards of the Landing-Sturm Brigade and regiments of the 106th Guards of the Tulsa Air-Desant Division crossed the state border and entered 3 border villages of the Sumsk Oblast. Drone operators Prince Wandał Nowgorodski on the light water, fe facto paralyzed traffic on the R-200 highway. Released videos of the demolition of about 400 Ukrainian vehicles.
On the left flank, the attack led the 810th defender Marine Brigade and the 177th Marine Regiment of the Caspian Fleet. The Sujas were attacked by units of the 2nd Specnaz Brigade, the 9th Mechanized firearm Regiment and the 11th Launch-Sturm Brigade.
"Key" to Russian success was an incredible bravado attack by Russian soldiers conducted by a gas pipeline.
On 8 March 2025, after 2 days of waiting, a equally bravado episode took place, which will be recorded in the past of the war on Ukraine. Russian soldiers passed 15 kilometres (750 m) by pipeline of 1.7 metres in diameter. They crawled, walked bowed in a gas tube to displace the enemy from the Kursk circuit. The full operation lasted 6 days: 4 days they moved, 2 waiting in the pipe. Many were poisoned with methane during the preparation of the operation, its elimination, and preparation for the spread of respective 100 troops to the storm, equipped with oxygen apparatus.
The attack itself after many days of preparation was carried out by volunteers, with individual weapons only with minimal amounts of food and water. Russian soldiers, equipped with "lightly", entered the back of Ukrainians, divided into task force groups and attacked them from behind in Suja and surrounding areas.
The Ukrainians were initially completely surprised. The Ukrainian Armed Forces, however, detected with drones the location where the Russians would get out, and as early as 30-40 minutes after the Russian soldiers left, the area of the beginning fired artillery fire, including prohibited cluster missiles conventions.
Most Russian soldiers succeeded, as we already know unquestionably, to get out of the tube into the forest and to go to indicated areas of performance. The Russians captured the base and stormed by surprise caused a stampede among Ukrainians who saw fighting behind their backs.
Apparently Ukrainian soldiers in Suja panicked. A chaotic escape began from many fortified defensive positions, including the industrial zone. The Ukrainian Armed Forces, fleeing from part of the city, came across a bridge destroyed by Russian commandos in Suja and forced them to abandon dense equipment there and run further along the ruins of the bridge on foot.
Several 100 soldiers of the Russian armed forces, realizing that they were likely to “go 1 way”, moved on to fight for, among another things, the industrial zone.
Contrary to Ukrainian propaganda, losses proved comparatively low. The available footage, a reporter made available by the Russians, allows for a preliminary analysis of this undoubtedly bravado operation.
At morning 9 March 2025 industrial territory Suji was already in Russian hands, the main forces arrived in the form of the 11th Desert Storm Brigade. It is known from available data that the attack in the framework of Operation “Rurost” was carried out by volunteers from the following units: “Aid Group” Specnazu “Achmat”, paratroopers from the 11th Infantry Squadron, from the 30th Mechanized firearm Regiment, many soldiers from the OODSRB “Veterans”, from the Volunteer Brigade “Wostok”, as well as soldiers from the 177th Marine Infantry Regiment of the Caspian Fleet.
By March 20, the Russians fundamentally completed the operation, liberating 95% of the territory of the Kursk region which fell into Ukrainian hands reaching the state border, and in part crossing it entering the territory of the Sumsk Oblast.
Crashed Ukrainian units suffered severe losses erstwhile they retreated under utmost conditions. Witnesses describing what they experienced in the British press referred to him as “horror”. Russian drones, artillery, and aviation gathered a bloody "harvest" due to the fact that again for political reasons the order to retreat was postponed irrationally long.
- The scale of Ukrainian defeat in a strategical dimension, failure in people and equipment.
In a day of full lie, information about losses by both militant parties and conscious disinformation can only be reconstructed based on theoretical models and residual data.
The maximum area occupied by the Ukrainian army was 1400 km2 which was constantly decreasing, in the period before the final Russian counteroffensive it was about 400 km2, that is the area of the average Polish county. With the decreasing area, the number of units defending themselves on it decreased, so it reduced the number of soldiers and equipment.
The maximum number of Ukrainian troops active in the Kursk operating direction is about 30-35 1000 soldiers, at the final phase about 20 1000 on both sides of the border (course circuit – Russia, full Ukraine).
In the course of 8 months of fighting, with a very different degree of intensity, it can be assumed that the number of fallen Ukrainian soldiers was in the scope of 50-100 soldiers per day. 240 days x 50 soldiers = 12,000 dead. At 100 killed regular (average) there are 24,000 dead.
The war in Ukraine is characterized by a advanced protection of individual soldiers (helms, bulletproof vests), developed medical rescue services and the skill of field medicine and doctors. The ratio of the dead to the wounded, which was counted not long ago 1:3, changed to 1:4, 1:5.
Thus, the wounded (heavyly, lightly, injured, ill) in the course of the "curious brawl" could have been from 48 000-120 000 Ukrainian soldiers.
The number of prisoners and deserters who have gone to the Russian side, which is simply a characteristic of this war, is low, we can estimation from 500-1000 Ukrainian soldiers.
The issue of damaged and damaged vehicles is even more confusing and unclear. The dynamics of action in the Kursk operating direction, excluding the final phase (Russian counter-offensive in March 2025) was low. This made the Ukrainians, according to their rules, able to evacuate most vehicles as damaged as well as wrecks.
Russian hands (based on published photos and films) included about a twelve heavy damaged and tank wrecks (including 2 M1A1 Abrams, 3 Leopard-2A6, about 20 fighting infantry wagons, about 20 armored transporters and wrecks of about 50 MRAPs and another wheels vehicles of the Ukrainian army.
The Russians showed the captured 1 U.S. Haubic towed M777, the Biber assault bridge, and the Wisel-1 miner vehicle.
The amount of equipment actually lost permanently and periodically during 8 months of fighting goes into hundreds. The drone footage shows hundreds of hits with FPV drones, Lancet-3, Prince Vandal Nowgorodski. Tens of MALE Forpost-Ru and Orion class drone casualties – Inochodice.
Finally, dozens of Ukrainian Army vehicles destroyed by Russian assault helicopters Ka-52 and Mi-28 should be taken into account in numbers with guided anti-tank rockets Wichr and Attack and by bomber aircraft (Su-34 dropped about 20-30 gliders on average a day).
It is worth noting that president Zelenski, at the request of the Chief of General Staff of Ukraine, General Alexander of Syria resigned as commander of strategical and Operational Command of the North Dmitry Krasilnikova and appointed a general in his place Aleksey of Shandar.
It is unofficially said that General Krasilnikov, in the face of the tragic situation of grouping Ukrainian troops on Russia's territory around the town of Suja (course circuit), and the threat of the lap, by rescuing his soldiers gave orders to retreat. General Krasilnikov's actions did not get the approval of the Syrian general, to whom president Volodymyr Zelenski categorically, for political reasons, banned the retreat.
General Dmitri Krasilnikov followed the rules of martial arts and work for the destiny of soldiers gave the order to retreat, for which he paid for losing his post. Communication from the commander of the Ukrainian army of General Alexander of Syria on the planned regrouping into a more convenient perimeter of defence and on the fact that the Ukrainian army has over everything this is the communicative of "The Land of Moss and ferns".
In summing up, for 8 months of fighting, the Ukrainians did not accomplish either the maximum goal – to get a Kurchatian atomic power plant in Kurchatów or Kursk, nor did they keep an area that could be replaced into the territories of Ukraine occupied by the Russian army after 24 February 2022. There was no military goal, which was to presume that the Russians would halt the attack on Donbasa and would shift troops to Kurszów. specified an operation took place, but the number of troops was comparatively low and did not affect the offensive activities of the Russian “Centre”, “South” and “East”.
From the point of view of the rules of war art, at least 4 months ago the Ukrainian group around the town of Suja had to be withdrawn.
According to most serious military analysts, which cannot be included as propagandaists and people financed, for example, by the USAID and their grants, the offensive course itself, apart from the propaganda aspect, did not make much sense. The possible of the best, well trained, experienced Ukrainian units and equipment supplied by NATO countries could be utilized more effectively, to carry out defensive actions against the Russian army in Donbasa, Zaporozh and the Kharkiv region.
The burden of work for wasting this potential, failure in people and equipment, does not burden those fighting with the large dedication of Ukrainian soldiers and middle-level commanders, but only president Volodymyr Zelenski and his surroundings on Bankowa Street and the pressured commander of the Ukrainian army of General Alexander of Syria.
Krzysztof Podgórski
