I was happy to read polemic Ronald Lasecki, to mine. text "Understanding the Specificity of the Russian Resentiment". It is very good that "Think Poland" is no longer just a stand of free speech, but that in it we conduct investigation on areas that are either undiscovered in the Polish information space or stay lying.
But I gotta start with a method issue: the multifacetedness of the words col. Lasecki forced me to mention to them not according to the chronology of my Adversary too, but I made their structuring, assigning each of them to 1 of the 3 main themes. If there is no answer to any of the paragraphs in this text, it should be considered that I simply agreed with Ronald.
The thought of why the russian Union even happened
First of all, I cannot agree with the besides personalized diagnosis of the fall of the Romanov Empire. Ronald suggests it's Santa II as a person, he proved incapable to usage the tools that power gave him. However, I will stick to the thesis that this self-lease was simply an outdated form of management (so great) space. And the economical aspect that I realize is crucial. Lasecki agreed, i.e. that the Tsar administration was incapable to comprehend that Russia's penetration by Western capital was the foundation for the negation of the full strategy of power. And it's not that we had to halt the improvement of capitalism. No, his predominance over feudalism was due to the organization of production, it gave bourgeoisie greater wealth than aristocracy, and behind economical opportunities always follow political. So the origin of the revolution was the same as in France – the deficiency of organization ability to control the reality on the part of state power.
My Adversary criticizes Marxism on the ground of its western origin, unnecessarily disregarding the contribution Vladimir Lenin Marxism as such. After all, the later leader of the revolution gives up entirely the “young Marx” who is looking mainly for “the liberation of an individual” for the benefit of community. It strengthens the classiness of the thought itself. Secondly, it creatively develops the concept of "the dictatorship of the proletariat", stating that the working class has an instigated awareness by the influence of hostile ideas, and thus as specified is not fit to exercise power. This was the usage of russian power. And thirdly (although that's not all the differences) Lenin reverses Marxian predictions of the necessity of a revolution in a developed capitalist country. No, Russia in his head is the weakest link in this chain, so that's where the power should be the easiest, and it is through the policy of the russian state that the working class will be created from the dreams of Marxists. It is indeed a paradox of Marxism as "the creation of Western thought" that in its (assigned by Ronald) homeland, it remained at the highest level in the cathedrals of universities, where its representatives are careful not to say something good about the russian strategy (and thus not to lose jobs) and come up with fresh "revolutions" (but not class) and it succeeds until present (after adapting to local conditions) outside the alleged "free world".
Kol. Lasecki, however, besides accuses Marxism of developing national consciousness, in a conjecture of democratic ideas. Indeed, you can put the problem this way. In fact, in its first years, the USSR has developed even the smallest national cultures of this “imperium after rebrandingIt’s okay. ” but it's not an idea, it's a fact. As watchful observers of European national movements, Marxists, and behind them besides Bolsheviks, concluded that in the conditions of organised production (remaining to this and returning) based on language or territorial communities, national awareness is born. This was mainly due to the fact that working classes began to hang out with each other. Leninism so accepts what is inevitable, but does not claim that it must be mandatory to break into more state organisms. On the contrary, the very creation of the russian Union is simply a counterexample. However, it should be remembered that this besides applies to the Russian people. In Text The Pride of the Greater Russians Lenin not only does not deny, but he affirms Russianism.
Finally, the last thing on this issue – Ronald is making the right entry in my opinion of the request for strong, vertically organized power in Russia. After all, any of what I described above favoured this concept in the USSR itself. It should not be taken distant from the facts, the breakdown of this structure according to the national seams occurs at the same minute as the collapse of the socialist system, not the another way around. How they interpret it in Russia present and what a mistake they make here Vladimir PutinA small further.
Practice of Communism
It is rather risky that the thought of communism has been verified negatively. I don't want to play creative dialectic around here, but it must be remembered that the USSR was only the first effort to introduce this strategy on a global scale. The capitalist strategy itself did not win at once. In fact, in Europe itself he was born in pains of various trials about 500 years. A static description of reality is not able to exhaust the subject, even though the bases pointed out by Marxists inactive exist, and possibly even stronger than before.
This does not mean that the russian strategy does not deserve criticism. First of all, the supply over request has not been increased during this period, which would be the basis for the introduction of the communist rule of the distribution of goods. Notabene, that is why I do not mention to myself as a ‘communist’ due to the fact that I believe that this will never be possible in connection with technological progress. But besides the second digression – having overcome this problem, at the basic level, the president Aleksandr Lukashenko, successfully introduces a akin (because not identical) strategy in the Republic of Belarus.
Kol. Lasecki returns in his thoughts to Marxist democratism, which was to make the foundations for Russia's disintegration as an identity space, indicating that from the very beginning the Bolsheviks had broken its social structure. But in her place they offered something permanent and attractive. The improvement of the cultures of the USSR did not undermine its unity in any way. I don't think anyone's going to argue that this was any "black hole" in history. All you gotta do is look at the art of the USSR to appreciate the tremendous amount of work the russian authorities have done in this matter. We will go back to that aspect again, in the last part of the replica.
Again, however, Ronald is conducting a much-needed review of the thought of "matching with Russianness", however, with the thesis of "westernization" made by russian communism. Thesis – in my opinion – is risky. After all, the construction of St. Petersburg itself was (also in intentions) an effort of the Western reception of Russia. The generalization of the Tsar army in turn germanized from generation to generation. Production capital – either western or based on loans there. What happens in the USSR? The working class culture is formed (in a broad sense of the word). It's Russian, due to the fact that it's the first 1 in the world. Today, she is the way of Russianism, among the glazed skyscrapers set in Russia like fresh York. In this sense, however, the USSR remains a period of comparative opposition to Western influences – both in relation to the Romanov Empire and the Russian Federation.
Problems of modern Russian identity
Today's problem with Russia and Ukraine is not about the individuality of the nation as such. After all, the Russian Federation itself consists of many non-Slavic or non-Christian identities, and even the unwhite. Much bigger differences than those that be between Russians and Ukrainians. Russia itself is very careful about this "unity in diversity", institutionally fighting racism and another foolish attitudes to break up this mosaic. The problem with Ukraine is simply a political problem, 1 might even say "double political". Its basis is the distinctness of Ukraine as a state organism, but, as the example of Belarus shows, it would not should be specified a terrible challenge. The thing is, however, that present Russia does not have much Ukraine to offer. Here is the economical aspect with the idea. The another 1 was beautiful well pictured rather recently. Aleksandr Dugin, the erstwhile is due to the historical (and not systemic) advantage of the Anglo-Saxon West, having incomparable resources which he invested in Ukraine for 30 years. And so, erstwhile the West effectively influenced the Ukrainian subconscious, promising them gold mountains in the European Union or a sense of safety in NATO, Moscow wasted billions of rubles on a favorable part of Ukrainian oligarchs who simply stole these funds for their own needs. Against this background it is only visible how much more attractive, in the issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations, was the russian project.
Ronald, erstwhile writing about the dissolution of the Romanov Empire, mentioned the separation of Finland and the Baltic countries, but nicely omitted Poland here. Don't be. I mean, that truly worked out for us. To Poles and Russians. And that's what Lenin meant, arguing with Rose of Luxembourgwhich overestimated the economical aspect of the idea. National awareness exists, develops, and if the essential condition for "remedy" relations between nations is to make separate state organisms, it better be done. Lenin considered all national oppression a brake on progress. Yes, in the light of investigation into the past of the 19th century by historians who did not hatred Russia, we can learn that in fact Poles were able to make careers in terms of partitions, but that does not change much. Even modern Russian historiography considers Poland to be the biggest mistake. The resources active in maintaining the regulation of the Polish people outweighed the benefits of this.
And here we come to Ukraine after the dissolution of the USSR. The problem is not its separateness, but excessive greed, consciously awakened by neo-conservatives, including the right quoted here by Col. Lasecki Anne Applebaum. Ukraine came out of the USSR task with the "Independence + Programme", where the population in most Russian-speaking languages had at its disposal, and in the east and south of the country even without feeling any distinctness from Russian. The Kievs with different strength tried to Ukrainianize it. He overreacted in 2014, scaring those people adequate to catch a gun. This has only created a favourable climate for the installation of NATO's military possible in Ukraine, and this has besides forced Moscow to react, which we are constantly observing. Again, I return to the earlier question – why did it not happen in independent Belarus?
Vladimir Putin criticizes Lenin far besides soon. It undermines the grounds for the improvement of Ukrainian identity as part of the russian project, but it seems to forget that it was during this period that there were no problems with the integration of Ukrainians with Russians. Evidence? Perversely, for example, the alleged "gunned rebirth", the concept popular in today's Ukrainian nationalist historiography. But they are people who have decided to return from the West to russian Ukraine! Under the influence of Lenin's politics. They created Ukrainianism within the USSR and in full integration with Moscow. The people of russian Ukraine did not consider the flags to be their representatives at all. Their influence in the USSR, during the march Adolf Hitler To the east, it was practically nothing. Putin, in decline after the russian project, was given in relations with Ukraine a truly greenhouse conditions to make these relations, even in the form of mixed Ukrainian-Russian families. In the form of a large community of Russian language. Yes, you can insist that if not Corienisation, this Ukrainianness would never have existed, but it's completely unauthorized. The basis of the Ukrainians' separateness was created first by us, Poles (then it was a spiritual aspect), and then creatively developed by Germany, wishing to direct it against Russia on cultural grounds. Meanwhile, Lenin simply won it, snatching Russia's enemies from their hands, showing the Ukrainians that they could live peacefully alongside the Russians in 1 country. The minute erstwhile I compose this is evidently rather inappropriate; we do not yet know how past will measure Putin in relation to Ukraine, but the very fact that Moscow must usage military force there is simply a failure. Yes, the Bolsheviks utilized it too, but after the Treaty of Brest they competed from a much worse ceiling than the modern Russian authorities after the dissolution of the USSR.
Last but not least
In summing up Marxism, laziness and the full russian project, we request to look at without ideological prejudices and, however, critically working on ideas about Russia, which are skillfully fueled by forces hostile to Poland and thus Polish-Russian reconciliation. This is why it is worth to remove all these issues from the clutches of Karoniów, Zychowiczów or Ziemkiewiczów.
However, I would like to thank my colleague Ronald Lasecki for leaning over my text. This is how I imagine public debate and we can only regret that this is 1 of the fewer examples of it, but let us besides want that specified exchanges would proceed on the pages of “Polish Thoughts”.
Tomasz Jankowski
