Could Peter Arkadievich Stolypin have saved Russia? Answering the shortest – not due to the fact that he represented the class interests of those forces, which yet led to the collapse of the erstwhile order of nothing in return offering nothing another than the dissolution of the Empire, to which the Russian statesman tried so hard to prevent.
In fact, the Russian Prime Minister was involuntaryly strengthening nonsubjective revolutionary factors, which yet buried the erstwhile Russia, which is interesting adequate to preserve it to last the core of the Russian planet itself. And yet the legend of Peter Stolypin remains an crucial component of modern Russian historical policy, as demonstrated by the loud last year speech president Vladimir Putinof which leitmotivem was just a capital phrase about “The right of Russia to be strong!”. Strong in defence of values specified as sovereignty and national interests.
Patron to all stages
Those who inactive have access to Russian tv will shortly be able to see how the turn towards the White tradition is being implemented in version popular, serial. Judging from the announcements, in addition to the appeals to the “need to defend the large Russia” – in Rossiji's fresh production1, there will besides be a informing by interior betrayal, even in the circles of close power, which in turn implies a connection with the revisionist imagination of Turkey's past presented in poorly known Polish viewers seriesPayitaht: Abdülhamid, emblematic for propaganda message Mr Recep Erdoğan. Observing a popular culture under the control of state propaganda has always been a good method of diagnosing the current political line, not just countries with strong individual leadership.
However, regardless of the current request for a strong leader, whose goal is to lead Russia through the next hard times, while forcing and maintaining the modernisation course – it should be noted that interest in Stolypin's patronage in the circles close to Kremlin returns in various periods and editions. Prev release This cult took place in 2011-2012, so inactive during a period of comparative relaxation in Russia-West relations. That's erstwhile president Putin uncommon with a completely non-binding appeal that the Moscow monument of Stolypin should be funded from voluntary contributions of members of the government and deputies to Duma. However, at that point the Russian president chose a completely different quote from the Russian Prime Minister. “Give you 20 years of peace, external and internal, and you will not know modern Russia!” Putin stressed. As we already know, as before Stołypin, Vladimir Putin did not get these 2 decades of peaceful modernization, due to the fact that they were not in the interest of either openly enemies or alleged friends of Russia. In this sense, the erstwhile editions of Stolypin's cult actually came down to a repetition of history, given that in the Russian realities it was in fact forerunner of mostly pro-Western conservative liberalism, i.e. the political line to which at least part of the Cremel background was peculiarly attached to the last moments before and even after the Ukrainian crisis. In fact, it was alternatively a repetition of past mistakes than learning from them.
Capital reforms as a catalyst for revolution?
In fact, in the early 20th century, changes in Russia were not only and not primarily thanks to Stolypin, and not all the effects of his policies proved to be clearly beneficial, as economically, as especially socially and politically. Take, for example, the celebrated Earth Reform. Its essence was to encourage peasants to leave conventional agrarian communities, piss. So it was an action. to the introduction of capitalism to agriculture in Russia. This mechanics worked two-track – it actually allowed a group of wealthiest peasants to make individual farms, geared towards food production as part of capitalist trading. At the same time, he freed agrarian poverty, which fed a number of agricultural workers or moved into cities, forming part of the city's proletariat.
The scale of the phenomenon was limited, as until 1909 with piss small more than 1.1 million peasant families came out, i.e. around 9.4%, and yet by 1916 with piss 2.5 million farms were separated, 22% of the full number of farms. However, the Stolypin managed in 1 effort to increase the social base of the future revolution, awakening the hunger of the land individually owned (whose desire could not satisfy the unsettled and mainly in the hands of Cucumbers sales) and weaken the folk community, which has been comparatively resistant to revolutionary agitation so far. Therefore, 1 of the strong critics of the form of the capital improvement was Sergei Witte, self-declared supporter of the repair of Earth relations in Russia. From a perspective, these objections seem all the more justified due to the fact that the reforms have besides (not) been successful and trapping Russia may have been its increasing dependence on English and French capital, and hence accelerated capitalist pauperization, the breakdown of conventional social ties and as a result, an increase in revolutionary pressure.
The elite lose Russia
Russia's problem was (is) the weakness of its elite, their vulnerability to Western news, their tendency to yield to strangers. This manifested most powerfully during the February Revolution and the decay of a state comparable alternatively to times BorisJelcin more than Sadness. It is worth reminding the fewer traditionalist enthusiasts of white legend that in fact no 1 defended the carat, even in the White ranks, fewer people advocated a return to the old order. In turn, the course of the Allied intervention only confirmed that the erstwhile allies are aiming to share Russian wealth, i.e. to carry out the same script as in their participation in the capitalist transformations of Russia, only in an accelerated, drastic form. besides frequently in Russia, too, it is forgotten that the February revolution was a historical misfortune for her. Firstly, it led to the continuation of the war, which was destructive to Russia. Secondly, it disorganized the state and led straight to its disintegration into cultural republics. Thirdly, both processes only accelerated the acquisition of control of Russia by its economical competitors, temporarily only called allies. In this situation, the October Revolution appears alternatively unsuccessful, but understood the reaction to the real fall due to the February coup.
Tron and the People
Did Russia truly have a 3rd option, but Captivating Reformism and Bolshevik Destruction? Theoretically so, if at the control of the Empire there was individual capable of conducting a top-down state change in the name of preserving society, based on the bond of the throne and the people, above the heads of elites, intelligence and bourgeoisie. For specified a script Alexander III deficiency of imagination, Fyodor Dostoevsky political influence, Witt's determination, and possibly besides defeating his own narcissism, The Stolipin, on the another hand, was oriented towards this class, which yet led to the collapse of the erstwhile Russia, while Santa II... Well. It was not by accident that any echo of the Emperor's attempted alliance with his people became a legend. GrigorijaRasputin (as opposed to the mischievous ones who see physical similarity as the heir to this peculiar tradition, they consider Alexander Dugin).
It is so natural that the current state power of the Russian Federation refers to the Stolypin line, due to the fact that it best reflects the disposition of modern elites, not even affected by the fact that after 10 attempts at the assassination of Piotr Arkadiewicz – the eleven were yet successful, and among the suspects of directing the gunner's hand were representatives of the erstwhile establishment. Is it not, then, more an interior informing than an external declaration of force?
Vladimir Putin himself seems to deficiency not so many instruments of power, but alternatively a political personality, to hazard a program initiated from the top up, but a bottom-up transformation, in a social, economic, and in a systemic and geopolitical perspective. In this situation, Stolypin's road seems to be a safe reference, of course with the reservation that this time will succeed. For Russia and her president, it is simply a kind of sharp experimentation with a strong component déjà vu. And you can end up just as easy on this road and like Piotr Arkadiewicz, and – worse – like Nicholas II...
Konrad Hand
