Officially, GDR and Poland (PRL) were "brotherly socialist countries". In fact, however, the peculiar services of both countries were spying on each other, and East Berlin considered its neighbour from the east to be “enemy territory”.
Lack of trust
Polish publicists call the relations between the Polish People's Republic and the GDR until the end of the communist dictatorship in 1989 "exposed friendship": while both state and organization leaders celebrated harmony, East Berlin and Warsaw did not trust each another profoundly behind the scenes.
Many Poles saw their neighbours on the western side of Odra as possibly dangerous “red Prussians”. In turn many east Germans considered Polish comrades to be incredible allies, who threatened the existence of the communist camp with their liberal reforms.
The service was no exception either
For a long time, contacts between the safety services of both countries were considered an exception to this rule. According to erstwhile research, the common enemy in the West made close cooperation between peculiar services necessary.
However, fresh archival studies show a different picture: distrust and rivalry, which were always felt between the GDR and Poland on a political and social level, even more clearly revealed in designation and espionage.
Fear of “Solidarity”
"NRD-owska Stasi was seen as a powerful institution with immense capabilities for operational intelligence, capable of infiltration and influencing crucial areas of Polish life. In turn, the Polish Ministry of abroad Affairs was considered weak and incomparable to the GDR Ministry of State safety (MfS). Nevertheless, cooperation between the 2 institutions was considered comparatively harmonious" – explains in an interview with Deutsche Welle Titus Jaskułowski, IPN investigator in Szczecin and prof. at the University of Zielona Góra. “But this is simply a story that is overthrown by fresh finds in archives” – adds.
The turning point in relations between East German Stasi and the Polish MMA was a wave of strikes on the Baltic coast in the summertime of 1980, which led to the creation of the trade union "Solidarity". Leaders in East Berlin saw events in a neighbouring country in the east as an existential threat to their power – and a threat to the full east bloc.
Attempts by Polish communist leadership to find a compromise with “Solidarity” caused panic of the Minister of State safety of the GDR Ericha Mielke And his men. The politicians of the GDR openly accused Polish comrades of mediocre leadership and submission to “antisocial enemies”.
He had not yet dried the ink on the contract, erstwhile the SED Politburo gathering saw the word "contrrevolution". The fact that Polish communist leadership subjected to force from the nationwide strike movement and signed an agreement with the leader of “Solidarity” on 31 August 1980 Lech Walesa, caused massive carotid swelling not only Erich Honecker. German communists are trying to counter this "fall" of socialist leadership alongside with extremist severity. Inside and out.
From the point of view of the SED Politburo, compromise is hard to swallow. The fact that the communist leadership was to bend under the force of society and give power to the non-communist movement – what else would that mean, but not a large defeat? Only 3 days before the signing of the Gdańsk Agreement Markus Wolf He personally addressed the Polish Ministry of the Interior and received a reply: "The main political request of strikers for free and independent trade unions is seen as a request of legal opposition in the state and cannot and will not be met".
Quarantine
While MfS and SED's management are questioning through all channels, the propaganda department is already laying down lines for the future argumentative handling of the "crisis" in Poland. Neighbors were overcame by “Polish fever”. At least that is how the “Neues Deutschland” and another SED authorities interpret a phenomenon that contradicts all the laws of technological Marxism. And they rapidly agree on the defence strategy against the further spread of this anti-socialist bug: the only thing that can aid here is the strictest isolation. Quarantine.
But how to sale and implement quarantine? Nothing simpler: for "temporary changes in private travel"As it is called internally in the Central Committee, it speaks more than that. Why not suspend the visa-free movement that began in 1972?
In fact, on October 30, 1980, not only the visa-free and passport-free movement between the GDR and the Polish People's Republic was unilaterally suspended, but besides the massive simplification of all organization and social contacts with Poland. These steps were justified by completely different “fixions”.
Anti-Polish moods
"To defend the interests of citizens of the GDR" – informs us of the GDR Council of Ministers, the border has been closed again due to the fact that "mass purchases of goods, in part related to speculative transactions, have reached unacceptable levels and are increasingly being rejected by citizens of the GDR".
Anti-Polish Resentiments have been deliberately fueled since September 1980. The authorities of the SED did not even avoid the usage of eternal nationalist toposes, specified as the 1 about the “Polish economy” (German). plnische Wirtschaft). They purposely advance and strengthen the impression that part of society already has: “Poles strike only due to the fact that they do not want to work”. And the message seems to arrive immediately, as evidenced by the October 1980 text “Der Spiegel”.
"Too lazy to work". “They will drag us into this mess with them”. "Fucking Polacks". The choice of quotes – even if authentic – is rather arbitrary and unrepresentative. But anti-Polish moods exist. Above all, people fear that the standard of surviving they have achieved in their own country may be affected. It is this basic temper that seems to have sparked a more involuntary solidarity for the government of the GDR.
Despite the intimidation and anti-Polish propaganda of MfS, with excitement registered an increase in public sentiments for "Solidarity" from 1980 to 1982 and gradually increased operational force on abroad policy.
What could be felt in average people in terms of prejudice, resentment, was decently prepared and fueled by propaganda, in part very primitive. Jealousy that Poles buy, that Poles are different, that Poles let themselves to do something that you do not have the courage to do, that is to say, an open protest.
Collective aid
How can you halt the counter-revolution next door? – this question was on the head of the Political Office throughout the fall of 1980, while the monopoly of Polish communists on the usage of force gradually collapsed. The first SED Central Committee Secretary felt that only a joint demonstration of force by fellow statesmen could save the country. On November 26, Erich Honecker prepared a draft letter in which he requested Leonida Brezhnev to convene a gathering of all the leaders of the Warsaw Pact.
In his letter, he expressed his anticipation that the arrangement should definitely consider a military solution to the conflict. The faster the joint reaction, the better: "Our joint action yesterday may have been premature, present it is necessary, but next day it may be late".
Indeed, little than 14 days later they meet in Moscow, in a large group. Erich Honecker is well prepared for all possibilities. In his hand luggage, he has a general power of lawyer from his own organization and military leadership, which makes him stand unreservedly for military intervention in Poland. In particular, Honecker is in favour of this option of “solutions”. Just like he did Walter Ulbricht in Prague in 1968:“We besides have a work to our nations, to our friends around the world. They number on us to aid Polish communists triumph over the counter-revolution. erstwhile the power of workers and peasants, the power of the people, is threatened, erstwhile it must be protected from counter-revolutionary forces, which are determined to go all the way, then there is no choice but to usage the authority of the state of workers and peasants. This is our experience from 1953” stated Erich Honecker on December 5, 1980, in Moscow.
Moscow’s “round table” decides differently. There are warnings in advance. They came from Washington. The Americans are signaling that re-involved military intervention would encounter harsh economical sanctions. Even Cuba's blockade is under discussion. But besides internally, for Hungarians (Janos Kadar) and Romanians (Nicolae Ceaucescu); Honecker's red card – the joint deployment of troops is simply a road that meets with hard rejection.
In East Berlin, people pay attention to restraint with their mouths tight. At the same time, force is expanding in the country. The NVA Command shall be tasked with preparing the intervention plans. MfS is besides on alert. The budget for IM (secret co-workers) is importantly increased for the infiltration of Solidarity. Questions and tips developed in the Polish PZPR apparatus..
February 17, 1981, erstwhile the fresh organization leader, Stanisław Kania, paid tribute to the GDR, Erich Honecker one more time recalled the tools of the "tortur" of the Communist International. And by doing so, he recalls his own minute of powerlessness of the SED of June 17, 1953 as a model way of dealing with a crisis situation.
‘In 1953 it was essential to usage force due to the fact that counter-revolutionary elements were on the streets. russian units and troops of the combined folk police were utilized [...] A number of them were shot at the scene. This has led many people to reflect” – reads the note from the gathering with Kania.
Change of direction – no tanks
Effects on his counterpart: immeasurable. But giving up is not the answer. In May Honecker again asks Leonid Brezhnev and the Secretary-General of Czechoslovakian KC Gustav Husaka The meeting. Off the record. In Moscow, the SED leader wants to discuss with them his latest strategy: Behind the scenes they should work to change leadership in Poland. Only a change in management could bring about a return and departure from the intervention model.
"I am not a supporter of military intervention, although under the Warsaw treaty allies would have the right to do so. It would be appropriate to make leadership that is ready to introduce a state of emergency and take decisive action against counter-revolution" – says Honecker on May 16, 2981.
The background for this strategical reorientation was MfS analyses, which show that the PZPR is facing a immense staff coup. In fact, over 80% of the old staff were lost in secret elections to the fresh Central Committee in July 1981. The Warsaw KGB resident then reports to the Kremlin that the socialist strategy in Poland is in danger of collapse if this recently elected Central Committee is not rapidly replaced.
All hopes in both Berlin and Moscow now focus on 1 man: General Wojciech Jaruzelski. As a fresh Prime Minister, he has served since February 1981. In October, as sources at MfS report, he will besides effort to take over KC management. And that's what happens. And shortly things are even better for their comrades in Berlin. The SED Emissary reports to the office that the General has far-reaching powers to reconstruct peace and order in the country. In addition, it is full supported by the military and police, at which “Solidarity” has almost no supporters. Wind changes direction...
According to MfS sources, Jaruzelski's Political Office responds to a general strike announced by “Solidarity” on 28 October, preparing to declare martial law. After a year of failure, the head of the safety ministry of GDR Mielec senses a fresh stage. The situation study concluded that opposition had increased Polnische Vereinigte Arbeiterpartei (Poland United Workers' Party, PZPR) to "capitalist policy of retreating organization and state leadership from counter-revolution".
Less than six weeks later, fresh PZPR executives focused around General Jaruzelski usage these plans and declare martial law. A fewer days later, the East German press stopped all verbal attacks on the neighbour and without further ado returned to the socialist rhetoric of the “brother country” and “brother nation”.
Like Comrade Erich Honecker himself, who called the General on 16 December 1981 at 20.49 Berlin time not only to convey “brotherly conflict greetings”. "We are besides prepared to aid with any of the technologies needed for street fighting, building barricades, etc... You can be certain that in all respect you can trust on the German Democratic Republic and its National People's Army”.
When a Friend Becomes an Enemy
The introduction of martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981 was welcomed with relief in East Berlin. But east German comrades did not consider the crisis in the neighboring country to be solved. A day later, boss Ministerium für StaatssicherheitMielke issued a number of orders containing offensive steps towards Poland.
Order under codename Besinnung he put Poland on an equal footing with the national Republic, which in the GDR was called ‘FRG’ and another Western countries. The Polish People's Republic was declared an "operational area" – Jaskułowski writes – and thus an enemy.
Informer needed
The Warsaw Operations Group (OGW) has already been established in the GDR embassy in the Polish capital. This body, cast by Stasi members, was tasked not only to prevent the citizens of the GDR from escaping, but besides to spy on Poland.
Since the August strikes in Poland in 1980 Stasi desperately sought informants who could study events east of the Odra. Immediately after the fall of communism, researchers assumed that east German peculiar services had at least 1500 "unofficial collaborators" (IM) in Poland.
In the meantime, this figure has been corrected downwards to 200. Experts of the subject talk about about about a hundred, with only a twelve GDRs of IMs being able to execute complex missions, specified as infiltration of "Solidarity" environments.
Experts point to the increasing arrogance with which Mielke and his people acted in contacts with Polish partners after 1980. They reinforced conservative forces in the apparatus of the ruling Communist organization and did not cover their reluctance to liberal comrades in the east “brother” state.
The Polish side, which frequently had to act as a petent due to the deep economical crisis in the country, could not counteract it.
Representatives of the Polish Ministry of abroad Affairs asked their east German colleagues not only for supplies of sticks, rubber sticks and shields, but besides for shoes, socks and warm trousers. At the time, everything was missing in Polish stores.
Retaliation
The time of vengeance for the humiliation of Stasi came with democratic change. Refugees from the GDR, who crossed the Polish border in the summertime of 1989 to get to the embassy of the national Republic of Germany, and from there to West Germany, were transferred by the Polish Border defender despite crucial deportation agreements with the GDR.
Protests from East Berlin were bloomed in Warsaw in silence. By early 1990, erstwhile Mielke was already behind bars awaiting trial, General Czesław Kiszczak, who was inactive the Polish Minister of the Interior, wrote a congratulations telegram to the fresh Minister of the Interior of the GDR, Michael Diestel, which came from the erstwhile opposition and led the recently created institution succeeding Stasi – the National safety Office.
A spy friend
Now Stasi, who has always been much better equipped from Polish peculiar services in terms of personnel, logistics and financial, “She lost everything that was to be lost”. "Because of ideological limitations, MfS people were now – unlike their Polish colleagues – incapable to realize the planet as it was".
Although Polish-German relations flourished after German reunification in 1990, the peculiar services of both countries remained at a distance. In 1993, a Polish officer was even sentenced to prison – for spying for Germany. besides reportedly, German diplomats were expelled for intelligence activities.
Poland – martial law – Honecker
In December 1981 General Jaruzelski declared martial law for Poland. The GDR behaved surprisingly, the management was definitely in favour of this action.
To underestimate your counterpart is never a good thing. "Erich Honecker's acting talent is small, not good at pretending," he said. The Secretary-General, Government spokesperson and trustee Helmut Schmidt, after the state Chancellor's visit to East Germany, 10 days before Christmas 1981.
On 13 December exactly, the communist government in Warsaw shook the free world: in Poland, a martial law was introduced to take over the freedom movement “Solidarity”.
Did SED know? Did Honecker trick the Chancellor?
Helmut Schmidt, who had been on a delicate visit to the second German state since Friday 11 December 1981, provided at a press conference on Sunday morning: "Mr. Honecker was as frightened as I was." A helpless Social politician added: “I hope that the Polish people will solve their problems”.
In fact, the leader of the GDR has usually deceived his West German guest. Like the full SED management, Honecker was thoroughly informed of General Wojciech Jaruzelski's plans, including the exact date. Yes, he was even among those powers of the east bloc that called for decisive action.
That was already known in the outline. Soon, however, the doctoral work of the Warsaw historian will be published in Polish Philip Gańczak, Polen geben vir them Preis, which analyses in depth Polish SED management policy between 1980 and 1981, based equally on German and Polish acts.
Country of transit for the GDR
In August 1980, from the point of view of the German communists, the situation in the east neighbour took a dramatic turn. Agreements between the ruling Polish communists and strikers of workers, as well as the authoritative designation of "Solidarity" as an independent trade union, challenged the monopoly of Marxism-Leninism power.
From Honecker's point of view, it was even worse: liberalisation in Warsaw would endanger direct supply lines to the GDR. Without the permanent presence of the Red Army, whose supply routes ran through Poland, the end of the SED government was only a substance of time. The same was actual of the interruption of the supply of energy from the russian Union, a large part of which passed through Poland by pipelines.
This was “the worst scenario”, but inactive a serious threat to Honecker. The GDR was unstable. The main reason for maintaining the SED government was that the PSC urgently needed the second German state as the cornerstone of its European strategy.
Erich Honecker, however, was not curious in "solving" the problem, as in August 1968 at the CSRS, erstwhile the Warsaw Pact troops brutally ended the Prague Spring. specified action would have been expected to have been interrupted détente between East and West, whose GDR was the most crucial beneficiary.
Four Steps
The Polish SED management policy prior to the introduction of the martial law of Gańczak, which, in addition to technological work, is besides a writer specialising in German subjects, is divided into 4 key decisions. His work so allows for the first time to look at the prehistory of martial law.
The first step was to establish a "sanitary cordon" on the east border of the GDR with Poland. Visa-free travel was suspended, another contact options were limited to the maximum – freedom virus should have been avoided.
The second step was only due to russian pressure: The GDR agreed to grant food aid and even loans to starving Poland, although the SED government itself remained solvent only thanks to West German money.
Gańczak evaluates handwritten notes on the telephone conversation of the Secretary-General of the National safety Council with Honecker: "Leonid Brezhnev dictated the terms and the Political Office followed the instructions" “The Polish historian writes.
The 3rd step was to build a dangerous background. Honecker himself was formally authorised by the Political Bureau to prepare “necessary measures”. The consequence was planning “joint exercises” of the east bloc troops with Polish troops. Given the fresh memory of 1968, it was clear what specified exercises would mean: invasion of Poland in the event of a collapse of the government in Warsaw.
But neither East Berlin nor Moscow had any peculiar interest in it. That's why Honecker forced the exchange of the current secretary-general of Polish communists to be a conservative military Jaruzelski and sent clear instructions on how to solve the crisis: relentlessly and, if necessary, forcefully.
In November 1981, the Ministry of State safety of the GDR and the Ministry of the Interior in Warsaw concluded an agreement to supply demonstration equipment to Poland. It was besides a clear signal that Jaruzelski could number on political support from SED.
Honecker, however, broke his word due to Helmut Schmidt's visit. He pretended before his guest that he was completely surprised. In fact, for months the SED has discreetly probed how the West German government will respond to “decisive actions” in Poland.
Helmut Schmidt was not as unprepared as he explained to the press: “Bonn signaled to East Berlin that the red line of German-German politics would be the NVA invasion of Poland." Honecker followed this, and the Chancellor decided not to shorten the visit but to proceed it.
Christmas packages from children from East Germany
When martial law was introduced in Poland in December 1981, the GDR was not only politically on the side of a socialist “brotherly country”. Already on December 17, the first transports with aid supplies for a heavy experienced neighbour began. In all schools in the Republic, Christmas packages are packed for “Children of People’s Poland”, and labour collectives collect donations. The action is initiated “from above”, but the desire to aid the East German people is authentic and honest.
During this time, the socialist neighbouring country, Poland is experiencing not only the biggest political crisis in its history, but besides the economical hole: store shelves are mostly empty, and if you can buy something, it is only for food cards. The GDR is compared to the land of milk and honey flowing.
What happened in Marienberg these days shortly before Christmas is part of a regional solidarity campaign. On December 17, 1981, just a fewer days after the martial law was declared, a government plane with 10 tons of drugs for Poland on board took off from Berlin-Schönefeld airport, and the first convoy of trucks with aid supplies departed from Dresden.
A day later, the action “Help for Children of People’s Poland” is launched, which is besides attended by Schulz from Marienberg. Food, sweets and toys packages are collected in all schools in East Germany. Adults can make donations to a peculiar account of 555 in Postscheckamt Berlin.
Promotion of humanitarian action
Just the day after the rotation call, December 19, 1981, Stimme der DDR, Berliner Rundfunk and Radio DDR II relate the solidarity of the population in a two-and-a-half-hour peculiar broadcast: hundreds of people call or send telegrams to the studio. Young pioneers, FDJ members and worker collectives study how many donations they have made – reportedly 1.25 million brands were collected on the first day of the action.
Over the following days, “Neues Deutschland” has besides scrupulously listed donations, from comparatively tiny transfers, specified as 480 brands from the youth brigade “Ernst Thälmann” at VEB Robotron-Elektronik Zella-Mehlis, to large donations from the Central Council of FDJ and FDGB, which give respectively 1 million and 10 million brands. In the programme of December 21, 1981, the deputy editor-in-chief of “Die Aktuelle Camera” is virtually raging due to specified large generosity – and at the same time he cannot refrain from complaining about the “class enemy” from the West.
Truck convoys with gifts from the Berlins for the Polish ‘sister town’ – Warsaw had 60 vehicles. erstwhile she arrived, she caused a sensation: passers-by turned with amazement, reported "Neues Deutschland", and GDR tv showed Warsaw's children from homes that opened packages, glowing with joy. besides outside Berlin there was no deficiency of aid – finally, the Honecker organization leader personally ordered all GDR districts to organize transports to their Polish partner region.
Thus by the end of the year, about 160 trucks leave Dresden region itself. From Magdeburg 5 million eggs are carried on a freight train to Poland, from Cottbus – respective milk transports. It is common for truck convoys to spend all day travelling on ice and snow. "Humanitarian aid from friend to friend" and ‘internationalist obligation’ – measure the central SED body. The vehicles are decorated with East German flags and bilingual inscriptions of the kind “Friendship – Freundschaft”.
Even the National People's Army sends donations on the way “to the Polish class and comrades in arms”.
War in Poland?
Truck drivers utilized to leave as if they were leading to the front, as the situation in Poland is said to match a real war, and armed members of “Solidarity” are causing havoc on the streets. These horror movies were the consequence of a pre-war propaganda campaign. The management of the SED feared that the “Polish virus”, or request for reform, could spill to the GDR. Therefore, it endures visa-free border movement and fuels in the media concerns about Poland.
But with the martial law announcement, they changed their tactics. From the SED point of view, Poland returns to the right way and is again presented in the media as a "brother country" which needs to be helped. And even if the action is controlled from above and utilized for propaganda purposes – the desire to aid the citizens of the GDR is large and sincere! This is confirmed by Stasi reports, which discreetly monitors events.
Two and a half million Christmas packages are collected in East Germany. Students, teachers and parents are eager to engage in the gathering. Companies work overtime to produce goods for Poland. People are besides generous in donations, they organize raffles and charities. According to the GDR government, goods worth 200 million marks can be shipped by the day before Christmas Eve.
In a motion of human solidarity, greeting cards were besides added Frohe Weihnachten, from adults and children who prepared gifts for starving families in Poland.
***
The relations of GDR – PRL were different, as you can see.
It cannot be forgotten that denazification in both German countries was not “ruly”. A large number of erstwhile members of the NSDAP, Gestapo or SS fed SED and Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), but besides Stasi or Polizei in Germany. In the GDR propagandaists from the NSDAP could find themselves very quickly, propaganda – the fresh enemy – West and capitalism. Propaganda methods have not changed, as I mentioned, only the direction of propaganda has changed.
Matthäus Golla
Literature:
- Titus Jaskułowski, "Von einer Freundschaft, die es nicht gab. Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR und das plnische Innenministerium 1974-1990", Analysen und Documente, Vol. 57th series of the national Commissioner for State safety Service Act of the erstwhile German Democratic Republic (BstU)
- Die DDR im Blick der Stasi 1976 Die geheimen Berichte an die SED-Führungiegfried Suckut (Hg.)
- Die Streitkräfte der DDR und Poles in der Operationsplanung des Warschauer Pactes – Taschenbuch · Sachliteratur · Geschichte MGFA
- ‘Polen geben vir nicht preis’. Der Kampf der DDR-Führung gegen die SolidarnoÅc 1980/81 Galczak, Philip
- Land und Leute – Polen – Berliner Verlag DDR
- WER HAT ANGST VORM STREIK NEBENAN? Vom Umgang mit der polnischen Solidarity-Bewegung in der MDR 21. 10. 2022
- SOLIDARITÄTSAKTION – MDR FERNSEHEN | MDR ACTUELL | 31. August 2020 |
- https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/informationen-zur-stasi/themen/beitrag/vom-v-mann-des-sd-zum-stasi-spitzel/
