Voices never matter

maciejsynak.blogspot.com 2 weeks ago

reprint - selected fragments of the 2015 study

Hypotheses of votes invalid in the general election in Poland after 1989.

Przemysław Śleszyński
Institute of Geography and Spatial Management of the Polish Academy of Sciences,
Twarda 51/55, 00-818 Warsaw

4. Model for the formation of invalid votes

The formation of an invalid vote may consequence from a number of reasons relating to the fact that there are many intermediate steps that can affect this phenomenon between the voter's decision and the announcement of the results by the State Election Commission.

Furthermore, any of the reasons straight influence earlier stages – consciously or unconsciously.

For example, the State Election Commission approves voting cards whose appearance, layout, etc. can contribute to certain electoral behaviour. This is due to electoral ordination, but so that the statutory obligations of the Polish National Police Office. This is so an informed and politically accepted influence, although not all its effects can be predicted in lawmaking.

There is besides an impact of the opposite, linked to the fact that the public opinion, namely the voters, can, through various kinds of pressures, influence decisions relating to the functioning of the electoral commissions of different levels, despite the rule of independency of these bodies.

The overall model of the formation of null ballots is so presented in Figure 4. (see oryg. paper - MS)

In this model, the voting card is an crucial element, which is equally the subject in the sense of the voter's electoral decision, as well as the subject in the sense of the procedure for classifying and counting votes and giving results. Cards and ballots in regional committees shall be counted among the minutes, and these shall be further forwarded to the territory commissions. At the same time, digital recording is produced.

In the final phase, there is fundamentally only digital recording.

Moreover, voting cards are after any time, according to the ordinance, destroyed and after any time there is no anticipation after an equation of digital recording with the origin original.

The various stages at which a invalid voice can be “produced” can be explained by different concepts in the field of psychology and sociology (especially explanation of choice, social impact), computer discipline (data processing, computer errors), mathematics (probability theory, distribution of random numbers), statistic (co-existence, correlation) and geography (surface trendum in case of spatial correctness).

5.3. method hypothesis

The method hypothesis is rather closely linked to the competence hypothesis, as the issue of nullity of vote determines the physical characteristics of voting cards and the way content is recorded and the method of voting.

These include: the form and formats of these cards, and all graphic and typographical issues (letter sizes, font size, distribution of typographical elements, etc.). As a result, the voice card is more or little readable and understandable to the voters, and so determines the different course of cognitive and decision-making processes.

Similarly, the difficulty of putting up a peculiar mark or marks documenting the selection of the required number of candidates and in the appropriate place on the ballot may be the reason for not voting.

In this context, it seems even more common to be able to delete in the incorrect place or besides many of these deletions.

There were 3 basic forms of voting cards in the current voting practice in Poland:

(1) a single average ballot card (sheet of paper format B5, A4 or similar),

(2) Single but folding card (in the case of a peculiarly large branch of ditches, referred to pejoratively as ‘flat’),

(3) a hand-over card (by electoral code "multi-page" or multi-card voting card), briefly referred to as "brooch" or "book";

This second form deserves peculiar attention due to the fact that it can contribute differently to the formation of invalid votes and even to distort the results of elections.

The broached form of voting cards can find respective types of behaviour at the ballot box.

First,, it may discourage the vote itself from being given for competence reasons (the voter does not know how to decently vote – on 1 side or on all sides), as well as due to himself unacceptable to any of the voters of the form (equations, convictions of excessive size and number of names or lists).

Second, may negatively affect the uncovering of a candidate (who is known and wants to vote for) due to the many names and lists of committees mentioned.

Third, The brochure form may distort the actual results of the elections by voting only on the front page.

This was shown by J. Flis (2015), arguing that in the 2014 general election due to the appearance on the first page of the PSL list brochure, this circumstantial bonus amounted to 5.8 percent points (p.p.), including 2.1 pp. in the Grodzki counties.

A akin “premium” was detected by J. Flis in the elections to territory councils in the case of PSL and PiS, which in various counties of the country had letters on the first page of the “book”. The most spectacular case so far with the impact of voting cards on the results of elections is the vote to provincial Sejm in the 2014 local elections.

The brochure, which was then in force throughout the country, was to mislead voters and find more frequent placing of votes on the list there, i.e. the list of the Polish People's Party. As mentioned, J. Flis (2015) estimated this bonus empirically utilizing regression equations to little than 6% of the vote.

However, it is worth noting that in non-governmental elections, which besides included ‘books’, exceptionally increased support for letters on the front pages was not statedand at least there are no known studies on this subject.

[The Seymites in a sense duplicate the power of the Voivodes - do they be so that "at the right time" any of them can advocate the detachment of the Recovered Lands? - MS]

However, self-government voting does not request to be comparable to parliamentary voting, as it can accumulate different groups of voters with different competences and ways of making electoral decisions. In favour of a affirmative verification of the method hypothesis, the spatial schedules of votes not valid in the 2010 local elections, and in peculiar the 2 or more "X" votes, could supply evidence.

Observed at the time strongly distinguishing borders of the Mazowieckie province could be due to the usage of the brochure, unlike another voivodships.

However, the advanced percent of votes with more than 2 or more "X" marks was not observed in the full voivodship, in the Podwarszawskie gminas and Warsaw itself, due to the fact that the percent of invalid votes was not high.

The brochure's argument besides does not explain advanced percentages in another municipalities throughout the country, especially in its western and north-western parts.

It is besides unclear why in earlier local elections there was a phenomenon of the borders of the voivodships, e.g. Mazowieckie in 2006 and Lubuskie, Dolnośl skiego, Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Mazowieckie in 2002. (Śleszyński 2011).

In order to make this more clear, it would be essential to collect information on the forms of ballot cards in all the elections utilized in each constituency. specified a survey has not yet been developed and could be crucial in clarifying spatial differentiation in all local elections in which it was observed interesting overlap of increased percentages of votes "2+X" with the boundaries of voivodships and constituency (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010).

Moreover, it should be examined whether and in what form the brochures were utilized in the voting of the territory councils, which were besides observed to be advanced in relation to areas surrounding the interest of invalid votes, e.g. in the territory of Żelwski in 1998, Poznań, Garwolinski and Nowotarski in 2002, Bolesławiecki in 2006 and In general, in northwestern Poland in 2010

Overall, studies helping to find the impact of the above conditions on the number of invalid votes are fundamentally the same as for the competency hypothesis. In addition, linguistics, cognitive discipline and praxeology can be indicated as disciplines of discipline predisposed to investigation in this area. Irrespective of helping to explain the formation of invalid votes, this could contribute to better plan of voting cards in the future.

5.4. explanation hypothesis

The validity of voting in general elections shall be determined by the electoral code. On the basis of this, detailed instructions (training of election committee members) are prepared, according to which individual peripheral commissions interpret which votes are valid and which are invalid. In the past of elections in Poland The electoral code has been amended respective times; the principles of explanation of what is an crucial voice have likewise changed and what is invalid.

No comprehensive analysis has been developed on this subject so far, which would be useful for recognizing the importance of this hypothesis in the formation of invalid votes.

According to the interpretative hypothesis, there are differences in vote classification for important and irrelevant due to different interpretations of the same means of filling in the vote.

This is not about "ordinary" mistakes and omissions (which besides happen for some, but are always marginal), but about the qualification of the vote on the basis of the characteristics of the deletion, i.e. the place of the peculiar mark or even its shape.

In electoral regulations, this is rather clearly defined, including this ‘special’ sign, which is 2 lines intersecting inside the grate. This is the form of the letter ‘X’ and any another characters (‘bird’ in the form of the letter ‘v’, the blurring of the grid, etc.) are not acceptable.

In the case of a card, there is simply a question of the classification of the vote erstwhile entering the decently constructed ‘X’ character under force it pierces the another side in the form of a clamp.

Similarly, the correctly written ‘X’ character, but with the line cut outside the grid is considered invalid.

It is worth noting that may be affected by the size of the grid and the associated ease (difficulty) of correctly entering the sign. For example, in the 2015 parliamentary elections a 6x6 mm grate was introduced, resulting in comments that it may be besides poorly recognisable to the aged and the visually impaired.

A second group of interpretative factors for the differentiation of null ballots may be different guidelines on the classification of votes for valid and invalid votes in territory committees, comparatively different practices, despite uniform guidelines of the PCW. This may concern the classification issues described above, e.g. printed characters on the following pages of ‘books’.

This hypothesis could explain the overlap of an increased percent of multiple votes in the 2014 local elections with the borders of the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, i.e. the scope of control competence of 1 of the territory commissions.

Thanks to this hypothesis, however, it is inactive unknown why in most municipalities located on the Metropolitan Area of Warsaw the level of votes was importantly lower than in another parts of the voivodship.

It seems that in order to verify the interpretative hypothesis more clearly, it would be essential to carry out more detailed studies of filled ballot cards in different voivodships, if specified cards have been preserved somewhere. This survey was to be carried out on the basis of the 2014 local elections team appointed by the Batory Foundation, which in May 2015 signed a cooperation agreement with the Chief Directorate of State Archives (Elections... 2015).

5.5. Computer hypothesis

The IT hypothesis is based on the anticipation of errors in computational algorithms and the presumption that for this reason the results made available by PKW do not reflect actual voting results due to non-compliance at the stages of entry or computer processing.

The consequence of specified errors could then be importantly increased, e.g. by a government of size, data on electoral variables:

number of cards issued,

votes cast,

the structure of the reasons for the annulment of the votes and even

the number of votes cast per individual list.

Depending on the location, an mistake in the algorithm and computer program could change the actual consequence at the country or districts level and contribute to known spatial distributions of voices that do not reflect the boundaries of voivodships.

Behind this hypothesis could be evidenced by local elections in 2014, the anticipation of external interference in data transmission and mostly the problems revealed in these elections, related to the mediocre quality of preparation and implementation of software and information systems.

Use faulty software, results would be affected by a systematic error in the calculation (recalculation) of the partial data from the individual committees, disclose e.g. in known spatial distributions referring to boundaries electoral districts.

Against this hypothesis is evidenced by the possible scale of irregularities.

The systematic incompatibility of thousands of protocols with the digital evidence existing in PKW (KBW) would be easy to detect and very hard to imagine. An alarm would suffice in just 1 of these many thousands of committees, which would compare the digital evidence on the PKW website with its own handwritten protocol, to note that there have been any inconsistencies with the digital record.

The analysis of P. Paczos (2015) concerning IT safety in the 2014 general election besides argues against the affirmative verification of the IT hypothesis. It has shown that there were very many steps in the IT procedure to enter and check data coming from the peripheral commissions, and control at different levels of the IT system, among another things, by means of checksums mostly excluded computational errors.

Similarly, it would be unrealistic to be aware of the change ("improvement") of the results, since there were besides many independent information cells active in the IT service and to have the expected effect, They'd all should be in sync.

[conversation is collusion, and distant head control is called possession? - MS]

Nevertheless, Mr Oleński (2015) points out that there is no external control over the improvement of the results above the level of the constituencies.

When discussing an IT hypothesis, it is besides crucial to return attention to public assurance in the usage of information systems, as the average voter does not request to know how large the logistics scale is applied solutions and that the electoral IT strategy is not a "black box" to which You can “break in” and without noticing any tens of thousands of people active in its operation change the results.

The deficiency of this assurance has peculiarly revealed itself in the form of a legend of “ruskie servers” (in November 2015 Google search engine returns about 15,000 websites with the occurrence of this term). However, as public assurance in the electoral process is most important, in the future, additional solutions should be suggested, which are impaired – especially after the 2014 local elections – IT trust would restore.

In particular, an urgent request should be indicated after calculation of votes in the regional commissions to hang hand-held protocols in visible places and to photograph and store them on the local servers (e.g. municipal offices) so that all voter can compare this original protocol with digital recording in PKW.

5.6. Counterfeit hypothesis

False hypothesis undermines fairness and impartiality the elections, formulating an allegation relating to the intention to falsify their results.

J. Oleński (2015) mentions in this context techniques concerning both time (period) envisaged for voting (addition of votes, "syndrom of the last quarter", "clearing tracks"), the counting phase of votes by members of the regional committees (mistake of card selection, incorrect counting of votes, cancellation of votes by adding up the additional sign "X") as well as the copying phase of the vote from the handwritten protocol to the IT and the summation of votes on territory committees.

The allegations made by the public, especially in relation to the local elections, afraid the various stages of the electoral process, in particular all mentioned anticipation of adding second crosses on the card to the vote by the members of the electoral committees erstwhile the votes are counted. Such The deletion would render the vote invalid. Cancellation should concern the votes cast for candidates and lists whose chances of selection would like to reduce the individual on the election committee, thereby expanding the chances of another or another candidates and letters.

Authorising person acts would act out of intent or in collusion with others. Mr Flis (2014)b notes that the electoral commissions are addressed to individuals not only with the clear and you political views, but besides that can be guided by feelings the harm that “requires to be recovered by adding additional votes of the party, on which it is believed to have been harmed” (Flis 2014b: 22).

It would be naive to think that the above cases do not happen when millions of votes are cast in respective tens of thousands of electoral committees. The key here is to find whether these are incidents or incidents.

The essence of the false hypothesis is the presumption of the universality of falsification of votes by adding second crosses.

Such opinions frequently appeared after the discovery of overlaps with the increased percent of votes invalid due to the position more than 1 X mark in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship general election in 2010 followed by the 2014 general election

Quite a advanced correlation of the large share of invalid votes with borders Mazowieckie voivodship in 2010 (or more specifically with its almost full area) is However, an argument far more contrary to the hypothesis of falseness in regional electoral commissions alternatively than advocacy.

It would be very hard to imagine a situation in which in all neighbouring places around 2500 regional commissions (beyond Warsaw and another Grodzki districts) were made by not only mass falsifications, but besides forgeries of akin percentages sizes.

If the increased percent of null ballots were to testify on abuses, it is more appropriate to look for those committees that have a bearing on the environment. However, on the basis of published maps in different areas of the country, only the individual municipalities which fulfil specified conditions can be identified.

The most reliable and effective way to verify the hypothesis it would be to check individual ballots. If it were found that on cards deemed invalid due to more than 1 character X there are correlations between the occurrence of these characters on lists assigned to circumstantial groupings and candidates, usually competition that could have happened. However, proving specified a crime in a procedural sense is not possible, Since it is hard to consider statistical correlation as evidence, this is only a circumstantial circumstantial case. It would be more likely to compare colouring agent (tush) which has left a mark on the card erstwhile deleted on different lists or stro Nach ballot cards, but specified criminal methods are very time-consuming ne and technically hard to carry out on a large example of ballot cards. In this case, the procedural value would most likely be just a small higher, as it is theoretically possible for a voter to usage respective genera tools for writing.

[a sympathetic ink in the pens of an election venue that can be removed with a lighter flame - or another akin but unknown method - all committee members would should be collusive - or "depressed" - MS]

The method of obtaining information already mentioned above statistical methods are more likely to be misused, widely utilized in specified analyses (Rzazewski and others, 2014; Gawron and others, 2015).

The analyses carried out by J. Szklarski (2015) indicate any correlations between the participation of invalid votes and support for certain political groups; but it is not known whether this kind of co-incidence is due to joint action factor, e.g. specialization of functional areas, determining both larger political support (city – liberal parties, village – peasant parties, etc.), as well as behaviour described in the competence and aversion hypothesis.

A. Sułkowska (2015) While applying Benford's law, it states that there is no average distribution of the number of shares of support (i.e. it notes any incompatibility), but does not entail this without delay on average with no votes.

P. Gawron and others (2015), on the another hand, do not notice no peculiar relation between attendance and the participation of invalid votes, but they show a affirmative correlation between null and void votes PSL.

The same authors do not state possible irregularities on the basis of Benford law analysis. In the case of the 1998-2010 local elections, it would be worth to examine whether correlations between the election consequence and the place on the list were observed in those voivodships where card cards were in existence. Confirmation This hypothesis would support the argument to explain the advanced result Polish People's organization in the 2014 Provincial Sejm elections

5.7. Conversion hypothesis

Conversion hypothesis is fundamentally a variation of the false hypothesis, but it has been distinguished due to the peculiar possible for irregularities. It is that the votes are vacant as a consequence of the actions of persons in the regional committees are ‘warned’ by the correct deletion. This setting of the X is Intentionally and in the interest of a peculiar candidate or list. In another words, There is simply a "second life" of the unfilled card: the natural level of votes is empty a high, and the background-lower percent of "empty" votes is due to their The votes are valid.

Today, the most promising and already empirically justified hypothesis is an averse, associated with empty voices.

In the case of votes 2+X a method hypothesis for any applications deserves attention elections and districts of multi-page brochures.

In her case, that does not mean However, a full explanation is inactive unclear as to why advanced interest characterise electoral circuits, municipalities and even larger areas outside electoral districts on which the brochures were used.

Similarly, it is not known. why voivodships and constituency in the general election between 1998 and 2006.

In another words, still not explainedwhy

- within 1 territorial scope of the committee, and
- in functionally akin areas

There are very large differences in the level of cast-off of invalid votes, especially multiple votes.

And we inactive gotta explain where 2 million Germans were lost during the last war...

socialspacejournal.eu/10%20number/Industry%20Sleszyński%20-%20%20Elections.pdf

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