Jakub Majmurek: The Sahra Wagenknecht Movement (BSW) causes problems for commentators and politicians, having difficulty with its ideological classification and placing it on the left-right axis. How would you qualify this fresh political creation? It's a populist left, conservative left, utmost right, alt-left?
Rafał Chwedoruk: I would say that the root of the problem is the social democracy crisis which has been going on since the 1970s, with a short break for the times of Blair and Schröder. The left tries to give 2 different answers. So different that any researchers even claim that for half a century we have been dealing with the existence of 2 different lefts, which, even if they function within 1 party, stay fundamentally different: on the 1 hand, there is simply a fresh left, based in the youth revolts of the 1960s and 1970s, on the other, conventional social democracy.
Wagenknecht spoke and wrote repeatedly about this dualism, including in her book of 2022, entitled Self - Justice (Die Selbstgerechten). There, he attacks a fresh left, which he calls the "left lifestyle", primarily from the academic mediate class. She accuses herself of being locked up in her own circle, of seeing her own privileges as virtue, and giving them a moral dimension, rejecting a priori any discussion. The academic class mostly knows languages, which makes it naturally more "cosmopolitical" and gives it a competitive advantage in a globalised economy.
This left-wing Wagenknecht opposes a community-based left, afraid about its social cohesion, focusing mainly on the redistribution that the national state must make. This left rejects identity policy, treating it as a threat to the community, to equality. It besides has a circumstantial attitude towards migration, which is the main origin of the problem with the classification of Wagenknecht traffic.
Isn't her position on migration just right?
One French politician erstwhile said that France could not accept the full poorness of the world. And it wasn't a man from the National Front, it was Michel Rocard – the socialist Prime Minister of Mitteranda from 1988 to 1991. fewer people remember that in the times of the regulation of the People's Front in France (1936-1938) the biggest complaints about migration came from communist mers of tiny industrial cities, which was the hardest to deal with the costs of accepting people from another countries – by the way frequently from Poland.
Also, the Euroscepticism of Wagenknecht is nothing fresh on the left. In the beginning, opposition to the single marketplace was mainly from social democratic parties and trade unions. In summary, what Wagenknecht says is frequently an effort to revitalize the thought of social democracy from respective decades ago: a welfare state protecting its marketplace and controlling borders, collective safety agreements alternatively of military pacts specified as NATO – this last possible is completely absent in Poland.
So the Wagenknecht movement is just an anachronistic retro-social democracy?
Not precisely anachronistic, akin ideas are taken by another leftist parties in Europe: Smer Robert Facy in Slovakia, Sinn Fein in Ireland, to any degree traditional, post-communist Romanian Social Democracy and Bulgarian Socialist Party. Skepticism towards migration is besides presented by Danish Social Democracy under the direction of the Prime Minister Matte Frederiksen, the ruling country since 2019. Although it would sound alternatively paradoxical, you could see even any points in common between the Wagenknecht programme and blairism.
In what way?
Mostly economic. Although in the papers of the fresh organization the word "socialism" falls very often, they do not truly have ideas to socialise the economy.
Wagenknecht talked a lot about support for cooperatives or the fight against besides large monopolistic corporations.
Yes, but at the same time the BSW does not truly propose anything that would violate the marketplace mechanism. Wagenknecht besides refers to the thought of ordoliberism, connected with the post-war revival of the West German economy. A certain enlightened spirit, emphasizing the importance of unity or cultural community – rejecting the search for differences in the name of identity policy, is besides connected with BSW's blairism. Blair is very skeptical present about what is happening in the area of culture and identity policy on the left.
Wagenknecht besides combines reasoning in globalization categories with it. Return to migration: the BSW is not against it, it calls for increased investment in the surviving conditions of migrants in Germany. Wagenknecht herself has immigrant, Iranian roots, the leadership of the movement is the descendants of migrants, formally co-chairing is the Egyptian-born Amira Mohamed Ali. At the same time – what is not blair – Wagenknecht has always paid attention to the costs of migration for countries from which migrants come. Emigration can be a form of brain drain. erstwhile an educated mediate class leaves, the improvement opportunities of the countries that leave are weakened.
In Germany, in the realities of circumstantial democracy due to its historical entanglements, BSW's position towards migration is the origin of the top misunderstandings and fears. In Poland – the relation of this movement to Russia and abroad policy. The BSW programming papers include the names of Willy Brandt and Gorbachev, in the Polish debate of completely forgotten characters, but for any Germans who are a symbol of the desire for 1945 to never happen again.
The Pro-Russian Wagenknecht program is besides a repetition of the old message from the German left or something else?
It is mostly a return to the Ostpolitik Brandt tradition. But I would argue whether her position is so pro-Russian. This is not a German-Russian cooperation program in the kind of Bismarck or Weimar Republic, in the spirit of Rapallo. The BSW's attitude to Russia determines not so much phyloro-rossiness as the pacifist tradition of the German left present forgotten.
By the way, it is very interesting that the organization most criticized by Wagenknecht present is the Greens, who are the most pro-American and "jaster" in abroad policy organization in Germany. Which, given the beginnings of this organization in the counter-cultural pacifist movements of the 1960s, is rather ironic. In addition, investigation shows that there is virtually no flow of electorate from Greens to BSW – the Wagenknecht movement takes voters for it Die LinkeSPD, even liberals.
The BSW, which is completely eluded from the Polish reception, is powerfully European on strategical issues, despite scepticism towards the way the Union and its institutions function. She speaks of the request to build a strategical independency of Europe, and points to the contradiction of its interests and interests in the US. For example, circumstantial American companies in the sector are listed in the traffic programming papers in a critical context Big Tech. This in turn is linked to a wider phenomenon: the opposition of conventional sectors of the economy, based on industrial production, to the fresh digital economy. In Germany it is peculiarly visible, as is the fear of disindustrialisation, as was seen in the last run to the European Parliament.
This besides involves a very circumstantial approach by the BSW to climate policy. On the 1 hand, the movement does not question the problem of environmental destruction, on the another hand it fears the effects Green transition and warns against extremist activism.
Jeremy Cliffe, analyzing In November 2023, BSW's proposals on "New Statesman" pointed out that the movement did not see the possible for industrial improvement that the green transformation gives Germany. Isn't the climate issues of the BSW just in the past?
The BSW is aware of the request for ecological transformation and does not argue fresh green technologies, but besides increase costs for consumers, but besides for medium-sized companies, which in the traffic programme occupy quite a few space. It would like the green transformation to proceed as the German mining improvement has been going on since the 1950s. The 20th century: it was spread over decades, held in social dialogue, involving trade unions.
The success of the BSW in the Thuringia and Saxony elections is due to the specifics of East German? The movement will be able to translate it to success in another lands?
The BSW has an offer, which present perfectly fits the expectations of residents of the east Lands, who feel disappointed by the mainstream of German politics, but for various reasons do not want to vote for the AfD. Especially the resident, due to the fact that it is already clear that the voices on the AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Movement are sexually polarized, men are more willing to vote for the first party, women on the BSW.
The degree to which this movement will be able to make greater advancement in the Lands erstwhile owned by the national Republic of Germany depends on how large economical and political perturbations Germany will be waiting. How citizens will measure the hazard of Germany being drawn into the war with Russia, the question of the cost of surviving of the German economy. The greater the turbulence, the greater the chances of BSW.
Wagenknecht is besides a very pragmatic politician. The full name of her organization is Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht – Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit, or the Sahra Wagenknecht Movement – Reason and Justice. On the 1 hand, ‘reason’ refers to this enlightened tradition, which I have been talking about, on the other, can simply mean reason. BSW frequently presents itself as a organization referring to common sense, not necessarily to ideology. Wagenknecht very consciously does not position his movement as a classical force left of social democracy, as Die Linke did. I don't want to limit myself to this niche, looking for voters outside of it.
The BSW will now play a key function in Thuringia and Saxony? And can he enter national governments?
Let us look at the wider German political context. Everything indicates that next year the CDU will return to power. The Chadeks so want to weaken the SPD, a organization that will most likely be its chief coalition. For this purpose, the BSW, as a movement capable of gaining support from the poorer people of East Germany, is perfectly suited – let us remember that in 2021 Olaf Scholz became Chancellor mostly thanks to the votes of retired people from the erstwhile GDR.
The CDU can so take the game with Wagenknecht to weaken the SPD. Especially since it will not cost anything politically, and the SPD is besides powerfully divided in the war in Ukraine. For the CDU long-term would be very beneficial if next to the SPD Wagenknecht built a second, more conventional social democracy. However, it will not limit itself to the anticipation of action, e.g. by putting in a barrier call for possible partners. Scholz is aware of this threat. The last "dove" of the Chancellor's statements on the war in Ukraine can be read as a reaction to the successes of the BSW in Saxony and Thuringia.
When the Wagenknecht Movement was formed, it was said that it could take AfD support. The results from Saxony and Thuringia verify these expectations? In both lands, AfD's support increased in comparison to erstwhile Land elections, and BSW's successes have most likely harmed mostly Die Linke – the organization from which Wagenknecht left to establish a fresh formation.
It is worth remembering that the south of the erstwhile GDR after the unification of Germany was always more right-wing than Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Pomer Front, not to mention Berlin. In Saxony, she has long ruled the CDU and will regulation further, although it is unknown in which configuration.
Research shows that BSW voters are much more left-wing than AfD voters and actually the only bridge between the electorates of both parties is migration. So it cannot be expected that the BSW will abruptly take voters alternatively – although many of them declare that it could vote for the Wagenknecht formation – it can limit its expansion. As it happened in Denmark, where social democrats led by Frederiksen blocked the drain of the labour electorate, mainly from the working suburbs of Copenhagen to the anti-immigrant right.
In turn, the future of AfD will depend mainly on the CDU. Whether this organization decides to regulation with the Alternative. If the Liberals fall under the threshold, if they weaken the Greens and the mainstream left, it cannot be ruled out.
Do you think the BSW could become part of any ruling German coalition?
Given the pragmatic orientation of BSW, this is not excluded, and Wagenknecht can be flexible. akin to the BSW's approach to migration gradually penetrates left-wing mainstream. It's already happened in Denmark. This penetration is besides seen in Germany, for example in the fresh decisions of the Scholz government to reconstruct border control.
Do you think that a akin left might arise in Poland? We have no place for an anti-American party, but is it on the left skeptical of migration and culturally more conservative? erstwhile Paulina Matysiak announced the creation of the “Yes to Development” AssociationIt was compared to Wagenknecht.
In Poland, as in Hungary, it is besides late for that, the window of anticipation has closed. The minute to build a akin formation was erstwhile the current organization division, based on the polarization of PO-PiS, developed. Then the left could appear with, say, a average cultural agenda, akin to the then PO, and an economical agenda not far from then PiS. The SLD tried to go down this road for a while, balancing between the 2 poles, which did not have the worst effect, as the result of this organization in the 2010 parliamentary election and Napieralski in the presidential election, in which he finished third, winning over 13.5% of the vote.
Since 2010, however, a lot has changed in Poland politically and socially. The divisions deepened and imposed various axes of dispute: economic, cultural, central-periphery. There's no force to teardrop this weave apart today. It is surely not the left.
Entering identity policy facilitated her return to the Sejm in 2019. But it gives no space to develop. In Poland, as in Turkey and Israel, the left is present the most extremist cultural faction of a wide liberal camp. The defeats of all independent organization launch attempts Together show that there is no area for another left, powerfully oriented on socio-economic issues.
Together it has always been a very progressive culturally organization that has never attempted to temper its message to more conservative voters.
The electorate, which the BSW kind reaches for, is not necessarily conservative, but has different priorities than the 1 that raises the "levice lifestyle". The only successful populist movement in Poland outside the right, able to scope for the social electorate, was Self-defense. But her electorate besides spread across the PiS and Platform. Which shows that this dual – as if we did not complain about it – reflects how the Polish society in the 21st century truly shares.
Two conclusions come from the success of the BSW for Polish political life. First, the left cannot pretend indefinitely that it is not in crisis and sit on the barricade as it did for years of SPD. As a result, a organization with more than 150 years of tradition, with millions of voters, inactive a powerful membership base, is present profoundly divided and increasingly helpless against the challenges of the modern world. Secondly, in good times it is possible for years to pretend that Western Europe and the United States have no conflicting interests. But these contradictions exist. Poland will besides gotta specify itself to them and find out somehow. Especially if Trump wins in November.
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Rafał Chwedoruk − Politologist, habilitated doctor of humanities, university professor, University of Warsaw.
