The alleged doctrine of Gierasimov, or hybrid war, information war or the last word - Cognitive War, it's all the same - and that's what I've been describing for years on the blog and in the Werwolf study.
What military specialists and peculiar services are developing/ studying, I myself noticed and described it.
I wrote it all on the basis of reflection and public sources.
Which means everyone has access to this information and anyone could describe it.
So why did I - collect specified an extended compedium on this subject and others did not?
Because seemingly others are not curious in stems, they are not curious in their country.
They are not taught to do this, they do not have the habit, but they have the habit of going easy and alternatively of analyzing things themselves - they scope for the prepared formulas of others - frequently false and specially sold for misinformation.
And that should be changed.
It is essential to rise patriotic and affect citizens, mainly men, in building permanent resilience of the state to hybrid attack, to cognitive war, to war in general.
The article confirms what I wrote on the blog - the cognitive war is now in progress.
It has been going on since 1944, for 80 years - it is time to wake up and take it!
The conventional war did not go to the lame, but the war as specified changed and the conventional perception of war no longer applies.
Now politics is simply a continuation of war - but besides mass media, 5th column, and the means of war become a widely understood "council" of beliefs.
The description of the war as a "continuation of politics, but another means" no longer applies in the "Gierasimov Doctrine" due to the fact that it does not treat war as a continuation of politics, but politics as a continuation of war, stressing that effective policy conduct may include a wider arsenal of non-military measures and methods
I would besides like to point out that Gierasimov published his article in March 2013, almost 2 years after me, due to the fact that I published the Werwolf text on August 28, 2011.
The Gierasimov Doctrine is only a contractual word and adolescence, it refers to an article in which the Russian general outlined certain problems of modern war.
below fragments from English wikipedia
automatic translation
Gierasimova Doctrine, named after the Chief of General Staff of the FR Armed Forces General Walerij Gierasimov, is simply a pseudomilitary doctrine created by Western media and any Russian analysts.
Armed actions
Furthermore, the doctrine assumes "information confrontation", without specifying whether these actions are military or non-military.
wikipedia for Poles
Non-military methods (economic, political, informational) can be equally good and possibly even more effective than conventional attacks.
The advantage of the opponent can be offset by the interior opposition, controlled by peculiar services, which will make a friendly front in the enemy state.
One form of usage of armed forces abroad may be seemingly peaceful and indeed military (conducted as: humanitarian, rescue, sanitary cordon, evacuation, etc.).
Gierasimov recalled russian strategist Alexander Swieczin, who stood in the position that all war requires individual analysis and a separate methodology and agreed with his opinion.
The concept of the next generation war
The fundamental difference between the conventional war and the next generation war, described by Gierasimov, is to take into account the crucial function played by actions specified as disinformation, chaos, destabilisation of the region. He described it as an indirect action strategy and the usage of non-military measures, virtually "non-military".
The name of the doctrine suggests that Gierasimov is the author and originator of all solutions. Indeed, the extra-military ways of supporting or creating wars he mentioned have been known and applied since ancient times.
In the 20th century, Russian soldiers described the concept of "small war" (the investigation was conducted by Boris Smysłowski) and "rebellious war" (described by Evgeny Messner).
The abroad Intelligence Service (SWR) of Russia recognized the abroad Minister of Poland's pre-war Józef Beck as an agent of German intelligence.
Seweryn Osiński - "5th Column in Gdansk Pomerania" page 266
Isserson:
Neither was any serious effort to erect field fortifications in the days before the outbreak of war. Poland The General Staff has carelessly declared that there is no request for this: the war will be waged as a mobile war.
Thus the Polish army marched towards the hurricane, which prepared to wipe it off the face of the earth.
how we managed to concentrate almost 1 and a half million armies secretly and unnoticed on the Polish border and deploy it to invade the full front.
In fact, there was nothing peculiarly hidden about it. The concentration of German forces increased from period to month, from week to week. To set the date of its commencement, we must go back to 1938, the period after the accession of the Czech Republic and Moravia to Germany. erstwhile forces accumulate so gradually, first in one, then in the other, and then in the third, the process of concentration does not get any independent expression in time and is absorbed by a number of another events that accompany it. [method of tiny steps - MS]
When you dip your finger alternately in a cold and then hot water vessel, you can immediately find the temperature difference. But if you dip your finger in a water vessel gradually heated over low heat, it is very hard to find a gradual change in temperature.
In the same way, the concentration, compressed in a short time and creating exceptional tension in the operation of transport, becomes a dominant phenomenon during a given period and can be easy detected.
However, concentration, which takes place gradually and consistently and prolongs over time, is very hard to calculate, or alternatively distracts and dulls observation. And that was the nature of the concentration of German troops.
This concentration was no longer one, single at the time of the action, which began and ended with certain pre-defined hours, and the duration could have been about calculated by the enemy.
The concentration took on a deep character. No 1 can evidence his beginnings at all. Its continuation always leaves uncertainty as to whether it is preparing for a real armed uprising or whether it is simply a strengthening of the diplomatic threat. Its end only reveals the very fact of armed action.
So the modern war begins before the armed struggle.
Polish-German War
3. Errors of Polish command
The Polish command besides made strategical errors and miscalculations which cannot be straight dependent solely on the interior political decay of the erstwhile Polish state. They are rooted in a striking deficiency of knowing of the fresh conditions in which modern war may take place.
In this respect, the war was mainly lost by the Polish General Staff. which was an example of a terrible misunderstanding of the strategical situation and its fundamental misassessment. The French General Staff made a immense mistake in assessing the strategical situation, joining the war of 1870. However, Polish strategists far surpassed the sad past lessons shown by their teachers. Mistakes of the Polish command can be brought to 3 main ones.
1. On the Polish side, the main German forces were believed to be bound in the west by the actions of France and England and would not be able to concentrate in the east. It was assumed that around 20 divisions would be left against Poland, and all another forces would be thrown west against the English-French invasion. So large was the belief in the strength and velocity of the Allied offensive. So the plan to strategically deploy Germany in the event of a war on 2 fronts was completely wrong. German capabilities in the air were besides assessed. Finally, they powerfully hoped for direct and effective assistance from England from the air and sea forces. Without trace, historical lessons from the past have passed, which have repeatedly shown the actual price of the promised aid to England, which has always been able to fight only abroad soldiers.
More false conclusions are drawn from all these false calculations. They think you can handle almost 1 army in peacetime. That's why they don't rush to mobilize the second line division. However, this is widely announced, promising the mobilisation of the 2 millionth army. specified misinformation was thought to scare the enemy. However, the effect was completely opposite, as in consequence the German command concentrated even more forces against Poland. [c. 1.8 million - MS]
2. On the Polish side, it was believed that erstwhile it comes to active actions from Germany, it could only be about Gdańsk, not even about the full Gdańsk and Poznań Corridor, separated from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, they did not realize the real aims and intentions of the enemy at all, bringing the full issue of the long overdue conflict exclusively to Gdańsk.
Therefore, very small attention was paid to the Silesian direction, where the main impact of the German troops actually came from.
3. On the Polish side, it was considered that Germany would not be able to immediately shift all the forces intended against Poland, as this would require their mobilisation and concentration. So we inactive have an first period ahead of us, which will let Zeros to occupy Gdańsk, and in the meantime even east Prussia.
Thus, Germany's readiness to mobilize and their accession to the war all the forces intended for this intent stay unaware of the Polish General Staff.
Poles did not realize the strategical situation, and it was already a failure of at least the first phase of the war, if not the full war.
In this respect, the war was lost to Poland before it began.
Poland had about 3 million trained soldiers, more than half of whom were trained after 1920. However, a large part of this trained flock was completely unused. As a result, in September 1939, up to 50% of those capable of military service remained outside the army.
Let's win this war, let's win the war with Germany.
--------------
Gierasimova Doctrine, named after the Chief of General Staff of the FR Armed Forces General Walerij Gierasimov, is simply a pseudomilitary doctrine created by Western media and any Russian analysts.
It is based on Gierasimov's views on the modern war of the United States, putting interstate conflicts and war activities on a par with political, economic, informational actions, humanitarian and another non-military activities.
Fixed au about him loudly after Mark Galeotti coined this word on his blog "In Moscow Shadows" and After the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea by Russia. any Western analysts were convinced that Russia's actions reflected "the Gierasimova doctrine", contributing to the dissemination of this word and making it a fashionable slogan.
The thought of the existence of the "Gierasimov doctrine" is questioned by many researchers and specialists from Russian military thought and doctrine. According to them, the key elements of Gierasimov's doctrine are at the heart of the fresh Generation War. Many besides claim that Gierasimov never wanted to present doctrine, or alternatively asked scientists from the Russian Academy of Military Sciences to conduct investigation that would aid him realize fresh ways of conducting war in the West.
Gierasimov's article was a transcript of his yearly speech and presentation at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in March 2013, erstwhile he attempted to explain the way the West engages in war activities and the increasing importance of non-military instruments to accomplish military objectives.
The thought of the existence of the "Gierasimov doctrine" is questioned by many researchers and specialists from Russian military thought and doctrine. According to them, the key elements of Gierasimov's doctrine are at the heart of the fresh Generation War. Many besides claim that Gierasimov never wanted to present doctrine, or alternatively asked scientists from the Russian Academy of Military Sciences to conduct investigation that would aid him realize fresh ways of conducting war in the West.
Gierasimov's article was a transcript of his yearly speech and presentation at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in March 2013, erstwhile he attempted to explain the way the West engages in war activities and the increasing importance of non-military instruments to accomplish military objectives.
In another words, these were the views of Gierasimov about modern American methods of war. This article was reprinted in the English magazine Military Review, and then quoted repeatedly in the Western press.
Gierasimov's views on future war activities
Doctrine assumes the ratio of non-military to military action in a 4:1 ratio.
Gierasimov's views on future war activities
Doctrine assumes the ratio of non-military to military action in a 4:1 ratio.
Gierasimov stresses "the importance of controlling the information space and coordination in real-time all aspects of the campaign, as well as the usage of targeted strikes deep into enemy territory and destroying critical civilian and military infrastructure".
It besides proposes masking regular military units "in disguise of peacekeeping forces or crisis management forces".
Armed actions
Military strategical deterrent measures
Strategic implementation
Warfare (war action)
Peacekeeping operations
Hybrid War Stages and Processes
Non-military activities
Strategic implementation
Warfare (war action)
Peacekeeping operations
Hybrid War Stages and Processes
Non-military activities
Creating coalitions and alliances
Political and diplomatic pressures
Economic penalties
Economic blockade
Breaking diplomatic relations
Formation of political opposition
Actions of opposition forces
Conversion of the economy of the country confronting Russia into military tracks[citation needed]
Finding ways to resolve the conflict
Change in political leadership of the country towards Russia
Implementation of a set of actions to reduce tensions in relations following a change in political leadership
especially these last 2 points are crucial regarding the war in Ukraine - MS
Political and diplomatic pressures
Economic penalties
Economic blockade
Breaking diplomatic relations
Formation of political opposition
Actions of opposition forces
Conversion of the economy of the country confronting Russia into military tracks[citation needed]
Finding ways to resolve the conflict
Change in political leadership of the country towards Russia
Implementation of a set of actions to reduce tensions in relations following a change in political leadership
especially these last 2 points are crucial regarding the war in Ukraine - MS
Furthermore, the doctrine assumes "information confrontation", without specifying whether these actions are military or non-military.
wikipedia for Poles
Lecture and publication
On 9 November 2012, Gierasimov was appointed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. On January 25, 2013, he was invited as a talker to a conference of the Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow, during which he gave a lecture on the wars of the future and referred to the concept of a next generation war.
The key thesis of Gierasimov’s lecture was contained in the article “The Value of discipline in Prediction. fresh challenges require rethinking the forms and methods of war.” The text was published on 27 February 2013 in the paper "Military-Industrial Courier" (ru. "Военно-промышленный курьер"), then on the newspaper's website (vpk-news.ru)
Summary of the article
Gierasimova's main thesis:
The key thesis of Gierasimov’s lecture was contained in the article “The Value of discipline in Prediction. fresh challenges require rethinking the forms and methods of war.” The text was published on 27 February 2013 in the paper "Military-Industrial Courier" (ru. "Военно-промышленный курьер"), then on the newspaper's website (vpk-news.ru)
Summary of the article
Gierasimova's main thesis:
The events of the arabian Spring show that a decently functioning state can in a short time, even a fewer days, plunge into chaos, become an arena of combat, alien intervention, civilian war and humanitarian disaster [nearly my words! - MS]
The next generation war differs from conventional armed conflicts.
Non-military methods (economic, political, informational) can be equally good and possibly even more effective than conventional attacks.
The possible of the protesting population, the information struggle, the activities of peculiar services, and military forces can besides be utilized under the pretext of maintaining peace and mastering the crisis in a destabilised region.
[a crisis related to the activity of Werwolf [a fighting democracy?] could be used, for example, by the US, which is now present in Poland - we remember Machiavelli's warnings - MS]
The advantage of the opponent can be offset by the interior opposition, controlled by peculiar services, which will make a friendly front in the enemy state.
One form of usage of armed forces abroad may be seemingly peaceful and indeed military (conducted as: humanitarian, rescue, sanitary cordon, evacuation, etc.).
Gierasimov recalled russian strategist Alexander Swieczin, who stood in the position that all war requires individual analysis and a separate methodology and agreed with his opinion.
In addition, he cited the book "New Forms of Combat" by the russian military theorist, Chief of Staff of the 7th Army and lecturer of the General Staff Academy of the General Staff of Colonel Gieorgij Samojlowicz Issierson, which was published in 1940.
Gierasimov praised the author for his observations about a fresh way of conducting wars without their resignation, which did not meet the approval of the commanders of the time. He called Issierson a “prophecy”, incomprehensible in his homeland.
The concept of the next generation war
The fundamental difference between the conventional war and the next generation war, described by Gierasimov, is to take into account the crucial function played by actions specified as disinformation, chaos, destabilisation of the region. He described it as an indirect action strategy and the usage of non-military measures, virtually "non-military".
The name of the doctrine suggests that Gierasimov is the author and originator of all solutions. Indeed, the extra-military ways of supporting or creating wars he mentioned have been known and applied since ancient times.
During his lecture at the Academy of Military Sciences, Gierasimov referred to Sun Zi's War Art, written in the 6th century BCE and its concept of winning war without combat action.
In turn, in his article, he recalled the book Issierson of 1940 in the context of conducting war without its resignation, which was besides not a fresh phenomenon from the position of Issierson, due to the fact that in this way the 3rd German Reich and the russian Union attacked Poland 1 year before its publication.
[it would should be checked if it was consistent with the content of the book - MS]
In the 20th century, Russian soldiers described the concept of "small war" (the investigation was conducted by Boris Smysłowski) and "rebellious war" (described by Evgeny Messner).
The issue of "asymmetric war response" was besides analysed. These concepts contain many elements in common with the next generation war described by Gierasimov, e.g.: no formal declaration of war, chaos in armed formations, Inability to delegate formation to a peculiar country, the chaos on the front line or its complete absence, military actions conducted within the state or distant from borders, blurring differences between the period of war and peace.
In May 2013, before the publication of the Gierasimov article, a akin imagination was presented by Igor Girkin, who held that: "The basis for success in new-type wars is preventive peculiar operations alternatively than large-scale military operations".
In May 2013, before the publication of the Gierasimov article, a akin imagination was presented by Igor Girkin, who held that: "The basis for success in new-type wars is preventive peculiar operations alternatively than large-scale military operations".
[in May, March ? - it seems that the author of the entry has calendar problems - MS]
Colonel Mirosław Banasik assumed that Gierasimov was not the author of the concept due to the fact that he presented it after only 3 months of his position and had not previously dealt with the analysis of war tactics, and the actual idear could have been Nikolai Makarov, the erstwhile Chief of the General Staff.
Colonel Mirosław Banasik assumed that Gierasimov was not the author of the concept due to the fact that he presented it after only 3 months of his position and had not previously dealt with the analysis of war tactics, and the actual idear could have been Nikolai Makarov, the erstwhile Chief of the General Staff.
Michael Kofman (Wilson Center, manager of Russian Studies at NCA) stood in the position that Gierasimov specializes in the armored war, and the improvement of military tactics requires coordinated work of the human staff. Therefore, he assumed that Gierasimov had reported on the military circles, commonly known assumptions, recalling the thoughts of various analysts and authors, with any of the postulates being so general that they could be applied to virtually any conflict.
Below is simply a fragment of Isserson's study.
The subject is extensive, I urge attention and my own studio.
Below is simply a fragment of Isserson's study.
It is hard to measure how much propaganda and how much reliable analysis.
Let us remember the remarks of Seweryn Osiński from the book "5 column in the Pomeranian Gdańsk" about the fact that the highest authorities (Józef Beck - min. on page 187) underestimated alarming reports from Pomerania, Which may have meant there was a German agent in command, or just possessed.
What about today?
Isserson's words seem to confirm the existence of influence... and in 2009 specified information appeared:
The abroad Intelligence Service (SWR) of Russia recognized the abroad Minister of Poland's pre-war Józef Beck as an agent of German intelligence.
The book Osiński shows that:
The war was certain
Seweryn Osiński - "5th Column in Gdansk Pomerania" page 266
Neither was any serious effort to erect field fortifications in the days before the outbreak of war. Poland The General Staff has carelessly declared that there is no request for this: the war will be waged as a mobile war.
Thus the Polish army marched towards the hurricane, which prepared to wipe it off the face of the earth.
how we managed to concentrate almost 1 and a half million armies secretly and unnoticed on the Polish border and deploy it to invade the full front.
In fact, there was nothing peculiarly hidden about it. The concentration of German forces increased from period to month, from week to week. To set the date of its commencement, we must go back to 1938, the period after the accession of the Czech Republic and Moravia to Germany. erstwhile forces accumulate so gradually, first in one, then in the other, and then in the third, the process of concentration does not get any independent expression in time and is absorbed by a number of another events that accompany it. [method of tiny steps - MS]
When you dip your finger alternately in a cold and then hot water vessel, you can immediately find the temperature difference. But if you dip your finger in a water vessel gradually heated over low heat, it is very hard to find a gradual change in temperature.
In the same way, the concentration, compressed in a short time and creating exceptional tension in the operation of transport, becomes a dominant phenomenon during a given period and can be easy detected.
However, concentration, which takes place gradually and consistently and prolongs over time, is very hard to calculate, or alternatively distracts and dulls observation. And that was the nature of the concentration of German troops.
This concentration was no longer one, single at the time of the action, which began and ended with certain pre-defined hours, and the duration could have been about calculated by the enemy.
The concentration took on a deep character. No 1 can evidence his beginnings at all. Its continuation always leaves uncertainty as to whether it is preparing for a real armed uprising or whether it is simply a strengthening of the diplomatic threat. Its end only reveals the very fact of armed action.
So the modern war begins before the armed struggle.
3. Errors of Polish command
The Polish command besides made strategical errors and miscalculations which cannot be straight dependent solely on the interior political decay of the erstwhile Polish state. They are rooted in a striking deficiency of knowing of the fresh conditions in which modern war may take place.
In this respect, the war was mainly lost by the Polish General Staff. which was an example of a terrible misunderstanding of the strategical situation and its fundamental misassessment. The French General Staff made a immense mistake in assessing the strategical situation, joining the war of 1870. However, Polish strategists far surpassed the sad past lessons shown by their teachers. Mistakes of the Polish command can be brought to 3 main ones.
1. On the Polish side, the main German forces were believed to be bound in the west by the actions of France and England and would not be able to concentrate in the east. It was assumed that around 20 divisions would be left against Poland, and all another forces would be thrown west against the English-French invasion. So large was the belief in the strength and velocity of the Allied offensive. So the plan to strategically deploy Germany in the event of a war on 2 fronts was completely wrong. German capabilities in the air were besides assessed. Finally, they powerfully hoped for direct and effective assistance from England from the air and sea forces. Without trace, historical lessons from the past have passed, which have repeatedly shown the actual price of the promised aid to England, which has always been able to fight only abroad soldiers.
More false conclusions are drawn from all these false calculations. They think you can handle almost 1 army in peacetime. That's why they don't rush to mobilize the second line division. However, this is widely announced, promising the mobilisation of the 2 millionth army. specified misinformation was thought to scare the enemy. However, the effect was completely opposite, as in consequence the German command concentrated even more forces against Poland. [c. 1.8 million - MS]
2. On the Polish side, it was believed that erstwhile it comes to active actions from Germany, it could only be about Gdańsk, not even about the full Gdańsk and Poznań Corridor, separated from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, they did not realize the real aims and intentions of the enemy at all, bringing the full issue of the long overdue conflict exclusively to Gdańsk.
Therefore, very small attention was paid to the Silesian direction, where the main impact of the German troops actually came from.
3. On the Polish side, it was considered that Germany would not be able to immediately shift all the forces intended against Poland, as this would require their mobilisation and concentration. So we inactive have an first period ahead of us, which will let Zeros to occupy Gdańsk, and in the meantime even east Prussia.
Thus, Germany's readiness to mobilize and their accession to the war all the forces intended for this intent stay unaware of the Polish General Staff.
Poles did not realize the strategical situation, and it was already a failure of at least the first phase of the war, if not the full war.
In this respect, the war was lost to Poland before it began.
German road plans from 1935u.
On the complexity of Polish military operations against Germany was besides determined by the fact that the erstwhile Poland was preparing for war, not in the West, but in the East, against the russian Union throughout the period of its regrettable existence.
Her western boundary belt was not treated as an operating base. Rather, it was a rear base, not intended for the function of theatre of war activities. It had no fortifications, but was richly saturated with back bases and warehouses. In addition, [33] in the west of erstwhile Poland were all military and economical facilities and the centre of Polish industry. In advanced Silesia there were 95% of Polish coal mining, 10 plants and lead, delivering 100% lead and lead (108 1000 tonnes per year) and nitrogen plants, providing 50% of the full Polish nitrogen production. In general, the full economical base of the erstwhile Poland was in the west. All communications and trade routes with Western Europe went through Western regions.
Thus, by deploying westward against Germany, Poles accepted the war with their backs alternatively than with their fronts.
Thus, by deploying westward against Germany, Poles accepted the war with their backs alternatively than with their fronts.
Poland had about 3 million trained soldiers, more than half of whom were trained after 1920. However, a large part of this trained flock was completely unused. As a result, in September 1939, up to 50% of those capable of military service remained outside the army.
Stutthof Part 4 (Autostrada or War?):
On labour Day on May 1, 1935, a map with the primary government network was published Reichs with a dimension of 6900 km from May 1934 and road surface to be completed in 1935. [7][8]
The Berlin–Szczecin and Elbing–Königsberg episodes were marked as being under construction, of which the Bern–Angermünde section and the section under Königsberg were to be mobile in 1935. By Pomerania a comparatively schematic and simple way through Labes, Polzin, Bublitz and Bütow was recorded, and behind the breach in the corridor in the area of Gdańsk to Elbląg.
It all shows that The war was 100% sure. and it was definitely planned since 1920, and Poland's business was included in the 1926 plans.
Were the Polish authorities preparing for war?
I urge the book Seweryn Osiński - V column on Pomeranian Gdańsk - link at the end of the article.
The revisionist policy of the Weimar Republic of the 1920s sought the annexation of the Polish Pomerania in global arbitration mode. The German government besides offered unofficially to Poland access to the sea at the expense of Lithuania (through the port in Polanga).
The eventual request of Adolf Hitler from October 1938 to Poland to agree to the annexation of Gdańsk by the 3rd Reich, despite the fact that Gdańsk was not within the Polish borders and on the extraterritorial road and railway line, passing across Pomerania, In return, Poland was to receive an extension of the non-aggression pact for 25 years.
in return, Poland was to receive an extension of the non-aggression pact for 25 years - I'm sorry. their goal was and is to exterminate Poles
For Germany without subjugating Poland - there is no future.
German aggression is inevitable
which I have described on this blog for 14 years
Let's win this war, let's win the war with Germany.
--------------
29 January 2020
Joseph Beck German agent
My opinion of Beck's agenthood is based, for example, on the reading of S. Osiński's book "5 column in the Pomeranian Gdańsk" (no reaction of Beck to reports from the region), in addition to the general reasoning about the policy of the Wolsudczyks, it comes to this my fresh experience with pushing, which may have been Beck's, was only his outer shell... and now here:
"And Józef Beck, Polish abroad Minister, was bought by Goering. We've published papers about it. Moreover, inYnika is from the evidence of the interrogation of Lieutenant General Alfred Gerstenberg, a military attaché in Bucharest.
He was previously in Warsaw and then in Bucharest. He was not asked questions, he simply said that Goering had met with Joseph Beck while hunting and invited him to say so, to work for Germany.
The payment was a check for 300,000 Reich brands. Incidentally, this is confirmed by papers from abroad intelligence, which she besides wrote a fewer years ago, that Józef Beck actually put Poland under a German axe. "
"A Юзеф Бек, министр иностранных дел Польши, был куплен Герингом. Мы об этом. Причём это протокола допроса генерал-лейтенанта Альфреда, военного атташе в Бухаресте. Он был этого в Варшаве, а в в Бухаресте. Ему не задавали, он просто, что Геринг время своей встретился Юзефом Юзефом Беком и и и и так, так сказать, работать на на Германию.
Платой был чек 300 тысяч рейхсмарок. И это подтверждается и и документами она она лет назад тоже тоже тоже писала о о что что что и и и по, по по по дела дела, положил Польшу под германский. "
2009:
Right Eye: Stutthof part 4 (Autostrada or war?) (maciesynak.blogspot.com)
Gierasimova Doctrine - Wikipedia, free encyclopedia
Gierasimova Doctrine - Wikipedia, free encyclopedia
Gierasimova Doctrine - Wikipedia, free encyclopedia
Gierasimova Doctrine - Wikipedia, free encyclopedia
Wikipedia links:
https://militera.lib.ru/science/isseerson/02.html
https://archive.ph/20120802040038/http://www.innenministerium.bayern.de/bauen/strassenbau/baukultur/08090/
Right Eye: Joseph Beck German agent (maciejsynak.blogspot.com)
Right Eye: Anyone can work in a German interview (maciejsynak.blogspot.com)
Right Eye: China - Pocovid Power (maciejsynak.blogspot.com)
Chomikuj.pl/Fotopomnik/Documents/Scans
