"Fiodor Lukjanov: The West risked Russia's defeat and alternatively drove itself into it. The long 20th century is over. The fresh planet is built by self-determination."

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Russia in Global Affairs
ARCHIVEAL PHOTO: gathering at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on 24 June 2025 in The Hague, Netherlands. © Lina Selg - Pool / Getty Images


Two quotes, separated by 4 years, show how profoundly global policy has changed.

The first is: "The United States of America undertakes to prevent further expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to the east and refuse to join the Alliance by the States of the erstwhile russian Union". It comes from Article 4 of the draft treaty on safety guarantees, submitted by Russia in Washington on 15 December 2021, a proposal made public with a parallel agreement addressed to NATO. The demands, halting NATO expansion and restoring the alliance to its 1997 configuration, were treated in the West as impudence. Even provocative. In Russia many analysts besides had difficulty interpreting this move: a final warning, a bargaining card or a declaration of intent?

The second quote appears in the chapter "Supporting European Size" of the US National safety Strategy, published on 4 December 2025: "The precedence of our common line on Europe ... is to put an end to the perception of NATO as a constantly expanding alliance and to prevent its achievement". This caused an equally large stir, among another things, due to the fact that the chapter on Europe, whose west is Washington's main ally, was written in a speech bordering on open hostility. Critics argued that the text reflected only 1 faction in Trump's administration and noted that Michael Anton, commonly regarded as the lead author, shortly resigned. However, the fact remains: it is now a formal doctrine of U.S. security.

Between these 2 statements lies the cascade of dramatic events. The year 2025 marked not only the fast acceleration of change, but besides the end of the historical phase, which had developed for years. Trump and “trumpism” were not born in vacuum; they were the consequence of accumulated contradictions that yet reached critical mass.

Memoranda issued in late 2021, in accordance with president Putin's instructions to the Ministry of abroad Affairs, were the last effort to signal the seriousness of the situation and encourage genuine discussion on European security. Moscow's message was simple: her patience ran out, and her deficiency of consequence to her concerns would lead to "military-technical measures".

This signal has been ignored. At the time, many in the West assumed the Kremlin was bluffing. In retrospect, this seems alternatively strategical indifference than disbelief. Western governments understood that escalation was probable, but considered armed confrontation to be better than a revision of their own dogmas regarding NATO's enlargement and "an global rule-based order".

The goal was not to provoke or avoid war.

In Washington and Brussels, concessions to Moscow were mostly seen as unacceptable. Besides, there was a silent belief that Russia would neglect and that it was incapable to change the balance of power.

Russia's motivations towards Ukraine were mixed and evolved over time: discontent with NATO-focused safety architecture, strategical concerns and, increasingly, historical and cultural perception of Ukraine as part of Russian civilization space. Over the last 4 years, this balance has moved more towards self-determination than strategy adjustments. However, conflict besides became an impulse for a much wider strategy change. The structural tensions in the planet order have surfaced and their consequences are now far beyond the first intent of the participants.

Compared to Moscow's 2021 proposals, today's situation seems to be the other of what Russia wanted: a deeper militarization of NATO, Finland and Sweden in the alliance, expanding tension in the Baltic Sea region, instability in the Black Sea and Ukraine acting as a substitute party. Meanwhile, Russian area for manoeuvre in diplomacy narrowed down due to the fact that attention focused on the battlefield.

But something else happened, something NATO itself didn't predict.


In 2022 NATO rediscovered its purpose. A well-known opponent returned to the stage, restoring consistency to the alliance for a long time with doubts about its identity. The language of “free planet versus tyranny”, profoundly rooted in Cold War mythology, has again become a communicative ordering Western politics.


The EU has gained moral clarity at no cost. Ukraine was a organization active in a direct confrontation. The Western capitals had hoped that Russia could be pushed to a strategical defeat without direct military commitment.


This anticipation proved to be wrong.


Both Russia and Ukraine have shown extraordinary resilience. It became a trap for NATO. The Alliance, especially Western Europe, was simply not prepared for a long-term confrontation, even indirect. Structural weaknesses in military production have become impossible to hide. Political unity became increasingly fragile: maintaining public support required constant emotional escalation of rhetoric about Russia and continuing to confirm the function of Kiev as a symbolic frontline.


Gradually, Western Europe has become a hostage to a conflict that it itself has shaped but could not get out of. Almost all political decision became subject to the war.


A decisive change came from Washington.


Even without Trump, there has already been a trend of gradual withdrawal, driven by aversion to the hazard of direct confrontation with atomic power and the economical benefits of the EU's disconnection from Russia. However, Trump accelerated and formalized this change.


His presidency marks a historical breakthrough. The United States departs from the large task “global leadership”, which defined the 20th century. Biden's administration was in many respects the eventual effort to preserve this world. A nostalgic reconstruction of an era whose foundations no longer exist.


Two processes, supported by American support for Ukraine, proved decisive.


Firstly, economical benefits flowed from Europe to the United States through protectionism, energy prices and industrial relocation. Secondly, a loose coalition emerged in the outside world, which Moscow calls the “global majority”, composed of countries reluctant to comply with the ideological force of the US.

Trump finished his turn. Western Europe is now being treated as a subordinate partner who has been ordered to show autonomy without opposing Washington at the same time. Elsewhere, the United States prefers transactional, bilateral pressure, assuming that their comparative strength is best suited to one-on-one clashes. However, this presumption is questionable in relations with China, Russia and India.


Washington itself disassembles the organization strategy that he erstwhile built – the architecture that shaped the postwar world. NATO, the fundamental structure of the end of the 20th century, is now being repositioned. Expanding the alliance generates crises; crises distract from priorities; priorities now lie in the Western hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific region. Hence the unexpected wording in the National safety strategy 2025, effectively confirming the request to halt NATO's progress.


Over the last 4 years the world's order has changed, and this process has not come to an end. The European Union, erstwhile advertised as a model of progress, is becoming more and more like a relic of the passing era, yet refuses to accept this reality. The dismantling of the integration task would be politically and economically dangerous; maintaining it unchanged is equally untenable.


In many respects, global dynamics has approached long-term criticism of the West-centric strategy from Russia. This criticism was based on the decision to launch a military operation in Ukraine. The tasks of this operation are carried out more slow than expected, but a wider change in global relations is unquestionable.


Russia is now active in a deeper process of self-determination. russian heritage – political, territorial and intellectual – yet fades. Administrative boundaries, erstwhile regarded as sacred, are no longer seen as unchanged. The question of what is “our” and what is “theirs” has returned as an existential question, and this interior settlement is now inextricably related to Russia's function in shaping the emerging world.


The fresh global strategy will not be created by external expansion. Rather, this will be due to the success or failure of national improvement models. The large powers turn towards each other, putting interior opposition as the foundation of external influences.


This in turn raises the stakes. Mistakes in abroad policy can be corrected. The 20th century, whose legacy is just coming to an end, has proved it many times.


This article was originally published in Profile magazine and a translation and editorial was conducted by RT team.



Translated by Google Translator

source:https://www.rt.com/news/630334-fyodor-lukyanov-west-armed-on-russias-defeat/

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