Friday: Starzyński did not paint grass green [talk]

krytykapolityczna.pl 2 years ago

Michał Sutowski: Did Stefan Starzyński, erstwhile he became president of the capital, have this large imagination of modern, monumental Warsaw, for which he was remembered by the descendants? Or was it a struggle?

Gregory Friday: I'm certain he didn't have a imagination at the entrance, especially since he was only expected to be president temporarily, for a fewer weeks, until the election was set up after suddenly, in the summertime of 1934, a vacancy appeared. His predecessor, Marian Zyndram Kościałkowski, besides the chamber president, and thus appointed by the Minister of the Interior, not elected by the local government, was rather unexpectedly appointed as head of... MMA, after Bronisław Pieracki died in an assassination effort organized by Ukrainian nationalists. Starzyński was considered an efficient organizer and did not have much to do, hence this abrupt and amazing nomination for everyone.

But I believe Starzyński has introduced fresh quality to city planning.

Zyndram started throwing slogans related to modernization, spatial planning, returning Warsaw to Wisla, etc. for respective months. In this way, he has been tricking ideas that urbanists have been reporting for years, dissatisfied with the appearance of the capital and its functioning. Starzyński would most likely take over this agenda, but he truly liked the planning of Warsaw, its urban planning and architecture, during his office. Notabene extended to over 4 years before the elections were held in 1938.

And what inspired him to taste it?

There is 1 ground-breaking reason that is easy to identify, i.e. the exhibition entitled Warsaw of the future, which he organized in 1936. Architects and urbanists have been killing for years with erstwhile presidents so that they can show their own projects, plans for large institutions and investors, but besides spark a social discussion about the city.

Starzyński picked up this idea, including in the context of the run for local elections. The election did not take place again, due to the fact that he had his word extended from the top, but the exhibition – yes. And it turned out to be a success, and he noticed – after the reactions of the press, which so far attacked him from the law and from the left – that abruptly the newspapers praised him. Even if the teeth are clenched, they appreciate that at last the president of Warsaw shows the patron of power and her interest in these matters.

So he saw the image possible in town planning?

Speaking the language of the day, propaganda. But remember that already coming to the town hall, Starzyński was a fan of planning as such. Being an economist and an economical politician, with a past in the Ministry of Treasury, and then in the Bank of the National Farm, he was looking at russian five-year-olds and firmly convinced that if the state hierarchically, top-down and precisely planned not to manage the economy, it would end in chaos and waste. That's why the ideas of architects and urbanists hit him on susceptible ground.

And how do we know about these russian economical five-year plans as his model?

For example, from his adversaries, especially conservative Pilsudczyk politicians, who called him Polish Bolshevik. This can besides be seen in his publications and programming texts from before the May coup – he does not look with admiration at the russian Union itself, but at economical planning definitely yes. In fact, this was the atmosphere of an era around the world, especially after the large Depression of 1929, erstwhile everyone saw what capitalism led to.

The State's interference in the economy as a recipe for a economical crisis is in fact part of sound economical sense, likewise large investments. But modern city planning is an earlier invention, isn't it? Did not the Polish elite alternatively impress Baron Haussmann and Napoleon III, with their extremist redevelopment of Paris in the mid-19th century?

In fact, it was the plans and realizations of Haussmann from that era that were called in inter-war Warsaw as an inspiration – penetrating boulevards, aestheticization of the city, unification of facades and general recomposition of medieval city according to modern guidelines. This name was indicated as a model of the city's host, and Warsaw was very fond of comparing itself to Paris, so it worked on imagination.

Starzyński himself was not considered a large erudite or intellectual in his surroundings – did individual tell him that Haussmann had just seen the effects of his work in Paris?

Paris surely did not know well, although we know that he was on vacation in Brittany before the presidency, so he had to at least drive through Paris. He surely heard about Haussmann in the spring of 1934, erstwhile he did not yet know that he would regulation the city – a large architectural and urban debate about Warsaw, its improvement and space, organized by the Olsudczyk architects was then held. Starzyński, as an activist of the Warsaw BBWR structures, opened this meeting.

It was there that 1 of the architects, Antoni Dygat, devoted his 19th-century redevelopment of Paris, which he called "a uniform work of art"; prof. Czesław Przybylski, in turn, stated that the form given to the capital of France by Haussmann was out of date due to the dense movement of the car, but is proof that "the effort of 1 generation can be changed into a composed whole".

And so this is simply a model for the actions of power?

Yes, and action, perpetuity, building power – these were key concepts that organized the imagination of its environment. In the 1920s, there were no architects or urbanists in the vicinity of Starzyński, but colleagues from Legions, especially those organized in the alleged Order of Good and Honor of Poland. These were mainly ex-military, politicians and officials from various ministries, including his Treasury Ministry, which was centered around him by Adam Skwarczyński, the ideologist of the sanatorium left and the creator of the magazine "The Road".

Was it like a Masonic lodge?

In practice, it was a think tank where men connected with power at different levels and in different industries met regularly, gave papers and it was a form of self-education and networking, but besides preparing programs for future, already created by this elite of governments. The aim was, of course, to build the power of the Polish state through this enlightened elite, and everything took place in a religious, free-molar atmosphere, with rituals referring to romanticist witches and Piłsudski figure, of course everything was secret. It is not known until present erstwhile precisely these meetings started and erstwhile they ended, although it surely took respective years.

And the secret was that there was a May bombing in perspective, which is just a coup?

It was mainly due to the habits that the Pilsudians of the Legions carried out and earlier from the conspiracy of independence, but besides from the simple fact that they dominated there were military, with their hierarchical approach, assuming secrecy and loyalty. This translated, of course, into their reasoning about the state and the function of society, which was besides close to Starzyński: the elite controls the state and possibly allows any social environment on a coopt basis.

For example, associations of local residents or entrepreneurs in any industry?

But besides experts in the field. The Piłsudskis thus took over the state: frequently alongside or over the already existing bottom-up organizations they founded, the Piłsudczyks, who began to act as the most legitimate representation of society. The façade of participation was thus built. Sometimes they besides entered already organized environments, as in the case of the Association of Polish Architects, dominated them from the inside, cooped older associations and thus united the organization, but already under their aegis.

To invest, rebuild Warsaw, plan it with momentum – it takes money. You said that in the 1930s, it was fundamentally a common sense of economical policy, but it all takes money. Sometimes there's no way to finance a debt investment by issuing bonds, etc. But the walsudians were, it seems, very conservative erstwhile it comes to monetary policy, and that doesn't aid build on power...

Of course, they watched the value of the gold, they didn't want to leave the gold standard.

Unlike another countries, in their fight against the crisis they did not devaluation national money, they defended it obsessively. I think it was the consequence of the trauma of hyperinflation and pride in the accomplishment of its choking in 1924 and the introduction of strong Polish gold.

Even though it was an endek, Władysław Grabski did a currency reform?

If you have to, the achievements are national, not party, you know.

Starzyński, if I realize correctly, had long dreamed of the function he yet had in Warsaw City Hall, a man who truly was responsible, with large power in his hand. He wanted to change reality, I get that, too. But Poland barely recovers from the economical crisis in 1934. Where did he want money for large investment programs?

He wanted to do large things in the Ministry of Treasury, he hoped to be a pilot of the Polish economy, but he did not advance sufficiently. Only in Warsaw did he get a chance to put his ideas into practice and actually started a wide investment programme, while this was based on a financial juggler – as a politician from the economy, liable for the budget earlier knew how it was done.

Is a financial juggler another creative accounting?

I wouldn't call it that, due to the fact that it sounds like illegal activity, not that. The point is, however, that he was given specified tools as the president nominated by the government, which the opposition city officials could not number on. For example, he led to a fast settlement between the Treasury and the city, which dates back to the time of the First planet War, erstwhile the city incurred various costs associated with the maintenance of the army and police as if it were a substitute for the state. In settlement – liabilities of the state in exchange for outstanding taxes – the city reached PLN 20 million per plus. In addition, Starzyński received a debt for a favorable percent from Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, whose deputy manager was just a minute ago.

School?

Yes, it was thanks to this debt that the construction of 10 general schools started, even in the first year of office, and were actually ready before the next winter. In addition, he was able to convert the city's short-term commitments into many years. Thanks to this, after the first financial year Warsaw turned out to be a slight plus, after years of immense debt.

Except any of these operations can't be repeated all year.

Of course, his opponents accused him of it – that it was not a miracle of the financial economy, but a one-time operation, in addition possible due to the fact that Starzyński has highly good access to the highest authorities of the state. Therefore, it is possible that if the war had not broken out, the bill for these investments would have hit the city’s finances in a fewer years.

You said about building 10 general schools in 1934 – this solved any of the burning problems with the deficiency of buildings in school, but it is not a very spectacular thing. Starzyński was remembered for his plans for a major reconstruction. Do I realize that these were plans for next day or even the day after?

Of course I do. Whether we are talking about the monumental territory of Marshal Pilsudski with a defilade square, embassies and ministries and the Temple of Providence, or about the sports park in Siekierki, or about the exhibition grounds planned in the area of Saska Kępa, in the place of present National Stadium and Skaryszewski Park – all these were plans for the future. Even at the start of the war, and so after 5 years of Starzyński's rule, many of these investments did not have any financial coverage or even a reliable estimate.

So what precisely was being built? In real life, not in mockups?

Starzyński acted to the degree of modest possibilities, although he had an amazing propaganda talent: he knew how to accomplish synergies between actual action and the image effect. Knowing that he had small money for investments and that he would not have much more in the close future, he decided that alternatively of patching up the side streets, scattered throughout the city, he would take over the main exit arteries of Warsaw in the first years. specified streets as Marymoncka, Wolska, Grochowska or Puławska at the time were very neglected, frequently paved with cat heads, sank in the mud, on the side were ditches. Within a fewer years, he led to the fact that they were regulated, expanded, asphalted, covered with trees and lined with pavements, where a tram was pulled up, for example, where an old-fashioned steam train utilized to scope the city as far as Puławy.

So alternatively of spending money on dozens and hundreds of tiny repairs, he did any large renovations and constructions, I understand. But somebody's gonna say it's a show.

Starzyński spent money in very visible places, but that besides means that utilized regular by tens of thousands of people. It wasn't green grass painting, it was real change. He concentrated his money where they would work best, where the streetcar led by the most people or even a simple sidewalk. He frequently talked about "productive expenditure", the most effective, but besides the most visible. So most people will appreciate these changes. So it wasn't absolutely façade.

And how did this investment policy of the city turn out on the... class side? Is it possible to find what social groups benefited more from it?

If in mine The Promised One I was afraid about how much it was apparent that measures were going primarily to better districts, that it was a two-speed city before the war – in Warsaw, though with any reservations, I do not see specified a sharp division. Starzyński predicted from the beginning that he would pull out poorer districts from neglect, and he thought about it multidimensionally. For example, he cared that urban services, to which many people did not have access, due to the fact that waterworks, electricity or trams did not scope their districts, or could not afford them – they utilized as many people as possible. He lowered tariffs everywhere, and in fact everything sank: a tram ticket, an entrance to the National Museum, an entrance to the zoo, but besides water or gas.

Was it more about social or about modernization?

Both. In this he actually saw an component of benevolence, but besides the modernization of the city, which would include subsequent social layers. In the long run, he besides hoped that if more people benefit from these services, then urban enterprises will be healthier financially, due to the fact that it was all paid and ticketed. And then they're gonna add more money to the city budget, it's expected to be specified a win-win.

What about the apartments? due to the fact that it's the most crucial manifestation of social and modernisation in one.

Starzyński was implacable on the issue of residential construction, although in Warsaw it was expensive, tight and mostly bad, and municipal construction on the scale of the city almost did not exist. He even publically argued with people who encouraged him to build urban housing, saying that Warsaw simply could not afford it. He spoke about the function of the city a small like today's neoliberals: that it ends with drawing urban plans and arming fresh districts.

That's even above today's standard.

All right, planning's already something. But that's all – let them build themselves on these plots, on the suburbs that are armed by the city.

In the suburbs, I mean, the villas?

No, remember that Warsaw was much smaller and more compact. Most of the buildings from the 1930s, close Grochowska, Grójecka or further Puławska were private rental houses.

What about the legendary WSM settlement in Żoliborz? It was cooperative, socialist construction.

It was an island of socialist modernisation in the sea of the private market. WSM was an absolute evenement, the largest specified venture in Warsaw and Poland, actually created alongside and against the rules of average practice. The remainder of the housing cooperatives in Warsaw were not addressed to poorer layers, but to the middle-high class: officers, officials, people of the liberal professions. If specified a group shouted, set up a cooperative, it could have obtained from the state under attractive conditions an area under construction, but it did not have much to do with providing inexpensive housing for workers. More like the staff of the ministry or the military garrison. As far as inexpensive apartments are concerned, there were inactive a fewer enclaves: on Kole, on Rakowec and on Podskarpinska in Grochów there were tiny settlements of the Workers' Settlement Society. Contrary to the name it was not a bottom-up initiative, it was a state institution whose task was to supply low-cost housing for the workers of state plants. Starzyński agreed to spare TOR for free the area for the construction of these settlements, in exchange for any housing pool for city workers.

I realize that Starzyński had an argument "the budget is not made of rubber", but the city could bring land – it is most likely a typical form of support of local authorities for bottom-up, working housing cooperatives.

The problem is that the city had very small land and Starzyński thought that this resource should not be depleted, alternatively tried to enlarge it. erstwhile he was in power, only about 5 percent of the area was owned by the city erstwhile the war broke out, this rate reached 10 percent, thanks to his large efforts. But it was inactive a third, a 4th of what was in the capitals of the West – it was said that in order for Warsaw to make properly, so that it could grow the streets where it was essential to build a school or even save a part of green from logging, this city should have as much as 30–40 percent of the area. Starzyński talked about half himself.

So the city simply did not have large plots that could be free or at a low price available for construction?

Warsaw had a very tiny reserve of land, already the Treasury had much more. Besides, Żoliborz or Bielany were expanding on the state grounds, WSM was erected on the land obtained from the state, on the esplanade of Citadel remaining from Russian times.

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Starzyński was well placed in the elite of the state power – this did not make a field for any convenient solutions for the city?

Not really. An interesting example is Pole Mokotowskie, in far-reaching plans intended for the construction of the Marshal Piłsudski district. It was partially state land, but the state refused to release the land from hand due to the fact that it was ordered that the money from the sale of land would go to the National Defence Fund. As a result, any game donated to the city would deplete the arms fund, and this was a very strong argument in the second half of the 1930s. First, due to the fact that the military as an institution dominated politically, and secondly, due to the fact that there was a real spectre of war hanging over us.

How much did Starzyński gotta say in Warsaw to those citizens who did not belong to the Unpartisan Block of Cooperation with the Government, and then to the National Unity Camp, or “unpartisan parties”, or political organizations of sanitization?

When Starzyński became a commissionary president, the City Council was already dissolved by the government and there was actually no representation, no social control over his office until the 1938 election, or, in fact, until March 1939, erstwhile the fresh council first gathered. The only control body was the Provisional Municipal Council, elected by the Ministry of the Interior, and thus favoring power.

In Warsaw, as in the full country, the Russians built the full constellation of local associations, various Friends of Grochow, Mokotów or Wola, which were to be quasi-representation of local residents at local level. Starzyński besides visited districts with a large celebrity, besides peripheral ones, together with members of these organizations and the finger he showed – here 1 must demolish the ruins, and here fill the clay, and there the sewage collector improve. specified remarks were rational in advance and had a disciplining effect on the administrative pits; local activists besides gave any sense of influence – but let us remember that there were always supporters of the ruling regime.

This villa on Szupra Street, today's Dąbrowski, a block from the Avenue of independency in Mokotów, is president Starzyński from an authoritative wage built?

With authoritative income, let's say that. The opposition was trying to prove that it was definitely from any levisna, due to the fact that he built it in 3 years, but let's remember that he was first Deputy Minister of the Treasury and then Deputy manager of Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego truly made good money. Also, there were alleged commissioners – he sat as a typical of the State Treasury on 4 or 5 supervisory boards of state-owned enterprises, and these were intranet jobs. From the same income, counting salaries and allowances for meetings, he could have built himself up nicely – in another words, he did not gotta steal. And, as far as I know, he wasn't that inclined, he was an honest man within the standards of then authority. In that elite, it is easy to identify larger sybarites and larger collectors of synecur. But he was a very hardworking man, for which he was very decently rewarded.

Was he being reminded of his standard of living?

Definitely, especially in the context of post-crisis poorness in Warsaw, low authoritative salaries at lower levels, but besides mostly low wages in the city services of Warsaw. Remember that for years the city has systematically paralysed the strikes of tram drivers, watermen, telephone operators, etc.

With his reign, the city's employees improved?

Yes, although he cleverly brought about a compensation for his earnings: the tram drivers who made the best money, cut wages or reduced any benefits, and improved conditions in another companies. It was besides part of his policy to treat urban institutions as a single apparatus, due to the fact that so far these companies or agendas have been acting a bit like the affluent principalities.

Starzyński led to greater synchronisation and coordination between different services. He had already announced at the beginning of his regulation that it could not be that, for example, there would be asphalt spilling somewhere, and in a moment, waterworks would arrive and a good fresh surface for their work. As a fanatical planner, he wanted everything to be included in any tables, schedules, or multiannual plans, so as not to waste effort and money. To a large extent, he succeeded.

But did Starzyński manage to build something truly spectacular before the war started?

The most spectacular was most likely the completion of the National Museum, which was expanded for 8 years as alleged modern ruins – alleged unfinished construction sites threatening in Warsaw at the time, likewise with the office of the Fire Department at Polna Street. They were pointed out as a symbol of the inability and inefficiencies of subsequent ruling groups, although only partially justly, due to the fact that the ruins of the Warsaw Town Hall were besides due to the unfavorableness of central authorities, from adverse regulations.

The cities didn't have their own taxation revenues?

Warsaw did not participate in income taxes, it was 1 of the problems Starzyński wanted to fight erstwhile he had already become president, although it was completely ineffective. The tragic situation of many Polish cities consisted in the fact that the revenues were mainly derived from urban enterprises, so they had to milk their tram companies or power plants, for example, and they saved themselves by local taxes, e.g. from having dogs. Another was the situation in the erstwhile Prussian partition, as the Second Republic had an inconsistent taxation system: Poznań, Toruń or advanced Silesian cities received their share of taxation revenues from residents, due to the fact that that was erstwhile the Prussian taxation code.

Why the National Museum?

Because this building stood in the mediate of the city, right next to Jerusalem Avenue, and thousands of people passed it all day. The prestige of this institution was inverse to the state of this construction – an awesome building in mind, to measurement the social ambitions that were to treat Warsaw complexes. In addition, the first sections of the boulevards at the tallness of the Old Town, already called the Wisłostrada, were surely impressive. And the third, large success, which must have made a large impression at the time, but present we do not see it due to the effects of the war, is simply a puncture, among the dense construction, of Bonifraterska Street from the Śródmieście to Żoliborz.

Shortcut to the north of Warsaw?

Because then, the large problem of Warsaw was the inability to run it consecutive – Jerusalem Avenues were the only simple artery in the center of Warsaw that could be accessed from 1 end of the city to another. Somewhere else, the streets were narrow, the streetcars did not make corners, people ran into them. Starzyński yet built the north-south road, serving fresh districts, Żoliborz and Bielany, with a tram – it was given just before the 1938 elections.

Why is building a street, even simple and necessary, specified a success?

Once the ghetto was demolished in 1943, we do not realize how much work it took to set a straight, wide road there, among quite a few tenements, yards, alleys. And two, that you had to buy about 20 plots from private owners there. The city bought it through substituted “shuts” so as not to lead to an artificial overvalue of the plots, as it is known that the city wants to invest there.

You compose in your book that street expansion plots weren't always bought.

True, the city frequently urged its owners to hand over pieces of land in exchange for land in another place, owned by the authorities, and unnecessary. Sometimes it was desired that the owner would give for free a 2–3-metre strip of land needed to widen the street or lay out the pavement. any of them gave kindness, any of them utilizing government newspapers, to put the privatization ahead of the common good.

There have besides been instances of resorting to blackmail or force more or little formal, in another words administrative obstruction. Stanislaw Rozanski, the head of the town planning department and the urban planner, wrote in his memoirs that there was specified a quiet instruction in the town hall that those who did not want to quit a part of land would make life hard for the officials liable for approving projects, e.g. they waited to issue a construction licence until the owner bowed down.

We talked in the beginning about Western inspirations, especially Parisian, but besides Soviet. Was there any peculiar intellectual fashion among urban planners, urban planners and architects in Warsaw in the second half of the 1930s??

At the level of plans and ideas, it was a pursuit of what actually had the right to be fulfilled only during the reconstruction of Warsaw after planet War II. It was about relaxing the building, introducing greens, expanding the streets and in general making communication networks. It was a reasonably standard, 20th-century thought of a functional city, but there was besides a full representation layer that the power expected.

To make Warsaw look like the capital of the power?

Exactly so that before Paris or before Vienna she does not should be ashamed to have adequate spaces for state celebrations, representation parades, state buildings.

Like in Germany? Or Italy?

The Nazi Germans did not seem to look with admiration in Poland, which does not mean that any did not look. likewise – especially in the late 1930s. – it was problematic to mention to russian urban planning, although until 1 point, “Architecture and Construction”, that is, the main manufacture magazine in Poland, printed delights over Stalinist planning in Moscow. At 1 point this ceased to be "politically correct", while Mussolini's Italy was enthusiastic, not only in Poland. It is for combining purely modernization goals, related to the standard of life, the functionality of the city, greenery, lighting and quality of housing – with the monumental element, referring to large historical, Renaissance, classicist, ancient traditions. Which, of course, was an attractive phase plan for power.

You said there was a political anticipation that Warsaw would look like the capital of the power. But would the slogan “the full nation build its capital” have accepted before the war? Or not? In another words, did you not anticipate the city to grow to the right scale and momentum, but for its own resources?

The state did not open the wallet to this full Warsaw modernization – if it needed a building for a peculiar institution, it did, but not to organize the city. This is evidenced by Starzyński's efforts to finance the construction of the metro. We do not know what consequence he received, but he tried to convince the military to contribute to the construction of the underground railway in the capital, due to the fact that possibly tunnels will be useful someday, for example, to run armored trains or just military transports. In another words, you tried to get it to contribute, but it was not very successful. Moreover, the same city had to build the National Museum, due to the fact that although it was called "national", it was an urban institution.

So there was no chance that the full country would be a powerful capital?

This slogan about the construction of the capital throughout the nation gained any carrying capacity only after the war, erstwhile the ruins of Warsaw became a symbol of the deliberate demolition of the national heritage by the Germans. Earlier Warsaw, as almost always in history, was disliked by the remainder of Poland. After all, if the controversy on the mediocre Kresy caused the thought to throw itself at Gdynia, the more the remainder of Poland would not realize why it should contribute to Warsaw, which, however, was considered a rich city, a city of power, careers and scammers, alternatively sucking juices from all over the country. Like the capital...

A serious grievance, comparatively a scratch on Starzyński image is undoubtedly the 1938 self-government campaign. The government National Unity Camp, whose list Starzyński opened, utilized innovative run techniques at the time – they called subscribers of the telephone network and were convinced that they had to vote on the OZN list, or Warsaw would be ruled by... Jews. Did Starzyński stand out from his background erstwhile it came to anti-Semitism?

Writing a biography, I didn't catch him on any another episode of this kind, you can discuss whether it's a lot or not... In pre-war Poland there were various shades of anti-Semitism, there were those who called for murder, to destruct physical Polish Jews. Starzyński, of course, did not belong to them, but was a typical product of his political camp, which the closer the war was, the more desperately he sought support among right-wing voters.

In short, after the death of Józef Piłsudski, he wanted to grow the base about the electorate of the end?

Yes, and for this reason mainly, from year to year he was increasingly courageous, spreading anti-Semitic slogans – besides to get closer to the Church. These were slogans specified as "defence of Polish trade", in the guess against judaic competition, and even specified good about "defence of Polish city count". In a guess – that without judaic and judaic districts Poland and Polish cities will be more beautiful, more orderly, and workshops of work, which supposedly Jews take distant Polish merchants and Polish workers, if they pass into Polish hands, the country and our people will make better.

I think Starzyński could have believed in these slogans – in the second half of the 1930s. it was a standard in OZN, although 10–15 years earlier, the Pilsudians had struggled alternatively with the Odium walking on the judaic belt. From a fresh biography by Adam Czerniakow, written by Patricia Dolow, I learned that only Julian Kulski, who took office after Starzyński was arrested by the Germans, was the first president of Warsaw to visit the judaic commune. This means that Starzyński did not visit an institution representing about 30% of the capital's population in 5 years of his rule.

Although this community has never been an enemy to the ruling camp.

Of course, and for me, it's a grim paradox of this full anti-Semitic pursuit of the late 1930s. The enemy and almost "fifth column" were made of citizens who were no threat to the state, at most they could not show enthusiasm for that power. They were simply a convenient enemy to mobilise the political majority.

Is this run successful? At the time, the president was not elected directly, it was the City Council. OZN won, but Starzyński did not find adequate majority to be elected.

Moreover, in the vote of the fresh Council, PPS candidate Tomasz Arciszewski won first place with 42 votes, and Starzyński was second, with 2 votes less. However, the qualified majority was as much as 51, so in this situation the Minister of the Interior decided – and of course appointed Starzyński.

It was a disappointment for him, but the run itself had any effect. The Piłsudczyks in Warsaw clearly extended their support in relation to the 1927 elections – the 1934 elections did not take place in the capital – the BBWR then had only 12%, the 4th score and 16 out of 120 seats in the Municipal Council; in 1938 it was already 40 seats for 100 and first place. The strongest previously endecia had won only 8 tickets, ONR got 5 – in another words, the reflection of the right-wing voters succeeded, though with a tiny turnout and an atmosphere of unifying citizens around the chief, due to the expanding global tension.

In another cities it was worse – socialists won in Łódź and Krakow, and in Poznań there was an endecia.

Despite government censorship and large resources on the OZN side, another parties besides conducted a flyer, megaphone and, above all, press campaign. They appeared in large amounts of endeck and socialist newspapers. Therefore, these 40% can be considered as a individual merit of Starzyński, who for 4 years truly changed a lot in Warsaw.

Was there an alternate to this duopol in Poland in the late 1930s, and especially in Warsaw of that era: on the 1 hand, an increasingly right-wing sanitization, on the another hand, an endecia with ONR? And on the level of urban policy: between the interests of private property owners and the authoritarian, top-down power?

There were any sprouting forces in the form of democratic clubs that gave emergence to the postwar Democratic Party, but it was a couch. However, the Polish Socialist organization was a serious force. This was a very efficient party, which was in favour of democracy, in contrast to the endings, and to the wolves who were already clearly in favour of limiting democracy. PPS combined the slogans of modernization, equality and democracy, claimed the rights of women or national minorities, so if the walsudczyks did not halt pride and prejudice from co-regulation with them, Poland would be completely different. All the more so, Warsaw, where despite the logistical and administrative advantage of the camp of power socialists won 27 out of 100 seats, and in the City Council managed to gather more votes for their candidate than Starzyński. It was a force capable of taking work for the state – but the sanitization was besides fixated on independent management of Poland.

After the German attack in September 1939 the government evacuates from Warsaw after a week, Starzyński stays put. What part?

The fact that the president remains on the ground is not unique – in the west of Poland it was frequent, for example president Kalisz besides remained and yet paid for it with his life. On the another hand, it was clearly not expected that an emergency script would should be implemented so rapidly in the capital, as Germany would scope the suburbs of the city in just over a week – that is why only on September 4th was the commander of defence of Warsaw appointed.

Despite excellent “coming” to the highest levels, even to the Prime Minister, Starzyński could not very much ask for information about the intentions of power and the action plan. most likely due to the fact that they didn't know what to do up there either. In the meantime, in fact, right away, he launched a civilian defence network – for that was the scenario. Only since the departure of the state authorities on the night from 6th to 7th September has he become the highest civilian authoritative of the Polish state, deprived, let's add, of order services, which were besides evacuated eastward, towards Brest. In Warsaw there is no police anymore, there is no fire department, so it has to face the highly hard task of maintaining order in the besieged city.

How does he respond to this situation? The ongoing offensive of enemy troops, combined with news of government evacuation, is simply a recipe for chaos...

For the first couple of days, he's been throwing himself a small bit, 'cause he's not known what his function is. erstwhile he was yet appointed civilian Commissioner at the Warsaw Defence Command, he rapidly led to the creation of the civilian Guard, a de facto grassroots militia guarding buildings and order on the streets – Warsaw had to be rehearsed inactive during planet War I. He besides rapidly formed a method emergency that dealt with the removal of fires, cleaning up the ruins, and extracting people buried from them.

Working from morning to night, he installed ad hoc services that had not previously been in any scripts. He besides engaged in commissioning: thanks to the powers of the civilian commissioner, even more dictatorial than the president, the city could occupy the stores of food from warehouses, take over shops abandoned by owners and share food among people. In another words, he did what he could – and much more. However, it shortly turned out that the location of Warsaw was tragic. Especially as Germany systematically destroyed the infrastructure essential for life, aiming at waterworks or power plants.

What do we know about the circumstances of president Stefan Starzyński's death? Is that definitely possible?

I'm certain we know little than a fewer years ago, and that's due to the fact that prof. Tomasz Szarota challenged the results of the IPN investigation into this case. Prosecutors of the Institute decided in 2014 that Starzyński was shot by Germans in Warsaw as early as late 1939, but there are respective another hypotheses about his fate. And Sharota convinces that they are actually all inactive to be taken into consideration: that he was carried out inside Germany and eliminated quietly, it is unknown at which point of war. possibly he was besides encouraged to cooperate – there were rumours that they wanted to make him the face of the business as a collaborator or that he himself urged Poles to join the Polish Legion, which was to decision against the russian Union.

In another words, these scenarios, which sometimes sound fantastic, cannot be excluded. 1 thing is doubtless: Starzyński was imprisoned at various points in Warsaw for 2 months. The Polish underground arranged for him to escape, but he refused, and before Christmas 1939 the package addressed to him returned from prison in Pawiak – and this is the last thing we know.

Gregory Friday (1980) – writer, journalist, critic, architect, Warsaw past and architecture expert. This year he appeared Old man. The president of the Monument, rewritten version of the book Sanator. Stefan Starzyński's career (for which he received the Literary Prize of Warsaw). He besides published I promise. City, Modernism, Modernization 1920–1939 (Awarded Nike readers 2023, Gdynia Policy Passport and Literary Prize in the category of essays), Best city in the world. Warsaw in Reconstruction 1944–1949 (Nike 2021 final) and Indestructible. Bohdan Pniewski. Architect of salon and power. For respective years he has been writing about architecture, cities and customs to the press (e.g. “Architecture-Murator”, “Gazeta Stołeczna”, “Gazeta Wyborcza”, “Salon”, “Good Interior”, “Vogue Polska”). He besides co-founded exhibitions, among others. Hotel Polonia. The Afterlife of Buildings (Golden Lion at the Venice Architecture Biennial, 2008) and Warsaw data (The Museum of Warsaw, 2017).