It is worth examining 1 of the issues concerning chaos in the context of peculiar Military Operations (SOW) – this is the application of chaos explanation in the martial arts. And this is not about accidental construction, or simply reflection of armed actions on the Ukrainian front. It's much more than that.
The American Army investigates chaos
In 1992, in the autumn issue of the magazine "Parameters", published by the United States Military Academy, a program was published Article a professional officer, Deputy Head of the American military mission to Sri Lanka, Steven P. Mann, under a prominent title The explanation of chaos and strategical reasoning (Chaos explanation and strategical Art). This text proposes the usage of nonlinear logic studied by technological theories of chaos in military strategy. A small later, this approach will take the lead in the explanation of network-centric wars (networks warfare). In a sense, these wars are the applicable implementation of the basic principles of the explanation of chaos in the military sphere. Network-centric wars are wars of chaos. Of course, chaos is understood here in the spirit of modern physics, meaning as an area of analysis of nonlinear systems of imbalance, bifurcation, probabilism and processes. It has only an indirect connection to the knowing of chaos in philosophy, politics explanation and global relations.
Nevertheless, we are dealing with chaos here, which means that after making all the essential reservations, we can scope to its philosophical bases. However, this must be done with careful consideration of all epistemological perspectives.
Basic assumptions of chaos theory
Steven P. Mann lists the basic assumptions of the explanation of chaos in physics.
- The chaos explanation concerns dynamic systems with a large number of variables.
- In these systems, there are irregular laws; at first glance, random data bundles can make unique but orderly patterns.
- Chaotic systems exhibit sensitivity and dependence on pre-conditions; any even insignificant change in these conditions leads to disproportionally different results.
- The existence of a certain order assumes that patterns can be predicted, at least for systems with a low level of chaoticity.
Steven Mann emphasizes that there is no contradiction between chaos theories and classical physical-mathematic science. Chaos only nuances the laws and principles of physics for certain circumstantial categories in border or non-linear systems.
"Classical systems describe linear behaviour and individual objects; chaos explanation describes statistical trends taking into account numerous, intense relations between objects" – writes Mann. This is so not about calculating the sum of linear trajectory, but about determining the probability of strategy behaviour; not at the level of linear forecasts, but based on probabilistic action.
Macroscale of the theatre of war activities: full War
In applying this rule to armed conflicts, Steven Mann comes to a crucial conclusion: the direct clash of 2 regular armies is characterised by a limited number of factors (the number of troops, the quality and quantity of weapons, the geographical specification, the nature of defensive reinforcements, the communication and the provision of military and equipment, the characteristics of the command style, etc.). All of this is within the area of classical strategy and remains within linear processes. There is no area for chaos, due to the fact that the results of all processes can be predicted rather easy from the beginning. The conventional strategy deals with situations specified as systems, structured series and clearly defined patterns.
Military strategy is simply a reasonably conservative discipline and the past of war by commanders from ancient Greece or Rome, as are the treaties of the Chinese strategist Sun Zi and general systems Karl von Clausewitz, they stay current and unsurpassed sources. However, this applies only to wars which Carl Schmitt referred to as ‘war forms’. Classical war, fundamentally linear. So chaos explanation does not apply in specified cases.
Broader context
But everything changes if we grow our analysis and place a circumstantial theatre of war activities in a broader context.
Then we will gotta take into account the ever-changing ratio of forces in global relations, the velocity of access to information and the ability to communicate it, the intellectual state of society, the characteristics of ideology active in the conflict, the spiritual and cultural context. If we do not ignore the region of direct armed action, but place it in a more complex area of interaction of many and operating on different levels of entities, the image will become so complicated that all linearity is disappearing and we see a fresh dimension which Schmitt has called "total war", pervasively noticing that this phenomenon is linked to liberalism, atomization and fresh pacifism. War becomes full erstwhile 1 of its sides completely refuses to belong to another human species. The pacifists and liberals respect their opponents – realists and opponents of liberalism – as “inhumans”, which deprives them of their formal opponent status. The enemy becomes total, which means that the war with it goes beyond the borders of the existing theatre of armed action and spreads to the full society. That's erstwhile war becomes nonlinear, and its rules are approaching chaos.
Network War, or War of Chaos
Liberalism refuses its opponents the right to have their own form, blurs their shapes and thus shifts all their aggression to non-military spheres, primarily into information space. It's coming to chaos. Significantly, the application of chaos explanation in the military strategy of American experts began to think in the early 1990s. – Steven Mann's article in “Parameters” was published in 1992, in the first phase of “single-polar moment” (Charles Krauthammer). In this way the explanation of network-centric wars, a typical strategy of chaos, appeared.
The Americans applied it in practice already in Afghanistan, then during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, later during the colorful revolutions in the arabian planet – Libya and Syria. The classical network war became the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in fresh Russia in 2022. Network war is simply a war of chaos. This means that non-linear rules apply to it and that it is exceptionally delicate to the first conditions.
Intersection of the Russian Spring: Western triumph in conflict for the starting conditions
That is why in 2014, after Crimea's return to Russia, it became so crucial to halt the process of the dissolution of Ukraine, to effort to recognise the independency of the republics on Donbasa and to introduce Russian troops (right-wing president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych he could easy have asked Russia to intervene in consequence to the state coup). In this situation, the West utilized all available resources to influence Vladimir Putin and as part of a "swiss plan" to block Russia's intervention and the liberation of fresh Russia. It was about the first conditions. In 2014, they were definitely beneficial to Russia. Putting off the intervention (strategically unavoidable) by 8 years, The West changed these terms. He thus played Russia in the war of chaos, utilizing the sixth column – the pro-Western liberal section of the Russian elite, consciously misleading Putin and urging him to accept the Western proposal, including false declarations on the designation of Crimea as part of Russia and the cancellation of sanctions.
Supporters and proponents of the "swiss plan" proved to be the most common traitors who contributed to Russia's armed action in much worse start conditions after 8 years. utilizing an influence agent to change the essence of the strategy is 1 of the most crucial methods of conducting network wars. Under the linear logic, classical peculiar services were incapable to announcement these chaotic processes. The influence on the Russian authorities was exercised in a more discreet way, sometimes with partial actions and emotions, hard to recognize. The application of the rules of chaos in the war against Russia in 2014-2022 remained virtually undetected by the power, based on the principles of classical linear strategy.
In SOW, we faced a war of chaos
The SOW was planned as a classical military operation and was successful until 1 stage. Until the West switched to a typical war of chaos against Russia, utilizing a full set of network-centric operations: large-scale information campaigns, economical sanctions, individual terror, political pressures, intellectual campaigns to confuse and distract the opponent.
Chaos besides made himself known at the direct theatre of war activities in fresh Russia. Western specialists in the field of network-centric wars combined systems of observation, electronic and satellite intelligence, artillery control, drones and another systems into a single beam, in which information flow was rapidly analysed and decisions were made immediately. At the same time, news of the armed forces was transmitted in real time to information war centres which interpreted them according to results – any were informed, others were silenced, distorted and any were invented. This resulted in a global tsunami involving Ukraine itself, Western countries and world-controlled media and besides reaching Russia. Microscopic, sometimes even an imaginary event on the front was blown to gigantic sizes and decisions on a global scale were made on the basis of unverified information. As part of this process, the reality behind the impenetrable wall of information, which is in fact part of war, was almost completely lost from sight.
At the same time, Russia's society, integrated fundamentally with Western technologies and systems, proved to be completely defenseless in the face of these continuous attacks coming not only from outside but besides from within.
The effectiveness of anarchoterror
The chaotic nature of the Ukrainian side's war was besides manifested in the usage of tiny groups. This is another regulation of chaos wars. tiny military troops, diversional-proprietary groups, which act comparatively autonomously, play the most crucial role. The explanation of network-centric wars proposes replacing the category of direct and explicit command on "the commander's slaughter". This means that a diversion-disclosure group or tiny terrorist cell does not receive a detailed plan of operations, but only general parameters and desirable objectives. In practice, circumstances-dependent actions are allowed. If you neglect to hit the main target, but an unexpected spontaneous and unforeseen anticipation of hitting another mark appears, you should do so.
Conducting specified autonomous military-terrorist operations fits historically with the narchized Ukrainian society; so the war of chaos was accepted by the Kiev troops as something organic. Violentness, sadism, beatings in the back, acts of panic against the civilian population, stubborn attempts to penetrate the back of the opponent – all of this is psychologically close to the Ukrainians, citizens of the borderland who have repeatedly applied them in their history. This time it was consistent with the fresh NATO war theory, whose rules were first formulated by Steven P. Mann.
Russian adaptation to the war of chaos
What lessons can be drawn from the conclusion that Russia is active in the war of chaos against its will? any applicable lessons have already been drawn.
We have highlighted the crucial increase in the importance of securing the information run and the request for a real information war, countering the intellectual operations of the opponent, creating their own networks and their own information protection systems.
On the Home Office fronts, we have besides seen the great, sometimes decisive function of drones in combat activities. The importance of "intelligent weapons" was clearly demonstrated in clashes with NATO equipment and Russian armed formations were forced to make directly, under the conditions of field drone combat systems and appropriate methods of collecting information and equipment.
We have not yet realised the request to equip all combat units, soldiers and equipment with independent video cameras and integrate data streams into 1 command center. However, we are heading this way.
The opponent's diversional-opportunity groups have caused the Russian troops many problems with their autonomous character, spontaneity and dependence only on "the intentions of the commander" alternatively than strict orders. Terrorist cells and sabotage groups operating on the deep back of our troops have besides proved to be very effective. We haven't developed a consequence strategy yet.
Russia did not full recognise the importance of the velocity origin of decision-making, which was crucial for the operation of NATO artillery, peculiarly the HIMARS systems, which were controlled by satellite intelligence data, a fast consequence to the location changes of the mark being targeted. In our case, the full cycle takes incomparably more time, and decision-making bodies are separated from interviewers tracking and their movement and performers by a number of formalized stages. The war of chaos assumes the consequence of decisions and actions taken, which is simply a breach of conventional systems of armed action. This is another example of nonlinearity.
We have not yet realised the destructive function of an extended network of Western agents operating in Russia, sabotaging decisions, inhibiting the preparation of society for the purposes of the SOW, including in the field of information and culture. Russia does not run a network residency cleanup, whose possible typical is all Liberal and trap. So far no actual center has been created for conducting intellectual operations against the opponent – neither Ukraine nor the West.
The secret of the effectiveness of Donbas volunteers, ‘agents’ and Chechens
To a large extent, Russia wages war by classical standards, responding to the chaos and network-centric challenges only defensively.
It is worth noting that the most effective structures in this war are those that intuitively or spontaneously act according to the logic of chaos. They are primarily insurgents from the Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic, utilized to fight the Kiev government and usage the same tactics against chaotic Ukrainians. Next, it is besides a company called ‘Wagner’, besides organised according to a network rule, including integrated with a media holding and ready to take a certain hazard in its activities. It can service as a model for a real network war. cultural armed formations, especially Chechen, are besides doing great. Their strategy is to take spiritual and cultural factors into account, making them not only militant individuals but a actual network.
In a word, there are examples in the russian Union of an effective war of chaos. However, they concern any segments of the Russian army, not the full armed forces, which are oriented towards carrying out war activities according to old linear principles.
In the structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, a military investigation department on chaos had long to be established. For example, the enemy has been working on these strategies for at least 30 years, studying fresh online rules and building on them his army. Without seeing it, we're doomed to fail.
Prof. Aleksandr Dugin
Source: https://t.me/russica2/49706, https://t.me/russica2/49707, https://t.me/russica2/49708, https://t.me/russica2/49712, https://t.me/russica2/49713, https://t.me/russica2/49714.
